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Managers of Western industrial companies are eagerly looking for
effective weapons to fight the hypercompetition and commoditiza-
tion tendencies they are confronted with. In recent years, management
scholars have been trying to answer their calls, propounding ‘strategic
innovation’ as an appropriate means to counter the competitive threats
that intensify strategy convergence among the different firms in an
industry. They have recommended firms to deviate from the existing
industry rules of playing the game, in order to create fundamentally
new and superior customer value. Yet, research on this kind of inno-
vation is still in its infancy. Even though the phenomenon of strategic
innovation did arouse (marketing) managers’ interest, academia has
so far been unable to provide managers with concrete handles they
may use to stimulate their firm’s capacity for strategic innovation.
Moreover, insights have been supported mainly by examples or anec-
dotes, and contributions tend to lack scientific rigor and corroboration
despite their promising ideas. 
This book is hence motivated by a scientific quest for any mechanisms
firms can use to deliberately crank up their strategic innovation capa-
city. It builds on insights from the management literature, integrates
several theoretical concepts and translates them into concrete business
practice. The book reports the results of qualitative and quantitative
empirical studies of Dutch industrial firms. Evidence is provided that
the establishment of specific managerial mechanisms may indeed foster
a firm’s strategic innovation capacity. The book distinguishes several
categories of mechanisms, specifies what elements these mechanisms
should target, how different mechanisms work in concert and finally,
what effects organizational and supply chain characteristics may
produce on the effectiveness of these mechanisms.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-120-4 
L ISELORE BERGHMAN
Strategic
Innovation Capacity
A Mixed Method Study on
Deliberate Strategic Learning Mechanisms
D
esig
n
: B
&
T O
n
tw
erp
 en
 ad
vies w
w
w
.b
-en
-t.n
l
Prin
t:H
aveka w
w
w
.h
aveka.n
l
87
L
IS
E
L
O
R
E
 B
E
R
G
H
M
A
N
 
S
tra
te
g
ic In
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 C
a
p
a
city
Erim - 06 omslag Berghmann  9/5/06  4:39 PM  Pagina 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY 
 
A MIXED METHOD STUDY ON  
DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING MECHANISMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Innovation Capacity 
 
A Mixed Method Study on  
Deliberate Strategic Learning Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
Strategische-innovatiecapaciteit: 
een mixed-method studie naar 
doelbewust opgezette mechanismen voor strategisch leren 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
 
 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
donderdag 19 oktober 2006 om 13.30 uur 
 
 
 
 
door 
Liselore Ann Berghman 
geboren te Antwerpen, België 
Promotiecommissie 
 
Promotor: 
Prof.dr. P. Matthyssens 
 
Overige leden: 
Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch 
Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen 
Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Internet: http://www.erim.eur.nl 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal:  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management, 87 
 
ISBN-10: 90-5892-120-4 
ISBN-13: 978-90-5892-120-8 
 
Design: B&T Ontwerp en advies www.b-en-t.nl  / Print: Haveka www.haveka.nl 
 
© 2006, Liselore Berghman 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by 
any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the 
author.
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
And strangely all of a sudden, what always seemed like an ultimate purpose starts to melt 
away. Six years have passed by. Years of doubt, despair, solitude and perseverance. Years 
of enthusiasm, discovery, euphoria and maturation even so. The ‘ultimate purpose’ has 
gradually started to transform itself, and new land is looming up. 
Still, this PhD project lives on through the scientific baggage, experience and curiosity that 
I have gained over the past years, and it makes me prepared and thrilled to start off on a 
new trip with fresh and different goals.  
Enjoying this privileged position is however far from solely my personal merit.  
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my promoter, Prof.dr. P. Matthyssens, and to my 
co-promotor, Dr. K. Vandenbempt (University of Antwerp) for guiding me throughout this 
PhD project. Our joint discussions undoubtedly helped in forming and developing the 
ideas and logic put forward in this thesis. I would like to thank them both for their 
inspiration, their cogent remarks, their devil’s advocacy and their exactingness. I am 
furthermore grateful to my co-promotor for orientating and stimulating me, especially 
during the first years of my PhD preparation. I would like to thank my promotor for his 
creativity, pragmatism, infectious enthusiasm, and for his encouragement, especially in the 
final phases of this study.  
 
I am grateful to all other members of my commission. I would like to thank Prof.dr. R. 
Martens (University of Antwerp) as the Master’s thesis that I wrote under his supervision 
has motivated me to plunge deeper into management research in the first place. I am 
particularly indebted to Prof.dr. M. Wetzels (Maastricht University) for kindly and 
patiently answering all my PLS questions.  
Furthermore, I owe many thanks to Prof.dr. J. Hagenaars (Tilburg University) and Prof.dr. 
W. Chin (University of Houston, Texas) for sharing their methodological knowledge with 
me. 
 
I am thankful to the University of Antwerp for giving me the ample opportunity to prepare 
this PhD. 
I also want to express my gratitude to the sponsors of my empirical research: the Stichting 
Techniek en Marketing (STEM), the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Cap Gemini 
Ernst & Young. The large empirical study could be undertaken thanks to their resources. I 
am especially thankful to Drs.ing. J. ten Bosch (director of the STEM) and his team for the 
logistical support during both the qualitative and the quantitative research phases. I thank 
all members of the steering committee for their valuable inputs during the research. 
I also want to show my gratitude to the numerous managers and company owners who 
made time in their busy agendas to participate in this research. For reasons of 
confidentiality, I can unfortunately not thank them by name. 
 
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Faculty of Applied Economics of the University 
of Antwerp for their help, their pleasant company, their sympathy, and of course the funny 
lunch breaks as welcome mental distractions. A special thanks to Kim, Tine, Andriy, 
Nathalie, Verolien, Stijn, Isabelle, Sven, Dieter, Jan, Andreas, Tony, Xavier, Marijke, 
 ii 
Anouk, Tom, Peggy, Liesbeth and Sandy. I will miss you. I want to thank Peter and Wim 
for the numerous conceptual and methodological discussions. 
A warm thank-you to all my sweet friends for their sympathy. I am especially grateful to 
Astrid, Stefan, Filip O., Joeri, Gert, Filip D., Elisabeth, Thierry, Evelyne V., Steve, Lou, 
Filip M., Gregory, Evelien D., Yves and Barbara for their support, their comic relief and 
for counterbalancing my persistent drive to work on this dissertation. Martijn, Merche, 
Lennert, Marco, Rogier, Arma, Eline and Frank, thanks for your interest in the progress of 
my work. 
 
I would like to thank my parents for imparting the values of academic work and 
intellectual development to me. Mama en papa, a large thank-you for your advice, 
unconditional support, and for your belief in me. And of course, mama, thanks for the 
reference check. 
I want to thank my brother for his great sympathy, his genuine interest in my research, and 
for his ability to see things in perspective. Michaël, I will miss our long nocturnal 
discussions, alternated with our great laughs and Hans Teeuwen sketches. 
 
My most loving thanks go to Bastiaan. Your unflagging encouragement, belief, sympathy 
and interest were indispensable to accomplish this work. Throughout the past years, you 
have been my prop and stay. Many thanks for your sweet care and understanding, and for 
awaiting me for six years in Amsterdam. You mean an awful lot to me. 
 
 
Liselore Berghman 
 
Antwerp, August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY ....7 
1.1 THE 'DYNAMIC RESOURCE-BASED' VIEW........................................................7 
1.2 THE BASIC TRAITS OF STRATEGIC INNOVATION........................................10 
1.3 THE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC INNOVATION ..................13 
1.3.1 Deviance from traditional industry assumptions and conventions.........................13 
1.3.2 Creation of new and substantially superior customer value...................................18 
1.4 THE CONCRETE APPROACH TO STRATEGIC INNOVATION.......................22 
1.5 A FINAL CONCEPTUAL DELINEATION AND DEFINITION...........................25 
1.5.1 Contents: locus ................................................................................................26 
1.5.2 Contents: degree ..............................................................................................27 
1.5.3 Process.............................................................................................................29 
1.6 STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY .............................................................31 
 
CHAPTER 2: DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING MECHANISMS..........35 
2.1 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY ....35 
2.1.1 Dynamic capabilities .......................................................................................35 
2.1.2 Strategic learning mechanisms ........................................................................39 
2.2 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES, ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, AND STRATEGIC  
INNOVATION CAPACITY..........................................................................................41 
2.2.1 The path-breaking potential of ACAP.............................................................44 
2.2.1.1 Sensemaking as an explanation of path-dependent logic .......................45 
2.2.1.2 Sensemaking as an explanation of path-breaking logic..........................49 
2.3 RECOGNITION, ASSIMILATION, TRANSFORMATION AND SICAP ............52 
2.3.1 The path-breaking focus areas of recognition capacity ...................................52 
2.3.2 The path-breaking focus areas of assimilation capacity ..................................56 
2.3.3 The path-breaking focus areas of transformation capacity ..............................59 
2.4 DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING MECHANISMS FOR SICAP .............62 
2.4.1 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms .......................................................62 
2.4.2 The form of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms ....................................65 
2.4.2.1 Traditional view on routines...................................................................65 
2.4.2.2 Modern view on routine .........................................................................66 
2.4.2.3 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as general,  
semi-structured rules ..........................................................................................67 
2.5 REMARKS ON THE EFFECTS OF DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING 
MECHANISMS .............................................................................................................69 
2.6 CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND SUPPLY CHARACTERISTICS.............72 
2.6.1 Organizational characteristics..........................................................................73 
2.6.1.1 Organizational culture ............................................................................73 
2.6.1.2 Organizational structure .........................................................................74 
2.6.1.3 Cross-functional information dissemination ..........................................75 
2.6.2 Supply chain characteristics ............................................................................76 
2.6.2.1 Supply chain information potential ........................................................76 
2.6.2.2 Supply chain innovation stimulus ..........................................................77 
 iv 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY..............................79 
3.1 MIXED METHOD DESIGN: A GENERAL EXPLANATION ..............................79 
3.2 A RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICATION OF A MIXED METHOD DESIGN  
IN OUR STUDY ............................................................................................................84 
3.3 A FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN ...........................88 
3.4 THE FIRST QUALITATIVE PHASE (QUAL1).....................................................93 
3.4.1 Research questions and level of analysis.........................................................93 
3.4.2 Design..............................................................................................................94 
3.4.2.1 Desk & expert study...............................................................................95 
3.4.2.2 Focus groups-1 (FG1) ............................................................................96 
3.4.2.3 Expert interviews....................................................................................99 
3.4.3 Analysis .........................................................................................................101 
3.5 THE SECOND QUALITATIVE PHASE (QUAL2)..............................................102 
3.5.1 Research questions and level of analysis.......................................................102 
3.5.2 Design............................................................................................................103 
3.5.2.1 Focus groups-2 (FG2) ..........................................................................103 
3.5.2.2 Interviews with strategic innovators.....................................................106 
3.5.3 Analysis .........................................................................................................110 
3.6 THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE (QUAN) .............................................................112 
3.6.1 Research questions and level of analysis.......................................................112 
3.6.2 Design............................................................................................................113 
3.6.2.1 Sample survey ......................................................................................113 
3.6.2.2 Construction of the questionnaire.........................................................115 
3.6.2.2.1 Measurement error: Pretesting the questionnaire ........................115 
3.6.2.2.2 Design of the final questionnaire ................................................118 
3.6.2.3 Sampling strategy.................................................................................122 
3.6.2.3.1 Respondent type ..........................................................................122 
3.6.2.3.2 Construction of the sample..........................................................123 
3.6.2.3.3 Coverage and sampling error ......................................................124 
3.6.2.4 Nonresponse error ................................................................................126 
3.6.2.4.1 Response rate ..............................................................................126 
3.6.2.4.2 Differences between respondents and nonrespondents ...............130 
3.6.2.5 Characteristics of the final data set.......................................................134 
3.6.3 Analysis .........................................................................................................135 
3.6.3.1 General characteristics of structural equations modeling .....................135 
3.6.3.1.1 A digression on the outer model: reflective versus formative 
indicators....................................................................................................137 
3.6.3.1.2 Two types of SEM ......................................................................138 
3.6.3.2 Variance-based SEM: Partial least squares ..........................................140 
3.6.3.2.1 The estimation procedure ............................................................140 
3.6.3.2.2 Specification of the outer model: reflective or formative  
indicators....................................................................................................141 
3.6.3.2.3 Assessing the measurement model..............................................144 
3.6.3.2.4 Assessing the structural model ....................................................144 
3.6.3.2.5 An evaluation of PLS applications by management scholars......145 
3.6.3.3 Covariance- versus variance-based structural equations modeling .....145 
3.6.3.4 Justification of our choice for PLS.......................................................149 
 v
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASES ............................155 
4.1 FINDINGS OF QUAL1 .........................................................................................155 
4.1.1 Industry recipes .............................................................................................155 
4.1.2 Selection of SIinitiatives and strategic innovators.........................................161 
4.2 FINDINGS OF QUAL2: FINDINGS PER INDUSTRY........................................165 
4.3 GENERAL RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY...................................166 
4.3.1 Identification and refinement of relevant constructs .....................................166 
4.3.1.1 The basic constructs: independent and dependent variables ................166  
4.3.1.2 Critical organizational and supply chain characteristics.......................174 
4.3.1.3 Control variables ..................................................................................177 
4.3.2 Development of hypotheses and additional research questions.....................182 
4.3.2.1 Hypotheses regarding the basic model .................................................182 
4.3.2.2 Research questions regarding the moderators ......................................188 
4.3.3 Development of quantitative measurement instruments................................190 
4.3.3.1 Operationalization of the independent variables ..................................191 
4.3.3.1.1 Operational construct definition..................................................191 
4.3.3.1.2 Indicator specification.................................................................192 
4.3.3.2 Operationalization of the dependent variable .......................................195 
4.3.3.2.1 Operational construct definition..................................................195 
4.3.3.2.2 Indicator specification.................................................................196 
4.3.3.3 Operationalization of the moderators ...................................................197 
4.3.3.4 Operationalization of the control variables ..........................................197 
 
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE............................201 
5.1 DATA SCREENING AND CLEANING...............................................................201 
5.1.1 Accuracy of input ..........................................................................................201 
5.1.2 Missing values analysis .................................................................................201 
5.1.3 Outliers ..........................................................................................................203 
5.1.4 Common method bias assessment .................................................................204 
5.2 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE MEASUREMENT MODEL....................204 
5.2.1 The reflectively specified constructs .............................................................205 
5.2.1.1 Exploratory factor analyses ..................................................................206 
5.2.1.1.1 Separate exploratory factor analyses...........................................207 
5.2.1.1.2 Joint exploratory factor analysis .................................................209 
5.2.1.2 Measurement model in PLS .................................................................211 
5.2.1.2.1 Reliability and convergent validity .............................................211 
5.2.1.2.2 Discriminant validity...................................................................215 
5.2.2 The formatively specified constructs.............................................................218 
5.2.2.1 Measurement quality of the formative indicators.................................218 
5.2.2.2 Test of the hypothesized semi-aggregate model for recognition..........218 
5.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL........................220 
5.3.1 Analysis of the control variables ...................................................................220 
5.3.2 Tests on the correctness of the hypothesized partial mediation model..........222 
5.3.3 Analysis of the partial mediation model........................................................225 
5.3.3.1 Analysis of the formative indicators.....................................................226 
5.3.3.2 Analysis of the structural relationships ................................................229 
 
 vi 
5.3.4 Analysis of the moderating effects ................................................................232 
5.3.4.1 Innovativeness (RQ1)...........................................................................237 
5.3.4.2 Risk taking (RQ2) ................................................................................237 
5.3.4.3 Cross-functional dissemination of market information (RQ3) .............238 
5.3.4.4 Information from customers (RQ4)......................................................238 
5.3.4.5 Information from suppliers (RQ5)........................................................238 
5.3.4.6 Centralization (RQ7) ............................................................................239 
5.3.4.7 Innovation stimulus from customers (RQ8) .........................................239 
5.3.4.8 Innovation stimulus form suppliers (RQ9)...........................................240 
5.3.4.9 Chain climate (RQ10) ..........................................................................240 
 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS.................................................241 
6.1 RELEVANT PATH-BREAKING FOCUS AREAS ..............................................241 
6.1.1 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition.............................241 
6.1.2 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation............................245 
6.1.3 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation .......................246 
6.2 PARTIAL MEDIATION EFFECTS ......................................................................249 
6.3 THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
CHARACTERISTICS..................................................................................................255 
6.3.1 The influence of the cultural characteristics of innovativeness and  
risk taking (RQ1 & RQ2) .......................................................................................256 
6.3.2 The influence of the cross-functional dissemination of market  
information (RQ3)..................................................................................................258 
6.3.3 The influence of general information provision by customers and  
suppliers (RQ4 & RQ5)..........................................................................................260 
6.3.4 The influence of a centralized organizational structure (RQ7)......................262 
6.3.5 The influence of supply chain innovation potential (RQ8, RQ9, RQ10).......263 
 
CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................................269 
 
APPENDICES.............................................................................................................287 
APPENDIX I.A: Strategic innovation contributions ....................................................287 
APPENDIX I.B: Related concepts to strategic innovation...........................................293 
APPENDIX II: Measures of all variables.....................................................................299 
APPENDIX III: Summarized findings of qual2 per industry .......................................305 
APPENDIX IV: Assumption check exploratory factor analyses..................................315 
APPENDIX V: Power analysis for the moderator analyses .........................................319 
 
REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................321 
 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)............357 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE ............................................................................................363 
 
ERIM PHD SERIES...................................................................................................365 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Forces of globalization and technological innovation may allow for frequent shifts in the 
industry structure. Lower industry barriers, making room for aggressive new entrants (e.g., 
McNamara et al., 2003; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003), may make gentlemanly agreements 
among incumbents erode progressively (D’Aveni, 1995a). Firms, in their struggle for 
control and short-term profits are inclined to all seek solace in the same weapons, in order 
to take away market share from each other (Markides, 1999a). Their similar strategies of 
incremental improvements in cost, quality or both (Thomas, 1996) trigger fierce price 
competition (Larsen et al., 2003). Accordingly, in many industrial sectors, margins and 
profits are squeezed (D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994, Hamel & Prahalad, 1996), and companies 
approach (or bounce into) a perfect competition state (D’Aveni, 1999). Furthermore, the 
arrival of just one hostile new entrant, an exogenous chock or an aggressive strategy of an 
incumbent is enough to spin this wheel of ‘hypercompetition’ (McNamara et al., 2003). 
In less globalized, less high-tech and less competitive industries, pressures for strategic 
convergence may be powerful as well. Due to their bounded rationality, managers seek for 
ways to make their environmental field more lucid and structured (Porac & Thomas, 
1990). Empirics have shown how firms in a specific industry gradually develop shared 
core beliefs about the relevant set of competitors and the appropriate ways to compete (e.g. 
Huff, 1982; Spender, 1989; Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998). These beliefs limit the range of 
strategic possibilities an individual firm considers and hence restrict its capacity to change 
its strategy (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003; Porac et al., 1989).  
Furthermore, in many industries, suppliers face a growing threat of product/service 
commoditization (Rangan & Bowman, 1992). Commoditization effects restrict the 
potential value of incremental product innovations (Rangan & Bowman, 1992; 
Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002), which forces suppliers to look for fundamentally new ways 
to differentiate themselves (Styles & Goddard, 2004; Day & Montgomery, 1999).  
 
Observations of these tendencies (and their mutual reinforcement) have raised scholars’ 
interest in innovations of a more disruptive nature (e.g., Christensen et al., 2002). More 
specifically, authors have recommended firms to hedge against the above mentioned 
threats by introducing ‘new ways of playing the game’ (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). 
Still, a new way of playing the game is unlikely to produce economic rents unless it better 
meets the needs of customers (Miller & Chen, 1996). Hence, firms are also advised to 
found these innovative strategies on the creation of new and substantially superior value 
for their customers.  
Such type of innovation has gone under the name of ‘strategic innovation’ (e.g., Markides, 
1997, 1998).  
 
Scientific research on strategic innovation is however still in its infancy and so far, 
academics lack insight into the specifics of strategic innovation. Inspired by Walsh’ (1995: 
286) assertion that “challenges should stimulate investigation, not serve as a rationale for a 
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research moratorium”, we accepted the conceptual and empirical challenge to study 
strategic innovation.  
 
In fact, we study strategic innovation capacity. We do so because authors have shed doubt 
on the sustainable advantage firms can derive from a ‘one-shot’ strategic innovation and 
advocate continuous strategic innovation over time (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2004). In addition, to increase chances of successful strategic innovation and 
to keep under control the risks associated with it, the value of portfolios of low-scale 
experiments has been touted (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004). We call such experiments 
‘strategic innovation initiatives’. We then denote the capacity an organization has to 
systematically create such strategic innovation initiatives by ‘strategic innovation 
capacity’.  
Our study is motivated by the quest for any mechanisms firms can deliberately use to 
foster their strategic innovation capacity. In this respect, we follow recent research on 
entrepreneurship, which has broadened from traditional questions of entry to management 
processes used to have the organization act entrepreneurially (Matsuno et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, management theorists’ understanding of proactive managerial actions vis-à-
vis the environment is still tiny (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). More specifically, we are 
interested in the effectiveness of such mechanisms given specific organizational and 
supply chain characteristics.  
In sum, we study deliberate, strategic learning mechanisms firms can use to foster their 
strategic innovation capacity.  
 
This PhD study reflects our belief in the value of strategic innovation in specific 
circumstances. Larsen et al. (2002) indeed demonstrated that strategic innovation does not 
only produce profits on a company level. Their findings moreover show that on an industry 
level as well, strategic innovators are capable of increasing average firm profitability (i.e., 
industry profitability) and in this way, may rejuvenate the entire industry. Yet, these 
findings need further corroboration. Hence, we would like to stress that this study on 
strategic innovation capacity implies by no means we are laid astray to pronounce any 
normative judgment upon the omni-appropriateness of this kind of innovation.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Given the nascent status of research on strategic innovation capacity, let alone on 
mechanisms useful to foster it, we explicitly chose for the application of a ‘mixed method’ 
empirical research design (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). First, a combination of multiple 
empirical research methods has potential to generate broader, deeper and more valid 
insights than mono-method research (Rocco et al., 2003; Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987).  We 
furthermore share King & Tucci’s (2002) viewpoint that the application of a mixed method 
design is especially useful in research on the complex organizational phenomena 
traditionally explored in strategic management research. Curral & Towler (2003) moreover 
claim that a mixed method design is especially suitable when research questions tackle 
innovation issues.  
In addition to our mixed method design, we adopted Orton’s (1997) iterative research 
process, in which on the one hand empirical data collection and analysis, and on the other 
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theoretical insights mutually influence, inform and drive each other. We hence 
continuously cycled back and forth between theory and empirics (cfr. Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
 
The conceptual part of the study rests on extant contributions on strategic innovation, and 
related concepts born in the managerial literature (such as value innovation, Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1997, 1999b) and scientific literature (strategic renewal). We furthermore 
build upon the insights scholars have developed on dynamic capabilities, absorptive 
capacity, sensemaking and routines.  
The empirical part of the study targets Dutch industrial firms. It rests on a mixed method 
sequential ‘QUALÆQUAN’ design (e.g., Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a), where we attach 
‘equal status’ to both phases.  
Figure i shows a simplified version of our research design.  
 
 
Figure i: Research design 
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The qualitative phase is split into two subsequent parts: QUAL1 and QUAL2. Both phases 
are engrafted onto a study of five Dutch industrial sectors: Energy (limited to electricity), 
Functional Foods, Traffic Management Systems, Trucks & Trailers and Graphics Printing. 
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QUAL1 rests on a desk & expert study, 5 focus groups and 28 expert interviews.  The 
level of analysis is the industry. The findings of QUAL1 lead to the identification of 
industry recipes and to the identification of ‘real’ strategic innovation initiatives and 
strategic innovators (business units or companies with a high level of strategic innovation 
capacity).  
The QUAL1-study centers on the following research questions: 
RQ1:   What are the specific industry recipes in each of the industries selected? 
RQ2: Given these industry recipes, what are interesting and ‘real’ strategic 
innovation initiatives in these industries? 
RQ3: Given these ‘real’ strategic innovation initiatives, what organizations are ‘real’ 
strategic innovators in these industries? 
 
In QUAL2, these strategic innovation initiatives and strategic innovators are further 
scrutinized by means of 5 additional focus groups and 18 in-depth interviews. The level of 
analysis shifts from the industry to the business unit (or firm for single-unit firms). Based 
on the QUAL2-findings we attempt to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1: Do deliberate, strategic learning mechanisms in the areas of recognition, 
assimilation and transformation foster a business unit’s strategic innovation 
capacity? (relevance of the basic constructs) 
RQ2: What are relevant path-breaking focus areas these mechanisms target? 
(subdimensions of the constructs) 
RQ3: How do deliberate strategic learning mechanisms in the areas of recognition, 
assimilation and transformation foster a business unit’s strategic innovation 
capacity? (relationships among the constructs) 
RQ4: Which internal and external characteristics may exert a critical influence on the 
effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms? (relevant moderators) 
Overall, QUAL2 serves a) to identify and refine relevant constructs (incl. construct 
dimensions), b) to specify an emergent theoretical model, and c) to develop quantitative 
measurement instruments.  
 
Finally, the model is statistically tested in a quantitative study (QUAN). Partial-least 
squares analyses are performed on a sample of all Dutch industrial companies. The 
interpretation of the QUAN-findings is facilitated and enriched by a re-inspection of the 
QUAL2-data. Research questions we attempt to answer during the quantitative study are: 
RQ1: Which of the path-breaking focus areas that deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms target are critical a business unit’s strategic innovation capacity? 
RQ2: What (partial) mediating effects can be detected among deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation on a business 
unit’s strategic innovation capacity? 
RQ3: What moderating effects of organizational and supply chain factors can be 
detected on the relationships between deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition, assimilation and transformation and a business unit’s strategic 
innovation capacity? 
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STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Despite the application of Orton’s (1997) iterative research process, for reasons of clarity 
this PhD thesis essentially marks out the conceptual and empirical phases in separate 
chapters.   
Figure ii shows how the different chapters can be mapped onto the research design. 
 
Figure ii: Mapping of the structure onto the research design 
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Due to the theoretical underdevelopment of the concept of strategic innovation, the study 
commences with a conceptual delineation of the concepts of strategic innovation and 
strategic innovation capacity. Chapter 1 is based on a thorough literature review on 
strategic innovation and related concepts. We distinguish the fundamental aspects of 
strategic innovation and gradually develop a definition of strategic innovation and strategic 
innovation capacity. 
Chapter 2 takes the conceptual discussion one step further. We conceptually integrate the 
concepts of strategic innovation capacity, dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity. In 
addition, the literature on strategic innovation is enriched by insights from the extant 
sensemaking literature to identify preliminary path-breaking focus areas in the different 
absorptive capacity-dimensions. We argue that, to foster strategic innovation capacity, 
managerial mechanisms should essentially target these focus areas. Recent insights on the 
form and effects of routines enable us to finally come to the concept of ‘deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms’.  
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In chapter 3, we justify our choice for a mixed method design. Furthermore, we provide 
the methodological specifics of each phase in terms of research questions & level of 
analysis, design, and analysis.   
The empirical part of the study starts off with chapter 4. There, findings of the QUAL1- 
and QUAL2-research phases are reported. Results are furthermore mirrored against the 
conceptual insights of chapter 2, in order to identify path-breaking focus areas and to 
formulate three hypotheses regarding partial mediation effects among the three 
independent variables. In addition, we formulate research questions concerning the effects 
organizational and supply chain characteristics may produce.  
Chapter 5 details the quantitative analyses in a technical way and reports the straight 
results of the quantitative study. More specifically, formative indicators are studied, a 
partial-mediation model is pored over, and the occurrence of moderated mediation effects 
is explored.  
The findings of chapter 5 are interpreted in chapter 6. For the interpretation, we do not 
exclusively rely on the literature, but the findings of QUAL2 (chapter 4) are re-inspected 
as well.  In chapter 6 the real character of mixed method research reveals itself.  
This PhD thesis rounds off with general conclusions on a more abstract level. We 
synthesize our study and its findings, and elaborate on its contributions to theory and 
practice.  Finally, the limitations of this study are discussed and we provide routes we 
think most promising for further study.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONCEPT OF  
STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY 
 
 
The notion of ‘strategic innovation capacity’ needs first sharpening before instruments of 
analysis can be developed. In order to define this concept, the concept of ‘strategic 
innovation’ is to be clarified first. The purpose of this chapter is hence to delineate the 
concept of strategic innovation (capacity) by an extensive literature study. We will begin 
by an overview of strategic innovation contributions, revealing fundamental aspects of 
strategic innovation. These findings will be enriched by relating them to insights from 
familiar concepts to strategic innovation (e.g., value innovation, disruptive innovation), 
principally developed in managerially focused contributions. Then, these insights will be 
further embedded among theoretical concepts that have been treated in scientific 
publications, more specifically the concepts of ‘strategic change’ and ‘strategic renewal’. 
In this way, we aim to conceptually ground the concept of strategic innovation in a more 
robust way. Finally, a definition of strategic innovation capacity is developed.  
 
 
1. 1 THE ‘DYNAMIC RESOUCE-BASED VIEW’  
 
The strategic management debate has traditionally been centered on the question of how 
differences in firm performance can be explained (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). 
Although it is neither feasible, nor useful to provide a comprehensive literature review 
here, a few highlights nonetheless warrant extraction for they help to frame the concept of 
strategic innovation within existing theoretical paradigms. 
 
For a long time, ideas from classical industrial organization economics have prevailed in 
explaining firm performance differences as being determined by structural conditions of 
the industry (McNamara et al., 2003). This so-called ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ 
school (Thomas, 1996) restricted strategy analysis to choice of industry and choice of 
market positioning within the industry (Baden-Fuller, 1995). It is within this thrust that for 
example Porter’s (1979, 1980) ‘Five Forces framework’ can be positioned. It could indeed 
be used by companies in their attempts to manipulate market structure and execute market 
power by precluding or removing disturbing competitive forces in the industry (D’Aveni, 
1999).  
 
This rather static approach on competition (Thomas, 1996) and its corresponding fit-
enhancing strategic analysis became however less meaningful since increasing market 
dynamism made market structure into a constant state of flux (Grant, 1996; Chakravarthy, 
1997; Hamel, 1998b). Furthermore, empirics had demonstrated that very competitive and 
hostile environments did not prevent firms from being successful (e.g., Hamel, 1999). This 
observation was in line with findings that increasing rivalry had moved the source of 
success internal to the firm (Thomas, 1996), such that firm effects strongly outweigh 
industry effects in explaining firm profitability (e.g., Rumelt, 1991; Baden-Fuller & 
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Stopford, 1994). Emphasis consequently shifted from a demand-side to a supply-side 
approach and made room for the ‘resource-based view of the firm’1 (e.g., Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). According to this resource-based view, sustainable differences in firm 
performance stem form firm-specific configurations of VRIN (valuable, rare, inimitable, 
non-substitutable) resources (Barney, 1991). Hence, not external strategic positioning but 
internal firm-specific resources were considered as a more stable basis for (sustained) 
competitive advantage.  
Yet, in recent years the resource-based view has not gone unchallenged. It has been 
extensively critiqued (e.g., Priem & Butler, 2001; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) for being 
tautological and static, and for its exclusive internal focus. Indeed, the influence of external 
factors has traditionally been fully ignored (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). 
Furthermore, the growing notion and assumption of ever-increasing competition and 
market turbulence in strategic management research (e.g., D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 
2002; Thomas, 1996; Volberda, 1996) have reduced the belief in achieving Peteraf’s 
(1993) necessary (‘rents’-) conditions for resource-based sustained competitive advantages 
(Martinsons, 1993).  
These beliefs have gradually, albeit only recently, led to a more dynamic resource-based 
perspective that stresses the dynamic aspects of, in particular, intangible (or ‘operant’, see 
Vargo & Lusch, 2004) resources. Scholars have come to link the resource-based view to 
industry conditions and to innovation (Hoopes et al., 2003) and incorporate the impact of 
environmental characteristics on the effectiveness and development of resources (see e.g., 
‘the contingent resource-based view’ in Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Teece et al., 1997).  
In this way inside-out and outside-in approaches to strategy research have gradually 
become reconciled (Baden-Fuller, 1995). This ‘enriched’ resource-based view has even 
become equated with the ‘hypercompetition perspective’ (McNamara et al., 2003). It 
borrows its name from D’Aveni’s (1994) research on ‘hypercompetition’ since many 
contributions in this stream of literature have been built on the central tenets of, in 
particular, his work.  
 
The dynamic resource-based view, or hypercompetition perspective, departs from the 
belief that technological revolutions and globalization forces (Hitt et al., 1998; Eisenhardt, 
2002) have intensified the, endogenous (e.g., pace of innovation) and exogenous (e.g., 
deregulation), triggers of environmental turbulence in terms of scope, speed and duration 
(Bogner & Barr, 2000). As such, many markets have become ‘hypercompetitive’ 
(D’Aveni, 1994) or ‘high-velocity markets’ (Eisenhardt, 1989a), that have in turn nurtured 
a high level of industry dynamism  since lowered entry and exit barriers allow for frequent 
shifts in the industry structure (McNamara et al., 2003; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003).  
Hypercompetitive environments are characterized by blurred industry boundaries (Floyd & 
Lane, 2000), ambiguous consumer demands, shortened product design and life cycles 
(Slywotsky & Wise, 2004; Krinsky & Jenkins, 1997; Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002), and a 
shift in competitive rules (Chakravarthy, 1997, Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; D’Aveni, 1994, 1995a,b; Thomas, 1996; Styles & Goddard, 2004).  
                                                          
1 For a collection of recent contributions, see the Strategic Management Journal, October 2003, 
Special Issue and the Journal of Management, 2001, issue 6. 
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The persistent competence-destroying change limits the duration of competitive advantage 
even more and meanwhile attracts new entrants that may in turn further change the market. 
Consequently, the characteristic trait of hypercompetitive environments is that firms, in 
their struggle for control and temporary competitive advantage, continuously create 
temporary disequilibria themselves (Volberda, 1996; D’Aveni, 1995). Eisenhardt 
(2002:89) denotes this phenomenon by the term ‘guerilla warfare’. In this sense, firms may 
even contribute themselves to the perpetuation (Bogner & Barr, 2000) or intensification of 
competitive turbulence (D’Aveni, 1999). 
 
Even though D’Aveni (1995a) claimed the omnipresence of hypercompetition, i.e. not 
limited to fast-moving, high-tech industries, he nevertheless identified several industry 
attributes that make one industry more susceptible to hypercompetition than others 
(D’Aveni, 1994). Thomas (1996), elaborating on his and other industrial economists’ 
ideas, empirically verified the influence of three areas: transactor dynamism (growth rate 
and inelasticity of demand, technical sophistication of suppliers), entry conditions 
(decrease in industry concentration), and in particular, the dynamism and depth of the 
industry knowledge base (percentage of workforce that is professional, industry 
productivity growth). He found that, even though the influence of all three factors was 
discerned, the industry’s knowledge base was by far the largest trigger for 
hypercompetition. 
Still, McNamara et al. (2003) found that a large part of the total variance in business 
profitability can always be attributed to unstable factors. Furthermore, they posit that 
cognitive ‘hindsight’ biases create a belief in increasing turbulence since they lead to 
managerial perceptions of a stable, logical past and a turbulent present and future. This 
means that also in more stable environments, companies should be able to cope with 
hypercompetitive issues. Furthermore, the arrival of one aggressive new entrant, an 
exogenous chock or an aggressive strategy of an incumbent is enough to spin the wheel of 
hypercompetition. For this reason, companies should always be prepared or should be able 
to disrupt if they want to.  
Therefore, McNamara et al. (2003) argue that the “management of dynamic environments 
and innovative capabilities remains important to any explanation of persistent performance 
differences among businesses, and continues to merit substantial academic attention”        
(: 273).  
 
This academic attention is indeed reflected in the existence of a substantial body of work 
on the strategic behavior of firms that are affected by turbulent environmental conditions.  
Authors have accordingly prescribed organizational conditions and strategies to better deal 
with hypercompetition (e.g. Hamel, 1999; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). There exists a general consensus that an exclusive reliance either on stable 
industry structures, either on idiosyncratic resources does apparently not suffice 
(McNamara et al., 2003). Fundamental changes in a firm’s environment may devaluate its 
key resources so that, without undertaking appropriate action, such environments can turn 
a firm’s core competences into ‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and induce a 
‘competence trap’ (Levinthal & March, 1993). Hypercompetitive pressures have hence 
shifted the internal organization of firms from thorough exploitation and defense of given 
strategic assets toward new organizational forms that favor exploration (e.g., Thomas, 
1996; Volberda, 1996). Characteristics of high-velocity environments place a premium on 
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dynamic organizations having the ability to engage in rapid, relentless, or continuous 
change (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Hypercompetition hence requires 
the infliction of pre-emptive strategies (Evans, 1991) and a firm’s capacity to constantly 
reestablish its role in changing markets (see e.g., D’Aveni, 1994; Hamel & Välikangas, 
2003).  
In other words, the dynamic resource-based view of the firm has turned the issue of 
strategically innovating to the centre stage (Baden-Fuller, 1995).  
 
 
1.2 THE BASIC TRAITS OF STRATEGIC INNOVATION 
 
A study of the literature (see Appendix I.A) revealed that the plea for creating new 
competitive advantages and disruptive strategies put forward in the hypercompetition view 
(e.g., D’Aveni, 1999; Thomas, 1996) bears much in common to the central tenets of the 
strategic innovation (SI) literature. Some authors have argued that the need to strategically 
innovate directly flows from the characteristic traits of the hypercompetition phenomenon 
itself (e.g., Baden-Fuller, 1995; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Forces such as globalization 
and technological innovation may lower industry barriers (e.g. the appearance of a foreign 
or nimble disruptive challenger) and make gentlemanly agreements among incumbents 
consequently erode (D’Aveni, 1995a). In this context of increased rivalry, following 
similar strategies to rivals in an attempt to take away market share from them (Markides, 
1999a) ends in simply outperforming them on the basis of incremental improvements in 
cost, quality or both (Thomas, 1996). The fight over increasingly smaller industry spaces 
eventually leads to fierce price competition. The intra-industry performance variance will 
be small since firms all have similar experience in the same areas and hence compete with 
the same weapons (Thomas, 1996). Basically, in their attempts to out-compete each other 
companies approach (or bounce into) a perfect competition state (D’Aveni, 1999). The 
only way companies can escape the perfect-competition scenario and achieve above-
normal profits is by creating new competitive advantages (e.g., D’Aveni, 1999). This 
rivalry is moreover rewarded because disruptive strategies can stimulate demand by 
responding to advanced customer needs (Thomas, 1996). In this way, differences between 
winners and losers will be larger (Thomas, 1996).  
 
Yet, not all authors on SI have taken hypercompetition as the starting point of their 
discussions. Markides (1997), for example, points out that the issue of strategic innovation 
is not new, neither is it becoming more important because of increasing environmental 
turbulence. He argues that eventually, all industries mature since competitors all tend to 
focus on a small number of narrow ‘industry spaces’, i.e. customer segments, 
products/services, and manufacturing and distributions methods. Implicit assumptions 
about how to compete are widely shared among industry players (Styles & Goddard, 
2004). Different theoretical rationales have been developed to explain these imitation 
driving forces (for an overview, see Larsen et al., 2003). Basically, the more an industry 
matures, the more companies tend towards strategy convergence. Miller & Chen (1996) 
indeed showed that firms are more inclined to pursue unconventional strategies during 
periods of market growth. This is because in periods of market stagnation, a shortage of 
resources makes firms more susceptible to institutional pressures imposed by powerful 
actors (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). As a consequence, when the need to strategically 
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innovate is the highest, companies seek refuge in strategy convergence. Since strategy 
convergence narrows competition down to a small competitive space, competition 
becomes fiercer. In this way, firms themselves contribute to a further erosion of the 
industry’s profit potential. Markides (1997) and Larsen et al. (2003) hence argue that not 
so much hypercompetition but these imitation driving forces produce strategy 
convergence. It is exactly the latter that largely leads to increased rivalry among industry 
players, which will eventually evoke price competition. Lower prices drive down excess 
profits onto the competitive equilibrium, at which consumer welfare is maximized 
(Scherer, 1992). Larsen et al. (2002, 2003) empirically demonstrated that not so much new 
entry but this inter-organizational strategy convergence will eventually erode above normal 
profits in an industry.  
 
In sum, underlying the literature on SI is always the premise that the specific types of 
innovation firms compete with affect their competitive position (Sheremata, 2004; 
Henderson & Clark, 1990). The basic tenet of SI is however that the occurrence of price 
competition in small industry spaces does by no means imply that the industry has lost all 
of its profit potential; it is just what Styles & Goddard (2004) call a ‘maturity trap’. Not 
only get attractive positions imitated but new –often neglected– strategic positions keep 
emerging as well (Markides, 1999b): the so-called ‘unexploited pockets of profitability’ in 
the industry (Larsen et al., 2002). Thus, “strategic innovation focuses on changing firm-
level strategy over time to identify unexploited positions in the industry ahead of rival 
firms” (Larsen et al., 2002: H1). In his 1998-article Markides notes that the unexploited 
gaps in the industry positioning that have to be identified for SI may stem from changing 
market and industry conditions. Discontinuities may thus contain innovation potential 
(Hamel & Getz, 2004). In other words, turbulence is not regarded as an external threat that 
should be responded to, but more as “generating new opportunities and the potential for 
new ground rules” (Markides, 1999a: 60). Apart from its response capacity a company’s 
pro-active behavior is hence largely emphasized (Markides, 1997; Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Contrary to the product life-cycle paradigm of birth-
growth-maturity-decline, industries (and some of their incumbents too) possess 
possibilities for industry ‘de-maturity’ (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Larsen et al. (2002) 
indeed demonstrated that SI does not only produce profits on a company level. Also on an 
industry level, strategic innovators are capable of increasing average firm profitability (i.e., 
industry profitability) and in this way, may rejuvenate the entire industry. 
In this respect, SI insights build further on strategic choice theories, by refuting the 
assertion of environmental determinism (Volberda et al., 2001a,b; Kim & Mauborgne, 
2004). As proactive strategic behavior is considered related to managerial intentionality 
(Van den Bosch et al., 2003), not environmental forces but managerial action and choice 
are deemed as the driver of firm performance (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994). Following 
this logic, SI can originate from the organizational competencies giving rise to new 
opportunities and new ways to play the game (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Hamel, 
1996; Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). The consequences for marketing have been expressed 
by Dickson (1996: 102) as follows: “[…] marketing is the art and science of creating 
change (disequilibrium) in markets in such a way that the change benefits the firm (or an 
alliance of firms) and, consequently, comparatively “disadvantages” rivals. If a market is 
in equilibrium, marketers are not doing their job”. 
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Accordingly, the central idea of SI is one contra strategy convergence (e.g., Markides, 
1997; Larsen et al., 2002), whether produced by hypercompetion or not. Strategic 
divergence implies that the nature of competition is changed (Schlegelmilch et al., 2003): 
firms deviate from, or even actively alter, the industry rules of the game (Baden-Fuller, 
1995). Accepted industry assumptions about how to compete are challenged and 
overturned (Styles & Goddard, 2004) by introducing a ‘a new way of playing the game’ 
(Markides, 1998, 1999b). “A strategic innovation is a creative and significant departure 
form historical practice” (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004: 69). Introducing the concept of 
disruptive SI, Charitou & Markides (2003) take an even more radical standpoint by 
asserting that not only a different, new way of playing the game is required, but also one 
that conflicts with the existing way.  
 
Secondly, the ultimate strength of SI lies not so much in the act of rule changing in se but 
in its potential to produce dramatic value improvements for customers (Schlegelmilch et 
al., 2003). In many industries, suppliers face a growing threat of commoditization (Rangan 
& Bowman, 1992). Demanding customers in business-to-business markets rationalize their 
supplier bases and ask their remaining suppliers for dramatical value improvements (Day 
& Montgomery, 1999). In order to beat the ‘commodity magnet’ (Vandenbosch & Dawar, 
2002) firms need to find new ways to differentiate themselves. Hence, not only 
hypercompetion tendencies and strategy convergence, but also product and service 
commoditization may tighten the profit squeeze. Therefore, strategic innovators are doing 
something genuinely different that customers like and reward (Styles & Goddard, 2004). 
Since SI implies to offer something new that customers largely value, and/or do this in a 
better way than rivals have ever done before, it has been argued that the success of SI 
largely depends on a deep understanding of customers’ needs and priorities (Markides, 
1997). Schlegelmilch et al. (2003) advise firms to be customer-oriented and not product-
oriented: customers should feature at the center of strategic thinking. In some publications 
(Markides, 1998; Charitou & Markides, 2003), it is even argued that the new market 
spaces should “grow to capture a large share of the established market”. Whereas Markides 
(1997, 1998, 1999a,b) originally focused on disrupting the rules of the game, i.e. stressing 
foremost the disruptive effect SI has on competitors, with the introduction of ‘radical 
innovation’ in his most recent articles (Markides, 2004; Markides & Geroski, 2004), his 
attention has shifted towards the disruption SI can produce on customer behavior and 
habits as well. He posits that radical innovations require “major new value propositions” 
(Markides, 2004: 36). Likewise, Govindarajan & Gupta (2001) and Govindarajan & 
Trimble (2004) have suggested firms to reinvent and reconceptualize delivered customer 
value. SI hence implies that the product and service boundaries of the sector are altered 
(Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
In general, scholars (e.g., Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005; Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001; 
Markides, 1997; Schlegelmilch et al., 2003) share the view that new customer value can be 
created by either delivering a fundamentally new offering to existing customers (e.g. 
IBM’s shift from selling hardware to selling a total solution), or by shifting the customer 
base, the so-called “reshaping of existing markets” (Schlegelmilch et al., 2003). The latter 
strategy implies that a new or previously unserved customer segment is uncovered (e.g., 
Canon’s focus from the corporate to the household and SME market for copiers).  
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In conclusion, a deviation from the industry rules of the game with the view of offering new 
and substantially superior customer value can be regarded as the central notion of SI. This 
notion builds around two elementary aspects of SI, i.e. industry rule deviation and superior 
customer value creation.  
 
Our intention to study both these aspects of SI has brought us to different concepts (see 
Appendix I.B), with a so-called ‘family resemblance’ (Evans, 1991) to SI. Kim & 
Mauborgne (1997, 1999, 2000) introduced the concept of ‘value innovation’ and ‘blue 
ocean strategy’ (2004). Hamel talked about ‘industry revolution’, ‘revolutionary strategies’ 
(1996, 1998a), and ‘strategy innovation’ (1998b, 1999). Christensen et al. (2000, 2002), 
for their part, studied ‘disruptive innovation’, and Normann & Ramírez (1993) stressed 
issues of value reinvention and value constellations. Not only management authors’, but 
also marketing scholars’ interest in this strategic phenomenon was aroused. Accordingly, 
the concept of ‘market-driving organizations’ was introduced (Jaworski et al., 2000; 
Kumar et al., 2000; Tuominen et al., 2004; Carrillat et al., 2004). A common denominator 
in all these publications over time, is their initial (end-90s) focus on both the 
environmental drivers and contents of this new kind of innovation, towards (from 2002 
onwards) a –logical follow-up– discussion of organizational prerequisites (with a strong 
emphasis on incumbents and established companies) to develop the capacity to 
strategically innovate.  Insights from these literature streams (see Appendix I.B) can shed 
further light on the two central elements of SI previously mentioned. Moreover, the study 
of these cognate concepts may fill the conceptual (and empirical) lacunae shown in the SI 
literature. Largely stemming from a managerially-oriented research tradition, the majority 
of contributions on SI predominantly lack scientific rigor, despite their promising ideas 
and instruments. Schlegelmilch et al. (2003: 129) contend that “Research on strategic 
innovation has progressed substantially in the last few years, yet it is still a field where the 
big picture is only beginning to take shape. It is neither clear how many puzzle pieces 
comprise the picture nor what these pieces actually look like”.  
 
In order to capture the essence of the various definitions/ conceptualizations encountered, 
each was considered in relation to the two elementary aspects we derived. We will treat the 
deviance from the industry rules of the game, and the creation of new and substantially 
superior customer value, consecutively.  
 
 
1.3 THE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC INNOVATION 
 
1.3.1 Deviance from traditional industry assumptions and conventions 
 
Kim & Mauborgne share Markides’ belief that eventually all strategies decay, and not 
because of hypercompetition alone. The fight over increasingly smaller industry spaces 
eventually leads to fierce price competition, or a so-called ‘competitive trap’ (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999a). Hamel & Välikangas (2003) further add that a decline in strategic 
strength may indeed be grounded in convergence (Markides, 1997), but that in addition, 
strategies can also be supplanted by better ones, can get exhausted when markets become 
saturated or can get eviscerated because of an altered balance of power in the industry. 
Slywotzky (1996) has depicted this phenomenon by the term ‘value migration’, indicating 
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that in established markets market value may be captured by firms that establish 
‘innovative business designs’, using new go-to-market mechanisms, differentiated 
offerings, and superior customer selection by (re)configuring resources to capture value in 
the market space. Therefore, even in non-hypercompetitive industries breaking industry 
rules may be a necessary condition to increase (or maintain) performance (Markides, 
1999a; Mitchell & Singh, 1993 concerning technological innovations). 
Still, in contrast to his original 1997-contribution, Markides (in Mang, 2000) later adds that 
even though SI may always be required, the new economic scene may intensify this need 
all the more (see also, Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001; Hamel, 1998a,b, 1999). Likewise, 
Hamel (1998a) argues that the new economic landscape puts an end to strategic 
‘incrementalism’. Several authors share the view that the move from an industrial to an 
information age welcomes industry revolutionaries just as it punishes complacent 
incumbents all the more. This has made scholars turn the following phrases: “all 
businesses are living on the precipice” (Hamel, 1998a: 20), “it’s no longer safe to be safe” 
(Styles & Goddard, 2004: 72), or “more risk can be prudent” (Sheremata, 2004: 374).  
 
Authors posit that real opportunities for profit and growth lie specifically in “innovation 
outside the conventional context” (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999). “Shackled neither by 
convention nor by respect for the precedent, these companies [rule breakers] are intent on 
overturning the industrial order […] rule breakers set out to redefine the industry, to invent 
the new by challenging the old” (Hamel, 1996: 70-71). Industry structures may be altered 
in order to change the roles and relationships performed by various industry parties 
(Jaworski et al., 2000), and to reshape the power balance (Baden-Fuller, 1995).  
Govindarajan & Trimble (2004) share Kim & Mauborgne’s (1997, 1999) emphasis on the 
distinction of SI with mere product or technological innovation. They argue that product 
innovation is often incremental and may lack strategic significance. Likewise, Slywotsky 
& Wise (2004) maintain that a high level of strategic discontinuities (Hitt et al., 1998), and 
the rapid strategic maneuvering among global and new market players (D’Aveni, 1995a) 
reduce the potential of mere product-innovation growth moves. Lynn et al. (1996) however 
posit that continuous, incremental product line extensions remain useful to maintain 
success, but only after they have first been established by means of innovations of a more 
radical and discontinuous kind. New technologies, in their turn, do not necessarily produce 
enhanced/ new customer value. As Abernathy & Clark (1985) put it: “Novelty and 
scientific advance may have little to do with an innovation’s competitive significance” (: 
7), and further: “An innovation of the most unique and unduplicative sort will only have 
great significance for competition and the evolution of industry when effectively linked to 
market needs” (: 13). Hence, Kim & Mauborgne (1999) assert that even though technology 
innovators may indeed create value in macro-economic terms, only few of them are 
capable of eventually realizing their innovations in financial terms. As technological 
pioneers seldom end up dominating the market (Markides & Geroski, 2003a), Markides & 
Charitou (2004), they too warn for a mere technological focus.  
 
It is however (product and process) innovations resulting from intensive R&D-efforts that 
have received the most attention in the value creation literature (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003). 
Yet, some firms have succeeded through innovative strategies, based neither on innovative 
technologies, nor on new products and/or services (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004).  
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Instead of a singular focus on technological and product innovation, strategic innovators 
invented a new game that truly differs from the game industry rivals play (Styles & 
Goddard, 2004). Miller & Chen (1996) speak of ‘iconoclasts’ that compete in non-
conventional ways, adopting competitive practices that deviate from industry norms.  They 
avoid actions frequently used by competitors and undertake market-oriented ploys that 
rivals rarely use. This aspect highlights the resemblance to Schumpeter’s catch phrase of 
“creative destruction”; innovation provides superior offerings but in doing so also carries 
with it the inherent characteristic of undermining market positions of established firms 
following the more traditional rules of the game. Schumpeter (1942: 84-85) hence writes: 
“[…] in capitalist reality […] it is not [price] competition which counts but […] 
competition […] which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the 
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as 
much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a 
door” (in Scherer, 1992: 1418, italics added to original). Following this line of argument, 
Christensen et al. (2000) point to the need of “the entrenched powers get out of the way” (: 
104), arguing that incumbents may consciously hold back disruptive innovation in the 
industry since this may undermine the fundaments on which once their success was built. 
Yet, the underlying sources of competitive advantage are perishable over time, such that 
often opposite factors are considered as sources of competitive advantage at different 
points in industries’ histories. Compare for example the eighties’ vertical integration 
mantra to the current belief in the value of nonintegrated business models à la Dell 
(Christensen, 2001). Instead of blindly following an industry’s rules of the game, 
companies need to develop an insight into the underlying factors of why and under what 
conditions a specific practice leads to an advantage (Christensen, 2001).  
 
The simple ‘strategy divergence’ may sound, the difficult it is in reality. Pressures for 
strategy convergence and herd behavior are powerful and pervasive, and companies tend to 
share world views and assumptions about how to compete (Styles & Goddard, 2004). The 
underlying rationale for strategy convergence is hence to be found in theories on 
managerial cognition. More specifically, strategic choice theories (e.g., Child, 1972), on 
which the SI concept rests, brought the issue of managers’ ability to influence firm value to 
the forefront of strategic discussions. Formulating strategies is however based on 
managers’ understanding of their environment. Theories on managerial cognition provide 
insight into the social-psychological factors that influence managers in framing their 
competitive milieu (Porac & Thomas, 1990).  
 
These ideas essentially extend the work of neo-institutional theorists, positing a 
homogenizing tendency in organizational fields (e.g., an industry). These scholars argue 
that homogenization is not entirely grounded in rational economic motives (competitive 
isomorphism), i.e. pressures toward similarity resulting from market competition (e.g. 
Hannan & Freeman’s (1984) population ecology). In addition, homogenization is also due 
to actors’ social relationships (Miller & Chen, 1996) giving rise to socially constructed 
beliefs influencing firms’ actions.  
Dimaggio & Powell’s (1983) contribution is an often-cited example of this theoretical 
stream. Dimaggio & Powell (1983) argue that individual efforts to deal with uncertainty 
lead to structuration. So in their attempts to change their organizations, individuals make 
them more similar. This process of homogenization is called ‘institutional isomorphism’. It 
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is based upon the assumption that firms not only compete for customers and resources, but 
need political power and institutional legitimacy as well. Three isomorphic processes lay 
the foundations for this tendency. In reality these three processes may be intermingled. 
First of all, other organizations and society in general (e.g., a common legal environment) 
may exert pressures on a firm that eventually lead to similarity among industry players. 
‘Coercive isomorphism’ hence results from political influence and the search for 
legitimacy. Secondly, faced with uncertainty, organizations tend to model themselves on 
other organizations that they perceive as more legitimate or successful. ‘Mimetic 
isomorphism’ thus stems from standard ways to deal with uncertainty. Consequently, 
Dimaggio & Powell (1983) hypothesize that the higher the uncertainty and ambiguity an 
organization has to cope with, the stronger its inclination to imitation (their hypotheses A-3 
and B-4). Following their line of argument, imitation driving forces will be even higher in 
hypercompetitive environments. The modeling proclivity resulting from mimetic 
isomorphism may however not only originate from a firm’s deliberate attempts to better 
control uncertainty, but may also stem unintentionally from employee transfers, trade 
associations or consulting firms preaching and spreading a limited number of 
organizational models (see also, Abrahamson, 1991). As Hamel (1998a: 22) wrote: 
“Hawking their studies of “best practices”, consultants carry orthodoxies, like a deadly 
virus, across companies”. Finally, ‘normative isomorphism’ can be attributed to 
professionalization. Academic education and the existence of professional networks across 
firm boundaries are important hotbeds of professional norms. Moreover, common hiring 
and promotion criteria and practices across firms may stimulate normative isomorphism all 
the more. What is most remarkable is that these isomorphic pressures may proceed, 
without producing any added value in terms of increased internal organizational efficiency. 
Furthermore, these imitative tendencies make mental models of rivals become more 
similar over time and produce group level beliefs about how and with whom to compete in 
the marketplace (Porac et al., 1989; Huff, 1982).  
 
Among the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism cited by Dimaggio & Powell 
(1983), it is especially the second, ‘mimetic isomorphism’, that has received most attention 
in the academic literature (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Especially the work on industry 
recipes, emphasizing the homogenizing effects cognitive decision-making processes can 
have on an industry level (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), is built upon the belief that a firm’s 
interactions with other actors have an important impact on its competitive beliefs and 
moves.  
In essence, it is argued that due to managers’ bounded rationality organizations make their 
competitive field more manageable by reducing their number of competitors. This reduced 
set of competitors then functions as a benchmark for strategic ideas and competitive 
actions (Huff, 1982). Porac & Thomas (1990) argue that the mental models of a 
competitive environment managers base their strategy formulation on are taxonomic. 
Managers simplify their environmental scanning activities by drawing up some cognitive 
taxonomies of organizational forms, i.e. by grouping individual organizations with similar 
attributes. Positioning the focal organization within a specific taxonomy also implies 
demarcating what the firm is, what business it is in and who its rivals are. This fixation on 
specific competitive boundaries carries the risk of ignoring ‘interspecies’ competition (i.e. 
from rivals in a different class) since it orients managers towards similar, rather than 
dissimilar sources of rivalry. It may further create ‘competitive blind spots’ when 
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environmental changes outdate the mental models used. Since this focused attention on 
nearby competitors is reciprocal, the biased estimates firms have about their competitive 
environment correlate with those of nearby firms (Johnson & Hoopes, 2003). As Porac and 
colleagues’ (1989) study of Scottish knitwear manufacturers indicated, the mutual 
enactment of socially-constructed beliefs among industry partners press toward a shared 
mental model. Hence, in an industry a strategic frame is gradually developed that 
determines common perceptions among industry competitors (Huff, 1982). Spender (1989) 
accordingly defines an ‘industry recipe’ as a “shared knowledge base that those socialized 
in an industry take as familiar professional common sense” (: 69). The industry recipe 
contains core beliefs about the relevant set of competitors and the ‘appropriate’ way to 
compete. In this way, firm-level and group-level competitive activities become linked and 
the range of strategic possibilities considered by an individual firm in the industry becomes 
limited (Porac et al., 1989). Sutcliffe & Huber’s (1998) empirical findings indeed showed 
that top managers’ perceptions of the environment are more similar within than across 
industries. These perceptions reflect common beliefs about appropriate strategies and, as 
such, restrict strategic choices of individual firms. Research has indeed demonstrated that 
organizations that are less ingrained in the industry recipe are more likely to focus upon 
radical innovations combining practices and ideas from different macrocultures 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994).  
 
In conclusion, industry recipes supply the industry rules of the game. The stickiness of 
these rules of the game tends to lead to strategic convergence, inertia and a lack of strategic 
change among competitors (Porac et al., 1989; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003) and among all 
parties in an industry’s supply chain (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). If SI implies 
strategic divergence, by breaking the rules of the game, SI will thus entail a deviation from 
the industry recipe. In other words, it requires a deviance from traditional industry 
assumptions and conventions. Some scholars (e.g., Baden-Fuller, 1995) have argued that 
SI can even alter the industry rules of the game.  
Although the change of industry recipes has only marginally been treated in the literature, 
agreement seems to be reached on that the source of change can be either exogenous or 
endogenous (Walsh, 1995). Industry recipes change when the industry’s social, 
technological, cultural, or economic context changes (Spender, 1989). Barr et al. (1992) 
found indeed that group mental models may change in response to environmental changes. 
In addition to these external ‘jolts’, recent research on institutional entrepreneurship 
advocates the possibilities of endogenous institutional change as well. Industry recipes 
may hence change because of an innovation by an incumbent in the industry (Abrahamson 
& Fombrun, 1994). In this way, attempts have been made to solve the ‘paradox of 
embedded agency’ inherent to institutional theory.  For example, Greenwood & Suddaby’s 
(2006) results show that large, central, elite organizations can actively change the mature 
institutional structure in which they themselves are embedded. These findings imply that 
industry incumbents can deviate from traditional industry conventions and assumptions 
and can in this respect initiate SI. The major challenge of the creation of SI hence lies in 
ensuring that the new strategy does not reflect managers’ biases, likely rooted in the 
industry recipe (Bogner & Barr, 2000). 
Yet, a deviance from the industry rules of the game in and of itself is unlikely to produce 
economic rents unless it better meets the needs of customers (Miller & Chen, 1996). This 
brings us to the second fundamental aspect of SI. 
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1.3.2 Creation of new and substantially superior customer value 
 
Even though the strategy literature has conceptualized ‘value’ as a three-fold concept, 
consisting of shareholder, stakeholder and customer value, it has been argued that, in the 
end, it is customer value that lays the foundations of both the other value categories 
(Khalifa, 2004). Inspired by particularly the market orientation literature (e.g., Kohli & 
Jaworski, 1990; Narver & Slater, 1990) recent contributions in marketing as well as 
strategy research  have hence emphasized the central role superior customer value plays in 
the creation of competitive advantage and long-term success (e.g., Day, 2000; Lindgreen & 
Wynstra, 2005; Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Slywotzky, 1996). A general assumption is 
that firms create value for themselves by seeking value for customers (Sheramata, 2004).  
Authors on SI unanimously agree with this proposition. Innovation without customer value 
may be too wild or too technology-driven (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999). Especially Hamel 
(1998b) asserts that the goal of SI is not so much cost cutting and to have earnings exceed 
costs, but to capture a disproportionate share of the industry wealth creation (i.e. share of 
the total market capitalization of all firms in a particular competitive domain). He argues 
that companies should hence focus their strategic attention on revenue growth by creating 
superior customer value, and not on mere cost cutting. In his view, optimization 
(retrenchment and operational efficiency) tactics should clearly serve the goal of SI; an 
opposite logic leads back to incrementalism. In other words, optimization may not become 
the guiding paradigm in and of itself (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003).  
In the same vein, Kim & Mauborgne (1997, 1999a,b, 2000) posit that innovation should be 
anchored with buyer value. The competition should be made irrelevant by offering 
fundamentally new and superior buyer value. They even use phrases such as “a quantum 
leap in buyer value to create new markets” (1999: 43), and the creation of ‘uncontested 
market space’ (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004).  
 
Despite the popularity of ‘customer value’ in marketing and strategy literature, there is no 
clear conceptual consensus about it (Flint et al., 2002; Payne & Holt, 2001). The concept 
of customer value “…is one of the most overused and misused concepts in social sciences 
in general and in management literature in particular” (Khalifa, 2004: 646); “it has neither 
defined common status nor common use” (Woodall, 2003: 1). In Woodall (2003) and 
Khalifa (2004) extensive literature reviews are provided. Both these authors made attempts 
to integrate various viewpoints on the subject in order to provide some coherent 
representation of customer value. In general, four characteristics of customer value recur in 
publications: 1) customer value is a subjective concept, 2) it is conceptualized as a trade-
off between benefits and costs, 3) these benefits and costs are multi-faceted (e.g. use value, 
price), and 4) value perceptions are relative to competition (Ulaga, 2003).  
 
In contrast to much marketing literature, the management literature, and contributions on 
SI and related concepts alike, focuses on the creation and delivery of customer value, more 
than on the customer’s valuation process. In this way, a more strategic, supplier-focused 
perspective on customer value is followed, stressing foremost the creation of an offering’s 
intrinsic value (e.g., Normann & Ramírez, 1993; Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). This intrinsic 
value comprises the offering’s total benefits, i.e. its attributes as well as its consequences 
in terms of use. For example, Bowman & Ambrosini’s (2000) discussion relates value 
creation to the creation of use value (value appropriation is in turn determined by exchange 
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value). They further posit that this focus on use value and internal value creation has been 
typical for a resource-based view of the firm. Sharma et al. (2001) have argued that 
business-to-business marketers need to further focus and compete on the in-use value of an 
offering.  
 
We believe especially Khalifa’s (2004) insights may prove a useful contribution to the 
literature on SI. More specifically, Khalifa (2004) developed a multidimensional 
configuration of customer value that integrates three complementary viewpoints on 
customer value: the ‘value exchange model’, the ‘value buildup model’, and the ‘dynamics 
of customer value’.  
First, the ‘value exchange model’ is a benefits-costs model; it considers customer value as 
the difference between total (psychic and utility) benefits and total (customer ownership) 
costs.  
Second, the ‘value buildup model’ restricts attention to the benefits side of the customer 
value equation. According to this perspective, total customer value is affected by four 
factors: whether the customer is treated by the supplier as a mere customer or as a person, 
whether the relationship with the supplier is a simple transaction or involves genuine 
interaction, whether the customer needs that the supplier intends to satisfy are of a utility 
or a psychic nature, and whether customer benefits are tangible or intangible. Customer 
value accumulates always through the latter option of these four dimensions. In this way 
customer value can take four distinct forms, going from functionality (product) to solution 
(support features), to experience (adding intangibles), to meaning (philosophical or 
emotional connection, self-esteem needs).  
Finally, the ‘dynamics of customer value’ facet in Khalifa’s model describes how 
customers evaluate a supplier’s total offering. Product/service and delivery attributes 
determine the customer’s (dis)satisfaction. The presence or absence of basic features, and 
of implicitly and explicitly expected product/service features all affect a customer’s level 
of satisfaction. Finally, value magnifiers and destroyers are interaction features that focus 
on the customer as a person, i.e. the way the customer is treated by the supplier. They can 
even destroy or magnify the value created by the product/service attributes.  
His discussion undoubtedly reflects a supplier’s perspective. He argues that these three 
customer value angles complement each other in the sense that “to be able to offer 
customers superior value for exchange [i.e. the overarching, value exchange model], a firm 
should understand how to generate and accumulate value for customers, what forms 
customer value may take, and what factors influence the accumulation of value [i.e. the 
value buildup model] […] in order to build up value, it is essential to know what elements 
or components may create or destroy value [dynamics of customer value]” (Khalifa, 
2004:660). In this way, Woodall’s (1994) viewpoint also subscribes to the central 
assumption of the SI literature that the creation of value to the customer will eventually 
produce value to the firm; i.e. it also focuses on the value outcomes of customer value 
creation and delivery. 
 
Within a discussion on SI, Khalifa’s (2004) conception contributes in three respects.  
First, it pinpoints the importance of adding additional benefits to customers; a claim also 
made by the strategic marketing literature in general. Total solutions (e.g., van der Haar et 
al., 2001), experience and meaning (e.g., Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002) have been 
frequently suggested as value enhancers. The stress the SI-concept puts on the offering’s 
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intrinsic value (Woodall, 2003) emphasizes that customer value creation entails more than 
just increasing a customer’s net benefit; it is about enhancing, or even innovating the 
benefits, not just lowering the price (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999). Ulaga (2003) developed a 
‘value drivers wheel’, which suppliers can use to differentiate themselves on other value 
drivers than just price. Simpson et al. (2001) argue that many customers are becoming less 
interested in mere products or services, but require total solutions. Hence, suppliers should 
be able to bundle products and services (Normann & Ramírez, 1993; Vargo & Lusch, 
2004; Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). Since an offering only has value to the degree the 
customer can use it to leverage his own value creation, the offering should moreover 
increase the customer’s own value creating potential (Normann & Ramírez, 1993). Hence, 
for business-to-business customers the evaluation of the value proposition will have a 
highly pragmatic and business results-oriented emphasis (Woodall, 2003). The procurer 
should be convinced that the offering will contribute to the firm’s profitability (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 2000). The literature on value creation has been critiqued for exactly this lack 
of integration between a supplier’s value chain and a customer’s value chain (Payne & 
Holt, 2001). Woodruff’s (1997) value hierarchy model that links attributes of the offering 
to a customer’s own goals and purposes could provide useful insights in this respect. 
 
Secondly, Khalifa’s (2004) model embeds the concept of customer value within a more 
modern perspective of relationship marketing, instead of a pure transactional context 
(Payne & Holt, 2000). This view is echoed in Ulaga (2003) who critiques extant research 
on customer value for focusing too much on product-related issues instead of on the 
relational dimension of customer-perceived value. He moreover pleads for a better 
incorporation of the multidimensional character of relationship value.  Prahalad (2004) 
even announces a new value creation model, one that is moving away form a transaction-
based value creation model towards the full co-creation of value and the embeddedness of 
value in personalized experience. In similar vein, Ramírez (1999) makes a plea for ‘value 
co-production’. Services included should expand in order to contribute to a total and 
individually tailored meaningful customer ‘experience’ (Sharma et al., 2001; Khalifa, 
2004). The tailoring of offers to individual customers is however not a new idea; it has 
been well developed in the literature on one-to-one marketing. Simonson (2005) moreover 
indicates that in many business-to-business and service contexts it has gradually become 
the standard practice. In a business-to-business context business relationships have been 
attributed with both economic value (fulfilling economics needs at a minimum cost) and 
social value (satisfaction with the relationship) (Gassenheimer et al., 1998).  
 
Thirdly, Khalifa’s (2004) focus on the dynamic character of value creation stresses the 
continuous need to add additional and new value attributes. Webster et al. (2005) consider 
this a clear break with the past ‘short-termism’ of marketing literature. Within their pleas 
for superior customer value creation and the establishment of new markets, SI scholars 
have emphasized a ‘redefinition of the market space’ (Hamel, 1996) and the innovation of 
customer value. Slywotsky & Wise (2004) speak of ‘demand innovation’. Also Kim & 
Mauborgne’s (1997, 1999) use of the term ‘value innovation’ leaves no doubt. They 
(1999) indicate that the difference between value innovation and value creation is that the 
latter covers a much broader arena of strategic maneuvers (e.g., price cutting), and leaves 
room for value creation on an incremental scale (e.g., incremental product innovation). In 
the same vein, Normann & Ramírez (1993) argue that, especially in the present volatile 
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economic environment, strategy is no longer a problem of positioning (products, markets, 
supply chain) but involves a reinvention of value. Offerings should hence deliver customer 
value that is good enough in terms of the old attributes, but that exceeds performance in 
new attributes (Markides & Charitou, 2002). In addition, the offering could include 
elements that have not yet been considered as essential in the traditional meaning (Khalifa, 
2004). In this respect, suppliers do have to pay attention to customers’ desired value 
changes as well (Flint et al., 2002). Value propositions should moreover stretch beyond 
industry boundaries (Baden-Fuller, 1995; Kim & Mauborgne, 1999; Krinsky & Jenkins, 
1997). Authors have proposed that dramatically new value propositions, resting on deviant 
market compositions and/or behaviors may yield a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Jaworski et al., 2000). Research on value innovation has indeed demonstrated that 
business innovations targeting new market spaces account for a much higher profit 
increase than do incremental line extensions (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997, 1999, 2004). In 
this way, SI scholars have carried the idea of overturning industry conventions to the field 
of customer value itself. Especially Christensen has elaborated on this issue.  
 
Generally, in their attempts to outcompete their competitors companies tend to stretch their 
products and services upmarket by means of ‘sustaining innovations’. This is because 
incumbents operate within a specific ‘value network’. This means a context where 
customer problems and systems of use are defined in specific performance attributes (e.g., 
high speed and low cost per copy for Xerox; simplicity, low machine cost, small size, ease 
of use for Canon) that consequently appeal to a specific type of customers. Firms tend to 
implement innovations that are valued by their markets; innovations that address customer 
needs within their established value network. “It is difficult for established firms to 
marshall resources behind innovations that do not address the needs of known, present and 
powerful customers” (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995: 255-256). Christensen & 
Rosenbloom, (1995) argue that many incumbents do not redefine their systems of use, 
since this involves far more poorly defined and risky commercial opportunities and the 
establishment of new value networks and new markets. New and more-advanced product-
line extensions are hence introduced in order to target the most-sophisticated, high-end 
(and hence high-profit) customers within this value network. In doing so, companies 
overshoot the needs of most customers. Instead, neglected customer segments or neglected 
customer needs may be targeted (Styles & Goddard, 2004; Markides, 1997) and customer 
expectations and behaviors may be changed (Hamel & Getz, 2004; Jaworski et al., 2000; 
Kumar et al., 2000). Still, the latter view contests the idea widely shared in marketing 
literature that customer retention (by better serving existing customers) increases chances 
for long term success (Payne & Holt, 2001). 
 
Departing from the two fundamental aspects of SI, many authors have centered their 
discussions on proposing various approaches companies can follow to achieve SI. The 
creation of a new business model, a redefinition of roles and (power) relationships in the 
industry inclusive, has been suggested as an expedient tactic (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1: Clarifying the notion of strategic innovation (SI) 
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1.4 THE CONCRETE APPROACH TO STRATEGIC INNOVATION 
 
Deviating from the industry rules of competition and creating substantially superior 
customer value almost logically imply adjustments to the business model. In current 
turbulent times, Hamel & Välikangas (2003) argue, mere reliance on momentum 
(regulatory protection, stable product paradigms, high-entry barriers, etc.) does not sustain 
success. Instead, new ‘who-what-how’ combinations (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001; 
Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004, 2005; Markides, 1998, 1999a) should be introduced, 
which impose changes in terms of the product or service offering, pricing, distribution 
methods, market approach, customer service, or a combination of these (Styles & Goddard, 
2004).  
Accordingly several authors have stressed that, ultimately, SI originates from the invention 
of a new business model (Styles & Goddard, 2004) or a fundamental reconceptualization 
of the existing business model (Markides & Charitou, 2004; Charitou & Markides, 2003; 
Schlegelmilch et al., 2003). Others have called this ‘a redesign of the end-to-end value 
chain’ (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004). According to 
Hamel (1998a,b; 1999; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003), the invention of an  entirely new 
business model or the radical redesign of existing business models is hence the only way 
companies can grow and wealth can be created in ‘the present economic environment’. 
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Some scholars have even operationalized their study of SI as an analysis in terms of 
business models. For example, Styles & Goddard (2004) and Markides & Charitou (2002) 
constructed an exploratory measure of SI, largely based upon Slywotsky’s (1996) and 
Day’s (1990) work on business models.  
 
While, especially in recent publications, Markides, Hamel and Govindarajan take a 
‘fundamentally different business model’ as a defining element of SI, the starting point of 
Kim & Mauborgne’s and Christensen’s discussions are more centered on the issue of 
customer value creation. Their articles are punctuated with phrases such as ‘new product 
and service offering’ (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997; Christensen & Overdorf, 2000), ‘quantum 
leap in buyer value’ (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999), ‘fundamentally different value curve’ 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 2002), ‘buyer utility map’ (Kim & Mauborgne, 2000), and ‘the 
creation of entirely new markets’ (Christensen et al., 2002).  
However, they too, call attention to the value of the business model. Since customer value 
comes from utility and price and company value comes from cost and price, cost should be 
driven down while simultaneously customer utility is enhanced (Kim & Mauborgne, 2000, 
2004). The alignment of the entire system of price, cost and utility (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2004) often requires a different cost structure, and different distribution and operating 
processes (Christensen et al., 2002). A redefinition of the business model is hence required 
(Christensen et al., 2000; 2002).  
 
Other scholars carry the discussion even one step further. In their view, value creation 
stretches outside the focal firm to involve customers and suppliers (Baden-Fuller, 1995), or 
other actors in the supply chain. This view is consistent with the stress Khalifa (2004) has 
put on relationship marketing. Normann & Ramírez (1993) even advocate a reinvention of 
the entire value-creating system. They argue that in order to create new value companies 
should surpass the barriers of the firm or industry, and conceive entirely new value 
constellations (involving suppliers, customers, allies, etc.). New value is then invented by 
means of an integrated business system that optimally fits together the various 
competencies of all parties. Firms can direct this system by occupying a position at the 
nexus of different suppliers and customers (Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002). This viewpoint 
matches the idea put forward by the IMP-group (e.g. Ford et al., 1998), that a firm is no 
isolated entity but embedded within a network of relationships. Changing the firm’s 
business model will hence automatically produce effects on external parties as well. 
To create SI, the entire value creating system has to be redesigned, roles and relationships 
should be reconfigured and different players should be mobilized.  
 
This assertion can in fact be backed by our previous discussion on industry recipes. 
The Porac et al.’s (1989) study previously mentioned indicated the complex interweaving 
of technical and cognitive factors in a transactional network. A business definition requires 
a choice of specific business model and transactional network (e.g., the use of distributors). 
“Reciprocally, each choice reinforces this definition by narrowing the range of informal 
channels through which relevant market information flows. The result is a competitive 
arena defined by symmetrical mental models throughout the value chain” (: 410).  
Decision makers’ perception of the marketplace remains thus limited to the one 
determining, and determined by, the existing business definition. In a similar vein, 
Abrahamson & Fombrun (1994) assert that value-added networks shape macrocultures, 
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which in turn determine managers’ competitive attention, interpretation, strategic action 
and, hence, the value-added network. A value-added network engenders a macroculture 
that secures and even fortifies the network’s own raison d’être. They hence share Porac et 
al.’s (1989) point of view about the circular influence between the structure of a value-
added network (e.g. a supply chain) and macrocultural competitive beliefs. The mutual 
reinforcement between a macroculture and a transactional network may lead to dense or 
even suffocating macrocultures, and to value networks that may make member 
organizations collectively vulnerable to exogenous shocks to the network structure, 
producing collective strategic failure (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). In other words, it is 
the continuity of social interaction over time, established in a structured value-added 
network, that produces convention. Or, as Miller & Chen (1996: 1213) say: “The passage 
of time […] brings with it mutual mimesis and the mantle of tradition”. Assuming that 
exchange networks correspond to networks of social ties (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994), 
one could argue that only different value-added networks will lead to different social 
networks, different strategic core beliefs, and different strategic actions. Alternatively, 
different strategic assumptions and perceptions may lead to different actions, which will in 
turn affect the value-added network required. 
 
The work of Normann & Ramírez (1993) hence draws attention to the role of additional, 
non-customer stakeholders in the entire value-creation process. These same ideas have 
been reflected in the work by Jaworski et al. (2000) who stressed the value of changing the 
entire market structure in order to improve customer value and/or the performance of the 
focal business. Low value-adding players in the supply chain can be eliminated (e.g. 
disintermediation of the supply chain to eliminate distribution parties by e-commerce 
channels, Sharma et al., 2001), new players can be added (e.g. add complementary service 
providers), or the functions different players in the market perform can be modified (e.g. 
forward or backward integration).  
 
Furthermore, given the complexities it takes to drive markets, pooling capabilities and 
resources across different organizations in order to jointly change markets might prove 
more effective than when a single organization undertakes this venture on its own 
(Jaworski et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 1998). Indeed, the benefits of networks for renewal have 
been largely documented (Ford et al., 1998; Malhotra et al., 2005; Baden-Fuller & 
Volberda, 1997, Håkansson et al., 1999). Criticizing the sequential character of value 
creation, inherent to the traditional concept of a supply chain, Ramírez (1999) makes a plea 
for ‘value co-production’, and a reconceptualization of value creation as “synchronic and 
interactive, not linear and transitive” (: 50). The shift from linear sequential supply chains 
to the establishment of value webs and alliances is, according to Prahalad (2004), a logical 
consequence of the shift in the underlying value creation model from product-innovation to 
the innovation of customer experience. In his view, changing a linear supply chain toward 
a web model of joint value creation is especially useful since industry boundaries are 
becoming customer-driven, making traditional industry boundaries extend towards other 
industries. Authors have hence asserted that strategic innovation hence implies the meta-
competence to leverage and bundle the value-creating activities of different parties into 
one system of “interconnected, co-productive offerings” (Normann & Ramírez, 1993: 77). 
This highlights the importance of partnerships and alliances with parties inside or outside 
the traditional industry (van der Zande, 2001; Normann & Ramírez, 1993; Vandenbosch & 
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Dawar, 2002) when pursuing an exploration-oriented strategy. Although strategic alliances 
and partnerships are often established for specific strategic purposes, their value can well 
extend beyond these initial motives. Empirics demonstrated that the exchange of 
experience among partners can challenge partners’ dominant logic and market 
interpretation (Holmqvist, 2004). Strategic relations with other firms hence provide an 
invaluable source of new ideas and opportunities for strategic innovation (Shimizu & Hitt, 
2004). Accordingly, value innovators have been found to often use a network of partners to 
provide them with complementary assets, capabilities, products and services (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999).  
Hence, strategic innovation requires both a redefinition of the business model and of the 
roles and relationships in the industry. 
 
 
1.5 A FINAL CONCEPTUAL DELINEATION AND DEFINITION 
 
A study of the literature on SI has resulted in a first demarcation as to the contents of, and 
approach to SI. The inherent notion of change on a strategic level makes however a further 
comparison to existing, related concepts of ‘strategic change’ and ‘strategic renewal’ 
inevitable. It is furthermore impossible to imagine recent scientific management literature, 
especially contributions tackling issues of hypercompetition and environmental dynamism, 
without the concepts of strategic change and renewal.  
In addition, contrasting SI to related concepts will only help delineating the concept of SI 
even further. In other words, we first have followed Bagozzi’s (1984) advice to develop 
conceptual meaning within theory construction through ‘attributional definition’. This 
means we compared the different statements of SI characteristics put forward in the 
literature on SI and closely related managerial concepts. The process of attributional 
definition has revealed much of the nature of SI. Still, for reasons of completeness we will 
apply an additional method for conceptual development, this of ‘dispositional definition’ 
(Bagozzi, 1984). This method consists of identifying associations and relationships with 
other related concepts, in this case concepts of strategic change and strategic renewal. This 
process will finally result in a definition of SI.  
 
However, neither the concept of strategic change, neither this of strategic renewal have 
been conceptualized as monomorphous constructs. Both the contributions on strategic 
change and strategic renewal show much diversity in terms of research questions 
answered, theoretical frameworks used, definition (incl. the definition of the concept of 
strategic change and renewal in itself) and operationalization of key variables, and 
methodology used (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Still, despite its diversity, some 
underlying patterns of general consensus can be discerned, particularly in the literature on 
strategic renewal. Since the concept of strategic renewal has gradually begun to replace the 
concept of strategic change (Huff et al., 1992), we will especially focus on strategic 
renewal. 
 
A study of the literature reveals that accents between SI and strategic renewal differ chiefly 
along the following dimensions: contents (locus and degree) and process (see Figure 1.2). 
We will treat them successively. We would however like to stress that differences 
mentioned describe distinctions between these two literature streams in general. This does 
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not alter the fact that, given the plethora of contributions, some specific authors may 
slightly dissociate their viewpoints from the general tendencies indicated here.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: SI versus strategic renewal: Main distinctions 
External: market, industryInternal: competences
Vaguely defined
Covers entire spectrum 
(competence exploitation Æ competence development)
Depth of change in relation to effects on    
subject firm (cfr. locus)
Well specified
Limited to mid/right of spectrum 
(rule breaking Æ rule changing)
Depth of change in relation to 
effects on industry (cfr. locus)
Marginally treated: org. side conditions
No clear perspective 
(assumption: gradualist)
Start-ups vs established companies    
(growing attention for explor.-exploit 
tension)
Extensively treated: ‘renewal journeys’
Gradualist change perspective
Focus on large, established firms             
(much attention for explor.-exploit 
tension)
Contents:
Locus
Contents:
Degree
Process
STRATEGIC RENEWAL STRATEGIC INNOVATION
 
 
1.5.1 Contents: locus 
 
In contrast to the organizational change literature, merely treating process aspects of 
change, content issues have been treated explicitly in strategic renewal contributions 
(Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997). However, content issues have been described in broad 
and vague terms, and authors have clearly been inspired by a strong inwardly-focused, 
competence-based research tradition. In almost all definitions the term ‘competences’ does 
literally appear (e.g., Flier et al., 2003). ‘Renewal’ is hence defined from the perspective of 
the firm undergoing the change, not the industry. Little attention is paid to the differential 
effects of these changes on competitors, or other parties in the supply chain. 
 
Scholars on SI take up a contrasting standpoint; the path-breaking character of SI has no 
internal but an external reference point (Baden-Fuller, 1995). In other words, its 
innovativeness lies specifically in that it deviates from industry rules of the game (e.g., 
Markides, 1998, 1999b). In this respect, the effects of SI may also surpass the boundaries 
of the change-undertaking organization towards the industry level, in that it may even alter 
the industry rules of the game (Baden-Fuller, 1995). As already mentioned, the latter 
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meaning bears resemblance to Schumpeter’s (1934) concept of ‘creative destruction’ in the 
field of technological innovation, in that it redefines the sources of competitive advantage 
in an existing industry. As such, SI can, in its most extreme form, even create entirely 
different industries (Abernathy & Clark, 1985).  
 
The external focus of the SI concept also carries with it a strong notion of market-linking 
activities (Johnson et al., 2003). Whereas strategic renewal’s focus on internal competence 
deployment or creation does, by definition, not imply a dramatic increase in customer 
value, or a fundamentally new value proposition, it is exactly the latter aspect that is a 
defining element of SI. To use Abernathy & Clark’s (1985) vocabulary, SI stresses the 
‘market transilience’ of an innovation, i.e. the capacity of an innovation to influence the 
established systems of marketing. Accordingly, in SI literature marketing aspects have 
been given a far more crucial role in strategy contents. This is also exemplified by 
marketing scholars’ interest into this specific type of innovation (e.g., Jaworski et al., 
2000). SI literature thus endorses the viewpoint of modern perspectives on marketing that 
it is the mission of marketing to actively influence markets and to create disequilibrium 
(Dickson, 1996). In conclusion, SI is in comparison to strategic renewal more externally-
focused, both in terms of reference point and in terms of effects. 
 
1.5.2 Contents: degree 
 
Defining the locus of renewal as primarily internal to the organization, scholars on 
strategic renewal also consider the depth of change relative to the existing organizational 
competence base. Accordingly, also the distinction between incremental and 
transformational change is drawn from the perspective of the subject firm, without much 
regard to the effect on the environment.  
Moreover, although strategic renewal clearly distinguishes between the different degrees of 
change, it still covers the entire spectrum from competence deployment to competence 
definition (Floyd & Lane, 2000), or from competence reordering to competence 
revitalization (Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997). In this respect, the literature on strategic 
renewal bears much resemblance to the literature on strategic change. Critiquing the 
latter’s vagueness, Rajagopalan & Spreitzer (1996) mention that while it is clear from the 
literature that strategic change should result in a change in the contents of a firm’s strategy, 
there is however no indication how deep this change should be. It may result in major, or 
minor changes in a firm’s strategy, incremental or transformational, involving a major shift 
in the underlying knowledge structure, cause maps and ideologies, or not.  
Innovation is however no unequivocal concept; it has many dimensions. Fundamental 
differences across different innovation types hence preclude universal innovation theories. 
Therefore, Sheremata (2004) argues that research should far more explicitly distinguish 
between innovations of a more radical and a more incremental type in order to improve 
insights into the competitive consequences of innovation.  
This call has however been better responded by SI scholars. This literature is much clearer 
about the degree of change required for SI. More specifically, the depth or degree of 
innovation depicts a continuum from incremental (rule-following, -enhancing) over rule-
deviating, up to rule-changing on an industry level. SI is limited to only the mid/mid-right 
of this innovation continuum. 
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In conclusion, strategic renewal covers the entire continuum of (internal) competence 
change. Although some authors do indeed mention the various external effects (or 
motives) specific types of renewal can have (e.g., Floyd & Lane, 2000 mention changes in 
a firm’s product-market domain), it is not their main concern. For example, Volberda et al. 
(2001a) indicate types of strategic renewal that follow industry rules (‘emergent’ and 
‘directed renewal’), whereas ‘facilitated’ and ‘transformational renewal’ influence or even 
change industry rules of the game. Still, these authors focus on the different renewal 
trajectories firms develop over time, fixing their attention merely on the internal aspects of 
renewal and leaving less thought for market consequences of these strategies. The pivotal 
issue in contributions on strategic renewal is consequently the study of process aspects of 
incremental versus frame-breaking strategic renewal trajectories. This frame-breaking 
character is moreover considered primarily vis-à-vis the existing competence base, and not 
in relation to the industry rules of the game. Yet, change inside the organization does not 
necessarily imply innovation in market terms (Baden-Fuller, 1995). Kim & Mauborgne 
(1999: 49) also critique this prevalent resource-based view of the firm by stating that: “An 
inwardly driven focus on capabilities within a company, however, significantly limits a 
company’s opportunity horizon and introduces resistance to change if the market is 
evolving away from a company’s forte”.  
 
Likewise, SI-scholars’ focus on external effects has often distracted their attention from 
the internal consequences of change. Although SI may require –fundamental– internal 
organizational changes, this issue tends to fade into the background of SI discourses. The 
fact whether competences need developing, changing, stretching, reconfiguring or mere 
exploiting is often considered as only a matter of secondary importance, and has certainly 
not yet been explored in depth. Even though some authors on SI have warned for an overly 
emphasis on either an inside-out, either an outside-in perspective on SI (e.g., Markides, 
1998, 2000) their actual viewpoints and discussions are inclined towards the latter.  
Baden-Fuller (1995) notes that this separation of the inside-out (prevalent in strategic 
renewal literature) and outside-in perspective (prevalent in SI literature) has been 
characteristic for strategic management research. Even though the separated development 
of both approaches initially served the development of the field, it has gradually become 
more of an impediment. He points out that especially the concept of SI could unify both 
views by following a more dynamic resource-based theory of the firm. The outside-in (or 
market selection and positioning) perspective and the inside-out (or internal change) view 
are ultimately intertwined. After all, “Although they differ in time horizon, these two 
sources of competitive advantage [core competences and strategic position] are linked, 
because core competencies develop through […] interactions with factor and product 
markets as the firm seeks distinctive ways to create customer value or to deliver value 
efficiently” (Floyd & Lane, 2000:155). Therefore exactly, we positioned SI within the 
theoretical stream of the dynamic resource-based perspective. 
 
In conclusion, researchers of strategic renewal on the one hand and of SI on the other seem 
to complement each other well in terms of fort and weakness. Although SI contributions 
have highlighted external aspects of innovation, at least, this external focus should be 
complemented with an internal focus on developing an overall internal organizational 
capacity to create SI (Carrillat et al., 2004).  
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1.5.3 Process 
 
Although scholars have explicitly stressed the three-dimensional character of the concept 
of strategic renewal (content, process, context) (Volberda et al., 2001b), their attention 
largely fixes on process aspects. The stress on competence redefinition (or better in the 
active form: ‘redefining’) is a corollary in this literature. This has logically focused 
research on renewal ‘journeys’ (Volberda et al., 2001a) of large, established firms. 
Consequently, also the exploration-exploitation tension, which is so typical for this kind of 
companies, has extensively been treated in this literature (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Floyd 
& Lane, 2000; Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997).  
 
The traditional notion of punctuated change patterns (e.g. Tushman et al. 1986) has 
prevailed for a long time in the strategic change management literature (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1996; Genus, 1995). Tushman et al. (1986), for example, describe organizational 
evolution as long periods of ‘convergence’ (small, incremental changes), punctuated by 
‘upheaval’ (painful and risky revolutions involving discontinuous, system-wide changes). 
In contrast, the strategic renewal literature follows a more gradualist and long-term 
perspective on change journeys (Leavy, 1997; Ravasi & Lojacono, 2005). The 
evolutionary (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003), iterative, continuous (Huff 
et al., 1992), though purposeful (Ravasi & Lojacono, 2005) character of strategic renewal 
processes is emphasized. Accordingly, Volberda et al. (2001a: 160-161) define strategic 
renewal as “an ongoing journey instead of a shift from one state to the other”. Huff et al. 
(1992) even assert that it is especially this belief that has made the concept of strategic 
renewal replace the concept of ‘one-off’ strategic change.  
 
The more process aspects have been tackled in strategic renewal literature, the more SI 
scholars have ignored them. SI scholars’ predisposition towards content issues of SI has 
clearly diverted their attention from process aspects. Yet, whereas seminal SI writings 
exclusively treated content aspects (Markides, 1998; Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001, Styles 
& Goddard, 2004; Christensen et al., 2002; all publications by Kim & Mauborgne), other 
authors, especially in later publications, have extended their discussion towards ideas 
regarding process issues. For example, Baden-Fuller (1995) mentions the need to build an 
organizational capacity for SI, largely embedded within corporate entrepreneurship. Larsen 
et al.’s (2002) empirical findings pointed to the beneficial company and industry effects of 
continuous SI, and Hamel & Välikangas (2003) plea for the creation of ‘strategic 
resilience’.  
The assumption underlying these publications is that SI is not a non-recurrent need. Hamel 
& Välinkangas (2003) even literally stress that SI is no turnaround; “it should be 
continuous and opportunity-driven, rather than episodic and crisis-driven” because a 
turnaround is a “transformation tragically delayed” (: 54). Likewise, Govindarajan & 
Gupta (2001) posit that the quest for changing the rules of the game is a never-ending 
process, and Christensen et al. (2002) argue that managers should already embark on new 
business projects when the business is still going well. Although one could argue that these 
authors are inclined to a more gradualist approach, overall, most SI scholars have restricted 
their discussions to an indication of general organizational side-conditions and tools, 
without further specifying the exact SI-process. For example, Markides’ (1999a) advice to 
build a ‘reinforcing organizational mosaïc’, Kim & Mauborgne’s (2002) ‘strategy canvas’, 
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and the ‘strategy wheel’ put forward by Styles & Goddard (2004). Overall, readers are kept 
dangling whether a one-off, turnaround, or gradualist approach is to be preferred in the 
context of SI.  
 
Furthermore, strategic renewal scholars’ exclusive focus on large, established incumbent 
companies is less apparent within SI discussions. Where prior SI-articles made abstraction 
as to whether new start-ups or established companies were best fit for SI, later publications 
made room for much debate on this issue (e.g., Markides & Geroski, 2003a,b; cfr. infra). 
Consequently, discussions on the management of dual business models (and exploitation-
exploration trade-offs) that have been so prevalent in strategic renewal articles, became 
explicitly treated in later SI-literature as well, e.g. by Markides & Charitou (2004). 
 
Apart from the differences in contents and process we discerned in the literature review, a 
more subtle difference on ‘motive’ needs further explanation.  
Even a superficial reading of the SI-literature draws attention to statements, such as 
‘reshape the rules of competition’ (Baden-Fuller, 1995), ‘proactively break the rules’ 
(Markides, 1999a), ‘introduce major new value propositions’ (Markides, 2004a,b), and 
‘alter the business’ (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005). Hamel & Välinkangas (2003: 54) 
stress: “the capacity to change before the case for change becomes desperately obvious”. 
These phrases all have rather proactive connotations. Our discussion on the basic traits of 
SI and on herd behavior and the industry recipe elucidates that strategic innovation casts 
off industrial conventions in a proactive way (Hamel, 1996). Proactive moves transcend 
the competitive structure or market preferences (Johnson et al., 2003). Proactivity means 
that firms initiate change, or even actively influence the external environment (Evans, 
1991; Sandberg, 2002. Yet, proactivity may also have a less drastic connotation. It might 
imply that firms act before they are forced to react to environmental threats and 
opportunities. In this sense, although SI is not a pure reaction to environmental changes, it 
can still be a reaction to the symptoms of coming change (Sandberg, 2002).  
In contrast, in definitions of strategic renewal phrases such as ‘align the organization with 
a changing environment’ are prominently present (e.g., van der Zande, 2001; Huff et al., 
1992). Although some scholars even speak of “adjust to environmental shocks”, “adjust to 
competition” (Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997:96) and “adaptation to broad environmental 
shocks” (Ravasi & Lojacono, 2005: 52), emphasizing a reactive, ex-post behavior, other 
publications also mention more ex ante, protective moves (i.e., hedging in view of 
expected environmental shifts) (Evans, 1991). Volberda et al. (2001a), even discern 
renewal journeys aimed at influencing or even changing industry rules. Furthermore, 
scholars on strategic renewal do not adhere to the idea of strict environmental determinism, 
which considers the environment as completely immutable and managerial actions as a 
‘black-box’ (cfr, the rational lens perspective on strategic change, Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1996). Explicit room is indeed left for managerial action and initiative. For 
example, Flier et al. (2003) stress managerial intentionality and speak of strategic renewal 
as managerial actions to align competencies with the environment.  
So even though one might argue that the concept of SI distinguishes itself from strategic 
renewal by its larger emphasis on proactivity, some authors have associated proactivity 
with strategic renewal as well. As differences in motive between SI and strategic renewal 
are unclear and subtle, we therefore did not explicitly incorporate ‘motive’ as a fourth main 
distinction between the two concepts (see Figure 1.2).  
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Based on the literature study of contributions on SI, related managerial concepts and the 
concept of strategic renewal, we are finally able to define SI.  
 
 
 
This definition of SI enables us to further define the concept of ‘strategic innovation 
capacity’. As already mentioned, empirics demonstrated that sustained competitive 
advantage does not so much originate from entry, imitation or mobility barriers, but from 
continuous SI (Larsen et al., 2002, 2003). What is important in the long run is hence the 
capacity to systematically create SI (Baden-Fuller, 1995).  
Following this line of argument, the literature of SI has extensively drawn attention to the 
need to develop a portfolio of SI experiments.  
 
 
1.6 STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY 
 
In an emerging business, estimates for market potential and expenditure levels are, to say 
the least, prone to poor judgments (Leifer et al., 2001). For the success of an initiative can 
only be evaluated with hindsight (Markides, 1999a), Baden-Fuller & Stopford (1996) 
maintain that every initiative with the potential to create a growing and satisfied customer 
base should seriously be taken into consideration, even though not all SIs will turn out to 
be successful (Baden-Fuller, 1995). Initial expectations can enhance through trial and error 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004; Hamel & Getz, 2004; cfr. the learning lens perspective on 
strategic change, Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Successful SI consequently comes from 
‘portfolios of options’ (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004), taking “multiple, well-informed bets” by 
implementing “parallel innovation streams” (Pitt, 1998:559). The latter is what scholars 
have called ‘the probe and learn process’ (Lynn et al., 1996) or ‘theory-focused planning’ 
(Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004).  It has hence been argued that the more creative a firm is 
in the process of  strategic idea generation (i.e. new ‘who-what-how’ combinations), the 
higher its chances to end up with an innovative, rule-breaking strategy (Markides, 1999b; 
in Mang, 2000). This viewpoint can be also embedded within Burgelman’s framework 
(1991), which maps ideas from population ecology to the organizational level. According 
to Burgelman (1991), the only way organizations can escape the forces of environmental 
selection is by the creation of an internal selection environment that produces a wide 
variety of strategic initiatives (cfr. Floyd & Lane, 2000). Such variety can in turn originate 
through trial and error or through a formal planning process (Markides in Mang, 2000). 
 
Ideally, experiments are small-scale to limit risks (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1996), while 
being broad-based enough to accommodate a variety of potential perturbations (Hamel & 
Välikangas, 2003). Organizations can hence ‘de-risk’ big opportunities by low-cost 
Strategic innovation entails the creation of new and substantially superior customer 
value by a new and fundamentally different way of playing the game in an existing 
industry. It implies the deviance from traditional industry assumptions and conventions 
and, as such, has the potential of altering the rules of the game in an industry.  
Strategic innovation can be achieved by redefining the business model and the roles 
and (power) relationships in the industry 
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experimentation that is rapidly deployed (Hamel & Getz, 2004). Especially when 
untraditional initiatives are taken at the periphery of the business, a portfolio of options is 
far more useful than placing one big bet (Day & Schoemaker, 2004b). In similar vein, 
Markides (1997) has stressed the value of low-scale and high-scope experimenting to 
reduce the risks of SI. In fact, risk is hedged over different initiatives; the goal is not to 
totally avoid unsuccessful ones, but to increase chances of ‘one big winner’ and to 
maximize the entire portfolio’s pay-off (Hamel, 1999). In smaller, less-resourceful 
organizations, the use of small trials can furthermore be an alternative to the set-up of 
entire parallel innovation projects (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004).  
Successful strategic innovators purposefully create internal variety and allow the outside 
market decide the winners and losers (Stringer, 2000; Markides, 1998). This is why 
strategic experiments are to be conducted in live commercial settings in order to learn how 
customers interact with and react to the initiative (Hamel & Getz, 2004; Lynn et al., 1996). 
In addition, SI experiments are not limited to new-product pipelines but should also 
embrace experiments in areas such as pricing, distribution, advertising and customer 
service (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). 
SI hence proceeds with a plethora of strategic experiments to test the commercial viability 
of new business ideas (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004, 2005; Hamel, 1998b; Hamel & 
Välikangas, 2003). We call such strategic experiments ‘strategic innovation initiatives’ 
(SIinitiatives). 
 
A portfolio of initiatives does not only increase chances of a successful SI or decrease the 
risks of SI, but is furthermore required in the longer term. For example, Hamel & 
Välikangas (2003) argue that strategic resilience builds on variety.  
Following neo-classical economics, a one-shot strategic innovation may only lead to 
temporary advantages through exploiting monopoly positions during competitors’ 
response lag. In fact, the possibility to exploit a monopoly position will be ended by 
imitation, which will eventually erode margins (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997; Govindarajan & 
Gupta, 2001). Alternatively, disruptors may fall prey to disruption themselves (Christensen 
et al., 2002; Charitou & Markides, 2003). At this time the firm should exit and embark on 
a new (kind of) innovation (MacMillan et al., 1985; Abernathy & Clark, 1985). Larsen et 
al. (2002) found empirical evidence that continuously targeting new industry gaps, or 
continuous SI, can help sustain excess profits in the industry indefinitely. This stands in 
sharp contrast to traditional economic theory (e.g., Schumpeter’s theory on creative 
destruction) predicting the return of temporary excess profits to a competitive equilibrium 
state (Scherer, 1992). In this same vein, Dickson (1996) argues that comparative advantage 
is associated with the rate-of-change of suppliers (i.e. their higher-order learning); as long 
as a single supplier is learning more rapidly that its rivals, there will be heterogeneity in 
supplier and buyer behavior, and consequently “the market is never in a state of supply and 
demand equilibrium” (: 105). Authors have accordingly advised firms to have a strategy 
that is forever morphing (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003); companies need to constantly 
assess and redesign their value constellation (Normann & Ramírez, 1993). Johnson et al. 
(2003) argue that this is especially the case in the context of high environmental 
turbulence: having options available increases the likelihood that over time, a company can 
shape the market and stay ahead of it.  
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Consequently, in terms of sustained competitive advantage studies have demonstrated the 
beneficial effects of a continous innovation cycle (Larsen et al., 2002). As the quest for 
changing the rules of the game is a never-ending process (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001), 
companies need to develop the capacity to continuously strategically innovate over time 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 2004). Therefore, we focus on ‘strategic innovation capacity’ (SIcap).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows how the notion of SIcap can be embedded in the previous conceptual 
analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Clarifying the notion of strategic innovation capacity 
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SIcap is treated as the dependent variable of our study. This focus on SIcap brings process 
aspects to the forefront of the discussion, in contrast to the stress traditional SI 
contributions have laid on content aspects. By stressing the portfolio aspects of SIcap, a 
more gradualist than punctuationalist perspective on renewal journeys (Leavy, 1997) is 
supported. In this respect we follow the strategic renewal literature (cfr. section 1.5.3). 
Moreover, taking SIcap as the dependent variable in our study implies we answer the long-
We define strategic innovation capacity as an organization’s capacity to systematically 
create SI initiatives 
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standing need to operationalize the concept of SI (e.g., Baden-Fuller, 1995). Every medal 
has however its reverse: restricting ourselves to the concept of SIcap implies that success 
variables of SIinitiatives are not incorporated in our framework. Furthermore, we do not 
focus our study on organizational outcome variables (e.g., financial outcomes such as 
profit). 
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CHAPTER 2 
DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING MECHANISMS 
 
 
Having defined strategic innovation capacity in chapter 1, we are basically interested in 
any explanations that shed further light on the development of strategic innovation 
capacity. Empirical studies have shown that the type of innovation, and the level of its 
novelty, influences the determinants of innovative performance (Laursen & Salter, 2006; 
Damanpour, 1991). This implies that different kinds of innovations require different 
organizational contexts and different managerial interventions (Abernathy & Clark, 1985).  
However, much research that did focus on revolutionary strategic change (vis-à-vis the 
industry rules of the game) did so from an industry level perspective (see e.g., Abernathy 
& Clark, 1985). As indicated in the previous chapter (section 1.5.3), considerably less 
attention has been paid to more micro-level implications in terms of managerial practices 
and important organizational and external side conditions (Leifer et al., 2001). Even 
though the latter issues are increasingly being treated in research on product development, 
the inherent different nature of product development and SI may prove results 
nontransferable from one field to the other (Lynn et al., 1996). Therefore, in this chapter 
we rely on a conceptual study in order to find organizational mechanisms that firms may 
use in order to foster their level of strategic innovation capacity. 
 
 
2.1 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC INNOVATION CAPACITY 
 
2.1.1 Dynamic capabilities 
 
We take Winter’s (2000: 983) view upon a capability as “[…] a high-level routine (or 
collection of routines) that, together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an 
organization’s management a set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a 
particular type”. Winter (2003) later refers to these as ‘zero-level’ capabilities: the 
capabilities that enable a firm to ‘keep earning a living now’ by producing and selling the 
same outputs to the same customers over time. High-level routines, or zero-order 
capabilities, are thus the managerial and organizational processes that reflect patterns of 
current practice and learning (Teece & Pisano, 1994). In other words, they refer to the 
organization’s ability to perform a coordinated set of tasks while utilizing resources (i.e. 
tangible or intangible assets or production inputs) in order to produce a specific result, 
such as manufacturing a specific product (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003).  
 
In the previous chapter we defined SI as the creation of new and substantially superior 
customer value by a new and fundamentally different way of playing the game in an 
existing industry. It implies the deviance from traditional industry assumptions and 
conventions and, as such, has the potential of altering the rules of the game in an industry.  
SI can be achieved by redefining the business model and the roles and (power) 
relationships in the industry. Following this definition, SI implies a change in outputs 
and/or customers (Winter, 2003), and hence in the patterns of current practice and learning 
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(Teece & Pisano, 1994). In other words, SI implies a change in zero-order capabilities. 
Such a capabilities change can occur by means of ‘firefighting’; in an ad hoc fashion, due 
to environmental pressures, or as a result of serendipity (Winter, 2003).  
 
This approach contrasts however sharply with our definition of SIcap as an organization’s 
capacity to systematically create SI initiatives (see chapter 1). It is thus the systematic 
character of SIcap that calls for a more patterned and stable type of behavior. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, contributions on strategic renewal could complement the SI 
literature by their belief in gradual, continuous and purposeful change processes (Floyd & 
Lane, 2000; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Huff et al., 1992; Barr et al., 1992). Scholars have 
indeed argued that organizations cannot just choose strategic innovations, but rather have 
to build a trajectory. For example, Baden-Fuller (1995 : S11) asserts that “If innovating 
new strategies which involves new routines and new procedures is itself a competence 
(akin to learning) then innovating new strategies is likely to be a skill which has to be 
developed” (Baden-Fuller, 1995:  S11).  So, innovation in and of itself should be made a 
systemic organizational capability (Liedtka, 2000; Hamel, 1998a). Christensen et al. 
(2002) speak of the importance of building an organizational ‘innovation engine’: a robust 
and repeatable process to create and nurture new business initiatives over time. 
Linking this insight to Winter’s (2003) definition of zero-order capabilities hence means 
that organizations that want to develop SIcap should develop the capability (in itself a 
high-level routine) to constantly revise and redefine its existing capabilities (Zott, 2000). In 
other words, stimulating SIcap requires the ‘capability to systematically adjust 
capabilities’. This higher-order kind of capabilities, more specifically those that “operate to 
extend, modify, or create ordinary capabilities” have been called ‘dynamic capabilities’ 
(Winter, 2003: 991). This is why an exploration into the organizational antecedents of 
SIcap brings the concept of dynamic capabilities to the center of discussion.  
 
Dynamic capabilities were originally defined by Teece et al. (1997: 516) as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address 
rapidly changing environments”. Galunic & Eisenhardt (2001: 1229) use a similar 
formulation: “Dynamic capabilities are the organizational and strategic processes by which 
managers manipulate resources into new productive assets in the context of changing 
markets”. A more recent definition, stressing the market disruption dynamic capabilities 
can produce, can be found in Eisenhardt & Martin (2000: 1107): “The firm’s processes 
that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release 
resources – to match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the 
organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations 
as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die”.  
 
As such, the dynamic capability concept addresses both the ‘dynamic’, or ‘outside’ 
character of SI (i.e. renew and change in a shifting environment, deviate from the rule of 
the game) and the inside-out aspect of ‘capabilities’ strategists should dispose of in 
coordinating, reconfiguring and adapting internal and external resources and competences 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Tranfield & Smith, 1998; Winter, 2003). 
Regarding the first critical aspect, just as SI, the dynamic capabilities concept fits within 
the dynamic resource-based view of the firm (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) or hypercompetition 
perspective (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Rindova & Kotha, 2001), focusing mainly on a 
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Schumpeterian premise of innovation-based competition (Teece et al., 1997). Concerning 
the second aspect, the concept stresses internal organizational processes, more than 
Schumpeterians, and SI scholars alike, have done (Teece & Pisano, 1994), and could in 
this respect enrich the SI literature. More specifically, dynamic capabilities emphasize how 
organizational processes may be deployed and redeployed in changing or new markets 
(Teece et al., 1997). Moreover, dynamic capabilities do not only generate change inside the 
firm, they may also produce market change, which suggests the interaction between micro- 
and macro-environments (Jarzabkowski, 2004) stressed in the SI literature.  
 
As noted, dynamic capabilities can be considered as high-level routines, capable of 
changing other organizational (configurations of) routines, resources and capabilities (Zott, 
2003; Winter, 2003). Dynamic capabilities are in fact the ‘antecedent’ routines by which 
managers alter their firm’s resource base with the view of new value-creating strategies 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). As Winter (2000: 993) writes: “For a performance 
improvement to register at a given level of the hierarchy [i.e. dynamic capabilities, 
capabilities, routines, subroutines, etc.], there generally has to be improvement in some of 
the constituent processes at a lower level”. This means that the influence strategic 
aspirations have on a certain hierarchical level of routines always tends to be diffused to 
lower levels in a trickle-down way. In other words, if a change in dynamic capabilities is 
envisioned, this will impact capabilities and operating routines as well. Hence “a dynamic 
capability is a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the 
organization systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of 
improved effectiveness” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 340).  
Winter (2000) illustrates the concept by the example of Nucor, a steel company that 
learned the capability to produce steel by means of a new technique. The pace at which 
Nucor reached this learning depended on persistent organizational features that provided 
Nucor with a dynamic capability for innovation. The output of this dynamic capability is 
not steel, but new capabilities for making steel, Winter (2003) argues.  
 
The strategic decision making process, product development routines, knowledge creation 
routines, alliance and acquisition routines, etc. could be considered as such dynamic 
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Hence, despite their first-order level, dynamic 
capabilities are embedded in a firm’s processes (Teece & Pisano, 1994). 
Dynamic capabilities are in fact close to what have been called ‘search routines’ in 
evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 1982); search routines “represent a body of wisdom 
regarding any potential modification of its [the firm’s] business practices” (Zott, 2003: 
105). These bundles of ‘first-order’ routines have also been called ‘learning’ routines 
(Rindova & Kotha, 2001), ‘meta-routines’ (Adler et al., 1999; Tranfield & Smith, 1998), 
or ‘transformational experience’ (King & Tucci, 2002). 
 
In sum, the strategy literature starts to show conceptual consensus that “dynamic 
capabilities are embedded in routine organizational processes aimed at affecting change” 
(Zott, 2003: 120). Dynamic capabilities are meta-routines that change existing routines, 
establish new ones and thus systematize the creative process (Adler et al., 1999). The 
routine character of dynamic capabilities implies that as firms develop experience 
(gradually embedded in routines) for the development of capabilities, the costs associated 
with it tend to decrease over time (Zahra & George, 2002). Dynamic capabilities can hence 
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make firms become more efficient in their capability generation, and “The routinization of 
activity constitutes one of the most important aspects of a firm’s potential competitive 
advantage” (Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997: 101). 
The value of dynamic capabilities in the context of SI is manifest since they are specific 
strategic and organizational processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) that lead to new and 
innovative forms of competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). They can smoothen 
(quicken and improve) processes of capability replication, redeployment and 
recombination (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), which are often required for SI. Moreover, the 
systematic character of dynamic capabilities implies that firms adopting ad hoc, creative 
but disjointed actions in response to crises do not exert dynamic capabilities (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). Dynamic capabilities could hence stimulate SIcap as they are used “to build 
new resource configurations and to move into new strategic positions using a path-
breaking logic of strategic change […] Here, the goal is a series of temporary competitive 
advantages” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1118).  
In conclusion, fostering SIcap entails the development of dynamic capabilities
2 (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: SIcap requires dynamic capabilities 
Dynamic 
capabilities
SIcap
 
 
 
 
This brings us to the question where dynamic capabilities come from and how they 
develop. 
 
                                                          
2 In our view, dynamic capabilities are a necessary, though insufficient, condition for SIcap. 
Dynamic capabilities do not automatically lead to SIcap, but SIcap does require dynamic 
capabilities. 
Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
 39
2.1.2 Strategic learning mechanisms 
 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) observed that dynamic capabilities show commonalities across 
firms; basically there exists some industry ‘best practice’. Or, in other words, a dynamic 
capability in and of itself does not automatically create competitive distinction. In fact, 
differential firm performance arises only because of different resource and capability 
bundles applied in the market (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Zott (2003) later confirmed 
this in a simulation study. This assertion stands in contrast to what was originally 
suggested by Teece & Pisano (1994).  
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000), however, found that “these commonalities imply that 
dynamic capabilities are equifinal such that firms can develop these capabilities from many 
starting points and along different paths” (: 1116). They further argue that, as a 
consequence of this, it is not so much the contents of dynamic capabilities but their 
idiosyncratic evolution path and its timing aspects by which intra-industry performance 
differences are determined (see also, Zahra & George, 2002). A similar assertion had 
already been made by Amit & Schoemaker (1993), arguing that a firm’s processes to 
develop capabilities are a logical prior to their disposition of capabilities. 
The capacity to reconfigure and transform the organization is indeed itself a learned 
organizational skill (Teece & Pisano, 1994). In other words, organizations should learn 
routines that determine the development of subsequent routines (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
For example, the capability to experiment could be viewed as a dynamic capability. A firm 
can then reduce its reconfiguration costs by learning how to experiment in more efficient 
or effective ways (Zott, 2003). The organizational processes aimed at producing these 
effects are learning mechanisms for dynamic capabilities.  
Consequently, an inquiry into the mechanisms of dynamic capability creation should focus 
on a company’s underlying learning mechanisms. 
 
Eisenhardt & Martin’s (2000) view has also been echoed in Zollo & Winter (2002) and 
Winter (2003). Due to environmental dynamism, zero-order capabilities and even first-
order dynamic capabilities too, may prove unstable and perishable over time (Winter, 
2003; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In fact, dynamic capabilities, just as ordinary, 
operational capabilities, follow a development cycle of founding, development and 
maturity (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Therefore, it is the learning mechanisms that create and 
modify dynamic capabilities that may be considered as competitive key (Zollo & Winter, 
2002). Furthermore, Zollo & Winter (2002) argue that these learning mechanisms could 
even reflect a ‘second-order dynamic capability’ in itself if they are systematic in nature, 
i.e. if the organization’s approach to learning is a dynamic and persistent feature of the 
organization.  
 
Similar ideas have been postulated in the marketing literature. Making a plea for a theory 
of dynamic competition, Dickson (1996) argues that a firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage does not lie within its product cost or value, but within its higher-order learning 
processes. Higher-order learning processes are then defined as processes and systems 
instituted within the firm that deterministically (i.e. not accidentally) drive its learning 
capacity (i.e. innovation and imitation in a market), and in this way determine its supply 
function over time. Processes for higher-order learning (or deuterolearning) thus improve 
learning reinforcement processes in themselves; they are used to “learn how to learn”, e.g. 
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processes to constantly improve a firm’s market orientation (Day, 1994). The underlying 
logic is that when a firm possesses, manages and sustains its higher-order learning 
mechanisms better than its rivals, it better controls its learning capacity (leaving less to 
chance) which may in turn lead to a sustainable competitive advantage (Dickson, 1996). 
The assumption is that (first-order) learning processes can be readily imitated but that the 
underlying organizational capacity that determines the rate by which these learning 
processes improve (relative to competitors’ improvements) can not (Dickson, 1996). 
Indeed, it is especially the pace of the creation of SI which will play a differentiating role; 
especially in hypercompetitive environments success is often related to speed (D’Aveni, 
1994). 
 
In the end firms may face the same goal, but it is the building trajectory in and of itself 
which is idiosyncratic. It is this learning trajectory that will eventually differentiate 
winners from losers and may build a competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1997; 
Volberda et al., 2001b; Flier et al., 2003). Hence, the strategic learning mechanisms by 
which dynamic capabilities are created seem to be key to the development of SIcap (see 
Figure 2.2).  
We use the term ‘strategic’ learning mechanisms since “strategic learning aims to generate 
learning in support of future strategic initiatives” (Thomas et al., 2001: 331). In this 
respect, strategic learning processes improve (change, renew) a firm’s strategic capability 
and aim at modifying and reconstructing basic assumptions and strategic routines 
underlying the design process of strategic behaviors (Kuwada, 1998). Since the 
mechanisms we focus on target the learning of dynamic capabilities, they could, by 
definition be considered as ‘strategic’. 
 
Figure 2.2: Strategic learning mechanisms for SIcap 
SIcap
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capabilities
Strategic 
learning 
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Following the line of argument we developed in the previous section (section 2.1.1), we 
aim to find the strategic learning mechanisms that enhance dynamic capability creation.  
However, what should these strategic learning mechanisms tackle? In other words, can we 
operationalize this –rather vague– concept better in the context of SI?  
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In the following section, we argue that the concept of absorptive capacity may in this 
respect provide a useful enrichment to the dynamic capabilities literature (Van Den Bosch 
et al., 2003). As such, we use the concept of absorptive capacity (ACAP) as a means to 
link strategic learning mechanisms to SIcap. In this way, we attempt to respond to Ethiraj 
et al.’s (2005) call to focus research not anymore on whether or not capabilities matter, but 
more on why they matter and what sort of capabilities matter.  
 
 
2.2 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES, ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, AND STRATEGIC 
INNOVATION CAPACITY 
 
Absorptive capacity (ACAP), most widely cited through Cohen & Levinthal’s (1990) 
definition as a firm’s “ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge to commercial 
ends” (: 128), has in recent years gained increasing interest from strategy scholars (Lane et 
al., 2002). Largely inspired by the basic definition of Cohen & Levinthal (1990), other 
authors have  later reconceptualized and refined the construct. Originally developed within 
the context of technological innovation, the concept was further tailored to issues such as 
innovation management in general (e.g., Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Zahra & George, 
2002). Lane & Lubatkin (1998) extended the concept even to a supra-organizational, 
learning-dyad level in the context of strategic alliances. In fact, they introduced the concept 
of ‘relative absorptive capacity’ as the ability of a student firm to learn from a teacher firm.  
Despite these refinements, Van Den Bosch et al. (2003) remark that the speed at which 
new theoretical and empirical contributions to ACAP are being published is not in line 
with the speed at which scientific insights into the conceptual and empirical underpinnings 
of the construct have been developed as yet. 
We think however that the way Zahra & George (2002) refined the construct makes a 
promising avenue.  
 
They define ACAP as “a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms 
acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational 
capability” (Zahra & George, 2002: 186). Zahra & George (2002) thus define ACAP as a 
more or less sequenced activity involving four distinct stages (Daghfous, 2004)3. 
According to them, the ‘acquisition’ dimension refers to a firm’s capability to identify and 
acquire external knowledge. ‘Assimilation’ refers to analyzing, processing, interpreting 
and understanding this knowledge. Organizational processes for ‘transformation’ are in 
turn geared towards the development of new routines that combine existing knowledge 
with newly acquired and assimilated knowledge. The last stage, ‘exploitation’, finally 
refers to refining, leveraging, or extending existing competencies, or to creating new ones.  
Zahra & George (2002) made an interesting contribution to the field by dividing ACAP 
into two subsets: potential ACAP (PACAP) and realized ACAP (RACAP). PACAP 
consists of the capabilities for the acquisition and assimilation of knowledge, whereas the 
transformation and exploitation of new knowledge are covered by RACAP. They argue 
that all dimensions play complementary roles in the realization of organizational outcomes. 
Consequently, a high level of PACAP alone does not guarantee innovation. In their view, 
                                                          
3 Although they mention the possibility of a multidirectional and nonpatterned 
development path as the locus of search may be constantly revised. 
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the formal introduction of RACAP as a capacity to leverage absorbed knowledge makes 
the link to competitive advantage more explicit, and in this respect fills the lacunae shown 
in the literature.  
 
We contend that ACAP can be used as a proxy for dynamic capabilities (see Figure 2.3). 
Several reasons lay the foundation of this argument.  
First, both variables have been associated to similar outcome variables (Van Den Bosch et 
al., 2003). Just as dynamic capabilities (Teece & Pisano, 1994), ACAP has been positively 
associated with organizational change and innovation (e.g., Tsai, 2001; Szulanski, 1996; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).  
Second, Zahra & George (2002) even explicitly equated ACAP with a dynamic capability: 
“we recognize ACAP as a dynamic capability that influences the nature and sustainability 
of a firm’s competitive advantage” (: 185), and further, “we broaden the theoretical 
interpretation of the ACAP construct by presenting it as a dynamic capability that 
influences the creation of other organizational competencies” (: 186). They argue that 
ACAP is to be considered as a dynamic capability in itself that enables a company to 
create and ally that knowledge needed for the development of other capabilities 
(production, distribution,…). In this way, ACAP is defined as the entire process that 
explicitly relates knowledge to competitive advantage.  
Third, similar to existing views on dynamic capabilities (e.g., Zott, 2003), ACAP is 
embedded within organizational processes and routines (Zahra & George, 2002).  
Finally, the centrality of issues such as organizational learning and external knowledge 
acquisition, creation and application underlying the ACAP concept is reflected in the 
literature on dynamic capabilities as well. The evolution of organizational knowledge has 
for example been explicitly associated with the development of dynamic capabilities 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Absorptive capacity as a proxy for dynamic capabilities 
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More importantly, we argue that using the concept of ACAP as a proxy for dynamic 
capabilities is especially appropriate in the context of SI. 
The central role of external knowledge absorption and outside-in learning processes have 
been stressed in the literature on innovation in general, and on SI in particular (e.g., 
Normann & Ramírez, 1993; Pitt & Clarke, 1999; Almeida et al., 2003). External 
knowledge may maximize opportunities for competing in ever-changing environments 
(Almeida et al., 2003; Grant, 1996) and for challenging and deviating from existing 
heuristics in the organizational knowledge base (Liao et al., 2003). Scholars have hence 
stressed the importance of new, external knowledge for SI (e.g., Styles & Goddard, 2004) 
and for reframing a business in general (e.g., Christensen et al., 1998). Pitt (1998) even 
asserts that the study of knowledge creation and exploitation could in this sense be 
considered as one of the most fruitful ways to map SI. This means that in order to stimulate 
SIcap, an organization has to develop a thorough understanding of its own knowledge, of 
its processes aimed at transforming this knowledge into capabilities and finally, of the 
capacity of these capabilities to meet environmental demands (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
The potential SI has to actively influence the rule of the game in an industry (e.g., Baden-
Fuller, 1995) may indeed originate from a firm absorbing knowledge from non-traditional 
domains, commercially exploiting it, and in this way influencing the knowledge 
environment of its competitors (Van den Bosch et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, ACAP has been conceptually and empirically associated with proactive 
strategic behavior (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Daghfous, 2004). Cohen & Levinthal 
(1990) assert that firms with higher levels of ACAP will tend to be more proactive. 
Especially PACAP has been related to strategic flexibility and a firm’s capacity to adapt, 
learn and evolve in high-velocity environments (Zahra & George, 2002). Consequently, 
the concept of ACAP has also been related to the creation of new knowledge 
configurations, in the sense of ‘architectural innovation’ (Henderson & Clarke, 1990). Van 
den Bosch et al. (1999) mention in this respect the importance of combinative capabilities. 
As already noted, such issues of proactive behavior and new knowledge and capability 
configurations buttress SI.  
 
Zahra & George (2002) conceptualized exploitation as the capability to persistently create 
new outputs such as new ventures, goods or services. Even though transformation is 
already associated with behavioral change, exploitation thus takes this a step further and 
further converts knowledge into actual outputs (Zahra & George, 2002). In this sense, 
SIcap could be considered as one possible operationalization of exploitation. We hence 
incorporate the dependent variable SIcap in the exploitation dimension of ACAP. Building 
on ACAP theory (Zahra & George, 2002), we could further hypothesize acquisition, 
assimilation and transformation capacity as the antecedents to SIcap4.  
We will however use the term ‘recognition’ capacity instead of Zahra & George’s (2002) 
‘acquisition’, since we feel that in the context of SI ‘recognizing’ new, external knowledge 
captures better the essence of this activity than does the term ‘acquiring’ (see our 
discussion in section 2.3). Still, we take Zahra & George’s (2002) original definitions of 
these three ACAP dimensions. This means that we define recognition capacity as a firm’s 
                                                          
4 In contrast to Zahra & George (2002), we add the term ‘capacity’ to these antecedent 
dimensions in order to stress the ‘stock’ character of these variables (see section 2.5). We do 
however still adopt the meaning Zahra & George (2002) attributed to these dimensions. 
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capability to identify and acquire new external information. Being a capability, recognition 
capacity comprises a firm’s routines and processes aimed at recognition. Assimilation 
capacity comprises a firm’s capability (its routines and processes) to analyze, process, 
interpret and understand acquired external information. Transformation capacity, in turn, 
refers to a firm’s routines and processes to develop new routines that combine existing 
knowledge with newly acquired and assimilated knowledge. 
 
The previous discussion explains that ACAP can be used as an appropriate proxy to 
dynamic capabilities in the context of SI. However, one very important thing remains us: 
that is to incorporate the path-breaking character of SI within the three antecedent ACAP 
dimensions. 
 
2.2.1 The path-breaking potential of ACAP 
 
Similar to dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece et al., 1997; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), 
absorptive capacity has been argued to be path dependent and to develop cumulatively 
(e.g., Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Liao et al., 2003). For example, Cohen & Levinthal 
(1990) argue that a firm’s ACAP is largely a function of its level of prior and related 
knowledge. They found this argument on individual learning theory, which posits that 
memory develops by associative learning. Zahra & George (2002) also consider 
experience as an important antecedent of ACAP. Carrying this idea further, Cohen & 
Levinthal (1990) even argue that a firm’s ACAP is in itself a function of the firm’s prior 
level of ACAP: higher levels of ACAP thus in turn facilitate the creation of ACAP.  
 
However, conceptualizing dynamic capability and ACAP development as entirely 
grounded in experiential learning contrasts with the path-breaking assumption of SI. This 
viewpoint moreover contrasts with Lyles & Salk’s (1996) equation of ACAP with 
organizational flexibility. Strict path dependency does not allow for any innovation in the 
strict sense, as all new actions emerge from the knowledge of past actions (Hargadon & 
Fanelli, 2002). Danneels’ (2003) empirics indeed show that experiential learning is ‘self-
limiting’, constraining the range of market information and strategic options considered. 
Van den Bosch et al. (1999) mention for example the possibility of negative feedback 
loops between ACAP and organizational knowledge, under the form of competency traps 
(Levitt & March, 1988). Furthermore, the path-dependent and self-reinforcing cycle of 
ACAP development several authors hypothesize (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) implies 
that proactive or reactive modes of strategic firm behavior are assumed to be stable and 
persistent over time. This is however not consistent with observations of actual firm 
behavior (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  
Accordingly, other studies have mitigated the influence of the prior organizational 
knowledge base on an organization’s ACAP. For example, Lane et al. (2001) could not 
detect a significant effect of the prior knowledge international joint ventures inherited from 
their parents. Furthermore, the development of dynamic capabilities has been explicitly 
associated with path-breaking change (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). Hence, following Zahra & George’s (2002) assertion to equate ACAP with a 
dynamic capability implies that the concept of ACAP should actually be made (better) 
reconcilable with the issue of path-breaking change. 
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Insights from literature on cognition may prove fruitful in this respect.  
Cohen & Levinthal (1990) have explicitly grounded the ACAP concept in theory on 
cognitive structures, and Van Den Bosch et al. (2003) mention ACAP’s theoretical value 
for research regarding managerial cognition. We share Dijksterhuis et al.’s (1999) view 
that management logics affect ACAP.  
Furthermore, the strategic consequences of cognition, such as the use of resources or the 
development of strategy, have been indicated more than once. For instance, Tripsas & 
Gavetti’s (2000) detailed study of Polaroid showed that this company had no difficulty in 
overcoming the path dependencies normally associated with knowledge evolution, i.e. the 
development of new and unrelated technologies. Empirics of the digital imaging industry 
indicated that it was foremost organizational cognition that influenced the development of 
new capabilities. “[…] Polaroid did not experience major difficulties searching in a 
radically new technological trajectory and developing new technological competencies, 
largely due to the consistency of this purely exploratory behavior with the belief in the 
primacy of technology” (: 1158). By restricting and directing learning and search 
processes, cognition may preserve an outmoded business model, ignoring changes in the 
competitive landscape (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Nelson & Winter (2002), themselves, 
later remark that Polaroid’s defeat in the digital imaging market seemed not attributable to 
its mindless, automatic ‘routine’ response (as would be in line with evolutionary 
theorizing), but to a systematically incorrect cognition. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) hence 
assert that “understanding processes of organizational change thus requires examining not 
only the central inertial forces associated with developing new capabilities, but also the 
impact that cognition has on such processes” (: 1149). Likewise, Barr et al.’s (1992) 
findings suggest that mental models have a crucial impact on directing resource 
deployment and resource accumulation. Hence, strong links exist between managerial 
thinking, firm actions and competition (Walsh, 1995). In relating SIcap to cognition we 
furthermore respond to Walsh’s (1995) call to management researchers for relating what 
appears to be an individual-level construct (i.e., managerial mental schemata) to 
“consequences of substantive organizational importance” (: 282). 
Finally, the value cognitive theories may have for ACAP theory is even more manifest, 
since the three dimensions of ACAP we focus on, show much similarity to the 
sensemaking process, as conceptualized by cognitive theorists. ‘Strategic sensemaking’ 
comprises the cycle of cognition-action processes of environmental scanning, 
interpretation and associated action (e.g., Thomas et al., 1993).  The fundamental ACAP 
dimensions of recognition, assimilation and transformation as previously defined, hence 
closely resemble these three key sensemaking processes. The mutual interaction patterns of 
the three processes of recognition, assimilation and transformation are thus critical to 
strategic sensemaking activities, and strategic sensemaking is a pivotal element in building 
ACAP. 
 
2.2.1.1 Sensemaking as an explanation of path-dependent logic 
 
In chapter 1, we outlined how the strategic actions managers initiate in response to 
environmental stimuli are grounded in the cognitive frameworks they use to make sense of 
stimuli and cues (Bogner & Barr, 2000). Although cognitive frames are essentially an 
individual-level construct, because of social interactions, they evolve to supra-individual, 
or collective, frameworks on a firm and on an industry level (Walsh, 1995; Gioia et al., 
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1994). Organizations too, can hence be considered as interpretation systems (Daft & 
Weick, 1984).  
Since organizations have unique history and learning trajectories that affect the specific 
nature of the organizational processes they apply (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982), different 
scholars have argued that individuals within organizations come to share a similar world 
view. This is because interpretations of external information can be verbalized and can 
thus be shared by several people. Over time, this creates a socially reinforced view of the 
world (Porac et al., 1989). Empirical data indicated that organizational membership indeed 
explains significant homogeneity of environmental perceptions (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998). 
“Reaching convergence among members characterizes the act of organizing (Weick, 1979) 
and enables the organization to interpret as a system” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 285). The 
cognitive mechanisms of individuals give rise to a so-called ‘dominant logic’ at the 
aggregate, organizational level (von Krogh & Roos, 1996; Bettis & Wong, 2003).  
 
A dominant logic comprises “the way in which managers conceptualize the business and 
make critical resource allocation decisions” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986: 490), “a mind set or 
world view or conceptualization of the business and the administrative tools to accomplish 
goals and make decisions in that business” (: 491). A commonly held set of beliefs (a 
shared cognitive map, or a dominant logic, Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) produces a deep 
structure in organizations. This deep structure determines organizational members’ action, 
which in turn reinforces this structure (Gomez & Jones, 2000). 
The role of a dominant logic in the context of SI goes without saying since it develops 
through experience with a certain business (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and manifests itself 
in an organization’s assumptions about competition and value creation (Prahalad, 2004). It 
has indeed been demonstrated that different dominant logics lead to different strategic 
reactions and hence to performance differences (von Krogh et al., 2000). A dominant logic 
thus influences the strategy development and decision process (Daft & Weick, 1984).  
 
Dominant logics affect the sensemaking process (Daft & Weick, 1984; Barr et al., 1992): 
noticing information, interpreting it, and taking action.  
More specifically, they operate as information filters, constraining data categories on what 
seems relevant in the context of the current dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995; 
Sinkula, 2002).  
They can moreover be considered as lenses that determine the interpretation systems used 
to put meaning on this information, influencing how the world is perceived (von Krogh et 
al., 2000). So, even if important new information is recognized, it may not be perceived as 
a signal of needed change (Barr et al., 1992). Since these lenses also determine what 
specifically the organization hears when it hears the voice of the customer, they have an 
important impact on market sensing (Sinkula, 2002).  
Dominant logics finally also suggest what kind of actions can be considered as 
‘appropriate’, i.e. belong to the organization’s accepted repertoire of actions (Sinkula, 
2002).  
The influence the dominant logic has on the entire sensemaking cycle explains why it has 
been argued that the ability to evaluate and utilize outside information is dependent upon 
an organization’s level of prior related knowledge and shared language (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). The path-dependent nature of ACAP could thus be traced back to the 
underlying mechanisms of dominant logic. Moreover, as a dominant logic determines the 
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way a firm applies knowledge a dominant logic also further affects how firms 
commercially exploit knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998); it hence also determines SIcap. 
 
A dominant logic may increase an organization’s efficiency by reducing the set of 
environmental stimuli and responses (Sinkula, 2002), and thus simplifying and speeding 
up decision making. Yet, it also carries some ‘toxic’ rigidity effects with it when 
environmental conditions change (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995; Bettis & Wong, 2003). Due to 
cognitive limitations mental maps will always be incomplete, still, their inappropriateness 
and inconsistency may further intensify when new (hypercompetitive) environmental cues 
occur (Barr et al., 1992; Bogner & Barr, 2000), or when the meaning of these cues have 
changed (Bettis & Wong, 2003). Prahalad (2004) even speaks of ‘the blinders of dominant 
logic’.  
 
Indeed, assumptions about ‘what works normally’ or ‘what worked before’ do not 
automatically apply to the management of changed, new or unrelated businesses (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1986; Sull, 1999).  
Operating as a ‘filter’ the dominant logic may limit search spaces (Bettis & Wong, 2003) 
and hence distract attention from emerging opportunities and threats (Prahalad, 2004; 
Miller, 1993) and radically new strategies (von Krogh et al., 2000). For example, 
marketing-dominated firms consider customers as key aspects of the environment, whereas 
quality leaders focus on technological opportunities and cost factors (Miller, 1993).  
Furthermore, because of cognitive structures learning tends to be local and ‘close in’ to 
previous activities. New cues may thus be wrongly understood. That is since cause-effect 
relationships are difficult to form in entirely new learning environments (Teece & Pisano, 
1994). “If a relation is indeterminant, its nature becomes a matter of belief backed up by 
confirming experience” (Hall, 1984: 923).  
Finally, the strategies a firm chooses to deal with new cues may be inappropriate. Renewal 
may be hampered since a dominant logic restricts actions to the ones that are consistent 
with it. Moreover, these actions further reinforce this logic by providing in turn new 
information that can be interpreted in light of the existing logic (Barr et al., 1992). “While 
a set of shared beliefs functions as a context for strategic design actions, it is also 
reproduced in these actions” (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999: 571). Strong feedback and 
reinforcement loops may hence produce a ‘fossilization’ process (Bettis & Wong, 2003). 
For example, a high-tech IT company may exclusively pursue customers who value state-
of-the-art technologies. Considering these customers’ preferences as direct proof of 
customers’ preference for advanced technologies in general, the firm feels confirmed in the 
correctness of its strategy.  
 
Even though some authors have argued that mental models may gradually improve when 
the erroneous actions they lead to are recognized (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Hall, 1984), 
most scholars agree that an obsolete dominant logic creates strategic path dependencies, 
may limit innovation potential, and eventually causes strategic problems (von Krogh et al., 
2000; Prahalad & Bettis, 1995; Bettis & Wong, 2003). This is because over time, the 
dominant logic becomes ‘condensed’ within the organization’s structures, processes, 
systems and procedures (Bettis & Wong, 2003). The entire organization hence becomes a 
reinforcing system that determines the organization’s collective learning (Bettis & Wong, 
2003). 
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Miller (1993) speaks of the ‘architecture of simplicity’, which ultimately leads successful 
organizations to their downfall. Simplicity in the subjective form (i.e., narrow managerial 
lenses) produces simplicity in objective terms (e.g., single strategic activity swallowing up 
all resources). The cultures, systems, processes, and worldviews of successful 
organizations will become so monolithic that they prevent them from embracing and 
adapting to environmental changes.  
 
Similar ideas have been expressed in Levinthal & March’s (1993) well-known contribution 
on ‘learning myopia’. Levinthal & March’s (1993) concept of learning traps was further 
refined and operationalized by Ahuja & Lampert (2001) in the context of breakthrough 
inventions. These researchers observed the existence of three different learning traps: the 
‘familiarity trap’, the ‘maturity trap’, and the ‘propinquity trap’. Familiarity traps occur 
because experience creates opportunities for specialization, and hence for immediate 
returns. Maturity traps reflect firms’ tendency to prefer what is mature, i.e. what is reliable, 
well understood, and offers legitimacy, over what is nascent. Finally, firms’ tendencies to 
search for solutions that are ‘near to’ existing solutions are grounded in their attempts to 
minimize risk, cognitive effort (bureaucratic convenience) and resources. For example, 
Kogut & Zander (1992) argued that firms tend to learn in areas closely related to their 
current practice, because common knowledge facilitates the transfer of knowledge. The 
latter tendencies become manifested in propinquity traps.  
Ahuja & Lampert (2001) found that, paradoxically, and in line with Levinthal & March’s 
(1993) view, all these traps often increase firms’ immediate benefits, but are detrimental in 
the longer run. For this reason, Miller (1993) calls this ‘the Icarus paradox’: Icarus’ wax 
wings allowed him to fly, but also produced his fatal fall. Variance is suppressed (Bettis & 
Wong, 2003) as the past shapes in fact the mental model for understanding the future 
(Bogner & Barr, 2000). As such, a dominant logic may impede the development of new 
capabilities (Bettis & Wong, 2003). As the firm’s problem-solving repertoire is not 
enriched and existing cause-effect beliefs are not challenged, in the longer run, these traps 
lead to an absence of novelty and experimentation of new domains and hence restrict 
opportunities for fundamentally new knowledge and resource reconfigurations.  
 
Furthermore, as highlighted in chapter 1, shared frameworks occur not only between 
individuals on a firm level but also between firms on an industry level (Bogner & Barr, 
2000). Both the latter influence and reinforce each other (Bogner & Barr, 2000; Bettis & 
Wong, 2003). “If the continuity of industry traditions encourages conformity at the market 
level, then the continuity of industry experience plays a socializing role at the firm level” 
(Miller & Chen, 1996: 1212). In other words, the existence of a competitive recipe at the 
industry level may shimmer through in organizational memory at the firm level and may 
hence determine the strategic actions managers initiate. It may dampen a firm’s desire to 
deviate from the industry rules of the game. “When deciding upon a strategy, the group’s 
dominant logic allows only for decisions that are conform with it, meaning that the basic 
rules of the business the company is operating in are not questioned for the future” (von 
Krogh et al., 2000: 85).  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, this questioning of rules is very critical for SI. Hence, 
not only need interpretation systems be built, they should often be changed too, especially 
when faced with environmental discontinuities (Barr et al., 1992). In fact, Tranfield & 
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Smith (1998) empirically verified that cognitive change in the form of a reframing of 
strategy was the main driver of strategic regeneration and dynamic capabilities 
development. Likewise Barr et al.’s (1992) study showed that managers’ mental models 
need changing in response to environmental changes, and that delays in this change 
process may lead to organizational decline. They hence write (1992: 34): “Managers who 
fail to consider changes in their beliefs during periods of major environmental change may 
set their firms on a course of a protracted, downward spiral”. Bogner & Barr (2000) hence 
stress managers’ need to engage in ‘adaptive sensemaking’ processes, faced with turbulent 
environmental conditions.  
 
Organizations have hence been advised to undertake actions to facilitate the unlearning of 
outdated dominant logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995). Accordingly, Prahalad & Bettis 
(1995: 10) write: “the focus shifts from learning to unlearning in the case of strategic 
change”. Unlearning by broadening the dominant logic (‘increasing its bandwith’), or by 
replacing old logics and behaviors by new ones (‘tune the filter to another band’) is hence 
required (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995). Shifts in dominant logic enable organizations to 
reassess assumptions about value creation (Prahalad, 2004). Sinkula (2002) even argues 
that firms adept at unlearning are better able to replace inappropriate routines with ones 
that will ultimately result in superior customer value.  
In this respect, unlearning or ‘forgetting’ (de Holan & Phillips, 2003) may be considered as 
a crucial condition to increase SIcap. The stronger the dominant logic, the more effort is 
required (de Holan & Phillips, 2003). The central issue is hence how different strategic 
beliefs can be developed and adopted. 
 
2.2.1.2 Sensemaking as an explanation of path-breaking logic 
 
Even though the issue of changing knowledge structures has been barely tackled in 
research, some evidence suggests that mental frames can indeed change. Exemplary of this 
is Barr et al.’s (1992) study. Porac & Thomas (1990), in turn, mention that some firms are 
indeed able to look beyond the borders of a cognitive competitive category. Likewise, 
Ahuja & Katila’s (2004) findings on the chemical industry show that firms do not only 
embark on path-deepening search, but are indeed able to change directions too. These 
results all demonstrate that firms may not be as inert as often thought (e.g., Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). Ahuja & Lampert (2001) even empirically verified that specific (double-
loop learning) strategies do exist, which may assist established companies in 
circumventing the aforementioned learning traps.  
 
Actually, the discrepant academic views and evidence regarding path-dependent and path-
breaking strategic behavior fit in with Hargadon & Fanelli’s (2002) complementary 
approach to organizational knowledge.  
They consider organizational knowledge as a dual phenomenon, encompassing both a 
latent aspect (knowledge as possibility) and an empirical aspect (knowledge as action). 
These –seemingly contradicting– perspectives explain why organizational knowledge is 
sometimes considered as enabling, while other times as constraining innovative behavior. 
Underlying are in fact two different research models with competing assumptions about 
organizational knowledge: the innovation and the organizational learning model. The 
former (e.g., Kim & Mauborgne, 1999b; Rindova & Kotha, 2001) considers knowledge as 
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possibility, providing the organization with novel ideas and the potential for novel action. 
‘Knowledge leads to (new) action’.  
In contrast, the organizational learning literature (e.g., Huber, 1991; Levinthal & March, 
1993; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) considers knowledge as prior lessons learnt that have 
become embedded within routines and organizational memory. The traditional 
conceptualization of ACAP as a path-dependent phenomenon can be situated within this 
research stream. In this view, experience leads to knowledge, in other words, ‘action leads 
to knowledge’. Prior and related knowledge is thus needed for new knowledge absorption 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Yet, this prior knowledge may also constrain future behavior 
(e.g., Miller, 1993; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal & March, 1993). Path dependencies 
are thus especially prevalent in the latter research model.   
A similar distinction has been made between the ‘path-breaking’ knowledge management 
(e.g., Nonaka, 1994) versus the ‘path-dependent’ evolutionary model (e.g., Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) (see, Coombs & Hull, 1998).  
Basically each model treats half of the story: innovation models stress how knowledge 
creates innovation, without questioning where this knowledge originated from in the first 
place; whereas organizational learning theories study how organizational knowledge bases 
are built over time, ignoring much of how they may lead to novel action (see also, Child, 
1997). Hargadon & Fanelli (2002: 295) argue that both models are complementary in that 
“extant solutions from the environment are never simply applied to novel problems. They 
are instead interpreted in light of the contextual conditions the actor perceives, before 
being used to construct new action” and further: “For organizational members, cues in the 
environment invoke a particular schema which in turn shapes their interpretation and 
action – but to be perceived, those cues themselves must already reside within their 
existing latent knowledge” (: 300). The relationship between past learning and future 
action is definitely a complex one. Action shapes empirical knowledge from which mental 
schemata arise. These schemata in turn influence action which makes the cycle start anew.  
Hence, both the mental frameworks used and the action giving rise to and resulting from 
these frameworks are path-dependent (Bogner & Barr, 2000).  
The challenge, especially in the context of SI, is thus to break this vicious cycle and to 
modify the constraints on a firm’s internal variety generation (Coombs & Hull, 1998). 
Hargadon & Fanelli (2002) claim that influencing the creation of schemata (i.e., redefining 
them) is key in this respect. In similar vein, Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991) assert that 
especially the study of the processes whereby mental schemata are altered is fundamental. 
“Understanding and action, including strategic action, [thus] derive from the framework of 
meaning ascribed by the organization’s members” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 435).  
 
Strategic learning, as required for SI, hence involves altering mental frameworks 
(dominant logic). Changing dominant logic means altering the entire sensemaking cycle, 
as all sensemaking activities influence what is noticed, how this noticed information is 
interpreted and what actions should be undertaken (Bogner & Barr, 2000; Daft & Weick, 
1984). In this respect, we assert that all sensemaking activities that create and reflect 
dominant logic are also the activities through which dominant logics can be modified.  
Referring to the previously mentioned similarities between the sensemaking activities and 
the ACAP dimensions of recognition, assimilation and transformation, we could postulate 
that changing dominant logics, and breaking path dependencies in sensemaking, can be 
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triggered by influencing recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity (see Figure 
2.4).  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity and SIcap 
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In order to further specify the path-breaking potential recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity can have, we will now return to contributions on SI. We argue that 
the literature streams on ACAP, SI and sensemaking can be enriched by integrating them 
with each other.  
In other words, we will map crucial antecedents to SI, as mentioned in the SI literature, to 
the three previously mentioned antecedent ACAP dimensions and enrich them with 
insights from the sensemaking literature. Accordingly, the path-breaking aspects of SI will 
become incorporated in the ACAP dimensions of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity.  
As such, we do a first attempt to further refine and tailor the construct of ACAP to the 
specificities of the dependent variable SIcap. In this way, it is also a first step in our 
attempt to operationalize the ACAP construct within the domain of SI. 
The following section indicates what specific aspects of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity, as regards the contents of these capacities, may be marked as 
crucial. We call these aspects ‘path-breaking focus areas’.  
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2.3 RECOGNITION, ASSIMILATION, TRANSFORMATION AND SICAP  
  
2.3.1 The path-breaking focus areas of recognition capacity 
 
Scanning an organization’s external environment has been proposed as the starting point of 
strategic sensemaking (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984) and organizational performance 
(Thomas et al., 1993). Exemplifying the role recognition plays in unlearning, Weick 
(2002) asserts that “it is those with the least information who are most certain […] there is 
no felt need for learning, right at the very moment where learning is most urgently needed 
(Weick, 2002: S14). He means that if new information, or disconfirming information is not 
perceived, not sought after or even consciously avoided, unlearning may be hampered, 
obsolete logics are preserved, which in turn makes the organization more vulnerable.  
Scholars on cognition seem moreover to agree that knowledge structures may change as a 
function of some change in the information environment (Walsh, 1995). By influencing a 
firm’s recognition capacity, i.e. its capability to identify and acquire new external 
information (Zahra & George, 2002), a firm’s knowledge structures may hence be 
changed. In fact, recognition capacity affects the ‘filtering’ aspect of the dominant logic. 
 
In general, the establishment of external knowledge linkages has been found a common 
aspect of successful knowledge creation processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). The 
intensity of an organization’s effort to acquire new external knowledge has hence been 
proposed to positively affect the development of capabilities as well (Zahra & George, 
2002). Especially for firms adopting a proactive strategy the development of external 
knowledge acquisition capabilities was found of critical importance (Liao et al., 2003). It 
has thus been argued that not so much slack resources, but the capacity to recognize new 
opportunities and options in a sustainable way is of crucial importance to any firm that 
aspires breakthrough innovation (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Colarelli O’Connor & Rice, 2001; 
Johnson et al., 2003). In particular, market knowledge has been considered as an important 
driver to innovativeness (Hurley & Hult, 1998). The generation of market intelligence has 
been found to be especially beneficial for firms with a global and pro-active strategic 
posture (Tuominen et al., 2004). 
 
Logically, scholars on SI have stressed the value of external knowledge. Indeed, the 
outside-in character of SI (Krinsky & Jenkins, 1997) requires deep and fast customer and 
market insight (Varadarajan & Jayachandran, 1999). To achieve customer and market 
insight, the SI literature emphasizes to study customers and especially their dissatisfactions 
(Christensen et al., 2002; Styles & Goddard, 2004). Dell, an often-cited strategic innovator, 
is hence considered as “a shining example of acquiring information about business 
customers” (Simpson et al., 2001: 122). In addition, the organization’s environment should 
constantly be monitored (Markides, 1999a) in order to discover any innovation potential in 
environmental discontinuities, to detect any change in the underlying sources of 
competitive advantage (Christensen, 2001), or to tap ideas from outsiders to the 
organization, such as customers, suppliers, industry visionaries, etc. (Hamel & Getz, 
2004). Furthermore, in a dynamic environment characterized by random and unclear 
information flows, the establishment of centralized ‘gatekeeping’ functions seems 
somewhat counterproductive (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Neither should the responsibility 
of recognition be reserved exclusively to top management (Hamel, 1999). Instead, 
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everyone in the organization should act as ‘spies’ who collect and utilize information and 
ideas from everybody in- and outside (e.g. suppliers, distributors) the organization 
(Markides in Mang, 2000; Markides, 2004b; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
 
These elements all bring the value of market orientation to the forefront. The market 
orientation literature (e.g., Slater & Narver, 2000; Tsai & Shih, 2004) has indeed 
emphasized the value of market intelligence generation for the creation of superior value 
propositions (Day, 1994; Simpson et al., 2001). Varadarajan & Jayachandran (1999) hence 
explicitly consider research into the innovation consequences of market orientation as an 
important future research direction in the strategic marketing field. However, as mentioned 
in chapter 1, the literature on strategic innovation emphasizes, more than does the 
traditional literature on market orientation, the need to shape customer behaviors and to 
develop dramatically new customer value propositions over retaining and better satisfying 
current customers and markets (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). More recently, researchers 
have indeed started to doubt the business performance benefits originally associated with 
market orientation (e.g., Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  
 
In general, little empirical evidence exists regarding the relationship between external 
search strategies and the degree of novelty of innovation (Laursen & Salter, 2006). Still, 
unlike the emphasis that has traditionally been put on hearing, understanding and adapting 
to the immediate voice of the customer (e.g., Day, 1999), implying more customer insight 
and interactions (e.g., Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002), some scholars have raised the idea 
that customer and market information may well offer insights into existing value systems, 
but not into new markets with different systems of use (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). 
Recognition channels may come to mirror existing perspectives, values and strategy and 
may as such have a blinding effect towards information that helps shaping or evaluating 
new business ideas (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004; Miller, 1993). In a supply chain, beliefs about 
competitors, suppliers and customers focus managers’ limited attention to specific 
transactional partners (Porac et al., 1989). Especially, the detrimental effects of close 
customer relationships have aroused researchers’ interest. For instance, Danneels (2003) 
argues that tight customer coupling becomes self-validating in the sense that when 
suppliers arrive at a specific insight and definition of the customer, they automatically 
become more focused on those customers that correspond the best to their definition. This 
convergence of cognition and behaviour diminishes firm’s flexibility to serve alternative 
customers and markets. Traditional market research & analysis techniques, being primarily 
focused on intelligence generation from and on current customer needs (scarcely revealing 
unmet needs or long-bared vexations) lock firms into a specific strategic course and may in 
this respect hamper SI (Christensen et al., 2002; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Hamel & 
Getz, 2004; Lynn et al., 1996; Zhou et al., 2005). In fact, ‘hearing the voice of the 
customer’ might lead companies to merely adapt their offerings, neglecting to proactively 
reshape customer preferences (Kumar, et al., 2000). Zhou, et al. (2005: 45) even speak of 
the ‘tyranny of the served market’. Given the dynamics in the customer value models as 
discussed in the chapter 1, a market orientation approach might in this respect be 
detrimental to both customer and supplier. Furthermore, the idea has become widely 
shared in the marketing literature that not all buyers do have well-defined preferences that 
can be revealed, but that they often construct their preferences when faced with the need to 
make a decision. Hence, the plea one-to-one marketing researchers have made for building 
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a learning relationship with customers may come into question, and at the very least “the 
benefits and costs of addressing individual customer preferences are much more complex 
and less deterministic than has typically been assumed” (Simonson, 2005: 42).   
 
Scholars opposing against the traditional market orientation literature, have in contrast 
emphasized the need to understand the future evolution of markets in order to uncover new 
opportunities to serve current or new customers (D’Aveni, 1994). Companies thus need 
market-sensing capabilities to signal and read market developments (Johnson et al., 2003). 
Understanding the future gives change a direction (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). More 
specifically, to avoid drifting, reacting, or following (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), 
companies are advised to use intuition-based processes (Christensen et al., 2002) and to 
develop ‘industry foresight’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). So-
called ‘strategic soothsaying’ (D’Aveni, 1994), or ‘forward-sensing’ (Kumar et al., 2000) 
enables firms to understand markets, not in order to react to it, but in order to modify 
structures and behaviors (Jaworski et al., 2000). Firms are advised to closely monitor new 
tendencies in the market and industry, e.g. in technology, demographics, regulations, and 
lifestyles (Christensen, 1997; Markides, 1999a; Krinsky & Jenkins, 1997; Styles & 
Goddard, 2004), and to focus on fringe (Markides, 1999b) and non-customers (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999a). In addition, the customer’s own business can be studied to develop an 
idea of how the offering can enhance the customer’s own value creation potential vis-à-vis 
his customer (Markides, 1997, Normann & Ramírez, 1993). In this way, hidden customer 
needs can be explored or new demand can be created (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999a).  
 
Moreover, “In a world in which changes come from many different directions, the ability 
to balance organizational focus with the wide-angle view may be the most important 
ability for long-term survival and success” (Day & Schoemaker, 2004a: 117). A recent 
special issue of Long Range Planning (2004) was entirely devoted to the creation of 
‘peripheral vision’. Paying proactive attention to the periphery is important since these 
fringes of the business can contain sources of strategic blunders, of strategic attack but of 
opportunities even so.  
A broad-based ‘panoramic surveillance of the market’ has been associated with the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). Zahra & George (2002) have 
likewise emphasized the importance of the ‘direction’ of knowledge acquisition for the 
development of ACAP. In similar vein, Van den Bosch et al. (2003) stress the ‘scope’ 
dimension of ACAP (i.e. the ability to absorb knowledge from new domains) as especially 
useful for exploration. Following this line of argument, Almeida et al. (2003) assert that, 
given detrimental effects of path dependencies, firms should make deliberate investments 
to broaden the scope/breadth of their search activities. A broad scanning of the 
environment increases firms’ flexibility to follow different strategic courses and to serve 
new customers (Danneels, 2003). Still, the mantra of strategy has been ‘focus’, and 
different institutional mechanisms and internal forces are aligned to this perspective (Day 
& Schoemaker, 2004a). Organizations thus tend to focus views on their current frames of 
reference, which are in turn determined by the current business. As indicated, this narrow 
focus may eventually lead to blind spots (Zahra & Chaples, 1993). Alternatively, a too 
broad vision may be inefficient either; information overload creates confusion and is very 
costly. The challenge organizations deal with is hence to take notice of the periphery, 
without ignoring ‘traditional’ information (Day & Schoemaker, 2004b). 
Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
 55
Other scholars have furthermore argued that the use of analogy, in studying other 
companies in other industries (e.g. Lilien et al., 2002) or geographical regions may point 
the way to new business ideas and may help to rethink the logic of the business (Prahalad, 
2004; Hamel & Getz, 2004; Markides, 1997). Yet, if analogies are based on superficial 
similarity, and if they are used, not only as a creativity trigger, but to really copy 
businesses they may be useless, even dangerous (Gavetti & Rivkin, 2005).  
 
Next to stressing the value of a customer orientation, the traditional definition of market 
orientation (Narver & Slater, 1990) points to establishing a competitor orientation as well5. 
Even though SI contributions stress the value of monitoring competitors, they strongly 
discourage firms to use rivals as benchmarks (Kim & Mauborgne, 1997; Markides,1999a), 
because competitive benchmarking may reinforce herd behavior (Prahalad, 2004). It leads 
to imitative market approaches, reactive acting and hazy understanding of emerging mass 
markets and changing customer needs (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999b): “intense competition 
makes innovation indispensable, but an obsessive focus on the competition makes 
innovation difficult to attain” (: 49). Benchmarking may hence be valuable to increase 
efficiency in the current game, but will never lead to a distinct competitive advantage 
(Hamel, 2004). Benchmarking against conventional and ‘close’ rivals leads to the 
ignorance of unexpected and unconventional new threats, and produces even adaptive 
failure (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). Likewise, Khalifa (2004) pleads for a shift in 
thinking from beating competitors to serving customers with superior customer value. 
Competitor benchmarking could indeed reinforce chances of incremental improvements at 
the detriment of searching for fundamentally new sources of customer value (Urbany & 
Montgomery, 1998). 
 
In conclusion, despite growing interest, the debate whether (traditional) market orientation 
facilitates (e.g. Johnson et al., 2003) or impedes (e.g., Zhou et al., 2003) SI remains 
unsolved so far. Danneels (2003) speaks of the ‘paradox of customer orientation’: thight 
coupling with customers (cfr. Jaworski & Kohli, 1993) enables efficient transactions but 
meanwhile restricts environmental inquiry and available options for the firm. What is 
however less debated is that sensing, surveillance, and visualization of the market in one 
way or another facilitate the recognition of new SIoptions (Johnson et al., 2003). 
A study of the SI literature however reveals that path-breaking factors such as market 
sensing (forward sensing, industry foresight), peripheral vision (e.g. broad tendencies, non-
customers, other industries) seem crucial aspects of recognition capacity in the context of 
SI. Strategic learning mechanisms influencing recognition capacity to improve SIcap, 
should hence primarily target these path-breaking focus areas. 
 
                                                          
5 In fact, the –cultural– market orientation construct has traditionally been defined as a 
three-dimensional construct (e.g., Slater & Narver, 1995), involving interfunctional 
coordination too. Others have however rejected this third dimension, arguing that the latter 
is an intrafirm communication mechanism and not a dimension of market orientation (e.g., 
Day, 1994). We therefore incorporated this third dimension as a separate factor, see section 
2.6.1.3. 
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2.3.2 The path-breaking focus areas of assimilation capacity  
 
To influence the ‘lens’ through which dominant logics constrain interpretation, 
assimilation capacity may be influenced. This is because assimilation capacity comprises a 
firm’s capability (its routines and processes) to analyze, process, interpret and understand 
acquired external information (Zahra & George, 2002). Assimilation is hence primarily 
considered as a sensemaking process whereby new knowledge is connected to existing 
knowledge (Lane et al., 2001).  
 
Despite advancements in IT, making large amounts of data available, organizations are still 
characterized as “information-rich but interpretation-poor systems” (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1995: 6). Organizations apparently lack interpretation capacity and actionable knowledge. 
Therefore, if recognition is not to lead to an information overload, it should be tied to the 
organization’s capacity to distill meaning out of the information collected (Day & 
Schoemaker, 2004b). The evaluation and interpretation of external information may help 
the identification of new opportunities (Child, 1997). In fact, Liao et al. (2003) empirically 
verified that proactive firms faced with high environmental turbulence placed indeed an 
even greater emphasis on the assimilation than on the acquisition of knowledge. Lane et al. 
(2000) note that flexibility and other learning structures and processes impact primarily on 
the assimilation component of ACAP. Marinova’s (2004) results showed that not so much 
the possession of market knowledge by itself stimulates innovation. Only when 
interpretation updates market knowledge, which is then shared among managers, an 
increased innovation effort could be discerned. These arguments all place assimilation 
practices to the centre stage of SIcap development.    
 
By definition, SI involves a departure from a proven business definition and all of its 
underlying assumptions about what success consists of (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005). 
Hamel & Välikangas (2003) use the term ‘cognitive challenge’ and posit that “infatuation 
with conformance severely hinders the quest for resilience” (: 60). Scholars in the SI field 
have indeed emphasized that changing the rules of the game requires an inquiring and 
nondogmatic collective mindset (e.g. Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1996). As learning 
theorists have advocated, learning takes place when organizational members reconstruct 
old meaning into new meaning (Louis & Sutton, 1991). Logically, Baden-Fuller (1995) 
asserts that building SIcap does not so much require an investment in physical assets, but 
rather in intangibles and organizational mindsets.  
 
Tripsas & Gavetti (2000) point to the value of ‘deframing’ skills and the ability to question 
current strategic beliefs in an ongoing way (Dunbar et al., 1996). Likewise, Barr et al.’s 
(1992) empirical findings demonstrated the value of a gradual and continuous change in 
mental frames, in contrast to abrupt, radical and drastic changes to it. In successful, 
strategically proactive organizations, so they mention, new mental models are not 
‘refrozen’, but stay open to additional and continuous adjustments. 
Unlearning entails ‘switching cognitive gears’, i.e. the shift from an automatic to a 
conscious cognitive mode of ‘active thinking’ (Louis & Sutton, 1991). It has been shown 
that effortful thought (e.g. by means of causal cognitive mapping) can reveal mental 
schemata and can attenuate framing bias (Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Hall, 1984). Likewise, 
Porac & Thomas (1990) mention the triggering effects of personal reflection. As Weick 
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notes (2002: S12): “When people engage in what they call ‘reflection’, the bulk of this 
activity may involve unbelieving things they initially believed to be true”. Critical 
reflection could in this respect stimulate unlearning. The value of critical reflection also 
explains why it has been argued that exploration is primarily performed by means of 
cognitive efforts to develop new intuitions and ideas, and to select promising ones by 
assessing their ‘fitness value’ or performance implications (Zott, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 
2002). Therefore, Rajagopalan & Spreitzer (1996) also contend that learning at a cognitive 
level is more fundamental than learning at the action level. Unfortunately, these 
deliberative cognitive efforts have been largely ignored in for example the behavioral 
tradition on organizational learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
 
Organizational knowledge is however a socially constructed phenomenon: it originates 
from social interaction (Nonaka, 1994; Floyd & Lane, 2000). “The distinctive feature of 
organization level information activity is sharing” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 285). In Crossan 
et al.’s (1999) 4I framework of organizational learning, the ‘interpreting’ phase, i.e. 
explaining ideas and insights to one’s self and to others, is the process whereby individual 
learning moves to a collective level. Through the interpreting process, ideas are 
incorporated into cognitive maps and, as such, are related to new ideas and new domains.  
However, this social character of new knowledge creation also implies that the 
organizational knowledge needed to efficiently pursue and sustain an existing strategy, 
emerges through and builds upon communication channels that have become implicitly 
embedded in the organization (Henderson & Clark, 1990). This creates islands of 
perspective and knowledge that reinforce instead of undermine the existing strategy, and 
that make it hence extremely difficult to explore new ideas and assimilate new 
information.  
 
With the view of SI, the assimilation process should hence cut through existing knowledge 
barriers in order to modify these ‘lenses’. Schein (1993) makes a plea for cross-functional 
and cross-hierarchical dialogue. More specifically, assimilation processes should involve 
an open dialogue among a group of people with perspectives as diverse as possible 
(Liedtka, 2000; Thomas et al., 2001). This is because learning about the external 
environment through organizational assimilation structures with greater breadth will 
produce more renewable or continuous adaptive capacity (Jarzabkowski, 2004: 543). New 
ideas, that are so critical to SI, emerge if issues are reflected on from different angles or 
perspectives (Markides, 1997). Bogner & Barr (2000) pointed to the value of cognitive 
diversity for ‘adaptive sensemaking’. Similarly, Leonard-Barton (1992) has pointed to the 
value of having multiple frameworks and discrediting existing perspectives in order to 
avoid core rigidities.  
 “Paradoxically, organizations often try to make too much sense of an inherently noisy 
environment. They would be better off making less sense and developing multiple views” 
(Day & Schoemaker, 2004b: 139). Hargadon & Fanelli (2002) hence point to the value of 
‘pluralism in mental schemata’. This pluralism can be triggered by interactions and 
confrontations between diverse organizational members, enriching people’s perspectives 
(see also, Bogner & Barr, 2000 for similar arguments).  
When individuals learn to use different lenses on information, they hence create new 
knowledge from the same information (Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002). Hence, “Sharing 
interpretations enables a firm to create new knowledge through the collective 
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reinterpretation of existing information” (Denealt & Gatignon, 2000: 16). As Weick & 
Roberts (1993: 378) put it: “when individual comprehension proves inadequate, one of the 
few remaining sources of comprehension is social entities. Variation in the development of 
these entities may spell the difference between prosperity and disaster”. Decision-making 
teams made up of persons with diverse cognitive perspectives hence reach a higher level of 
cognitive complexity (March, 1991) and a richer firm-level framework (Bogner & Barr, 
2000).  
 
People expressing and sharing their beliefs, opinions, ideas and individual experiences, and 
a constructive dialogue and debate of these (the so-called ‘kowledge articulation’) are 
therefore considered as an important way of collective learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002; 
Denealt & Gatignon, 2000). Kuwada (1998) also stressed its value for strategic learning, 
i.e. for changing cognitive frameworks. 
Managers thus need to build variety in their understandings and develop a ‘complicated 
understanding’ that will eventually make the organization as a whole more effective 
(Bartunek et al., 1983). Shimizu & Hitt (2004) propose a team-based approach with a 
devil’s advocacy lens. Discussion of multiple hypotheses, asking disconfirming questions, 
stimulating dissenting viewpoints (Bartunek et al., 1983), creative interpretation of 
information, and brainstorming about possibilities (Day & Schoemaker, 2004b) can all be 
useful  in this respect.  
 
Even though top management plays a critical role in initiating a change in organizational 
mindsets (Markides, 1999a; Kim & Mauborgne, 1999b), ultimately every organizational 
member, and manager in particular, should be willing to continuously challenge taken-for-
granted trade-offs (such as low price versus good service) and traditional assumptions 
about the competitive arena and the overall business (Mintzberg, 2000; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1997). Markides (1997), for example, remarks that the organization’s 
perception of the business it is in probably constitutes the most dominant mental model in 
the organization. Since mental models guide behavior, an organization’s perception of the 
business they are in determines its strategy (Styles & Goddard, 2004). Consequently, 
Markides (1997) believes that an honest questioning of the business the firm believes it is 
in is often the first step to SI. Empirical research by von Krogh et al. (2000) showed that 
the higher the variety in a company’s conceptualization of its business, the better it can 
cope with environmental variety. Questioning the strategic position not only allows 
companies to detect early the decay of their current position (reactive) but it also enables 
them to be the first in exploring new opportunities (pro-active) (Markides, 1999b). In 
similar vein, Slater & Narver (1995) made a plea for the development of organizational 
processes that target the critical assessment of key assumptions about the business. They 
argue that these processes are requisite for frame-breaking innovation and generative 
learning (a redefinition of the way business is done). Yet, especially in established 
companies currently doing well this proves an extremely difficult process. Likewise, the 
company’s business model may be deconstructed in its constituent parts (e.g., marketing 
strategy, value proposition, distribution methods, etc), which are successively critically 
reflected upon (Hamel & Getz, 2004; Slywotsky, 1996). Companies can also question who 
their customers and their needs are in order to discover entirely new customers or new 
customer segments by re-segmenting the existing customer base (often the low-end of the 
market or niches) (Markides, 2004b). Reflection on the sources of competitive advantage, 
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revenue and profit models, organization and management systems, and the offering are 
fruitful routes as well (Markides, 1999b; Styles & Goddard, 2004).  
 
In conclusion, within the context of SI assimilation capacity largely centers on collective 
critical reflection. This reflection serves to question especially the dominant assumptions 
and beliefs regarding the competitive arena, customers, and the overall business. Strategic 
learning mechanisms influencing assimilation capacity to improve SIcap, should hence 
primarily target these path-breaking focus areas.  
 
In sum, the PACAP dimension corresponds to sensemaking activities, consisting of 
environmental scanning and interpretation. Both the latter are deemed key elements for 
organizational decision and strategic change (Maitlis, 2005). “Scanning and sensemaking 
are at the center of things. Almost every organizational activity or outcome is in some way 
contingent on interpretation” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 293). Having clarified the value of 
recognition and assimilation capacity for SI, we hence agree with Zahra & George’s 
(2002) assertion that “Firms with well-developed capabilities of acquisition and 
assimilation (PACAP) are likely to be more adept at continually revamping their 
knowledge stock by spotting trends in their external environment and internalizing this 
knowledge, thus overcoming some of the competence traps discussed above” (: 195)6. This 
citation exemplifies the value of especially PACAP in –at least– loosening dependencies. 
 
2.3.3 The path-breaking focus areas of transformation capacity 
 
In contrast to recognition and assimilation, transformation capacity brings behavioral 
aspects of ACAP to the forefront. Transformation capacity has to do with changing 
‘operating routines’ (Zollo & Winter, 2002), in order to integrate the newly acquired and 
assimilated knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002) within the organization’s activities (Lane 
et al., 2001). It centers on issues of conversion, internalization and recodification (Zahra & 
George, 2002; Daghfous, 2004). Transformation capacity could thus be viewed as the 
capacity to effectively change behavioral processes (Zahra & George, 2002).  
It is in these changed behavioral processes that the development of new (combinations of) 
capabilities is rooted (Liedtka, 2000). This is since new or modified routines and processes 
form the fundament of new capabilities (Zahra & George, 2002). Therefore, we could posit 
that it is transformation capacity that will produce the change in operating routines that is 
required for new value creation (Almeida et al., 2003) and SI.  
 
Furthermore, Daft & Weick (1984) consider behavioral processes in itself as the 
organizational mind. In their view, organizational cognition hence transcends a purely 
‘cognitive’ approach. This would imply that changing knowledge structures may result in 
an altering of behavior, and that alternatively, changing behavior may alter cognitive maps. 
As transformation capacity is geared towards the development of new routines that 
combine existing and new knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002), it is entirely focused on 
behavioral issues. Therefore, we argue that the constraining effects dominant logic may 
exert on organizational actions may be loosened by influencing transformation capacity. 
Prahalad & Bettis (1995) compare a dominant logic with a genetic factor. Although it is 
                                                          
6 This assertion seemingly contrasts their belief in the path-dependent character of ACAP. 
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invisible, its influence is pervasive through its interaction with organizational systems, 
structures and standard operating procedures (see also, Daft & Weick, 1984). Prahalad & 
Bettis (1995) hence argue that changing the dominant logic also implies making 
adjustments to these organizational aspects, since both are interwoven and mutually 
reinforcing. After all, organizational processes have, apart from their 
coordination/integration and learning purposes, also an important role in reconfiguring and 
transforming (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Even though the SI literature remains rather vague as regards the specific intra-
organizational behavioral aspects of SI, it still recognizes the value transformation capacity 
may have for SIcap. The implementation of new value propositions requires organizational 
changes (Carrillat et al., 2004) and a continuous redefinition of the “way of doing things” 
(Deneault & Gatignon, 2000). Since organizations with pro-active strategies should 
possess a ‘responsiveness capability’ (Liao et al., 2003), to turn new knowledge into new 
business concepts (Tuominen et al., 2004), they should be agile and develop the 
capabilities for flexible action and response (Day & Schoemaker, 2004b). Day (1994) 
furthermore indicates that new ideas do not succeed without any behavioral change. 
 
The cognitive change recognition and assimilation capacity may invoke, should hence lead 
(and be aligned) to behavioral and procedural change, in the form of revised routines 
(Tranfield & Smith, 1998): new insights, meanings and initiatives should be leveraged 
(Zahra & George, 2002). Indeed, a new conception of ‘how business is done’ is only 
complete when old routines are replaced with new ways of working and behavioral 
standards (Tranfield & Smith, 1998). Organizations hence need to redesign the processes 
by which the work has traditionally been done, in order to better match the requirements of 
the new business (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000).  
Furthermore, investments in PACAP all demand a significant amount of time, effort and 
other resources. These investments may eventually turn out counterproductive for an 
organization’s innovation capacity if too excessive exploration efforts reduce the attention 
available to actually implement and exploit new business ideas (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
Koput, 1997). Knowledge management theories have often ignored the latter aspect, 
becoming solely preoccupied with a firm’s intelligence creation (Davenport & Prusak, 
1998; Becker, 2001).   
 
The importance of the behavioral aspect motivates why exploratory search efforts 
(PACAP) have been hypothesized to be curvilinearly (inverted U-shape) related to an 
organization’s innovativeness (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). Recent research by Laursen & 
Salter (2006) confirmed that the depth and breadth of an organization’s external search 
strategies enhance its innovation performance, though with decreasing returns. 
Organizations can also ‘over-search’, which leads to an information overload, confusion, 
and financial outlays (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Levinthal & March, 1993). This issue is 
expressed in Zahra & George’s (2002) efficiency factor η as the ratio of RACAP 
(including transformation capacity) to PACAP. η determines the value a company can 
create out of its knowledge base; carrying with it a glaring contrast to the absolute value of 
ACAP (such as that which the popular measure of R&D expenses covers, e.g. Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Over-searching would hence show a low efficiency factor. Since it is 
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primarily RACAP that is associated with performance outcomes, investing in both PACAP 
and RACAP is required (Zahra & George, 2002). 
 
Yet, achieving a high transformation capacity is not evident. As already mentioned, 
cognitive schemata can be reinforcing in that they may prevent the recognition and 
assimilation of new, valuable information. Moreover, even if the firm remains vigilant to 
new information, this does not necessarily imply that an effective response is initiated. 
Organizational context (e.g. a culture where mistakes are severely punished) and ingrained 
behaviors may block behavioral changes (e.g., Schon, 1975). In addition, political power 
struggles and potential detrimental career effects may retard the transformational process 
(Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). SI may disrupt established routines and this intensifies perceived 
uncertainty (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Since people prefer the status quo, organizational 
inertia can prevent the transformation processes needed to create SIinitiatives.  
Therefore, effective transformation is often a fairly long process, surpassing traditional 
organizational functions (Carrillat et al., 2004). Behavioral change may be costly and firms 
are thus suggested to develop processes to minimize these costs by quickly reconfiguring 
and transforming ahead of competition (Teece & Pisano, 1994). As indicated, the timing of 
resource deployments in dynamic capability development (e.g., reconfigurations) have 
indeed been thought determinant of intra-industry differential firm performance (Zott, 
2003).  
 
In conclusion, SIcap requires a behavioral change as well. Processes fostering and 
speeding up the development of new routines, processes and ways of working, which 
better integrate new external knowledge with existing knowledge, will lead to the 
behavioral change SI requires. Influencing transformation capacity to increase SIcap 
means to influence essentially these path-breaking focus areas.  
 
Recapitulating our logic: Our main research objective was to search for any mechanisms to 
increase SIcap. We began our discussion by the assertion that SIcap requires dynamic 
capabilities. We argued that dynamic capabilities may prove perishable over time and that 
hence the strategic, second-order learning mechanisms that create and modify dynamic 
capabilities are key. This line of reasoning essentially builds upon Eisenhardt & Martin’s 
(2000) finding that dynamic capabilities are path-dependent in their emergence. That is, 
path dependence takes place through the learning mechanisms by which dynamic caps 
develop; it is the learning mechanisms that guide their development. So “the evolution of 
dynamic capabilities occurs along a unique path for any given firm, this path is shaped by 
well-known learning mechanisms” (: 1117). In other words: the learning mechanisms build 
the path. “these insights open the ‘black box’ of path dependence to reveal that the 
evolution of dynamic capabilities is guided by well-known learning mechanisms” (: 1117). 
In order to specify what these learning mechanisms should tackle, we had to refine the 
specific contents of dynamic capabilities in the context of SIcap. Therefore, we used 
ACAP as a proxy for dynamic capabilities. More specifically, we took recognition, 
assimilation and transformation capacity as three antecedent capacities of SIcap. Founding 
our argument on cognitive theories, we argued that influencing specific path-breaking 
focus areas in these three ACAP-dimensions could loosen path dependencies.  
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Still, we have not yet plunged into the specifics of these learning mechanisms. Hence, in 
the following section we take the discussion one step further to study the specific form of 
these learning mechanisms. 
Focusing on the strategic learning mechanisms for ACAP, we do a first attempt to answer 
Lane et al.’s (2002) critique of absorptive capacity research to date for paying too little 
attention “to the actual processes underlying absorptive capacity” (: M4). They further 
argue that this is rather disappointing since Cohen & Levinthal’s (1990) original 
contribution emphasized the need to study organizational mechanisms for ACAP 
development.  
 
 
2.4 DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING MECHANISMS FOR SICAP 
 
We first dilate upon the deliberate character strategic learning mechanisms may have.  
Then, we pursue in greater depth the question as regards the specific form of these learning 
mechanisms.  
 
2.4.1 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms  
 
Galunic & Eisenhardt (2001) critique existing contributions of dynamic capabilities for 
their implicit assumption of an underlying economic (i.e. business-minded) logic, that 
automatically optimizes internal firm capabilities to external market needs, without taking 
into consideration the influence of social (i.e. communal, e.g. loyalty) forces. 
Consequently, a stream of literature has recently arisen that stresses the value of deliberate 
investments in (dynamic) capability generation.  
For example, Knott (2003) stresses it reserves a continuous and crucial role for managers 
to preserve a firm’s resource advantages. The different roles managers at all organizational 
levels can play in the process of strategic renewal have also been indicated by Floyd & 
Lane (2000). Recently, Ethiraj et al. (2005) also empirically demonstrated the value of 
deliberate, proactive, institutionalized and sustained investments in systems and processes 
for the development of capabilities in the software services industry. A similar argument 
was developed by Helfat & Peteraf (2003). Even though these authors largely follow 
evolutionary arguments in explaining the development of dynamic capabilities, they still 
argue that the development of dynamic capabilities may branch into different directions, as 
a result of deliberate managerial decisions. In similar vein, Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) 
associated the development of successful core capabilities for innovation with specific 
management practices. In the context of architectural innovation, Henderson & Clark 
(1990) assert that given the way knowledge tends to be structured and organized to sustain 
the existing architecture (or strategy), learning about new architectures (or new business 
ideas) is unlikely to occur naturally and “may therefore require explicit management and 
attention” (: 28, italics added to original). Beck & Kieser (2003) have hence called to 
better study organizational rule systems, especially those encompassing change 
mechanisms that foster an organization’s learning capacity. 
 
Similar arguments can be found in ACAP research. ACAP has indeed been conceptualized 
as a combination of effort and knowledge bases (Kim, 1998).  
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Cohen & Levinthal (1990) argue that if a firm wants to acquire and exploit knowledge that 
is unrelated to its current activities, ACAP will not gradually arise as a natural ‘byproduct’ 
of  the innovation process, but that the creation of ACAP in this case will require the 
dedication of explicit and exclusive effort. Zahra & George’s (2002) view of ACAP even 
more points to the importance of managerial intervention in the creation and triggering of 
all four ACAP dimensions. They indicate that their conceptualization of ACAP as a 
dynamic capability implies that ACAP may be implemented deliberately to acquire, 
assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge. Thomas et al. (1993), for example, actually 
found that in firms that had put into place explicit mechanisms to increase information use, 
managers were more likely to initiate strategic change.  
To increase an organization’s ACAP, Jansen et al. (2006) make a plea for codification 
efforts through formalization, over experiential learning through tacit knowledge 
accumulation and routinization. For example, deliberate learning mechanisms for 
assimilation are valuable in that formal social integration mechanisms increase intra-
organizational information dissemination, interpretation and the identification of trends 
(Zahra & George, 2002). As a consequence, Van Den Bosch et al. (2003) have made a call 
for incorporating the issue of managerial intentionality (deliberately influencing ACAP) in 
future ACAP models. Lenox & King (2004) responded to this call and found that 
managers can directly influence a firm’s absorptive capacity. Their results suggest that 
absorptive capacity seems not durable and needs continuous investment. Lenox & King 
(2004) further conclude that also established firms can enhance absorptive capacity, even 
in domains where they lack prior experience. Furthermore, “The benefit of using clear and 
strict directions for knowledge absorption is that it can facilitate the process of breaking 
down existing socialization capabilities” (Van den Bosch et al., 1999: 565). Socialization 
capabilities refer to shared ideologies and cultures; deliberate learning mechanisms for 
ACAP could hence break the inertial influences of inappropriate (i.e. innovation curbing) 
cultures.  
 
The usefulness that deliberate learning mechanisms may have for sensemaking and 
changing mental frameworks has been exemplified at length. Thomas et al.’s (2001) study 
of the US Army indeed demonstrated the value of systematic and intentional learning 
mechanisms for strategic learning (i.e. changing strategic assumptions). De Holan & 
Phillips’ (2003) study showed that organizational forgetting required a high level of 
management concern, time and effort. Moreover, Daft & Weick (1984) posit that 
organizations using formal and systematic mechanisms to interpret their environment are 
so-called ‘test makers’, who do not accept their environment as given, but test and 
manipulate their environment by trial and error experimentation and/or by formal search. 
These organizations employ ‘enacting’ or ‘discovering’ interpretation modes. It is exactly 
these kinds of organizations, they argue, that may break or change environmental rules. 
Organizations hence need to establish driving mechanisms for discussing, sharing and 
interpreting information internally (Day & Schoemaker, 2004b). Furthermore, research has 
indicated that actors (and organizations too) switch to a conscious cognitive mode, not 
only when confronted with novel situations (e.g., a merger), or when discrepancy is felt 
between cognition and action (e.g., a performance decline), but also by deliberate requests 
for active thinking, i.e., in response to an internal or external request. Active thinking may 
hence be stimulated by motivating people to do so (Louis & Sutton, 1991). A more 
deliberate focus on collective reflection may increase the understanding of ambiguous 
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action-performance links and has as such been suggested as highly beneficial to the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Zollo & Winter, 2002). 
 
In the innovation area, Dougherty & Hardy (1996) found, in turn, that especially large, 
mature organizations are confronted with the innovation-organization problem, which 
reduces their ability for sustained innovation. This is because the effective implementation 
of the innovation in the organization depends primarily on individuals’ power bases. 
Hence, if innovation takes place, it occurs in spite of the system, not because of it. 
Dougherty & Hardy (1996) hence advice firms to design organizational systems and 
processes that ease the repeated creation of innovation in the organization. Koput’s (1997) 
simulation results provide further evidence for this argument. They show that the chaos, 
traditionally associated with innovation initiation, has a stable, underlying structure. His 
results suggest the possibility to design stable processes, such as practices and routines, 
aimed at the generation and selection of new innovative ideas. Zollo & Winter (2002) 
hence emphasize the value deliberate learning mechanisms can have, especially in 
exploration. Moreover, they propose that deliberate learning mechanisms will be more 
effective in the case of a low task frequency, high task heterogeneity, and high action-
performance ambiguity. SIcap could indeed be considered as an extreme exploration 
capacity, involving the creation of new (read: infrequent) initiatives and tasks. By 
definition, it entails the execution of heterogeneous tasks (path-breaking, so different than 
before) and much causal ambiguity due to its strategic novelty.  
 
In conclusion, all previous arguments lead to the proposition that deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms could prove useful to foster SIcap. As previously argued, deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms that stimulate specific path-breaking focus areas in 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity, may foster SIcap (see Figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for SIcap 
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2.4.2 The form of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
 
The influence deliberate strategic learning mechanisms exert logically depends on the 
specific object, which they exert this influence on. Hence, to examine the specific form 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms should take, we should first look at the object 
upon which these learning mechanisms act.  
Actually, strategic learning mechanisms are second-order since they operate on first-order 
dynamic capabilities. They thus influence, act upon, dynamic capabilities. As noted, we 
follow the predominant conception of dynamic capabilities as first-order routines (e.g., 
Zollo & Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003; Winter, 2003). First-order routines, while ‘meta’, are 
still routines (Adler et al., 1999). Therefore, let us explore theories on routines and on 
routine changes. They may shed light on the way strategic learning mechanisms may 
influence dynamic capabilities (or, in our study, the three ACAP-dimensions). 
 
2.4.2.1 Traditional view on routines 
 
Routines are traditionally conceptualized as patterned, (quasi-)repetitious, collective 
activity (e.g., interaction) regularities that are founded mostly on tacit knowledge (Becker, 
2004; Winter, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982). “Routines are stable patterns of behavior 
that characterize organizational actions to variegated, internal or external stimuli” (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002: 340). Routines increase efficiency in that they help to economize on the 
energy expended on calculation. In this way, they free up energy that may be spent on 
other calculations (Gomez & Jones, 2000). Winter (2003: 991) for example notes that: 
“brilliant improvisation is not a routine, and there is no such thing as a general-purpose 
routine”. This is because routines can only be successfully maintained to the degree they 
are frequently exercised and repeated. If a pattern of action occurs only once, it is no 
routine (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). 
 
Routines have been thought to develop in an incremental way, resting on processes of trial 
and error learning whereby experience is accumulated in a tacit way (Nelson & Winter, 
2002). Simply put, experiential learning is stimulus-response learning where choices 
associated with previous positive outcomes are reinforced, whereas choices associated 
with negative outcomes are suppressed (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Only exceptional 
mismatches between routine outcomes and environmental conditions may provoke change 
(Levitt & March, 1988). This is why the development of dynamic capabilities (since they 
rest on changing routines) has often been thought to be a slow and incremental process 
(Teece et al., 1997). In this view, dynamic capabilities equal ‘dynamic tendencies’ (King 
& Tucci, 2002). 
 
Since routines reflect experiential wisdom (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) they operate as 
‘local search’ mechanisms, constrained by existing routines and previous search activities 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Considering routines as codification mechanisms of 
organizational memory, some scholars argue that routines reflect current organizational 
capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997). In this way, a firm’s prior 
behavior may constrain its future action in that learning may be restricted to conventional 
domains, favoring the status quo (Levinthal & March, 1993). In essence, routines may 
create path dependencies by stimulating only local search efforts (Teece & Pisano, 1994). 
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Routines may in this sense promote innovation, as long as the innovation is still ‘in close 
proximity to current behavior’, i.e. in line with existing ideologies and strategies (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982; Miller, 1993; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Innovation by recombination is 
confined since local search efforts block the recognition and assimilation of new and ‘more 
distant’ knowledge (Almeida et al., 2003). “Learning by doing does not contribute to the 
diversity that is so critical to learning about or creating something that is relatively new” 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 134). Routines are thus traditionally considered as limiting a 
firm’s adaptiveness; constraining its strategic pro-activeness all the more. 
 
In conclusion, routines have traditionally been considered as repetitive, fairly mindless 
actions, concerning few cognitive effort, and taking place in an automatic mode (Becker, 
2004; e.g., Miller, 1993). Within the context of SIcap, it is especially the inertia, 
mindlessness, and path-dependent character of routines that should be tackled.  
 
2.4.2.2 Modern view on routines 
 
Recently, some scholars have critiqued this traditional view on routines. Their assertion 
that actors are to be considered as intentful in their use of routines puts into question the 
mindless and rusty character routines are traditionally assigned. Moreover, whereas the 
traditional conception of routines is lacking empirical proof, this ‘new’ perspective on 
routines as mindful and interpretative actions has been well documented in empirical 
research (Becker, 2004).  
 
Pentland & Reuter (1994) reconceptualized a routine from its traditional meaning of a 
fixed, mindless response to “a set of repetitive, functionally similar patterns of action” (: 
505), stressing the reflective agency (i.e. the explicit deliberation and search) actors 
dispose of in their execution of routines. “In the same way that English grammar allows 
speakers to produce a variety of sentences, an organizational routine allows members to 
produce a variety of performances” (: 623). Their results further illuminate the emerging 
idea that routines are not inert, but possess an endogenous dynamic of incremental change 
(e.g., Massini et al., 2002). Pentland & Reuter (1994) hence propose to substitute the term 
‘process’ for the pejorative term ‘routine’. 
Feldman & Pentland (2003) later brought these ideas into a coherent framework, 
differentiating between the ‘ostensive’ and ‘performative’ aspect of routines. The ostensive 
aspect refers to the abstract, ideal, schematic, ‘structure’ part of the routine; the 
performative aspect refers to the routine in practice, the enactment, i.e. the actual 
performances of the routine by specific people, at specific times, in specific places. The 
performative aspect clarifies that actors may tailor routines to better serve their particular 
intents and ‘improvise with the materials at hand’ (Jarzabkowski, 2004). As such, routines 
may consist of adaptive and creative behavior. Feldman & Pentland (2003) assert that 
routines are not blindly followed and reproduced but, through their performative aspect, 
stay open to constant change and variation. Some of the performance variations are 
eventually selectively retained in the ostensive aspect, producing incremental and 
continuous change. Feldman & Pentland (2003) argue that when performative aspects of 
routines are stimulated and effective selection and retention mechanisms are in place, this 
sheds doubt on theories of punctuated change (e.g., Tushman et al., 1986) that built their 
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argument on the assumption of routines’ structural inertia (cfr. Brown & Eisenhardt’s 
(1997) findings on continuous change in the computer industry). 
Their view reflects the idea that routines are not inert, are mindful and may be considered 
as a source of organizational flexibility. This improvisational aspect of routines has also 
been exemplified in, for example, Weick & Roberts’ (1993) study on flight decks.  
 
Feldman (2000), for her part, has taken the discussion even one step further. She found that 
people who engage in routines reflect on and react to various outcomes of previous 
iterations of the routine. As such, actors may not only choose another possible set of 
actions in a given repertoire (cfr. Pentland & Reuter, 1994), but may even try to make the 
routine itself more efficient (the process) or more effective (what the routine 
accomplishes). Her empirical results pointed to an internal dynamic in routines, i.e. even 
the repertoire, the ‘grammar’, can change over time. Although action is bounded by the 
cognitive, material and relational structures in the organization, at the same time it affects 
and changes these structures (Child, 1997). The ‘behavioral stability’ routines are said to 
induce is thus a relative concept, encompassing the potential change that is endogenous to 
the routine (Becker, 2004). As Okhuysen & Eisenhardt (2002) found in their study on 
knowledge integration in groups: “Structure acts not only as a channel for knowledge 
flows among individuals, but also can provide a platform for changing and improving 
these flows” (: 383).  
 
These conceptualizations bring the cognitive, reflective, agency aspect of routines to the 
forefront. In contrast to classic models of organizational routines, this research stream 
shows that routines can indeed change, as long as actors spent time on reflecting on 
previous iterations and outcomes (Feldman, 2000; Edmondson et al., 2001). “While 
organizational routines are commonly portrayed as promoting cognitive efficiency, they 
also entail self-reflective and other-reflective behavior” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 95).  
Feldman (2000) notes that because of the agency, more specifically the reflection people 
engage in before changing routines, the inherent dynamic in routines may encompass an 
ongoing process of double loop learning. Accordingly, in Feldman’s (2000) view, routines 
are not only a source of flexibility (cfr. Pentland & Reuter, 1994), but of considerable and 
radical organizational change as well.  
In other words, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms fostering changes in dynamic 
capabilities should hence stimulate the agency aspect of routines. 
 
2.4.2.3 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as general, semi-structured rules 
 
As the previous discussion indicates, the effectiveness of routines is context-dependent 
(Massini et al., 2002). Specific situations call for judgment and interpretation, in order to 
tailor the rules to the specific context before applying them (Becker, 2004). The more rules 
are formulated in general terms, the more their ‘performative’ aspect (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003), or ‘adaptive use’ (Jarzabkowski, 2004), will prevail. General rules thus 
stimulate creative behavior (Becker, 2004). This is important since Feldman (2004) 
showed that changes in organizational routines affect resource mutability. Likewise, 
Prietula & Watson’s (2000) computer simulation demonstrated that even subtle changes in 
key routines may have drastic organizational and economic effects. In addition, empirics 
demonstrated that changes in organizational routines should correspond to changes in the 
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work environment; strict routine changes that are enforced from above are likely to cause 
resistance to change (Feldman, 2004). General rules leave in this respect room for agents 
to tailor routine changes to the specifics of their work environments.  
 
If there exist rules for almost any action organizational members may take, persons have 
no time or opportunity left for improvisation and the creative development of more 
efficient or effective solutions. As a consequence, innovation is curbed (Beck & Kieser, 
2003). In a similar vein, Weick & Roberts (1993) argue that high-efficiency organizations 
have simple minds; whereas “A smart system does the right thing regardless of its structure 
and regardless of whether the environment is stable or turbulent” (: 377).  
Simple, formal interventions provide some kind of ‘semi-structure’ (Eisenhardt & Sull, 
2001) that holds processes together while not rigidly controlling them, balancing order 
with disorder (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). This semi-structure can also help entire groups 
self-organize in more effective ways, enhancing both their efficiency and flexibility 
(Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002).  
 
Similar ideas have been posited by Adler & Borys (1996), who distinguished between two 
types of bureaucracies: ‘enabling’ and ‘coercive’ ones. Their central message is that: 
“Formal procedures do not have to be designed to make the work process foolproof. They 
can be designed to enable employees to deal more effectively with its inevitable 
contingencies” (Adler & Borys, 1996: 69). Employees can be actively involved in defining 
and refining rules (Adler et al., 1999). In this way, and contrary to common perceptions, in 
an enabling bureaucracy high levels of formalization may support high levels of 
commitment and innovation. Beck & Kieser’s (2003) empirics did indeed show that formal 
organizational rules and mechanisms may enable organizational change and learning. 
Likewise, Gilson et al.’s (2005) result point to the complementary effects of creativity and 
standardized work practices for team effectiveness. Adler & Borys (1996) even note that if 
both routine and nonroutine tasks are managed in an enabling way, this can be the effective 
and real path to ambidexterity. They verified this proposition in subsequent empirical 
research (Adler et al., 1999).  
 
From a cognitive perspective, the value of general rules has been promoted as well.  
Bettis & Wong (2003) propose the establishment of multiple dominant logics as a way to 
build the requisite internal variety to cope with complex and changing environments. 
Building their argument on complexity theory, they argue that “multiple logics can evolve 
from simple rules” (: 352). In their view, simple rules permit the co-existence of multiple 
logics because the rules leave enough flexibility to accommodate different meanings. As 
these rules stimulate frequent deconstructions in processes (cfr. routines) the required 
instability is built in within the organization. Bettis & Wong (2003) position these rules on 
a deeper level as ‘meta-logic’. They draw the conclusion that: “The origins of complex 
adaptive behavior can, therefore, be surprisingly simple” (: 352). They accordingly call for 
more research on the establishment of such meta-logics.  
Maitlis (2005), in turn, suggested that a ‘guided’ form of organizational sensemaking may 
be well suited to produce innovative proposals; “guided sensemaking processes may be 
particularly valuable in situations that require the development of a rich, multifaceted 
account that can be used as a resource for ongoing and spontaneous actions” (: 47). Guided 
sensemaking coordinates and structures the overall process, while actively engaging 
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participants in sensegiving. In this way, while the discussion of diverse opinions and 
understandings is promoted, the process is meanwhile controlled and is hence more likely 
to lead to consistent actions. 
Furthermore, as proposed by Jarzabkowski (2004), the more turbulent the environment, the 
less likely fully institutionalized routines will meet environmental demands. This will 
promote internal change in the routines themselves, or even their entire rejection. This 
view is echoed in Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) and Galunic & Eisenhardt (2001). Based on 
their study of the Internet search engines Yahoo! and Excite, Rindova & Kotha’s (2001) 
conclude that “dynamic capabilities depend on emergent learning processes and simple 
organizing principles” (: 1274).  Even though these findings relate to first-order routines 
(e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), resting on Adler et al.’s (1999) and Winter’s 2000) 
statements large analogies exist with second-order routines (i.e. strategic learning 
mechanisms). If semi-structured first-order routines promote change in operating routines, 
then second-order routines promote change in first-order routines. 
 
In conclusion, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms should take the form of general 
rules, stimulating agency in the performance of first-order routines. In this way, deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms foster the inherent dynamic of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation processes.  
 
 
2.5 REMARKS ON THE EFFECTS OF DELIBERATE STRATEGIC LEARNING 
MECHANISMS 
 
We argue that the establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms may foster 
SIcap. The effects these learning mechanisms provoke occur in fact on two different 
dimensions. 
 
The first dimension is the most obvious one. In order to develop the dynamic capabilities 
required for SIcap, we argue that second-order mechanisms should target recognition, 
assimilation and transformation capacity (see Figure 2.1). Relating the ACAP cycle 
explicitly to cognitive theories of sensemaking and to literature on SI, we detected aspects 
in the three ACAP dimensions that are crucial to promote path-loosening effects. We 
hence propose that strategic learning mechanisms fostering especially these path-breaking 
focus areas may foster SIcap. We furthermore contend that firms may deliberately 
establish these strategic learning mechanisms.  
Stressing the value of strategic learning mechanisms, we follow Bogner & Barr (2000) and 
Bettis & Wong (2003) that it is this pattern of strategy creation processes (the ‘how’), and 
not the specific strategy contents (the ‘what’), that may be regarded as the source of 
success itself, especially in hypercompetitive environments. “recipes for success must 
focus on the process or “hows” of strategy, and not the “whats”” (Bogner & Barr, 2000: 
224). This highlights the competitive value deliberate strategic learning mechanisms may 
have.  
Furthermore, our focus on strategic learning mechanisms stresses the strategic value of 
specific, concrete firm processes, instead of studying more abstract ‘resources’. Although 
organizational knowledge processing (ACAP) is in itself unobservable, it is influenced by 
other organizational practices. Concrete organizational practices could hence function as a 
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proxy of a firm’s knowledge processing (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) and hence carry a great 
potential for empirical research. “They provide a ‘window’ to the drivers underlying 
change […] enabling researchers to map organizational change” (Becker, 2004: 649).  
 
The establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms also provokes changes on a 
less obvious dimension. The aforementioned ACAP-capabilities actually consist of 
specific routines aimed at recognition, assimilation and transformation (Zahra & George, 
2002). Edmondson et al.’s (2001) study on the establishment of new cardiac surgery 
routines in US hospitals showed that routines do not only change in a natural way (e.g., 
variation, selection, retention) but that the establishment of new routines can also be 
deliberately facilitated and triggered. Hence, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
should steer the development of ACAP-routines. Furthermore, we explained how agency 
promotes the inherent dynamic in routines (Feldman, 2000; Pentland & Reuter, 1994). 
Feldman’s (2000) results show that agency may not only lead to organizational forgetting 
(de Holan & Phillips, 2003), but it also enables path-breaking behavior to occur within 
daily organizational processes and routines. In addition, Coombs & Hull (1998), not only 
argue that especially routines and processes aimed at the generation and organization of 
market knowledge (say, ACAP) are crucial in the innovation process, but that these 
routines, and the modification of these routines (i.e. the first and second dimension), hold 
the key to (partially) relaxing the constraints on path dependency in innovation. Fostering 
the agency aspect in the performance of the ACAP-routines means stimulating the inherent 
change potential of recognition, assimilation and transformation capabilities.  
We hence argued that establishing deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as semi-
structured, general rules stimulates agency and hence cranks up the endemic change 
potential of routines. “A management practice may, therefore, be used deliberately to 
generate adaptive behaviour, in so doing adapting the practice itself to local 
circumstances” (Jarzabkowski, 2004: 549).  
 
In conclusion, not only the development of path-breaking aspects in ACAP is promoted 
(first dimension), but the internal change in ACAP capabilities, i.e. ACAP’s development 
path (second dimension), is stimulated as well. For instance, deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms may not only foster the path-breaking aspects of assimilation capabilities (say, 
processes for collective critical reflection), they affect the way these assimilation 
capabilities are built as well (say, stimulating a change in the specific processes for 
collective critical reflection, in order to make them more efficient or effective).  
 
In sum, we follow evolutionary theorizing for we recognize the existence of bounded 
rational actors, operating within a particular set of mental frameworks and firm-specific 
routines (incl. capabilities on a higher order). This implies that levels of analysis (from 
individual to organizational) are in fact –and inevitably– blurred (Weick & Roberts, 1993), 
since organizational structures affect cognitive processes and individual cognitive 
processes enact organizational structures (Pentland & Reuter, 1994).  
We further share the evolutionary idea of performance differences rooted in firms’ ability 
to create and internalize innovations themselves (Massini et al., 2002). We however 
dissociate ourselves from traditional evolutionary theory in our assertion that actors still do 
have the (albeit incomplete) ability to (partly) ‘see through’ the context they are embedded 
in, and thus dispose of mechanisms to consciously improve routines or to develop better 
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ones (Nelson & Winter, 2002). This does however by no means imply we entirely reject 
the idea of path dependency; we only reject the idea of complete path dependency and 
dissociate ourselves from its deterministic character. Sharing Child’s (1997) critique 
against the polarization of entire determinism versus entire voluntarism, we consider 
organizational reality as a mix of both.  
 
This view is consistent with more recent ideas in ‘strategic choice’ theory. As Child (1997: 
68) put it: “This [intentionality] is largely ignored by evolutionary economists because 
they try to concentrate their attention on essentially behavioural routines rather than on the 
level of cognition and rationale”. Child argues that evolutionary theories of the firm still 
tend to rely on assumptions of optimization and survival, ignoring the understanding and 
the intentions of actors: “Evolutionary theories of the firm are aware of the structural and 
technological manifestations of evolution, but they are searching for a link from these to 
the actions and underlying rationales which bring them about” (Child, 1997: 66)7.  
Gavetti & Levinthal (2000) exemplified the effect of actors’ understanding. They 
demonstrated the superiority of joint cognitive and experiential search over pure 
experiential search. Their computer simulation showed that, despite the value of 
experiential search, cognition may help organizations find more attractive regions in the 
business landscape. The authors furthermore found that cognition, and cognitive change, 
may influence subsequent experiential learning. Similarly, even Nelson & Winter (2002) 
themselves argue that over time, understanding and practice co-evolve; they tend to 
advance together. “Cognition is useful not only in seeding the process of experiential 
search on a particular location in the fitness landscape but also in constraining the process 
of experiential search from wandering to less attractive regions on the landscape” (Gavetti 
& Levinthal, 2000: 133). In this sense, cognitive search (even if consisting of imperfect 
cognitive representations) may prevent the competency traps induced by exclusive local, 
experiential search. Furthermore, Gavetti & Levinthal (2000) stress the value of cognitive 
change, especially when the organization faces environmental change. They argue that the 
loss of experiential wisdom induced by a change in cognitive representations, is attenuated 
as the experiential wisdom has become outdated anyway, given altered environmental 
conditions. In turn, Miner (1994), March (1994) and Lovas & Goshal (2000) have leveled 
their criticism against the natural, deterministic explanations of the evolutionary theory of 
the firm, that are devoid of any role of voluntary choice and managerial action. Lovas & 
Goshal (2000) did actually an attempt to study the organization as an ‘artificial’ selection 
environment, incorporating the active role of (top) management in guiding the 
evolutionary innovation processes of firms.  
More specifically, asserting that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms can both loosen 
path dependencies by stimulating specific aspects of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity and foster the internal dynamic of routines, we follow the view 
that the impetus for organizational change comes both from strategic choices and from the 
auto-evolution of the system itself (Deneault & Gatignon, 2000). 
 
                                                          
7 Nelson & Winter (2002: 33) later write: “The idea that habits of management thought 
channel strategic choices is not a radical new discovery of the evolutionist camp. The 
challenge, however, is to build a theoretical structure that is capable of making effective use 
of that insight”. 
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This auto-evolution lies herein that the effect deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
exert is an indirect one. They influence dynamic capabilities (ACAP), which in turn affect 
capabilities, which in turn affect resource configuration and operating routines. In fact, 
they set a chain of sequential effects into motion (cfr. Winter, 2000). The objects affected 
in this chain however comprise inherited things from the past. The central premise of the 
resource-based view is indeed that resources or factor inputs are available to all firms, but 
the capabilities to deploy them are not (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Ethiraj, 2005). 
(Dynamic) capabilities, just as ACAP, can not be bought, but should be developed (Teece 
& Pisano, 1994; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Furthermore, Ahuja & Kathila (2004) 
demonstrated that resource heterogeneity stems from particular situations and 
opportunities firms are confronted with. In this sense, the idiosyncratic situations firms 
face create specific (search and capability development) paths. Consequently, capabilities 
and dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic.  
This implies that the effect strategic learning mechanisms exert on dynamic capabilities 
depends on the level and characteristics of dynamic capabilities. This in turn affects the 
influence dynamic capabilities have on capabilities, and so forth. In other words, in each 
organization, strategic learning mechanisms and capabilities have other objects they 
operate on; firms do not start with a clean slate. Even though Ray et al. (2004) make a plea 
for business processes (cfr. high-order routines) as the ultimate sources of competitive 
advantage in the resource-based view, they hence note that “firms are not empty 
‘canvasses’ upon which any activity, routine, or business process can be drawn, and the 
differential effectiveness of these firm processes depends critically on the resources and 
capabilities a firm possesses” (: 35). In this respect, we share the idea of path dependency 
posited in evolutionary economics (e.g., Massini et al., 2002).  
The existence of path dependencies implies that even if two firms would apply the same 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms, chances are almost nihil that these would 
eventually lead to exactly the same product-market and performance implications. 
“Although the notion of making deliberate investments to improve firm capabilities may 
be understood uniformly by most firms, there are idiosyncratic firm-level differences in the 
timing of this effort, the nature and amount of the investment and effort they undertake, 
and the internal organizational mind-set that supports this process. These differences may 
get reflected in significant heterogeneity across firms with respect to the capabilities that 
result from this effort” (Ethiraj, 2005: 28).  
 
 
2.6 CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND SUPPLY CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Organizational theory posits that capabilities can only be used to the extent they 
correspond to the architecture, or overall configuration, of the firm (Grant, 1996; Miller, 
1993). Accordingly, Markides (in Mang, 2000) explicitly calls for more research on the 
interrelationships between a firm’s strategy and its internal organizational environment. 
Govindarajan & Trimble (2005) put much emphasis on the role of the ‘organizational 
DNA’ in the management of SI initiatives. This DNA consists primarily of systems, 
structure and culture. Especially organizational mechanisms (such as deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms) and processes are not established in a vacuum; they are embedded in 
a broader organizational context. Characteristics of this context hence determine their 
effectiveness (Adler et al., 1999).  
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This internal organizational context influences cognition and behavior (Vera & Crossan, 
2004). Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms may hence provide an integrated system 
of valuable strategy creation processes as long as it is backed by different organizational 
side conditions that make it operate efficiently and effectively (Liedtka, 2000). Culture and 
structure have been proposed as central building blocks of such an environment (Markides, 
1999b). Apart from organizational characteristics, attributes of the supply chain (network) 
relationships have been associated with ACAP and SI development as well (e.g. Baden-
Fuller, 1995). 
 
Therefore, we propose several organizational and supply chain characteristics that may 
exert a critical influence on the relationship between deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms and SIcap. The selection of characteristics discussed below is not meant to 
exhaust the universe of spheres of influence, but to summarize factors suggested in the 
literature. This provisional selection will be further refined based on the qualitative 
findings (see chapter 4). 
 
2.6.1 Organizational characteristics  
 
2.6.1.1 Organizational culture 
 
Organizational culture can be defined by “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help 
individuals understand organizational functioning and thus provide them with the norms 
for behavior in the organization” (Deshpandé & Webster, 1989: 4). Since an organizational 
culture refers to the values and beliefs of employees it can govern the behavior of 
individuals and hence make the function of more formal administrative methods redundant 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994). The shared values of a culture may function as a beacon of 
stability in the midst of change (Kanter, 1985).  
 
However, organizational values also reflect a strategic business logic (Hurley & Hult, 
1998); they set priorities and determine for example whether a new business idea is 
regarded as an attractive opportunity or not. Organizational culture can in this respect also 
produce conformity, blindness, and intolerance (Miller, 1993). Strong, coherent and 
unitary cultures may prevent defiance from current operations, may produce core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), and may retard innovation (Jarzabkowski, 2004) and the 
development of ACAP (Van den Bosch et al., 1999). Changing the organization in 
response to external forces can thus be extremely difficult (Christensen & Overton, 2000; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
Therefore, the role of crisis as a trigger of paradigm shifts and strategic renewal has been 
exemplified at length, especially by adherents of the punctuated change model (e.g., 
Tushmann & O’Reilly, 1996). Yet, there exists something as ‘the crisis paradox’: a 
negative crisis may evoke action, but a crisis situation in itself often hampers effective 
action (Markides, 1998). Therefore, scholars with a more gradual perspective on renewal 
have hence posited that the required crisis should by definition not be as painful as 
traditionally thought (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003).  
 
Notably organizational learning theorists have argued for the role that organizational 
culture can play in this respect. The value of innovation could actually be incorporated 
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within the culture itself (Jarzabkowski, 2004). Culture may thus also help to break with 
existing assumptions in order to increase entrepreneurial and creative action (Huber, 1991) 
By deliberately making creative tension as a central element of the organizational value 
system and culture, organizational culture can function as a less drastic and less reactive 
way to create the ‘crisis’ required for the continuous generative, frame-breaking learning 
(Leavy, 1997) that is inherent to SIcap. In large organizations the power of culture is that it 
enables employees to act in a conscious way (this means not by automatism and past 
assumption) while keeping overall consistency. In this way, it contributes to an 
organization’s capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and innovation capacity. Floyd & Lane 
(2000) stress the value of such a ‘clan’ coordinative system within conditions of high 
environmental turbulence. 
Furthermore, organizational culture (reflecting a supportive environment for 
experimentation, dissent and examination) has also been considered as a crucial element in 
actively leveraging the strategy development process in itself (Liedtka, 2000). Especially 
adhocratic cultures (characterized by an informal and external focus) fostering creativity, 
entrepreneurship and risk taking, have been considered beneficial to the creation of a 
market-driving organization (Carrillat et al., 2004) and to the creation of dynamic 
capabilities (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). The organizational culture could in this way 
promote the pursuit of SIs (Leifer et al., 2001). 
In conclusion, as the assumptions and beliefs underpinning the organizational culture 
determine the way environmental stimuli are interpreted and strategically acted upon 
(Johnson, 1987), it is logical that the effect deliberate investments in dynamic capability 
creation will have, also depends on a the organizational mindset (Ethiraj, 2005). Adler et al 
(1999), for example, demonstrated how culture fosters the effectiveness of meta-routines.  
 
2.6.1.2 Organizational structure 
 
The firm’s structural design determines the distribution of responsibilities and authority 
among organizational members, planning and control systems, managers’ perceptions and 
the creation, coordination and execution of decisions (Miller, 1993; Volberda, 1996). 
Volberda (1996) hence made a plea for the convergence of strategic and structural change. 
Moreover, SI requires a behavioral change. Since organizational (and individual) values, 
beliefs and behavior are conditioned by the structure of the system, a change in behavior 
requires structural modifications (Markides, 1999b, Amis et al., 2004).  
 
Decentralization and local autonomy have been suggested as beneficial to the development 
of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) and of new ways of understanding (Kuwada, 
1998). High degrees of formalization and centralization correspond to a mechanistic 
organizational structure, one that only enables incremental changes (Volberda, 1996). High 
centralisation was also found a barrier to market orientation (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). 
This is because a limited delegation of decision-making authority inhibits the 
dissemination and utilization of information (Matsuno et al., 2002). These results were 
corroborated by Harris’ (2000) results that high centralization may contribute to efficient 
decision making, but that it hinders both market responsive and innovative change.  
Structural properties have also been proposed as moderators in the creation of ACAP (Van 
den Bosch et al., 1999). A functional or hierarchical organizational form may limit the 
scope and flexibility of absorption (Van den Bosch et al., 1999) and restricts renewal to a 
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function of top-down managerial processes (Jarzabkowski, 2004). In contrast, 
decentralized structures stimulate participative decision making, which in turn enriches the 
organization’s knowledge architecture (Van den Bosch et al., 1999), its creativity, learning 
and risk-taking attitudes (Jarzabkowski, 2004). Flatter and more horizontal organizational 
structures facilitate innovation and increase the development speed of reconfigurations, 
transformations, and strategic actions (Hitt et al., 1998; Teece & Pisano, 1994). It 
corresponds more to an ‘emergent’ than ‘deliberate’ strategy creation process (Leonard-
Barton, 1992). Jansen et al. (2006) empirically demonstrated the positive influence of 
participative decision making on acquisition (i.e. the first ACAP-dimension) because of an 
increased number of ‘receptors’ to the environment. Their results showed furthermore a 
positive relation with transformation. Markides (1999b) hence contends that a 
decentralized structure promotes SI. 
 
2.6.1.3 Cross-functional information dissemination 
 
Isolated knowledge from different parts in the organization and from different frames of 
reference should be juxtaposed to generate new insights (Hamel, 1998b; Hitt et al., 1998). 
From a cognitive tradition, Bogner & Barr (2000) likewise stressed the value of interaction 
among individuals with diverse cognitive frameworks for adaptive sensemaking. They 
argue that cognitive diversity broadens individual cognitive perspectives, thereby 
increasing cognitive complexity since more trends, industry characteristics and 
environmental issues can be noticed. This is why the value of cross-functional 
communication for decision-making has been stressed (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).  
 
In addition, research has suggested that social contact in an organization may be required 
to keep the organizational memory from decay (e.g., interpretation of infrequent events) 
(Walsh, 1995). Formal lateral integrating mechanisms increase the frequency, breadth and 
quality shared across various functional domains (Hitt et al., 1998).  
However, contrary to the continuous and intense knowledge sharing as promoted by 
proponents of the ‘learning organization’, Almeida et al. (2003) found that it is the loose 
interaction between different individuals and groups over time that permits the integration 
of different knowledge bases and perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, the location in the organization where new information can best be found and 
acquired often differs from the location where it can best be applied (Lenox & King, 
2004). Therefore, cross-functional liaisons enable intra-organizational information and 
knowledge transfers (Markides, 1997; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Becker, 2001).  
Knowledge transfers within and between organizational subunits have in turn been 
proposed as beneficial to an organization’s ACAP (Liao et al., 2003; Vinding, 2000; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This was empirically confirmed in Lenox & King’s (2004) 
study.  
 
Likewise, research has shown that the key to a value-driven strategy is to move away from 
a traditional functional organization toward a process model integrating different functions 
for creating customer value (Sharma et al., 2001). In this way, all stakeholders can bundle 
their insights and efforts toward what customers value (Carrillat et al., 2004; Day, 1999). 
Especially the cross-functional information dissemination of market information has been 
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related to innovation (Martin & Grbac, 2003; Matsuno et al. 2002). Sharing market 
knowledge was hence found critical to put value innovation strategies into action (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999b). The innovative recombination of resources, essential for SI, requires 
indeed the establishment of specific intra-organizational mechanisms that ensure the 
communication of various subunits over time (Almeida et al., 2003). Scherer (1992) hence 
notes that one of the most important research areas to gain deeper insight into 
Schumpeter’s thesis is research into the relationship between large firms’ innovative 
capacity and their intra-firm communication networks.  
 
2.6.2 Supply chain characteristics 
 
2.6.2.1 Supply chain information potential 
 
Sharma et al. (2001) assert that the information asymmetry typical of the industrial era has 
made way for information ubiquity in the present business environment. Both suppliers 
and buyers have increasing information about the other and can thus be polled for 
innovative ideas (Adler et al., 1999). Establishing mechanisms to increase a firm’s 
exposure to external information could hence involve mechanisms that involve 
stakeholders more closely (Thomas et al., 1993). 
A firm’s interactions with external parties, such as customers and suppliers, has 
consequently been proposed as beneficial for its ACAP (Daghfous, 2004). Vinding (2000) 
demonstrated that especially a firm’s close relationships to vertically related partners (i.e., 
customers and suppliers) positively affect ACAP’s influence on a firm’s innovative 
performance.  
 
Organizational systems for receiving new ideas and perspectives from outside the 
organization moreover help managers avoid being trapped by path dependence (Shimizu & 
Hitt, 2004). Following this line of argument, Day & Schoemaker (2004b) point to the 
value of exchanging information with, and collecting information from outsiders 
(customers, competitors, channels and other stakeholders) to build the broad scope that 
peripheral vision requires. Similarly, Sinkula (2002) stresses the value of supplier cues to 
trigger the unlearning of obsolete mental models. He argues that since these cues tend to be 
more infrequent and serendipitous (than e.g. customer information) organizations must do 
explicit effort in receiving cues from suppliers.  
Moreover, a close information exchange with customers can not only provide valuable 
customer insights, but the amount of customer interaction also enhances the opportunities 
to influence customer values (Carrillat et al., 2004) and to effectively communicate the 
new value that is created by the supplier (Sharma et al., 2001). Without effective 
communication regarding superior value-creating activities, efforts to create value may 
even lead to customer dissatisfaction (Simpson et al., 2001). Accordingly, in the SI 
literature Markides (1999b) and Krinsky & Jenkins (1997) stress the value of other parties’ 
(e.g. customers, distributors) information for idea generation. Kodama (2003), based on his 
study of large, incumbent strategic innovators in Japan, stresses the absorption of 
knowledge generated through a firm’s relationships with external parties, such as 
customers and suppliers.  
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We hence consider supply chain information potential as critical external factor. By 
incorporating this concept, we respond to Jansen et al.’s (2005: 1011) call to integrate 
“dimensions of external linkages of organizational units” in ACAP research. 
 
2.6.2.2 Supply chain innovation stimulus 
 
The value of inter-organizational relationships in the supply chain has been stressed 
throughout marketing research (e.g., Day & Montgomery, 1999; Day, 2000; Johnson & 
Selnes, 2004). Coviello et al. (2002) speak of ‘interaction marketing’ and ‘network 
marketing’. More specifically, the literature on relationship marketing has advanced the 
‘co-operate to compete’ thesis, advocating that firms are increasingly competing through 
their close relationships with stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers (Hunt, 1997). 
In the business-to-business marketing literature, especially the European Industrial 
Marketing and Procurement (IMP) Group has propagated to consider customer-supplier 
interactions from a relationships instead of a transactional perspective. More specifically, it 
is argued that customization tendencies have brought the relationship between seller and 
buyer to the forefront of differentiation in business markets (e.g., Ford et al., 1998). Within 
networks of customers and suppliers, parties jointly create customer value through 
relationships, alliances and partnerships (Ulaga, 2001). This view is echoed in recent 
approaches on market orientation as well. For example, Helfert et al. (2002) posit that part 
of the firm’s internal value creation activity is outsourced to other supply chain partners. 
All this implies that market orientation extends beyond the organizational borders to 
include collaboration with other supply chain partners as an important element. The 
importance of supplier-customer relationships in the view of customer value creation has 
been highlighted in research on customer intimacy and CRM as well (Tuominen et al., 
2004). Collaboration strategies with customers and bonding with other supply chain 
partners are traditionally thought especially suited for business-to-business markets (e.g., 
Day, 2000).   
 
The value of inter-organizational relationships has been emphasized in the context of SI as 
well. For example, Baden-Fuller (1995) asserts that SI, causing rule breaking in the 
industry and changing sector boundaries, requires the organizational corporate 
entrepreneurship to extend beyond the firm into its suppliers, customers and the entire 
supply chain.  
The establishment of long-term relationships with a few customers is argued to lead to a 
higher value than does a transactional approach to deal with customers, because of the 
indirect effects such relationships produce (Walter et al., 2001). Close network 
relationships may in this respect foster organizations to innovate since they help them in 
detecting complementary capabilities needed for the innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). As such, innovative projects can be launched jointly with customers or suppliers, 
and innovative activities may be integrated (Vandenbosch & Dawar, 2002). In this respect, 
Prahalad (2004) emphasizes the potential of value ‘co-creation’, where customers become 
actively involved in the innovation process itself. Simonson (2005) furthermore proposed 
that an offer that is produced with the active involvement of a customer, is perceived by 
this customer as better fitting his preferences.  
Tuominen et al. (2004) state that especially in the context of business-to-business 
relationships, supplier-customer relationships reflect a continuum between market-based 
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transactions and close, collaborative relationships. The authors argue that firms pursuing 
proactive business strategies (reflecting market-driving organizations) require high levels 
of customer intimacy, collaborative learning and partnerships with lead customers. Adler 
et al.’s (1999) study of the auto assembly joint venture NUMMI indicated that NUMMI’s 
ambidexterity largely depended on its close relationships and joint innovation efforts with 
its suppliers.  
Although largely overlooked in the literature, certain industries may however set rules or 
norms that govern the relationships behavior among parties. Low (1996) argues that 
especially dynamic industries (with high entry and exit levels) may not have developed 
expected levels of high commitment, favoring short-term, opportunistic exchange 
relationships over long-term partnerships.  
Accordingly, we posit that supply chain innovation stimulus influences the effectiveness of 
the different deliberate strategic learning mechanisms on SIcap.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 MIXED METHOD DESIGN: A GENERAL EXPLANATION 
 
During the past decades, a large methodological debate has marked organizational 
research; this between the quantitative and the qualitative ‘camp’, largely associated with, 
and essentially rooted in, contrastive positivist and constructivist research paradigms 
(Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Mir & Watson, 2000; 
Sandelowski, 2003). Qualitative research has generally been typified by a focus on 
induction, exploration, discovery, theory/hypothesis development, the researcher as the 
primary data collection ‘instrument’ and qualitative data analysis. In contrast, quantitative 
research is mostly marked by deduction, confirmation, explanation, prediction, 
theory/hypothesis testing, standardized data collection and statistical analysis (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987).  
Despite these seeming contrasts, many management and marketing scholars have gradually 
come to recognize the actual compatibility of both methodological approaches (e.g., Jick, 
1979; Van Maanen, 1979, Eisenhardt, 1989a; Razzaque, 1998). Scholars defending this 
viewpoint adhere to the application of so-called ‘mixed methodology’, or ‘mixed 
methods’, which contain and reconcile elements of both research traditions. Given its 
increased popularity, some scholars claim that mixed method research can now be viewed 
as a full and separate research design in the social sciences (Creswell et al., 2002, 2003; 
Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Tashakkori & Teddlie 
(2003a) and Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) even speak of ‘the third wave’ or ‘the third 
methodological movement’. 
 
Mixed method studies are “those that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
into the research methodology of a single study or multiphased study” (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998: 17-18). In Creswell et al. (2003: 212) a more detailed definition is 
provided: “A mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative 
and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or 
sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more 
stages in the process of research” [italics in original].  
Mixed method research, often interpreted as mixed ‘methodology’, falls within the 
‘pragmatic paradigm’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Patton, 1990; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). By and large, pragmatists reject traditional paradigmatic dualisms 
and believe that both objective (positivist) and subjective (constructivist) points of view 
co-exist8. They contend that methods derived from opposing paradigms may be combined 
if this combination ameliorates the credibility of findings (Petter & Gallivan, 2004). 
Underlying is the premise of ‘the dictatorship of the research question’ (Tashakkori & 
                                                          
8 For an extensive discussion of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
pragmatism, as opposed to those of (post)positivism and constructivism, see Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) and Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998). 
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Teddlie, 1998); it is the research question that should drive the choice of research method 
and not vice versa (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Considerations of method and 
research paradigm underlying the method, are hence regarded as inferior; “The best 
method is the one that answers the research question(s) most efficiently, and with foremost 
inference quality (trustworthiness, internal validity)” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998: 167). 
Accordingly, the superiority of either quantitative, qualitative or mixed method research is 
situational and depends on the specific circumstances of the research (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  In a sense, pragmatism is thus anti-philosophy, preferring action and 
praxis over paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004)9.  
 
Although Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998: 5) assume that “paradigm wars are over”, one can 
observe that qualitative and quantitative approaches still remain bifurcated (Currall & 
Towler, 2003: 514) and incommensurate (Morgan, 1998a). Moreover, research areas and 
their journals are still marked by their preference of, and inclination towards, specific 
methods and methodologies (Jick, 1979; Scandura & Williams, 2000; Currall & Towler, 
2003).  
For example, Scandura & Williams (2000) reviewed research strategies employed in three 
leading management journals during the 80s and 90s and criticized (in particular strategic) 
management researchers for their increasing predisposition toward qualitative field studies, 
the most popular research strategy employed. In his review of work on SI, Pitt (1998) 
reached the same conclusion. As field studies try to maximize realism because of their 
stress on contextual factors, relevance is preferred over research rigor (the latter entailing 
internal and construct validity and generalizability) (Scandura & Williams, 2000). 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer (1996) argue that qualitative research (and especially single-case 
study research) may bear with it problems of overspecialization, which may result in 
underspecified theoretical frames, relying on poorly defined and measured variables and 
nongeneralizable context-specific –and even contradictory– research results. Hence, 
Scandura & Williams (2000) warn that, without enough attention being given to issues of 
rigor, relevance in management research can not be claimed.  
 
In contrast to Scandura & Williams’ (2000) findings, others have noted the prevalence of a 
quantitative (post)positive stance in management research (e.g., Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987; 
Kiessling & Harvey, 2005; Nodoushani, 2000; Currall & Towler, 2003). These authors 
argue that even though qualitative methods are gradually becoming more appreciated, most 
management researchers still adopt quantitative approaches, with questionnaires as the 
primary source of data collection. An exclusive reliance on such a quantitative approach is 
however not flawless either.  
                                                          
9 Actually, mixed-method advocates divide themselves among two positions: the 
pragmatist and dialectical position. Pragmatists argue that researchers should simply 
choose whatever method is most appropriate given the research question. According to the 
dialectical camp, paradigms should be mixed deliberately, in order to reach synergistic 
benefits of different paradigms. So, whereas pragmatists argue that different research 
paradigms are compatible; dialectics take up a more extreme position, asserting that 
different paradigms are moreover complementary (Rocco et al., 2003). The vast majority 
of mixed method writers (and the most influential ones) adhere to the pragmatist position. 
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According to Currall & Towler (2003), the dominant quantitative orientation has resulted 
in poor theory development and trivial theory testing. Creswell et al. (2002: 17) follow 
suit, noting that: “This approach [the positivist stance in management research] results in 
precise measures while sacrificing serendipitous discovery, and often contributes 
predictably low explanatory power in which even well-conceptualized, well-executed 
research generally explains little more than 10-20% of variance in the data”. 
In similar vein, Sawyer & Peter (1983) leveled their criticism against the predominance of 
the positivist tradition in marketing research (see also, Razzaque, 1998), and conclude: 
“we find it frightening to consider how much of the conventional wisdom in marketing is 
based on little evidence other than statistical significance” (: 125). A similar stance was 
taken by Laurent (2000), who fiercely criticized the lack of validity present in most 
marketing models. He condemns marketing researchers for formulating their models, 
variables and relationships mainly in view of statistical elegance instead of aiming at a 
representation of ‘reality’.  
Moreover, the use of quantitative methods offers no saturated solution to the previously 
mentioned ‘rigor’ problem either. Even though statistical testing procedures can be 
considered as mathematical and precise, Sawyer & Peter (1983) contend that there is a 
general misconception that statistical significance testing (within the positivist paradigm) 
would be completely objective. They posit: “because researchers make many subjective 
decisions that greatly influence the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis, it is 
misleading to consider the process of statistical significance testing as objective solely 
because of the objectivity of the mathematics” (: 124). The subjective decisions, or even 
manipulations, of the researcher they refer to include: increasing the sample size, 
increasing the reliability of the measures, changing post hoc the acceptable level of 
significance (e.g., from 0.01 to 0.05), and changing a two-tailed test to a one-tailed test.  
 
In conclusion, qualitative methods outperform quantitative data collection methods 
foremost in terms of realism: contextual information enriches researchers’ interpretive 
frameworks and may lead to theories that are understandable, experientially credible and 
managerially relevant (Maxwell, 1998; Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2003). Qualitative 
data are also useful to reveal additional information not anticipated by the researcher. The 
continuous juxtaposition of different and conflicting real data may indeed ‘unfreeze’ 
researchers’ thinking (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
Yet, methods for qualitative research are formulated verbally and are less formalized 
(Verschuren, 2003). Despite techniques for recording field notes, it is almost impossible 
for other researchers to trace in detail how interpretations from field notes were made. 
Qualitative methods are moreover more tied up with the personality and the interpretation 
of the researcher. Furthermore, the fact that statistical inference techniques can not be 
used, is a major drawback. This means that the mere presence or absence of a phenomenon 
can be identified, but not the degree to which the phenomenon is present. Hypotheses can 
not be tested in a formal way. Qualitative methods thus help to develop end refine theories, 
but do not test them (Currall & Towler, 2003; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). By far, the 
most commonly cited deficiency is their lack of external validity (Verschuren, 2003; 
Calder, 1977). Field studies score hence high on practicality and access to participants, but 
low on factors such as the precision of measurement and control of behavioral variables 
and on generalizability to the entire population (Scandura & Williams, 2000; Currall & 
Towler, 2003; Maxwell, 1998).  
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Quantitative methods, for their part, excel in their reliance on standardized measures, 
which enable the use of inferential statistics. The probability, strength and direction of 
relationships can be tested and compared across studies. However, quantitative methods 
have weaknesses as well. Especially sample surveys have been said to lack empirical 
realism (Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987; Scandura & Williams, 2000). Quantitative methods 
may hence test slivers of theory without having a direct and deep understanding of the 
phenomenon under study (Currall & Towler, 2003). In addition, the strong focus on 
predefined hypotheses and constructs may make researchers miss out important 
phenomena, the so-called ‘confirmation bias’ (Greenwald et al., 1986; Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). As noted above, statistical methods are not entirely objective either, 
and may become so ritualized that studies are too much ‘sanitized’ at the detriment of 
content validity (Van Maanen, 1979, cfr. infra: our discussion on the use of formative 
indicators). Furthermore, quantitative researchers may become more preoccupied with 
results than with interpretations (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). In sum, quantitative 
methods, and particularly surveys, score high on population generalizability and statistical 
conclusion validity but low on realism of context (Currall & Towler, 2003; Scandura & 
Williams, 2000)10.  
 
An entirely unflawed study does apparently not exist. Even the influential quantitative 
methodologists Cook & Campbell (1979) referred to ‘mono-method bias’ as an important 
threat to construct validity, since it may lead to an equation of the conceptual construct 
definition with the operational definition in the one method applied. Champions of the 
qualitative stance alike have promoted the use of additional methods (e.g., Patton, 1990). 
Strauss & Corbin (1998) even explicated the value of quantitative methods in grounded 
theory. 
Basically, the choice of a research method will limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
from it (McGrath, 1982). This is because research design choices imply trade-offs 
between:  
1)  external validity (generalizability to the population),  
2) internal and construct validity (precision in measurement and control of behavioral 
variables), and 
3)  realism of context (see e.g., Currall & Towler, 2003).  
Hence, McGrath (1982) posits that it is essential to triangulate, not only for measurement 
(e.g., multitrait-multimethod, Campbell & Fiske, 1959) or data collection purposes (e.g., 
combining interviews and observations to discover different perspectives on the same 
phenomenon, Patton, 1990), but also on the level of the research strategy itself.  
In light of this, Scandura & Williams (2000) make a claim for more triangulation on 
research strategies in the management field. “qualitative fieldwork and quantitative surveys 
can be employed within the same research domain [...]. Triangulation can therefore 
improve internal and external validity as the combination of separate research strategies in 
one study helps to counter the trade-offs inherent in others” (: 1252). Ideally, different 
methods applied should thus show complementary strengths (Morgan, 1998a) and 
nonoverlapping weaknesses (Johnson & Turner, 2003). 
                                                          
10 For a good overview of relative weaknesses and strengths of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods, see e.g. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004), Johnson & Turner (2003), 
Currall & Towler (2003). 
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Mixed method research could hence be placed under the heading of advanced 
triangulation. We use the term ‘advanced’ since triangulation in the mixed-method sense 
transcends the goal of mere convergence of results (Sandelowski, 2003) and may, for 
example, also add to the enrichment and broadening of results (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). Already in his 1979-article, Jick contended that the value of cross-method 
validation may well go beyond reliability and convergent validation in that it may also 
enrich findings by revealing new and other insights. The mixing of qualitative and 
quantitative methods may make the depiction of a phenomenon more comprehensive, 
accurate, detailed and complete (Johnson & Turner, 2003; Morse, 2003), and may as such 
improve the ‘knowledge yield’ of research (Morse, 2003; Currall & Towler, 2003).  
The choice of a mixed method design may hence be grounded in considerations of 
legitimation (i.e., convergence) or complementarity (i.e., enriched comprehension) 
(Morgan, 1998a; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Morse, 2003). A rationale of pure 
legitimation has however motivated the use of mixed methods only rarely (Petter & 
Gallivan, 2004). Legitimation implies that methods can not build upon each other, and 
each on their own should satisfy all types of validity (Scandura & Williams, 2000; Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). Most researchers find that the amount of effort required to perform both 
qualitative and quantitative studies simultaneously and independently is not compensated 
for by the fairly meagre results of producing ‘only’ convergent findings (Morgan, 1998a). 
Hence, it is the rationale of complementarity that has become the major source of 
justification for mixed method research (Morgan, 1998a). Here, qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are combined to examine overlapping phenomena or different 
aspects of the same phenomenon (Petter & Gallivan, 2004). The strength of one method is 
deployed to enhance the performance of the other one. This is also why the term ‘mixed 
methods’ has survived terms such as ‘multimethod’ or ‘combined methods’. The term 
‘mixed’ best conveys the meaning of really integrating different types of data in specific 
stages of the research process, so that both approaches strengthen each other (Creswell et 
al., 2002). To put it in the metaphoric words of Pearce (1868): “Reasoning should not form 
a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so 
slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected” (in Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 18). 
 
Even though more than forty types of mixed method designs were identified in the 
literature (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a), we shortly distinguish between three main types 
of mixed method designs (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998): 
• ‘Equivalent status designs’: qualitative and quantitative approaches are equally 
applied to understand a phenomenon  
• ‘Dominant – Less dominant designs’: either the qualitative, either the quantitative 
approach primes. The other approach serves only as small ‘add-on’ to the overall 
study (e.g. a short post-experimental interview)  
• ‘Multilevel designs’: data on multiple levels are collected and analyzed using 
different approaches (e.g., a survey of students combined with interviews from 
principals) 
In all types, the quantitative and qualitative approaches may be used sequentially, or 
simultaneously.  
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3.2 A RATIONALE FOR THE APPLICATION OF A MIXED METHOD DESIGN 
IN OUR STUDY 
 
Given the complexity of social phenomena, mixed method research is thought especially 
appropriate in social science (Creswell et al., 2003), management (Currall & Towler, 2003) 
and especially strategic management research (Creswell et al., 2002). Although the mixing 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches in organizational research has been touted for 
over 25 years (e.g., Jick, 1979), these calls have largely remained unanswered (Petter & 
Gallivan, 2004). A study of recent management articles shows that management 
researchers are still reticent to adopt a mixed methods research design (Currall & Towler, 
2003). This restraint may be due to three fundamental issues.  
First, there is the technical difficulty involved in mixing methods, and the required 
methodological knowledge of different approaches (Creswell et al., 2003; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003a; Morgan, 1998a). The majority of methodological courses for beginning 
researchers are designed to train them in either of both approaches (Rocco et al., 2003; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003b). And, not surprisingly, young researchers will apply the 
methods they are trained in to their own research (Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). 
Consequently, many researchers still profile themselves as either qualitative or quantitative 
advocates. Their specific preference also flows from journal and internal academic 
evaluative criteria (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a; Petter & Gallivan, 2004).  
Second, social scientists have sparked the debate whether methods that are seated in 
different paradigms, with different assumptions about reality, the nature of knowledge 
(e.g., objective versus subjective) and the appropriate means to generate it (e.g., deductive 
versus inductive), can actually be combined. This comes down to the dispute between 
‘purists’ and ‘pragmatists’ (e.g., Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004), which is basically more 
about the mixing of paradigms than the mixing of methods. Morgan & Smircich (1980: 
498) for example note that “any given technique often lends itself to a variety of uses 
according to the orientation of the researcher”, and that consequently “the dichotomization 
between qualitative and quantitative methods is a rough and oversimplified one” (: 499). 
Indeed, Howe’s (1988) ‘compatibility thesis’ states that qualitative and quantitative 
methods may actually be reconcilable even though the underlying paradigms from which 
these methods originally derive are not11.  
Third, multiple methods research is often more demanding in terms of the amount of time, 
money and other scarce research resources required (Creswell et al., 2003; Podsakoff & 
Dalton, 1987). 
 
Despite these difficulties and debates, Creswell et al. (2002) maintain that the adoption of 
mixed method design opens fruitful avenues for both content- and process-based strategic 
management research (see also Fredrickson, 1983). In their view, “mixed method designs 
provide logical options for creative approaches in all areas of management research by 
combining the best that each has to offer in terms of depth and breadth, and in terms of 
precision and discovery” (: 19). As Eisenhardt (1989b: 547) put it: “Perhaps “grand” 
                                                          
11 For an extensive discussion on this paradigm debate, see: Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 
(2004), Petter & Gallivan (2004), Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998, 2003a), Morgan (1998a), 
Morse (2003), Sandelowski (2003), Morgan & Smircich (1980).  
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theory requires multiple studies – an accumulation of both theory-building and theory-
testing empirical studies”.  
King & Tucci (2002) moreover call for the application of multiple empirical methods in 
the study of organizational phenomena such as dynamic capabilities. The problem strategic 
management researchers are confronted with is to make a pay-off between large samples 
with less rich measures, and smaller samples of richer variables. These authors however 
argue that on the one hand, studies that analyze the full population of firms cannot reveal 
the rich internal processes within a small group of firms. On the other, case studies on 
firm-specific difficulties can neither uncover central tendencies across the full population, 
nor can they determine the economic importance of the issues observed. They accordingly 
conclude that: “Both types of studies are needed” (: 184).  
We also follow Curral & Towler’s (2003) claim that a mixed method design is especially 
suitable when research questions tackle innovation issues. Furthermore, they argue that 
mixing qualitative and quantitative methods can also prove useful to refine and test a 
nascent theory or theoretical model, which is indeed of major importance in our study. 
In addition, mixed method research, generating broader and deeper insights than 
monomethod research, has also the potential to be more useful to policy makers in 
business (Rocco et al., 2003; Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). The adoption of mixed method 
designs may hence improve both the scientific value and managerial relevance of 
management research. 
Furthermore, from the marketing research area, Compeau (2003) writes that “marketing 
researchers have achieved some consensus that knowledge can be valuable regardless of 
the paradigm from which it is materialized or the paradigm to which it is applied”. 
Razzaque (1998) even makes a plea for a synthesis between the positivist and 
constructivist school in marketing research. In this sense, paradigm inconsistency is an 
invalid rationale to justify the non-adoption of mixed methods.  
These arguments considered there is everything in favor of using a mixed method design in 
our research. Now, it only remains us to specify the exact type of mixed method design we 
decided to use. 
 
Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998; 2003a) argue that particularly the sequential qualitative-
quantitative (‘QUAL Æ QUAN’) design is appropriate when the researcher studies a 
relatively unexplored area. The design’s main focus is indeed to ‘explore a phenomenon’ 
(Morgan, 1998a). This type of mixed method design has hence been referred to as a 
‘sequential exploratory’ design (Creswell et al., 2003). In fact, this design is used to firstly 
develop or refine a theory or model and then to test this (Morse, 2003).  
The QUALÆQUAN design is a common type of sequencing (Morgan, 1998a) because in 
most quantitative survey research, close-ended instruments can only be developed after 
exploratory qualitative interviews or narrative data have been content analyzed. This is 
especially the case when new research instruments are to be developed (Creswell et al., 
2003).  
 
In addition, this design may also help to explore a phenomenon and specify the elements of 
an emergent theoretical model (Creswell et al., 2003). Qualitative research is particularly 
useful in theory building (Bacharach, 1989; Charmaz, 2000); in generating hypotheses and 
speculations (Currall & Towler, 2003). In the qualitative phase, attributes or themes can be 
formed, and theoretical relationships between them specified, by means of for example 
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content analysis (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell et al., 2003). These results are in 
turn used to design a subsequent quantitative phase. These calls have also been voiced in 
marketing research, where, for example, Laurent (2000) has made a call for using 
qualitative methods as an input to formal model development and testing in order to 
increase the validity of models. As he put it: “The hypothesis should come from a thorough 
study based on information derived from the real system and the involved actors, and not 
from a lonely decision by the model builder” (: 181).  
 
The subsequent quantitative phase finally serves to generalize the qualitative findings 
(Scandura & Williams, 2000) to a larger sample, and to confirm the ideas induced by 
qualitative methods using more sophisticated measurement instruments and statistical 
testing of isolated causal relationships (Currall & Towler, 2003). Quantitative research, 
thus limiting threats to external, construct and internal validity, may lead qualitative 
research findings to more sophisticated and full-blown theory development (West, 1997). 
Given the nascent status of conceptual and empirical research on SI and ACAP, and the 
non-existence of any research tackling their interrelationship, the sequential 
‘QUALÆQUAN’ type seemed hence appropriate.  
Our design incorporates Morse’s (2003: 199) claim that “When used sequentially, the 
method that theoretically drives the project is usually conducted first [QUAL], with the 
second method [QUAN] designed to resolve problems/issues uncovered by the first study 
[internal, construct and external validity] or to provide a logical extension from the 
findings of the first study”. Our preference of a QUAL Æ QUAN design moreover reflects 
our view that social science research is a process that moves from the ‘emic’ to the ‘etic’, 
and back (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). 
 
Figure 3.1 gives a simplified, general overview of our empirical research design and 
relates each major empirical phase to its specific research purpose(s). The qualitative phase 
was split into two subsequent parts: QUAL1 and QUAL2. A more detailed explanation of 
the research design will be provided in the next section (section 3.3). Here, we will confine 
ourselves to a general discussion. 
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Figure 3.1: Main empirical research design 
QUAL1
- Explore context
- Prepare QUAL2
QUAL2
QUAN
- Specify model
(constructs, hypotheses, RQs)
- Operationalize model
Test model
• Relevant basic constructs
• Subdimensions constructs
• Relationships
• Relevant moderators
• Measurement instruments
• Significance formative indicators
• Mediation effects
• Moderated mediation effects
• ‘Real’ SIinitiatives & strategic 
innovators 
(i.e. contrast with industry recipe)
 
 
In short, the qualitative phase was incorporated because of the specific qualities qualitative 
research is claimed to have (Maxwell, 1998, cfr, supra). First, the qualitative findings of 
QUAL1 helped us to ‘understand meaning’ (Maxwell, 1998), i.e. how different managers 
make sense of their environment and industry in order to reveal the industry recipe (e.g., 
Spender, 1989). This industry recipe helped us to understand the particular (mental) 
context in the industries studied. It furthermore helped us to identify real SIinitiatives and 
business units (or single-unit firms) with a high level of SIcap (what we call ‘strategic 
innovators’) by explicitly contrasting them with the industry recipe. In addition, 
knowledge of the industry recipe helped us to better frame the data of QUAL2. 
In QUAL2, these SIinitiatives and strategic innovators were further scrutinized. First, 
QUAL2 enabled us to check the relevance of the basic constructs. Furthermore, we 
identified and refined relevant (sub)constructs. QUAL2 finally helped us to understand the 
specific processes (relationships among the constructs) that lead to the creation of SIcap 
(Maxwell, 1998), within the context of specific industries and strategic innovators. Results 
were mirrored against the conceptual insights of chapters 1 and 2, in order to formulate 
hypotheses (internal validity) and additional research questions. In this way, the qualitative 
findings enabled model development, i.e. internal and construct validity. Furthermore, the 
results of QUAL2 led us to refine and operationalize relevant constructs (measure 
development, construct validity). Overall, QUAL2 in fact served to specify an emergent 
theoretical model founded on the conceptual insights of chapter 2.  
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This model was in turn statistically tested in the quantitative phase (internal validity). 
Furthermore, the quantitative analyses were performed on a sample of all Dutch industrial 
companies (external validity). Samples were hence distinct, with the qualitative phase 
using small, purposeful samples (Patton, 1990), and the quantitative phase using a larger 
randomly selected sample. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the qualitative phase served broader goals than the mere 
development of measurement instruments (Petter & Gallivan, 2004); it did have important 
theoretical value as well. As noted, the sequential character of the mixed research design 
served to first develop and specify the theoretical model before testing it (Onwuegbuzie & 
Teddlie, 2003). We incorporated the qualitative phase for we judged the theoretical 
insights as too premature to be immediately subject to theory testing. The qualitative and 
quantitative phases were hence given equal importance in the overall study (Creswell et 
al., 2003). We therefore applied a ‘sequential equal status design’ (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). A QUALÆQUAN mixed method design attaching equal status to 
the qualitative and quantitative phases has an inductive thrust (Morse, 2003). Even though 
the empirical research was guided by theoretical ideas (see section 3.3), the main research 
purpose was still of an exploratory nature and the overall theoretical thrust of the entire 
study was inductive.  
 
 
 
3. 3 A FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Figure 3.2 shows all the research methods we employed. It depicts the research logic we 
followed to provide answers to our research questions in the separate phases, and 
throughout the entire research project.  
 
Figure 3.2 makes a crucial extension to Figure 3.1 by incorporating the box ‘conceptual 
study’. As such, Figure 3.2 alludes to the role theory played in the research design. The 
role of theory in a research design clarifies whether a study is deductive or inductive: 
“either the theory is planted and the data are adapted to fit the theory (deductive research), 
or the data are planted and the theory is adapted to fit the data (inductive research)” (Orton, 
1997: 422). Yet, in research practice the distinction between induction and deduction is far 
less clear-cut than may seem at first sight. Or, as Orton (1997: 422) put it: “Most 
researchers readily admit that research is a function of both inductive and deductive 
analyses, but they know they must present their research in either an inductive or a 
deductive rethoric”. 
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Figure 3.2: Research design 
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Our research design, starting with a QUAL-part, takes us to theories of qualitative 
approaches. A well-known and often used one is grounded theory, which has traditionally 
been positioned as an extreme inductive approach (Huberman & Miles, 1994). Data 
analysis leads to new theory development with no prior hypotheses or theory considered at 
all (see e.g., Charmaz, 2002). However, Strauss, one of the founding fathers of grounded 
theory, softened this position by later arguing that starting with a theoretically clean slate is 
practically impossible (Perry, 1998). In this vein, Strauss himself, in a later contribution 
with Corbin (1998: 166-167), writes: “Glaser & Strauss overplayed the inductive aspect. 
Correspondingly, they greatly underplayed both the potential role of extant (grounded) 
theories and the unquestionable fact (and advantage) that trained researchers are 
theoretically sensitized”. Greenwald et al. (1986) furthermore posit that even though 
theory may obstruct progress in research (due to for example confirmation bias), at the 
same time it is necessary to the progress –and process– of research. In their view, the 
blinding effects of theory come especially to bear in the use of confirmation, so when a 
theory is only tested. “Theory obstructs research progress when testing theory is taken as 
the central goal of research, if (as often happens) the researcher has more faith in the 
correctness of the theory than in the suitability of the procedures that were used to test it. 
In other words, theory obstructs research progress when the researcher is an ego-involved 
advocate of the theory and may be willing to persevere indefinitely in the face of 
prediction-confirming results” (Greenwald et al., 1986: 227). When theory is however less 
sacred, and only serves as a rough guide to the researcher, dangers are less prominent. 
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Hence, “Pure induction might prevent the researcher from benefiting from existing theory, 
just as pure deduction might prevent the development of new and useful theory” (Perry, 
1998: 789). Eisenhardt (1989b, 1991) has followed suit and made out a case for the use of 
a priori specified –though tentative– constructs in theory building research.  
In similar vein, Miles & Huberman (1994), made a claim for ‘prestructured research’ in 
research areas where some theoretical knowledge has been achieved, but more theory 
development and refinement is required before actual theory testing can be performed. In 
this case, tighter designs bring clarity and focus and are more time efficient. This ‘theory-
driven’ or ‘concept-driven’ posture in qualitative research (Wolcott, 1992 in Morse, 1994) 
seemed to fit the specifics of our research. Furthermore, Miles & Huberman (1994) argue 
that tight, prestructured research is less case-sensitive, which we judge especially 
convenient since the qualitative research was followed by a quantitative phase. In 
conclusion, a mix of induction and deduction seemed most appropriate in our research. 
 
Orton (1997) demystified this ‘no-researcher’s land’ between deductive and inductive 
research, which has become very popular with strategy process researchers. In the 
qualitative phase, we hence applied Orton’s (1997) iterative research process, in which 
empirical data collection and analysis and theoretical insights mutually influence, inform 
and drive each other. This method bears strong resemblance to what was called the 
‘extended case method’ by Burawoy (1991). Even though our analysis did not consist of 
exactly case study research, the underlying idea is the same: “the goal of the extended case 
method is to integrate and extend existing theory. The researcher examines the literature 
relevant to his/her problem area, and employs the empirical data to fill in its gaps, reveal 
its flaws, elaborate its meaning, and extend its coverage” (Danneels, 2002: 1101). In order 
to identify, refine and operationalize relevant constructs and to develop hypotheses, the 
ultimate purposes of the qualitative phase (see the meta-inferences of QUAL2 in Figure 
3.2), we hence applied such an ‘interactive design’ (Maxwell, 1998) and iterated forth and 
back between two ‘running exchanges’ (Burawoy, 1991): this between data collection and 
analysis (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989b; Maxwell, 1998) and this between theory and empirics 
(Orton, 1997). These iterations are marked by the full (forward) and dashed (backward) 
arrows in Figure 3.2. So, although the qualitative research was in itself led by the theory 
discussed in chapter 1 and 2 (deduction), the inductive theory building was at least as 
important overall (Perry, 1998). 
Following Orton’s (1997) methodology implies we take up the –popular– methodological 
middle-position between inductive and deductive research, and we continually cycled 
between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
 
Figure 3.2 furthermore shows that, although the study proceeds with separate qualitative 
and quantitative data collection and analysis stages, real integration of both methods was 
attained during the interpretation phase of the final findings (Creswell et al., 2003). This 
means that the previous qualitative findings were further used to illuminate the quantitative 
results (internal validity), providing important contextual aspects (Morse, 2003). This is 
indicated by the vertical arrow in Figure 3.2, linking the meta-inferences from QUAL2 to 
the meta-inferences from QUAN. 
 
Finally, in Figure 3.2 it can be seen that both for QUAL1 and QUAL2 ‘within-method 
triangulation’ (Jick, 1979) or a ‘multimethod design’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a) was 
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applied; this means that both these phases consisted each of multiple qualitative data 
collection strategies. QUAL1 consisted of a desk & expert study, focus groups and 
interviews; QUAL2 built on focus groups and in-depth interviews. Especially, the work by 
Patton (1990) has promoted the value of triangulation in qualitative studies, i.e. the use of 
different qualitative techniques in one study. Since a correlation coefficient cannot be 
calculated for qualitative observations, triangulation of multiple data sources is a viable 
alternative to evaluate the validity of observations by corroborating data form multiple 
sources (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998: 82). We hence applied within method triangulation 
with the view of cross-checking internal consistency and reliability of the data (Jick, 
1979). Therefore, the term ‘meta-inferences’ (see Figure 3.2) is used for each main 
research phase; the separate inferences we made from the analysis of each individual data 
source became integrated in the meta-inferences. In addition, the use of the different 
QUAL methods enabled us to become better acquainted with the contextual specificities of 
the five industry contexts. Especially in theory-driven approaches, seeing how a construct 
works in the field took time (Huberman & Miles, 1994). 
Following pleas that the different data collection methods used should show 
complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses (e.g., Currall & Towler, 2003; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Johnson & Turner, 2003), in Table 3.1 we provide an 
overview of the main strengths and weaknesses of the methods we applied. A more 
extensive explanation of the different research methods is provided over the next sections. 
 
Table 3.1: Strengths and weaknesses of the different methods used 
                                     
Data collection method 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 
 
Desk research  
(official documents) 
 
- Unobtrusive 
- May be collected for past time periods 
- Useful for corroboration 
- Useful for exploration 
 
- Possibly incomplete because of selective 
reporting/recording 
- Access to some type of contents possibly difficult 
- Interpretive validity possibly low 
 
Focus groups - Useful for exploring ideas 
- Good interpretive validity 
- In-depth information about exactly how people think 
about an issue 
- Information about how people inter-react 
- Allow probing 
- Most content may be tapped 
 
- Expensive 
- Reactor/investigator effects 
- Possibly dominated by one/two participants 
- Difficult to generalize when small unrepresentative 
samples 
- Moderator possibly biased 
- High dross rate* 
- Possibly low measurement validity 
- Preferably combined with other data collection methods 
- Data-analysis possibly time consuming 
 
Interviews - Useful for measuring attitudes and most other content 
of interest 
- Allow probing 
- In-depth information 
- Good interpretive validity 
- Moderate measurement validity 
- High response rates 
- Useful for both exploration and confirmation 
 
- Expensive 
- Time-consuming 
- Reactor and investigator effects 
- Low perceived anonymity by respondents  
- Time-consuming data analysis 
- Measures need further validation 
Questionnaire - Useful for measuring attitudes 
- Inexpensive 
- May be administered to probability sample 
- High perceived anonymity by respondents 
- Moderately high measurement validity 
- Low dross rate* 
- Ease of data analysis 
 
- Need validation 
- Must be kept short 
- Possibly missing data 
- Possibly reactive effects 
- Nonresponse to selective items 
- Low response rate 
 
* The dross rate is the amount of irrelevant material in relation to the data collected 
The table is largely based on Johnson & Turner’s (2003), Johnson & Onwuegbuzie’s (2004) and Curral & Towler’s (2003) discussion
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The empirical study was performed within an externally funded three-year research project 
(2002-2005). The project was coordinated by the Dutch Foundation of Technique, 
Marketing (STEM) and co-financed by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, several 
Dutch industrial companies and Cap Gemini Ernst & Young. Over its entire course, the 
project was supervised by a steering committee consisting of captains of the Dutch 
industry (most of them marketing managers) and a representative of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. Every four months progress presentations were held, where process 
issues and preliminary findings were presented. In addition, many progress reports had to 
be prepared. The steering committee acted as critical expert panel. Each industry selected 
had at least one industrial ‘marketer’ in the steering committee, who was also used as an 
informant/expert (mainly during the start-up phases). 
 
Table 3.2 shows a chronological overview of the specific methods we applied in each 
research phase. Over the next sections, these methods will be tackled in detail.  
 
Table 3.2: Research questions and methods 
Survey of proportionate, random 
sample of Dutch industrial 
companies (respondents: people in 
charge of marketing)
Sample survey1. Which of the path-breaking focus areas that 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms target 
are critical?
2. What (partial) mediation effects can be detected 
among deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
for recognition, assimilation and transformation 
and a BU’s SIcap? 
3. What moderating effects of organizational and 
supply chain characteristics can be detected on the 
relationship between deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms and a BU’s SIcap?
QUAN
18 interviews with strategic 
innovators and their customers
In-depth interviews
5 industry-bound focus groups with 
each 4 to 9 industry players and 
strategic innovators (across supply 
chain)
Focus groups-21. Do deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition, assimilation and transformation foster 
a BU’s SIcap?
2. What are relevant path-breaking focus areas 
these mechanisms target?
3. How do deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and 
transformation foster a BU’s SIcap?
4. Which internal and external characteristics may 
exert a critical influence on the effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms? 
QUAL2
28 semi-structured interviews with 
industry players
Expert interviews
5 industry-bound focus groups with 
each 4 to 10 industry players 
(across supply chain)
Focus groups-1
- Study of numerous industry & 
company reports, conferences 
- 12 interviews, 1 brainstorm 
session with industry ‘visionaries’
Desk & Expert 
study
1. What are the specific industry recipes in each of  
the industries selected
2. Given these industry recipes, what are 
interesting and ‘real’ SIinitiatives in these 
industries?
3. Given these ‘real’ SIinitiatives, what are ‘real’
strategic innovators in these industries?
QUAL1
Method specificsMethodsResearch questionsResearch phase
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3.4 THE FIRST QUALITATIVE PHASE (QUAL1) 
 
3.4.1 Research questions and level of analysis 
 
In chapter 1 we explicated how managers tend to enact their –socially constructed– 
environments and explained the concept of ‘industry recipe’ (Spender, 1989; Huff, 1982). 
We then defined SI as a deviance from traditional industry conventions and assumptions, 
with the view of creating new and substantially superior customer value. All this implies 
that the study of SI builds essentially on insights of the industry recipe. As qualitative 
research takes the perspective of the participant, instead of that of the researcher, it is well 
suited to study participants’ cognitions, interpretations and beliefs (Maitlis, 2005). 
Matthyssens & Vandenbempt (2003) have accordingly made a case for the use of 
interpretive methodologies to study business market strategy formation, particularly those 
affected by complex and dynamic contexts. In this respect, qualitative research was the 
appropriate method to uncover industry recipes.  
 
In chapter 1 we made an argument to use the concept of SIcap as the dependent variable. 
Adopting SIcap as the dependent variable however implies the identification of 
SIinitiatives in the first place. Indeed, Kim & Mauborgne (1997) performed their study on 
value innovation on the initiative-level (“business launches of about 100 companies”, 
“business initiatives in the marketplace”: 104). In the same vein, Govindarajan & Trimble 
(2004, 2005) performed their empirical study on SI by examining strategic experiments 
and ventures, and Colarelli O’Connor & Rice (2001) studied breakthrough innovation 
projects. Lovas & Goshal (2000) support their focus on ‘strategic initiatives’ with the 
argument that strategic initiatives incorporate external (product-market) aspects, whereas 
routines, competences and resources tend to focus attention exclusively on the internal 
organizational functioning. These external aspects are especially of importance within the 
context of SI, as argued in chapter 1. Furthermore, our focus on ‘initiatives’ instead of on 
completed, successful, SIs was grounded in Leifer et al.’s (2001) findings on breakthrough 
innovation projects, that the radical innovation life cycle is long (often a decade or longer), 
unpredictable, sporadic (stops, starts, deaths, revivals), non-linear and stochastic (with 
unpredictable exogenous events). A study of SIinitiatives enabled us to study SI in ‘real-
time’ and focused attention on the isolated effects of internal organizational, managerial 
mechanisms, making abstraction of punishing or favoring market factors determining the 
eventual SI success. In addition, we ourselves observed that over time, successful 
initiatives tend to become bogged down by the traditional industry recipe, and are hence 
easy to overlook and difficult to trace back with hindsight.  
 
Hence, first, in order to define concrete initiatives as ‘real’ SIinitiatives, they should be 
contrasted with the industry recipe (see chapter 1). Then, business units (or single-unit 
firms) excelling at the creation of such SIinitiatives, are considered as business units with a 
high level of SIcap, the so-called ‘strategic innovators’. 
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The main research questions we tried to answer through QUAL1 were hence: 
 
 
Given these research questions, the level of analysis of QUAL1 was obviously the 
industry. 
 
3.4.2 Design 
 
After two brainstorm sessions with the project’s steering committee, five industry contexts 
were selected: energy, focused on electricity, functional foods (FF), traffic management 
systems (TMS), trucks & trailers (T&T) and graphics printing. For budgetary reasons, the 
industries chosen were restrained to the Dutch geographical territory. The selection of 
Dutch, industrial contexts constrained variations in terms of territorial and market type. In 
addition, the choice of five specific industries enabled us to control environmental 
variation across different industries (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The domain of findings was 
hence bound to industrial companies, operating in the Netherlands in one of these five 
industrial contexts. 
Qualitative research is essentially based on theoretical or purposeful sampling instead of 
probalistic sampling (Patton, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989b, Yin, 1998). Since the industry 
selection primarily reflected the preferences of the project’s steering committee, the 
selection of these industries was in fact based on ‘convenience sampling’ (Henry, 1998). 
The exact delineation of these five industries was based on literature and on incumbents’ 
perception of the traditional industry boundaries, e.g. the parties included in the traditional 
supply chain (see chapter 4). We recognize that the classification of organizations in these 
industries is however partly arbitrary. For example, Porac & Thomas (1990: 226) note that: 
“both industry and market criteria can be ambiguous”. Nightengale (1978), in turn, argues 
that industry classifications often lead to somewhat arbitrary groupings, and Robinson 
(1956: 361) stated “a precise and meaningful definition of an industry is a vein objective”. 
Similar arguments have been offered against the economic market criterion (e.g., Day et 
al., 1979). 
Given the structural and technical complexity of these industries and the high dynamism 
many of them were subject to, a three-phase data collection was opted for. As noted in the 
previous section, the combination of several qualitative methods was used in order to 
improve the validity of results (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Only findings that were 
corroborated by findings of other data sources were retained.  
 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer (1996) moreover plead for the combination of perceptual 
measures and objective data sources. Indeed, a combination of interviews and archival 
data, with the view of triangulation, is very common in theory building research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). First, to provide perceptual measures of managerial cognitions, 
actions and noneconomic outcomes (e.g. satisfaction, perceived success of change), 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer (1996) argue that not only interviews can be used, but insights 
RQ1:   What are the specific industry recipes in each of the industries selected? 
RQ2: Given these industry recipes, what are interesting and ‘real’ SIinitiatives in these 
industries? 
RQ3: Given these ‘real’ SIinitiatives, what organizations are ‘real’ strategic innovators in these 
industries? 
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from industry experts or academics who are knowledgeable about the industry can also 
prove useful. This is why we chose to conduct interviews with both industry players and 
industry experts. In addition, focus groups were run. Focus groups are especially suited to 
use for triangulation purposes or in conjunction with other data collection strategies 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000). Second, objective measures of organizational and environmental 
conditions were found by studying industry reports and archival data sources (e.g., annual 
reports).  
Data were gathered up to theoretical saturation and in line with pragmatic considerations 
such as time, budget, availability of resources and willingness of individuals to participate 
(Yin, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
 
3.4.2.1 Desk & expert study 
 
This phase was used to get a first impression of the industries under study. Its aim was to 
explore the industry context and to reveal a preliminary industry recipe. As indicated, later, 
these data were combined with other data for corroboration purposes (see, Johnson & 
Turner, 2003). 
More specifically, we tried to study the industry profile and traditional chain structure 
(market share, market growth, concentration, players, segments and applications, 
technologies, end users,…), the industry dynamics (trends and their impact, 
commodization, liberalization, e-commerce,…), financials (value added per level), typical 
strategies used in the industry, their key strategic dimensions (efficiency, technological 
innovation,…) and specific growth strategies (vertical integration, alliances,…).  
 
Although this phase is considered as one entity, it contained both objective and perceptual 
measures.  
Regarding the objective data, we studied public industry reports published by large 
consulting firms, banks, Chambers of Commerce, specialist and trade journals, industry 
and trade confederations, Dutch and international (economic) newspapers and periodicals 
(e.g., Financial Times, NRC Handelsblad, FEMBusiness), Ministeries, and official 
governmental institutions (e.g., Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, EC). Likewise, annual 
reports of large players were studied. All this secondary material was obtained through the 
library, databases and the Internet. We also attended some specialist conferences (e.g., The 
‘Future of Manufacturing’ conferences, organized by the EC). In addition, members of the 
steering committee (linked to one the industries chosen) and the CGE&Y-consultants 
provided us with non-public, in-depth industry reports. 
As regards the perceptual measures, orientational interviews were held with different key 
informants to the industries under study (business consultants, industry captains, 
‘visionary’ members, etc.). The number of interviews per industry depended on the level of 
complicatedness of the industry and on the willingness of individuals to participate. In 
total, 12 semi-structured were administrated, each lasting approximately 1 to 2 hours: 2 for 
graphics printing, 5 for TMS, 2 for energy, 1 for functional food and 2 for truck & trailer. 
For TMS, an additional group interview sessions with a total of 11 managers of a TMS-
systems supplier and a TMS engineering/consulting firm was organized by a member of 
the steering committee. Despite the high complexity of the energy industry, we only found 
two persons willing to be interviewed. We felt that members of the energy industry, which 
was in the midst of deregularization and liberalization, were very reluctant to participate.  
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Finally, we discussed the general process characteristics of preparing an industry report 
with a Mc Kinsey-consultant, experienced in the writing of industry studies. 
 
3.4.2.2 Focus groups-1 (FG1) 
 
The second phase of QUAL1 consisted of focus groups. Focus groups are considered as a 
viable way to conduct qualitative research (Fontana & Frey, 2000; Morgan & Krueger, 
1998) and have accordingly been used in marketing, sociology and other social science 
research (Wooten & Reed, 2000). Focus groups have been advocated as a tool to study 
shared experiences of the group members (Fontana & Frey, 2000). Furthermore, focus 
groups may delve into group members’ thinking, stimulating participants to articulate their 
– normally unarticulated – normative assumptions about certain issues (Bloor et al., 2001). 
“The group is a socially legitimated occasion for participants to engage in ‘retrospective 
introspection’, to attempt collectively to tease out previously taken for granted 
assumptions” (Bloor et al., 2001: 6). In this respect, focus groups were considered an 
appropriate data collection method to reveal industry recipes. Furthermore, since focus 
groups may be used to “clarify, extend, qualify or contest findings on the same topic 
produced by other methods” (Bloor et al., 2001: 90), their combined use with the desk & 
expert phase and the expert interviews seemed fruitful.  
 
According to Morgan (1998b: 1) “focus groups are group interviews. A moderator guides 
the interview while a small group discusses the topics that the interviewer raises. What the 
participants in the group say during their discussions are the essential data in focus 
groups”. The major virtue of the technique lies in its explicit use of group interaction, 
which is said to produce data and insights that would be less accessible in individual, serial 
questioning (Morgan, 1997; Calder, 1977; Hydén & Bülow, 2003). Participants share their 
views through the moderator (Fontana & Frey, 2000), but any kind of consensus need not 
necessarily be reached (Patton, 1990). Two of the major benefits of focus groups are their 
time efficiency and the built-in quality control on data, since participants tend to provide 
checks and nuances on each other so that extreme or faulty views are questioned (Patton, 
1990). Krueger (1988) hence stressed their high face validity. 
Given these basic characteristics, it is indicated in the literature (see e.g. Morgan & 
Krueger, 1998) that researchers have many degrees of freedom in determining the actual 
format of the focus group (concerning e.g. interview structure, number of participants, 
number of groups, …). Nevertheless, general rules of thumb have been formulated: a) a 
homogeneous group of strangers as participants, b) a relatively structured interview with 
high moderator involvement, c) 6 to 10 participants per group, d) 3 to 5 groups, and e) an 
interview length of 1,5 to 2 hours (see e.g., Bloor et al., 2001; Morgan, 1992, in 1997; 
Patton, 1990). These rules of thumb were generally followed. 
 
Five focus groups were set up, one for each industry context. Each focus group had 4-10 
participants, all representatives of both general players and niche players, representing at 
least three levels of the traditional supply chain (for instance: second-tier supplier, first-tier 
supplier and OEM). In addition, a service provider to the industry (e.g. engineering office, 
R&D lab) and an industry expert participated in the focus group discussion. Participants 
were invited by letter, which explained the research, and the format and discussion topics 
of the focus group. 
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As the industry recipe needed to be uncovered, we chose participants who were strangers 
to each other. “Conversations among strangers avoid the taken for granted assumptions 
that are common among friends” (Morgan, 1998b: 68). The venue of the focus groups was 
the office building of one of the major sponsors. Advantages were that this was situated in 
Utrecht, central to the Netherlands and the Randstad, which maximized accessibility from 
all over the country (Bloor et al., 2001), and that we had rooms at our disposal with video-
recording equipment. Focus groups generally lasted 2 to 2,5 hours. 
Table 3.3 shows an overview of the companies represented during the focus groups. Since 
members were promised anonymity, the exact names of companies and participants can 
not be provided. Between brackets, we indicated the job title of the focus group members. 
Especially in the focus group on functional food, we had trouble in finding participants. On 
top of that, two participants we invited did eventually not show up without prior notice. 
This explains the relatively low number of participants in the focus group on functional 
food, in comparison to the focus groups on other industries. 
 
Table 3.3: Participants focus groups-1 
1 printer (director)
1 advertising agency (managing director)
2 hard-, software & solutions suppliers (director strategic planning + sales mgr.)
1 hardware supplier (director printing)
1 national copy center (marketing director)
1 consulting company (senior consultant graphics printing)
7Graphics 
printing
1 ITS systems supplier : 1st tier (director telematics)
1 jobber : 2nd tier (director)
1 raw material supplier :3d tier (manager product market development)
1 truck producer : OEM (marketing manager commercial vehicles)
1 trailer producer:  OEM (manager transport & trailers)
1 consulting company (senior consultant automotive)
6T&T
1 ingredients supplier (sales manager)
1 food research company (manager processing, quality & safety)
1 food packaging company (sales manager)
1 food company (R&D program  manager)
4FF
1 energy management consulting company (MD)
2 energy systems suppliers (director energy distribution+ director energy total solutions)
1 energy company (director business development)
1 engineering/consulting firm (business group manager energy)
1installation company (director energy systems & solutions)
1engineering company (account manager energy)
1energy research center (director durable energy)
1corporate end customer (director energy facilities)
1consulting company (senior consultant energy)
10Energy
1 systems developer (business manager traffic systems))
1 systems supplier (BU manager traffic systems)
1 installation company (vice-director infrastructure)
2 consulting/engineering companies (director infrastructure+ director software &technology 
services)
1 consulting company (senior consultant telematics)
6TMS
Companies represented (function of representative)Number of 
participants
Industry
 
The promotor and co-promotor of this research took up the role of moderators (one in two, 
the other in three focus groups) with myself observing and writing down specific points of 
interest (in terms of content and behavior). Being well-experienced in the guidance of 
focus groups, both moderators took consideration of the general characteristics of a good 
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interviewer: be empathic, objective, a good listener, etc. In addition, the moderators paid 
close attention as to avoiding a small coalition to dominate the discussion and to encourage 
recalcitrant respondents to participate, in order to gain a discussion from the entire group 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000). The moderator used slides prepared in advance and a flip-chart.  
With the view of exploration of the industry contexts (Fontana & Frey, 2000) and given 
the participants’ proficiency, a ‘moderately structured’ (Morgan & Krueger 1998, Morgan 
1998b) interview was opted for. This means a ‘funnel-based interview’ where the 
discussion becomes more structured towards the end of the focus group. Such a format 
enabled to reveal participants’ perspectives in a relatively unexplored research area while 
at the same time keeping focus and structure, necessary for staying as close as possible to 
our pre-established research agenda (Morgan 1998b). The format assures that background 
information, context and broader issues are broached before the discussion narrows down 
on very specific topics (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). A broad interview guide was used, 
since this kept the interactions focused while allowing individual perspectives to emerge 
(Patton, 1990). Table 3.4 shows the discussion guide used.  
 
Table 3.4: Discussion guide focus groups-1 
 
 
 
First, the moderator welcomed the participants and briefly explained the research, the aim, 
structure, and timing of the discussion. Participants were asked to introduce themselves.  
In the first part of the focus group (generally lasting 1,5 hour) the traditional industry 
context, supply chain, strategies used by incumbents and industry mentality/recipe were 
discussed. We used the preliminary results of the desk & expert study to structure and 
fasten the discussion (slides of supply chain and industry tendencies). In this way, the desk 
& expert results could be validated, extended and refined. In part 1, less structure allowed 
us to learn as much as possible about a relatively unexplored area and hence, to reveal the 
industry logic (Morgan, 1998b). The moderator continuously corrected and added 
information to the transparencies (e.g., when participants mentioned conventional shortcuts 
in the supply chain) and made notes on the flip-chart. 
Introduction
Part1: Traditional industry recipe 
• Show supply chain on slide 
- Discussion, refinement and correction of supply chain showed (parties & chain flow) 
- Discussion of traditional strategies and market approach of all parties 
- Discussion of roles, relationships and tensions between parties 
• Show inventory of important tendencies in the industry on slide 
- Discussion, refinement and correction of industry tendencies 
- Impact of tendencies on parties, strategies, roles & relationships 
Part 2: SIinitiatives 
- Discussion of unconventional strategies in the industry 
• Show definition of SI 
- Ask for similar initiatives in industry + motives 
- Ask for strategic innovators in the industry 
Round-up 
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In the second part (lasting ½ to ¾ hour), participants were asked to suggest innovative 
market strategies in the industry that clearly were distinctive from the ‘normal’ industry 
behavior. Next, they were given a definition and a neutral example of SI, and were asked 
to discuss similar initiatives in their industry. In addition, the moderator explicitly asked 
why these initiatives had been undertaken. In this phase, more interview structure was 
opted for, as a strong research agenda and well-defined questions were necessary (Morgan 
& Krueger, 1998) for the listed initiatives to be used as an input to the following part of the 
research: QUAL2. In addition, participants were asked about companies excelling in this 
kind of initiatives, the so-called strategic innovators. All information was noted on the flip-
chart. 
Finally, the moderator summarized the main conclusions and asked participants for 
additional remarks and considerations.  
 
All focus groups were videotaped since our memory largely permits us to summarize what 
people said, but it usually fails in remembering pauses, overlaps, inbreaths (Silverman, 
2000), tones, intonations, and facial expressions. Since interview data are far more than 
mere verbal expressions (Fontana & Frey, 2000; Patton, 1990), the videotapes enabled us 
to add other communication aspects to the interpretation of the data. Each focus group was 
transcribed verbatim (Bloor et al., 2001) by a secretary. She attended all focus groups and 
during the discussions, she already typed as much as possible of the conversations, and of 
what was written on the flip-charts by the moderator. We supplemented these transcripts 
with additional behavioral information observed during the group discussions (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1998). 
 
3.4.2.3 Expert interviews 
 
Even a first analysis of the focus groups already made clear the very complex nature of 
many industries, which were moreover subject to many shifts in terms of technology and 
regulation. In addition, not all levels of the supply chain were represented during the focus 
groups. For instance, in the focus group on functional food all downstream parties were 
conspicuous by their absence, TMS lacked a representation of governmental bodies, just as 
the tuck&trailer-focus group missed downstream parties. This could have led to 
misrepresentations of reality as we felt that often the absent parties were scapegoated. 
Finally, the collection of SIinitiatives and strategic innovators the focus groups had yielded 
was insufficient. This is why we still added a third data collection method: individual 
interviews with industry parties. 
Per industry, 4-8 individual interviews with –preferably marketing managers or CEOs– of 
the top 2-3 market leaders and 2-3 fast growers (based on relative average growth over the 
last two years) were conducted, in order to provide us with additional insights on each 
industry.  
The strategy consultants of Cap Gemini Ernst & Young sponsoring the project carried out 
these interviews. Per industry, one senior consultant, with expertise and contacts in this 
industry, conducted all interviews. Table 3.5 shows an overview of the interviews 
conducted; it specifies the type of companies and the interviewees’ function in these 
companies. 
 
Chapter 3 
 100 
Table 3.5: Interviewees: expert interviews 
- Marketing supervisor
- General marketing manager
- Director NL
- Marketing manager
- Director Sales
- CEO
- Distributor hardware
- Producer hard-&software + solutions 
- Producer hard-&software + solutions 
- Raw material producer
- Information & communications solutions provider
- Digital content distributor
6Graphics 
printing
- Director (+chair branch federation)
- Director Board
- Managing director
- Director product & marketing planning
- Manager commercial aftersales
- Components & module supplier (2nd& 3d tier)
- Module supplier (2nd tier)
- Module & systems supplier (1st & 2nd tier)
- Trucks producer (OEM)
- Trucks importer 
5T&T
- Marketing manager
- Manager development & application
- Director strategy BU Food
- R&D director
- Marketing manager
- Ingredients producer
- Ingredients producer
- Research center
- Food producer
- Food producer
5FF
- Director energy systems
- Chief Operations Officer
- Corporate lawyer
- Director facilities
- General director
- Director
- Facility manager
- Senior policy advisor 
- Combined heat & power producer & supplier
- Producer
- Amsterdam power exchange
- Corporate customer
- Producer, trader, supplier
- Distributor, metering company
- Corporate customer
- Ministry of Economic Affairs-Directorate Energy
8Energy
- Business development manager
- Project manager future traffic systems
- Vice-president board
- Managing director
- Systems supplier
- Ministry of Traffic (Rijkswaterstaat)
- Systems supplier
- Systems & solutions supplier
4TMS
FunctionsCompaniesNumber of 
interviews
Industry
 
A detailed interview manual was prepared by the researchers (Bok van Kammen & 
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1998). The manual included the interview guide (the questions and 
their preferred sequence) and provided some background information on the research. It 
furthermore specified what each question needed to probe and instructed the interviewers 
how this was preferably to be done. The outcomes of the desk & expert research, the 
transcripts of the focus groups-1, and preliminary analyses were given to the consultants. 
In addition, two researchers met beforehand with the consultants and spent an entire day 
explaining the research project: its purpose, conceptual background, research questions, its 
different phases and the preliminary findings of the desk & expert study and the focus 
groups-1. In addition, the researchers went through the entire interview guide and 
explained all questions in detail. Overall, the questions followed the same structure as the 
focus group interview guide, but more specific information was probed, especially on 
topics where the focus group data failed.  
The consultants were asked to audiotape all interviews. Even though we asked them to 
provide us with verbatim transcripts of all interviews, many of them only handed in 
interview summaries, due to their tight time schedules. The quality of the interviews 
differed from one consultant to the other.  Nonetheless, the additional interviews provided 
us with more detailed information and filled out many gaps in the industry analysis. 
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3.4.3 Analysis 
 
The qualitative research essentially built on the process guidelines by Eisenhardt (1989b) 
for case study research. For the coding and analysis procedures we mainly followed Coffey 
& Atkinson’s (1996), Dey’s (1993) and Miles & Huberman’s (1994) treatises on 
qualitative data analysis. We used content coding in order to analyze the qualitative data.  
In the concrete, per industry data were categorized according to the following predefined 
categories: general profile of the industry (e.g., size of industry for up- mid- and 
downstream companies), supply chain, traditional strategic approach and critical success 
factors (for up-, mid- and downstream companies), perceived trends and their perceived 
impact (for up-, mid- and downstream companies), and the (power) relationships among 
the industry parties. Per industry, we located and bundled stretches of data along these 
categories. We focused more on phrases than on single words. In addition, we paid 
attention to specific figures of speech such as metaphors (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).  
Per content category, we furthermore structured the data stretches by source (i.e. separately 
for the desk & expert study, FG1s and interviews) and looked for similarities and 
dissimilarities across the different sources per industry (as advised in a cross-case analysis, 
Eisenhardt, 1989b). Each data source was checked against the others in order to reveal 
consistent tendencies (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
The analysis of the focus group1-data deserves some further clarification. While 
methodologists like Morgan & Krueger have developed scientific advices concerning the 
procedures for focus groups, their potential research uses, strengths and limitations 
(Wooten & Reed, 2000), literature still lacks clear methods for focus group analysis 
(Smithson, 2000; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). Accordingly, many focus group data have 
been analyzed in similar ways as classic interview data (Hydén & Bülow, 2003). However, 
using focus group data implies that the group functions as the unit of analysis, and not the 
individual (Bloor et al., 2001). Hence, in the analysis of the focus group data, in addition to 
content analysis, we also looked at how persons’ perspectives changed over the course of 
the focus group (Smithson, 2000) and how individual perspectives fitted into the other 
participants’ expressions (Bloor et al., 2001; Hydén & Bülow, 2003). Furthermore, we 
were cautious as to the influence group dynamics may have exerted on the data expressed 
(Smithson, 2000; Wooten & Reed, 2000) and the possible bias in discussions involving 
members from companies with conflicting or strained relations in the supply chain. 
 
Gradually an industry recipe was developed for each industry. The industry recipe 
characterized assumptions about the specific role/mission of the industry parties, critical 
success factors, future critical success factors, power center and power play, competitive 
relationships among the industry parties, and co-operation along the supply chain. Per 
industry, the different SIinitiatives that had been named and explained were systematically 
contrasted with the characteristics of the industry recipe, in order to check their defiance 
from it. The analysis finally enabled us to identify one or more strategic innovators per 
industry (see chapter 4). 
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3.5 THE SECOND QUALITATIVE PHASE (QUAL2) 
 
3.5.1 Research questions and level of analysis 
 
The conceptual study of chapter 1 revealed that SI theory, largely built on managerial 
literature, is lacking well-funded insights, especially in terms of process studies. In chapter 
2, we hence made an argument as to how theories of dynamic capability creation, ACAP 
and routines may prove useful in filling this gap. However, these different theoretical areas 
have not yet been fully developed either, let alone in terms of their theoretical relationship 
to the concept of SIcap. Hence, theoretical insights have not been specified to the degree 
that a theoretical model would be directly amenable to quantitative testing. Therefore, we 
deemed it necessary to follow a QUALÆQUAN research design, where first the elements 
of an emergent theoretical model could be further delineated and specified (Creswell et al., 
2003; Bacharach, 1989; Charmaz, 2000), before subjecting it to inferential statistical tests. 
Accordingly, QUAL2 served to further refine theory, by selecting relevant constructs and 
proposing relationships among them, and to operationalize constructs, in order to 
quantitatively test the model afterwards. 
QUAL2 has important theoretical value since it is this phase, which lays the foundation of 
the theoretical model. In this sense, QUAL2 had a pivoting role in the overall research 
project. More specifically, relying on the conceptual insights of chapter 2 in particular, in 
QUAL2 we aimed to study the value and form of deliberate, strategic ACAP learning 
mechanisms for SIcap, and we aimed to propose some relationships among them. 
Moreover, we wanted to uncover influential internal and external conditions (moderators). 
QUAL2 further proved useful to the development of new research instruments (Creswell et 
al., 2003). 
The research questions we tried to answer during the QUAL2-phase were hence: 
 
 
 
In our attempt to study deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for SIcap, we were forced 
to lower the level of analysis from the industry in QUAL1 to the organizational level. To 
measure information scanning and interpretation processes, Thomas et al. (1993) too, 
operationalized these constructs on an organizational level. For large, diversified firms, we 
deliberately chose the business unit level. Since the level of analysis issue is still a subject 
of fierce discussion in the organizational literature (Klein et al., 1994), we followed 
previous studies in this choice. For instance, in their studies on value innovation Kim & 
Mauborgne (1997) tackled the business, rather than the corporate level. They even 
explicitly critique the industry or company level as the traditional unit of analysis (Kim & 
RQ1: Do deliberate, strategic learning mechanisms in the areas of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation foster a business unit’s strategic innovation capacity? (relevance of the  basic 
constructs?) 
RQ2: What are relevant path-breaking focus areas these mechanisms target? (subdimensions of 
the constructs?) 
RQ3: How do deliberate, strategic learning mechanisms in the areas of recognition, assimilation 
and transformation foster a business unit’s SIcap? (relationships among the constructs?) 
RQ4: Which internal and external characteristics may exert a critical influence on the 
effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms?  (relevant moderators?) 
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Mauborgne, 2004). Also Jaworski et al. (2000) apply their conceptualization of market-
driving organizations on the business unit level, in consistence with the research tradition 
on market orientation. Mizik & Jacobson (2003), in their turn, suggest value creation (and 
appropriation) strategies to be measured at the business unit level. The ACAP construct 
has likewise most often been operationalized at the business unit level (e.g., Tsai, 2001; 
Jansen et al., 2006).  
Even though the level of analysis was the organization/business unit level, we deliberately 
commenced discussions often by one or more specific SIinitiatives, since we felt that these 
concrete initiatives provided participants with a ‘feel’ of what SI meant in practice in their 
industry. Concrete SIinitiatives were hence used as a concrete angle of incidence to get the 
debate started. 
 
3.5.2 Design 
 
As dictated by the QUALÆQUAN design, we relied on qualitative methods to study the 
research questions in this phase. The benefits of qualitative methods for exploratory 
purposes, especially in the preparation of a quantitative study, have already been 
exemplified in sections 3.1 and 3.2.  
Per industry, an additional focus group was organized. These findings were further 
extended and validated by additional, individual in-depth interviews with strategic 
innovators. 
In QUAL2, cases were purposefully selected. This means that cases were deliberately 
chosen in order to extend the emergent theory (Patton, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
 
3.5.2.1 Focus groups-2 (FG2)  
 
In QUAL2, once again we chose to use focus groups. This is since focus groups have been 
said to be particularly useful for exploratory purposes in a research project (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1998). They are of particular use to explore members’ views of, attitudes 
towards, and experiences in particular areas (Hydén & Bülow, 2003). They are hence 
suited to suggest a range of hypotheses about a particular topic and are, in this respect, 
very useful as an input to quantitative methods (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). Focus 
groups thus lay bare important types of phenomena, of which the frequency and magnitude 
may be subsequently assessed in a quantitative study (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). 
Therefore, focus groups are well suited for sequential mixed method studies; they may 
inform the further development of interviews and questionnaires (Johnson & Turner, 
2003).  
Furthermore, since the focus group participants had essentially the same profile as the 
survey respondents targeted for the QUAN phase, a first contact with potential subsequent 
survey participants could produce more reliable measures than those generated in a so-
called ‘armchair fashion’ (Morgan, 1997). Focus groups could hence reveal the domains, 
and their dimensions, that needed to be covered in the survey and could also provide 
specific item wordings that effectively conveyed our intents to the target survey 
respondents (Morgan, 1997). We hence used the focus groups-2 in “an explicit attempt to 
use everyday thought to generate or operationalize […] constructs and scientific 
hypotheses” (Calder, 1977: 356).  
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Since the rich data focus groups provide are formulated within participants’ own words 
and context, these inartificial data show a high degree of ‘ecological validity’ (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1998). Smithson (2000) argues that the possibility for members to develop 
ideas collectively in a process of expressing individual priorities and perspectives, is one of 
the method’s major strengths. Wooten & Reed (2000), referring to McQuarrie & 
McIntyre’s (1988) study, mention the occurrence of selection effects during focus groups. 
Selection effects make that common concerns among members are more prominent in the 
group discussion than idiosyncratic, individual concerns. In this sense, the focus groups-2 
could enable us to shed a first light on common, relevant constructs and proposed 
relationships among them. Focus groups could hence be used to plunge into common 
aspects of concrete SIinitiatives and high-SIcap business units, while still taking account of 
the specifics of the five industry contexts. In this way, the focus grpups-2 provided a 
valuable ‘bridge’ between the industry level of analysis of QUAL1 and the business unit 
level of analysis used in the remainder of the study. 
 
Hence, a second round of five focus groups was set up. Again, a lot of effort was made to 
comply with the methodological prescriptions provided in the literature (e.g., Morgan, 
1997, 1998b; Bloor et al., 2001). As purposeful sampling was applied, much care was 
taken in the selection of participants. Our original intent was to gather marketing managers 
of strategic innovators per industry. However, in several industries only one or a limited 
few strategic innovators were identified. On top of that, not all of them wanted to 
participate in the study. Given the ‘innovative’ character of SIinitiatives, many managers 
seemed quite reluctant to share their experiences with other industry parties. In addition, 
several last minute cancellations forced us to ‘sin’ against our own rules.  In fact, 
participants to the FG2s represented a mix of 4 to 9 strategic innovators and ‘conventional’ 
parties. However, only managers, who were known in the industry as visionary and 
innovative, represented the latter. Furthermore, a double participation for the first and 
second focus group was avoided and only deemed acceptable when short on alternatives. A 
balanced representation of all levels of the supply chain was aimed at. In most focus 
groups an industry expert took part, namely the strategy consultant who had also 
conducted the QUAL1-expert interviews. In some focus groups an industry specialist from 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs attended and observed the discussion. Most participants 
were strangers to one another. Participants were invited by a letter, explaining the research, 
the format and the topics to be discussed in the focus group. Confidentiality was 
guaranteed. 
Table 3.6 shows all participating companies, their representatives and their respective 
functions. The representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs were only listed as 
participants insofar they actually took active part in the discussion. The limited number of 
participants to the focus group-2 on TMS was due to late cancellations. The extreme 
competitive and hostile character of the energy industry (at the moment of the research) 
resulted in the relatively small size of the focus group-2 on energy.  
 
The focus groups-2 were held in the same venue as the focus groups-1and lasted for 1,5 to 
2 hours. Similar to the focus groups-1, the discussions were moderately-structured by the 
same moderators. Once again, moderators used a funnel-based approach and used 
powerpoint transparencies and a flip-chart to make notes during the discussion. I took 
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notes of interesting issues raised and of attitudinal observations. All focus groups-2 were 
videotaped and transcribed verbatim during the discussions by a professional agency.  
 
Table 3.6: Participants focus groups-2 
2 hardware suppliers (director printing + marketing manager)
2 printers, incl. pre-press (director + commercial director)
1 communications company (director)
1 corporate customer (manager output & traffic management)
1 hard-, software & solutions supplier (director strategic planning)
1 consulting company (senior consultant graphics printing)
8Graphics 
printing
1 automotive coats supplier (business development manager)
1 raw material supplier s:3d tier (manager product market development + manager business dev.)
1 components supplier: 2nd tier (marketing manager)
1 truck producer: OEM (marketing manager)
1 jobber: 2nd tier (manager commercial & production)
1 trailer producer: OEM (director)
1 branch federation (vice-president, also CEO of components supplier)
1 consulting company (senior consultant automotive)
9T&T
1 raw materialist (marketing manager)
1 large retailer (project manager)
1 food packaging company (manager unit food)
1 consulting company (senior consultant food industry)
2 ingredients suppliers (sales manager + sales manager)
6FF
1 energy broker (director)
1 installation & maintenance company (head energy systems)
1 energy systems suppliers (director power transmission & distribution)
2 consulting companies (senior consultant energy, senior consultant industry)
5Energy
2 hard- & software suppliers (business development supervisor + product manager)
1 large city (senior manager traffic)
1 consulting company (senior consultant telematics)
4TMS
Companies represented (function of representative)Number of 
participants
Industry
 
The discussion guide that was used to structure the group discussions is shown in Table 
3.7. 
As in the focus groups-1, the discussion took off with a brief introduction. The moderator 
welcomed the participants, explained the problem statement of the overall research, and 
the specific structure and discussion topics of the focus group session. 
During the first part of the discussion (lasting approx. ½ h), participants were shown the 
general definition of SI. The moderator clarified this definition in detail and provided some 
well-known examples of SI from the literature (such as Ikea, Dell, Kinepolis). Then, the 
moderator showed a slide to participants with concrete industry-specific examples of 
SIinitiatives and strategic innovators. These examples had been inventoried based on the 
QUAL1 results and concretized the concept of SI by means of recognizable examples from 
the participants’ own industries. Participants reflected on these initiatives and strategic 
innovators and often provided additional information on them. Indeed, some of the 
examples mentioned had been launched by one of the companies represented. Almost 
spontaneously, participants brought up additional SIinitiatives recently launched in their 
industry. Participants referred to initiatives that either their own company or other industry 
parties had set up. All examples were noted on the flip-chart. 
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Then part 2 of the focus group was broached, which formed the pith and marrow of the 
discussion and lasted for approximately 1,5 hours. Here, participants were asked to make a 
cross section of all the examples mentioned. First, the moderator asked the participants to 
indicate some important internal and external characteristics in the systematic creation of 
such initiatives (i.e. SIcap). Then, participants were asked whether and what kind of 
concrete managerial mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation could 
help to foster the systematic creation of such initiatives. All information was inventoried 
on the flip-chart and participants were motivated to discuss and reflect on these collections. 
Finally, the moderator summarized the discussion and asked participants whether they 
wanted to add some more comments. Participants were thanked for their cooperation. 
 
Table 3.7: Discussion guide focus groups-2 
 
The focus groups uncovered many interesting issues, still we judged it appropriate to add 
some in-depth interviews with strategic innovators, in order to deepen out some issues 
raised and to triangulate the findings.  
 
3.5.2.2 Interviews with strategic innovators 
 
Focus groups are very useful as an input to in-depth interviews (Morgan, 1997; Bloor et 
al., 2001). Subsequent individual interviews can provide more depth and detail on topics 
that were only broadly discussed during the focus groups (Morgan, 1997). Moreover, they 
cover for some methodological drawbacks of focus groups, such as responses that are not 
independent of one another, responses that may be biased because of dominant members 
(Smithson, 2000; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1998). In addition, Churchill (1979) stressed the 
benefits of combining focus groups and interviews at the item-generation stage of a 
quantitative study.  
 
In the concrete, we selected several strategic innovators per industry for further study. 
Confining ourselves to strategic innovators implies we focus on business units that are 
successful in the creation of SIinitiatives. In this respect, we follow Lynn et al.’s (1996) 
Introduction
• Show definition SI on slide 
 
Part1: Examples of SIinitiatives and SItors 
• Show examples on slide 
- Discussion, refinement and correction of SIinitiatives and strategic innovators 
shown  
- Inventory and discussion of additional industry-bound SIinitiatives and strategic 
innovators 
 
Part 2: Intersection 
- Inventory & discuss critical internal & external characteristics  
- Inventory & discuss managerial mechanisms (in the areas of recognition, 
assimilation and transformation) to drive the systematic creation of such initiatives 
 
Round-up 
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argument to study successful cases in diverse contexts (in this case, dissimilar 
organizations in five different industries), rather to compare successes and failures in 
similar contexts. They argue that this is a very appropriate method to reveal what 
management practices are relevant in the creation of discontinuous innovations. “If we 
uncover similarities in management practices across these successful projects despite the 
differences, we have reason to believe that a relationship exists between practices and 
outcomes” (Lynn et al., 1996: 12).  
 
Table 3.8: In-depth interviews: strategic innovators, focal SIinitiatives, interviewees 
2: manager car refinishes+ international 
project support manager Europe
Total repair, accident & claim management: intermediary function
between body shops, insurance companies, fleet owners and 
leasing companies.Strategic partnerships with automotive 
insurance companies and international network of body shops, 
many of which do not even use their coatings
Chemical company: BU Car 
refinishes
T&T
1: CEO B2C portable navigation software + hardware Systems supplier
1: manager traffic & mobility
+ 2 external: head municipal traffic mgt & 
project manager traffic of customer-city + 
senior process manager municipal traffic 
management of other customer-city
Content provider: Collects real-time traffic information from its 
existing traffic systems, information is analyzed and a) reported to 
municipal traffic managers (real-time insight in traffic intensity) (e.g. 
in Almere, Utrecht), b) can steer dynamic traffic systems by DRIPs
(e.g. in the Hague, Zoetermeer), c) can be shown real-time on the 
internet (e.g. Almelo), etc…
Cities pay for content
Systems supplier: BU Traffic 
management
TMS
1: services director BeneluxDocument management (performance contracting document flow 
& costÆ BPR)
Hardware supplier: BU Benelux
1: ownerSet-up of bureau for multi-media design (incl. training)Printer 
1: sales mgr 
+ 3 external: directors of 2 partner companies 
+ documents traffic manager of customer
1: sales manager 
+ 1 external: manager customer 
-Partnership of three printers, each with their specialties, to 
subscribe to public tenders (combination of scale & flexibility & 
specialties)
-Co-organization of exposition with museum: printing high-quality 
(high price) leaflets, posters and books
PrinterPrinting
1: director
+ 1 external: facility manager of customer
Total package of energy performance contracting for corporate 
customers (scanning of energy consumption, finance, purchasing 
(=brokering), maintenance, metering, invoicing, etc.
Energy management company
1: Director retail services24h-energy maintenance & service (advise, appliance lease, 
installation, maintenance, 24h-service, subscription for damage 
repair 
(franchise formula with 8 regional installation companies)
Dutch energy company: BU 
Retail
Energy
1 business development manager Food
+ 1 external: consultant of BU
Launch of sports drink concept (invention & production active 
ingredient+ production drink+ design package+market launch). 
Concept sold to leading sports-food producer, IP’s name remains 
highly branded on product
Dutch, multinational chemical 
company: BU Food ingredients 
production
FF
InterviewsFocal SIinitiativeStrategic innovatorIndustry
 
As already noted, given the confidential and innovative nature of SIinitiatives, much effort 
had to be made to convince potential interviewees to participate. Even though we 
guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity, some of our efforts were in vein. The fact that 
the study was sponsored by Dutch industrial companies and, even worse, by consulting 
companies, did not fall on fertile ground. Consequently, some strategic innovators refused 
to participate. In addition, even for the strategic innovators who agreed to cooperate, we 
experienced problems. Even though we tried to triangulate data by means of multiple 
interviewees within the same strategic innovator, the unwillingness of individuals to 
participate prevented us from doing this for every strategic innovator (see Table 3.8). We 
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however explicitly recognize the limitations of single-informant studies (i.e. individual 
level of measurement and individual level of analysis), especially when the level of theory 
is the business unit or organizational level (see e.g., Klein et al., 1994), because 
homogeneity of organizational members is assumed in terms of the constructs studied. 
18 interviews were held with strategic innovators (and their customers). The interviewees 
had been/were all highly involved in the creation of SIinitiatives. Table 3.8 provides 
information on the strategic innovators studied in this phase. 
 
All interviews were audiotaped because of the same reasons as those cited above, and 
because it diminished the burdens of note taking, which decreases one’s interviewing 
capacity (Patton, 1990). Interviews were semi-structured: on the one hand, the interview 
guide helped us to make sure important elements were covered, on the other enough 
freedom was left to probe deeper into issues raised and to adapt the question formulation 
and sequence to the specific respondents and situations (Patton, 1990; Fontana & Frey, 
2000). The advantage of using an interview guide was that data collection was relatively 
systematic across respondents, while still leaving room for conversation and situational 
aspects (Patton, 1990). Even though the overall contents of the interview guide remained 
relatively stable across the different interviews, following Orton’s (1997) iterative research 
process resulted in minor adjustments to it in the course of the interviews. Some 
subquestions were added for completeness, examples were added for clarity and the 
sequence became even more structured from the concrete to the abstract.  
 
In the main, we followed Patton’s (1990: 277-368) advices regarding question formulation 
and interview conduct. For example, special attention was paid to ask questions in an 
open-ended way and to avoid dichotomous ones. Research jargon and typically Flemish 
words and expressions were consciously avoided. Often, role play had to be used for 
clarity, concreteness and re-experience (‘Suppose I worked here at your company as an 
account manager and thought of an incredible new idea to better serve my key customers, 
what should I normally do then?’ or, ‘Suppose I attended your monthly meeting with 
R&D, what would I see happening there? What points would I typically here being 
discussed?’). Furthermore, during the interviews, we often used a devil’s advocacy 
approach, we avoided management and marketing jargon, we guaranteed anonymity to 
interviewees, in later stages of the interview, we re-broached earlier mentioned themes 
using a different vocabulary, etc. 
 
The previous QUAL1 proved very useful for the conduct of these interviews. First, it 
enabled us to establish rapport with the interviewees, i.e. to see the situation from their 
perspective (Patton, 1990), within their industry context, rather than imposing some 
academic view upon them (Fontana & Frey, 2000). Second, we experienced that 
demonstrating the industry knowledge we gained through QUAL1, by citing through the 
lines some recent events, company and product names and technical jargon, created trust 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000) and credibility with the interviewees.  
 
The interview guide used is shown in Table 3.9.  
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Table 3.9: Interview guide in-depth interviews 
Part 1: General information of company/BU
-main activities (% turnover, % profit)
-customer segments
-position in supply chain/network?
-number of employees in BU
-general image of organization structure (+ position of interviewee)
Part 2: The focal SIinitiative
-explain initiative
-immediate cause?
-why launched? Why belief in its value?
-why specifically launched by your BU, and not by other industry parties?
-other parties involved?
-situate initiative in time (in which phase now?)
-how discovered? Detail entire process up till now.
-is initiative ‘different’ and why? a) in industry? b) in company/BU?
-good example of SI?
Part3: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms and other critical internal/external factors? 
3.1 Customer insights: comparison focal initiative-all initiatives
How do you gain insight in customers’ needs? Formal tools, informal tools, no tools? Which? Can customers 
define their own needs?
Responsibility of whom? What function has most insight?
What should you ideally study to discover such initiatives? (e.g., end customer? other industries? 
competitors? etc.) How study these?
Role of suppliers?
3.2 Development of ideas: comparison focal initiative-all initiatives
How are initiatives discovered? Who has ideas? Who creates ideas? Who has credibility to create? Same as 
above? Role of corporate HQ? Specific instruments?
What is done with ideas? Gathered, discussed, reflected on,…? Formal meetings/ informal channels? Who is 
involved? Really useful or formality?
3.3 Try-outs: comparison focal initiative-all initiatives
Often and quickly tried out? Cowboy or accountant approach? Dependent of…?
General attitude of company/BU and corporate regarding such initiatives? Has evolved over time?
3.4 Roll-out: comparison focal initiative-all initiatives
Initiatives easily rolled out? Implementation often the bottleneck? Why?
Resistance? Who? Internal/external (competitors, suppliers, customers?) How cope, solve? Improves over 
time? Partnerships?
Risk? Complementarity with conventional business?
Initiative-sponsors under pressure? Personal responsibility? Punished if unsuccessful?
3.5 Overall reflections
When focal SIinitiative started from scratch: what to change? What to keep? What good/bad? Managerial 
mechanisms?
Similar for other SIinitiatives?
Mistakes corrected over time? How?
Filing information: 
Date of interview, company + BU, main activities BU, number of employees in BU
Background information interviewee:
Name, function/responsibility, years in company, years in sector
 
 
First, we introduced ourselves and explained the entire research project, its problem 
statement, process and the phases completed so far, all in simple language. We clarified 
the concept of SI and provided some concrete, industry-specific examples, gathered 
through the previous research phases. Then we explained the purpose of the interview, its 
structure and the specific topics to be discussed. We also noted some background 
information of the interviewee. 
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The proper interview started with a general discussion of the organization and business 
unit. Similar to the process we followed in the focus groups-2, the main interview was 
structured from the concrete to the general. In other words, the interview was broached by 
the discussion of a specific SIinitiative. In the second part, the interviewee was explicitly 
asked to bear in mind specific factors that had proved important in the creation of the 
initiative, but to make now a transition to a more structural, general level. To this end, we 
provided some other examples of SIinitiatives recently created by the interviewee’s 
company and asked the interviewee to compare factors across these examples. A 
continuous comparison was hence made between factors that were specific to the focal 
initiative and factors that were considered as ‘standard’ in the company/BU when such 
SIinitiatives were created (see, Table 3.9, part 3). Originally, we structured this part of the 
interview on the basis of the conceptual and previous research findings (e.g. structure by 
recognition, assimilation, etc…). However, we felt that this approach was ‘artificial’ and 
obstructed the natural flow of the interview. We hence adapted the question sequence to 
better fit within the interviewee’s perspective, which was often temporal instead of 
conceptual. The second part of the interview hence followed a chronological structure from 
idea generation to market launch (see, 3.1 to 3.4 in Table 3.9). This new structure of 
interviewing yielded better and deeper data, nonetheless, the analysis was complicated 
because the interview structure did not match the conceptual research structure anymore. 
In other words, different conceptually related issues became scattered throughout the 
interview responses.  
We literally transcribed all interviews soon after interviews were conducted. This enabled 
us to remember patterns of behavior and facial expressions, which were added to the 
transcripts. 
 
3.5.3 Analysis 
 
As in QUAL1, the analysis largely built on guidelines by Miles & Huberman (1994), Dey 
(1993) and Coffey & Atkinson (1996). We applied a combination of categorical analysis 
(coding and thematic analysis) and memos and displays (Maxwell, 1998). Interview and 
focus group transcripts were read closely, highlighted, coded and analyzed. Often, 
audiotapes were relistened several times to overhear intonations and hesitations. We did 
not focus on loose words or phrases, but identified sequences of related talk (Silverman, 
2000).  
 
Qualitative research is especially appropriate to classify data into emerging categories or 
explanations (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Still, as the qualitative research was guided by 
the conceptual insights of chapter 1 and 2, we partly used preestablished criteria for the 
specification of themes. As already noted, Miles & Huberman (1994) argue that qualitative 
data can be analyzed using an inductive or a deductive logic. Accordingly, Huberman & 
Miles (1994: 431) state that: “Qualitative studies ultimately aim to describe and explain (at 
some level) a pattern of relationships, which can be done only with a set of conceptually 
specified analytical categories (Mischler, 1990). Starting with them (deductively) or 
getting gradually to them (inductively) are both legitimate and useful paths”.  
Departing from theoretical insights, preliminary themes and patterns were identified (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994) and noted. Data were grouped into conceptual clusters (Danneels, 
2002). More specifically, we applied pattern matching of the data (Miles & Huberman, 
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1994) to the predefined, or ‘sensitizing’ concepts (Patton, 1990), of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation and the different 
organizational and supply chain characteristics, derived from the ACAP and SI literature 
(see chapter 2). They served to indicate how these constructs were manifest in the context 
of SIinitiatives. In these general data categories, we –inductively– discovered several 
emergent, or ‘indigenous’ (Patton, 1990) subcategories. Data were hence coded at different 
levels of abstraction (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). For example, a data extract was coded 
into the category of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, and more 
specifically to the subcategory on information about other sectors. Or, the emergent 
construct of ‘innovativeness’ arose in the category of cultural organizational 
characteristics. In this way, the theoretical model and insights of chapter 2 were enriched 
and specific items could be developed.  
During coding, we were especially mindful of symbolic language and figures of speech, 
such as metaphors (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Wherever there was disagreement 
regarding the coding of verbal expressions into the (predefined or emergent) categories, we 
discussed the coding category until there was complete agreement on a judgment. Here, 
the advantage of using multiple investigators becomes clear (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Patton, 
1990). 
Similar to the analysis of QUAL1, we finally structured the data by source and looked for 
similarities and dissimilarities across the different sources per industry (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). First, this was done ‘vertically’, i.e. between the different data collection methods 
per industry. In contrast to the QUAL1-phase, this vertical comparison was still followed 
by a ‘horizontal’ comparison between the different sectors. In this way, the different data 
patterns found within industries were corroborated across the five industries as well 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
 
Data collection and analysis partly overlapped according to the ideas of Orton (1997) and 
Burawoy (1991). Eisenhardt (1989b) argues that the adjustment of data collection 
instruments is legitimate for it helps to probe new insights that may enrich theory 
development. Changes to, for example, interview guides usually reflect a better contextual 
understanding and may hence enhance the internal validity of the study (Huberman & 
Miles, 1994). In addition, the concurrence of data collection and analysis allows analysis to 
guide further collection in a way of ‘theoretical sampling’, such that the collection of 
unnecessary and excess data becomes increasingly avoided (Morse, 1994). 
First, during the course of QUAL2, field impressions were noted and different team 
meetings were held to share emergent ideas and reflections. We also created many memos 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), which proved especially useful for ongoing reflections on 
theory and methods (e.g. regarding the formulation and the sequence of the interview 
questions). In addition, we used diagrams, tables and flowcharts to structure the 
information, to match it with theory and to develop understanding. They in turn guided 
further data collection and analysis (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994). As a 
result, particularly in the course of the interviews, some questions were added and 
removed from the overall interview protocol and the question sequence was adapted (see 
section 3.5.2.2). Furthermore, in later interviews more specific questions were asked to 
probe for emerging themes from previous interviews and the focus groups-2, and to check 
factual data (cfr. Danneels, 2002).  
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In sum, the analysis of QUAL2 led to a) the identification and refinement of relevant 
constructs, b) the development of hypotheses and the formulation of additional research 
questions regarding moderator effects, and c) the development of quantitative 
measurement instruments (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
As regards the first objective, both prespecified and emergent categories were used.  
Concerning the formulation of hypotheses and research questions, we looked for overall 
patterns in the data. The specified hypotheses and research questions did thus apply to the 
aggregate data. This implies we did not use the ‘replication logic’ (Yin, 1989) where each 
case is used to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. We hence applied what Huberman & 
Miles (1994) have called a ‘variable-oriented strategy’, and not a ‘case-oriented strategy’. 
We chose this strategy because QUAL2 did not consist of full, stand-alone cases like in 
case study research, which could be compared. Instead, it was the combination of the focus 
group-2 data and the interviews across the different industries that together laid bare some 
patterns. These insights were compared to theory. Furthermore, the qualitative phase was 
used as an input to the quantitative phase. This means we opted to test the model only in 
the quantitative phase. The quantitative phase served to enhance the internal validity of the 
hypothesized relationships based on the qualitative data. In addition, qualitative data are 
particularly useful to develop an understanding (the ‘why’) of a relationship (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Hence, in turn, the qualitative data served to increase the internal validity of the 
quantitative analyses.  
Finally, regarding the third objective of QUAL2, we followed Creswell et al.’s (2003) 
guidelines for instrument development in a QUALÆQUAN design. One the one hand, 
themes, dimensions and specific statements from individuals raised during the qualitative 
phase were used to directly create items (see also, Morse, 2003). Alternatively, we looked 
for existing instruments that could fit the themes and statements found in the qualitative 
phases.  
 
3.6 THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE (QUAN) 
 
3.6.1 Research questions and level of analysis 
 
As noted above, QUAL1 and QUAL2 were used in order to develop and refine the 
theoretical model. The analysis of the qualitative findings hence resulted in the selection 
and refinement of relevant constructs. For these constructs, measurements instruments 
were developed. In addition, hypotheses and research questions were formulated. As 
predicated by the QUALÆQUAN research design, and with the view of ameliorating 
statistical conclusion, construct and external validity, the qualitative findings were 
statistically tested in the QUAN phase. 
More specifically, the research questions we attempted to answer in the QUAN-phase 
were: 
 
RQ1: Which of the path-breaking focus areas that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
target are critical for a business unit’s SIcap? 
RQ2: What (partial) mediating effects can be detected among deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation on a business unit’s SIcap? 
RQ3: What moderating effects of organizational and supply chain factors can be detected on the 
relationships between deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation 
and transformation and a business unit’s SIcap? 
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Incorporating RQ3, we followed Greenwald et al.’s (1986) ‘condition-seeking’ strategy in 
order to avoid confirmation bias and overgeneralized conclusions. This strategy implies 
that apart from studying the main hypotheses and results (‘does the result occur?’),  
researchers should buckle down to the specific conditions under which this effect occurs. 
Greenwald et al. (1986) argue that this strategy is aimed to produce qualified conclusions. 
In fact, the condition-seeking strategy comes down to testing moderation effects. “The 
difference between unqualified and qualified conclusions corresponds to that between 
statistical main and interaction effects. The condition-seeking method can therefore be 
understood as an interaction-effect-seeking method” (Greenwald et al., 1986: 224). 
 
Similar to QUAL2, in principle, the level of analysis was the business unit. Logically, for 
smaller, single-unit companies, the level of analysis had to be the organizational level. Our 
choice for this level of analysis is founded upon the same arguments as those discussed in 
QUAL2 (see section 3.5.1).  
 
3.6.2 Design  
 
3.6.2.1 Sample survey 
 
In general, self-reports have been the most prominent sources of data in social science, 
organizational behavior and management research (Harrison & McLaughlin, 1996; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). More specifically, the sample survey design (particularly by 
means of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire) has been one of the most widely used data 
collection strategies. Yet, it is also one of the most controversial techniques 
(Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 1996).  
 
Although problems of, for example, common method variance (the artifactual covariance 
between self-report measures of different constructs) or response biases, such as 
acquiescence, extremity, central tendency, positivity (Mathews & Diamantopoulos, 1995; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) or self-presentation biases (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) have 
since long been recognized, self-reports are sometimes the only practical alternative left to 
study certain research questions; laboratory studies are not appropriate to the examination 
of several behavioral phenomena and experiments are difficult and expensive to conduct 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).   
Furthermore, methods that make efficient use of scarce research resources such as effort, 
time and money, are regarded with favor. Self-report surveys fall within this category for 
they are often a plausible alternative to study a large sample with reasonable investment in 
time and effort (Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). The major advantage of a (probability-based) 
sample survey design lies indeed in its potential to quantitatively estimate the distribution 
of variables in a population by obtaining information on only a small proportion of this 
target population. In this way, surveys are relatively inexpensive and easy to conduct, can 
provide more extensive or directed information, are a practical alternative to study latent 
variables, and can reach a large sample (Cycyota & Harrison, 2002; Podsakoff & Dalton, 
1987). In our research project too, we judged questionnaires (and consequently the use of 
self-reports) the most viable way to study our research questions on a large scale.  
This choice has however not prevented us from acknowledging the main pitfalls of this 
data collection method. Self-reports imply that “the informant’s statement represents 
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merely the perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and 
emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal usages” (Dean & White, 
1958:  178 in Mathews & Diamantopoulos, 1995:  844).  
Hence, the use of sample results and derived population estimates to correctly infer 
conclusions about the entire target population (external validity), necessitates the 
elimination (or at least the reduction) of four sources of survey error, namely sampling 
error, coverage error, nonresponse error and measurement error (Groves, 1989 in 
Grandcolas et al., 2003). “A good sample survey, by whatever method, is one in which all 
members of a a population have a known opportunity to be sampled for inclusion in the 
survey (noncoverage error is avoided); the people to be surveyed are sampled by random 
methods in sufficiently large numbers to provide a desired level of precision (sampling 
survey error is limited); questions are selected and phrased in ways that result in people 
providing accurate information (measurement error is avoided); and everyone who is 
included in the sample responds (nonresponse error is avoided)” (Dillman, 1991:  228). 
Figure 3.3 shows a short overview of the strategies we used to reduce these error sources. 
In the following sections these will be more elaborated on. In addition, the results of tests 
we ran to estimate survey error will be reported.  
 
Figure 3.3: Strategies used to reduce survey error 
Measurement error 6 pre-testing phases
Coverage error ‘pre-recruited panels of internet users method’Æ frame population based   
on telephone number (selection of BIK codes in DMCD database)
Sampling error
- Sample drawn from frame population based on telephone number
- Probability sample: stratified proportional sample
- Authorization code for Web survey
- Response inducement techniques (pre-notification, follow-ups, incentive)
- Topic salience expected (demonstrated in QUAL + telephone survey)
- One respondent
Difference respondents-
nonrespondents
- Comparison of sample composition: population vs telephone respondents vs web 
volunteers vs final Web respondents
- Comparison early versus late final Web respondents on all theoretical variables
Nonresponse error
Response rate
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3.6.2.2 Construction of the questionnaire 
 
The original questionnaire consisted of 85 questions (4 questions related to the control 
variables and 81 questions related to the research constructs). Even though all items had 
been gradually and carefully developed on the basis of conceptual and qualitative findings, 
we still wanted to pretest these questions before submitting the survey to the target sample. 
 
3.6.2.2.1 Measurement error: Pretesting the questionnaire 
The prior aim of pretesting is to reduce measurement error (or response error, Mathews & 
Diamantopoulos, 1995) in survey results (Presser et al., 2004) (see Figure 3.3). 
Measurement error belongs to the category of non-sampling error (Bagozzi, 1994a) and 
consists of two distinct components: response variance and response bias. The first reflects 
variability in responses across different participants within the same study, e.g. due to 
different data collection modes. The latter, response bias, is the degree to which 
respondents’ answers reflect the true or correct values. It systematically stems from 
respondent characteristics, characteristics of the question wording (e.g., threatening or 
confusing questions, induced social desirability) or characteristics of the questionnaire 
design (Dillman, 1991; Mathews & Diamantopoulos, 1995). Pretesting particularly tackles 
this latter kind of measurement error, namely response bias.   
 
Although the use of pretesting has been stressed in the survey research literature (Reynolds 
& Diamantopoulos, 1996), so far, social science research literature lacks methodological 
results of different pretest practices, and only provides little empirical guidance on 
executing pretesting methods (Hunt et al., 1982; Presser et al., 2004). Since Blair & 
Presser (1992) found out that different pretesting procedures often reveal different types of 
problems, it seems advisable to combine different types of pretesting methods. Therefore, 
before the final questionnaire was administered to the target sample, we performed a 
pretesting procedure consisting of different steps/methods (see Figure 3.4).  
Overall, we followed Bagozzi’s (1994a) guidelines to perform firstly a critical review by 
the researchers themselves, followed by a review by a group of knowledgeable experts. 
Finally, a pilot test was conducted by administering the questionnaire to a small number of 
sample respondents.  
 
Step 1: Critical review by the researchers 
During this pretesting phase, the final measures were once more conceptually reviewed in 
order to improve content validity. 
 
Step 2: Original translation 
Since we targeted Dutch respondents, we wanted to develop a questionnaire in Dutch for 
the sake of clarity to the respondents. Yet, since the existing scales we wanted to use all 
had been developed in English, they first had to be translated into Dutch. Three Flemish 
speaking researchers translated these scales separately. From their versions a final 
translation was distilled and agreed upon.  
 
The methodological literature is not unambiguous about whether a pretest method should 
be conducted using the final survey method, or using personal interviews. After the 
translation we hence followed a two-stage approach where firstly knowledgeable 
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participants were asked to comment in-depth on the questionnaire-in-construction (step 3). 
In a second stage an ‘undeclared pretest’ was conducted reflecting the final survey method 
(step 5) (Converse & Presser, 1996 in Reynolds & Diamantopoulos, 1996).  
 
Figure 3.4: Different pre-test phases 
Content validity
STEP 3
In-depth review 
by experts (steering committee)
STEP 4
Additional High Dutch translation
by Dutch persons
STEP 5
E-mail pilot test of questionnaire
with representative respondents
STEP 6
Telephone debriefing
with respondents of step 5
Comprehension
Content validity
Comprehension
Comprehension
Construct validity
Comprehension
Face validity
Comprehension
STEP 1
Critical review 
by researchers
STEP 2
Dutch translation of existing scales
by researchers
 
 
Step 3: Review by knowledgeable experts  
The Dutch questionnaire was sent by e-mail to the steering committee of the project. 
Persons of this steering committee had been following the project (and its previous 
qualitative results) from the start and consequently knew the problem statement, the 
research questions and the constructs under study. Moreover, being all in charge of 
marketing strategy (many being marketing managers) in Dutch industrial companies or 
business units, their profile was similar to the one of the target respondents the 
questionnaire was going to be administered to. In addition, all members of the steering 
were Dutch native speakers.  
We undertook an e-mail Delphi round with the steering committee during which questions 
were discussed in-depth. The so-called ‘content-saturation’ of the scale (Burish, 1997) was 
discussed (deleting, adding or changing items). The question sequence and the clarity of 
the instructions were considered as well. As a result, the questions became more clearly 
formulated, some items were removed and others were added.  
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Step 4: Additional translation 
During the previous phase it became clear that the questionnaire still contained typically 
Flemish words or expressions. The questionnaire version that resulted from this Delphi 
round was, once more, purged from Flemish words and expressions by three Dutch 
persons separately. As a result, Flemish words and/or expressions were replaced by (High) 
Dutch synonyms. 
 
Step 5: Pilot test  
In order to conduct the pilot test, we asked members of the steering committee to have 
marketing staff members in their company fill out the questionnaire as a test case. In this 
way, we followed Tull & Hawkins’ (1976) and Zaltman & Burger’s (1975) (in Hunt et al., 
1982) guidelines to use respondents in the pretest who are similar to, or representative of 
the target respondents.  
Although some authors (e.g., Dillman, 2000) advise to make use of multi-mode surveys 
(e.g., a combination of fax, mail and Internet-based surveys), others (e.g., Cobanoglu et al., 
2001; Roster et al., 2004) explicitly caution for measurement differences between different 
modes that may result in different analytical conclusions. These multi-mode measurement 
differences could also apply to pretesting versus final survey mode. Since the final survey 
used an Internet mode (cfr. infra), for our pretesting results to be entirely transferable to the 
final survey, our pretesting procedure should ideally have been conducted on a Web survey 
too (Presser et al., 2004). Nonetheless, high set-up costs (resources & time) prevented us 
from having developed a Website only for pretesting purposes. This is why, for the pre-
test, we decided to send the questionnaire as an e-mail word attachment. Still, we tried to 
use a pretesting method that paralleled as well as possible the final survey method; 
possible measurement differences were anticipated by designing the pretest e-mail 
questionnaire according to the same structure as the one we were planning to use on the 
final Website. 
The Word document consisted of an instructions page, an identification page and several 
pages for the actual research data. Questions related to a specific content domain were 
bundled each on a separate page. A cover letter was included in the e-mail body, indicating 
a) some background information on the research (general problem statement, sponsoring 
companies, researchers), and b) the time needed to fill out the questionnaire. A total of 30 
completed surveys were returned. Since the target sample consisted of ‘sophisticated’ 
respondents (we questioned marketing staff about marketing research questions), the 
relatively small pretesting sample did suffice (Hunt et al., 1982).  
The returned questionnaires were statistically analyzed in order to further purify the 
measures (Churchill, 1979; Presser et al., 2004). By means of descriptives (e.g., 
distributional properties of answers, frequencies) we tried to reveal unclear or 
inappropriate questions. In addition, a principal components analysis was carried out on 
the reflectively specified constructs. This type of exploratory factor analysis is a useful tool 
for data (item) reduction (see e.g., de Heus et al., 1995; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2001c; 
Iacobucci, 1994). In addition, for the reflective scales we calculated Cronbach’s alphas as a 
measure of internal consistency. Results of these statistical analyses should however be 
treated with much caution since the required sample size for an exploratory factor analysis 
is much larger, the more if the factor pattern is relatively unclear (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001c; Iacobucci, 1994). Therefore, we regarded these results as indicative of potential 
Chapter 3 
 118 
data patterns, rather than as definite, manifest data characteristics. Accordingly, no items 
were removed solely based on these statistical results. 
 
Step 6: Telephone debriefing 
Finally, we conducted a telephone ‘debriefing method’ (Hunt et al., 1982); we called 
several respondents and asked them to comment on the questionnaire (e.g., time needed to 
fill out the questionnaire; difficulty of wording, ambiguousness of questions, sequence of 
questions, meaning of questions, etc.). We were especially mindful of loaded questions, 
double questions and ambiguous questions (Payne, 1951), as Hunt et al. (1982) found that 
these errors are more difficult to detect from pretests. In addition, since debriefing methods 
are especially suited to discover comprehension problems (Presser et al., 2004), during the 
telephone debriefing we examined whether all questions meant to the respondents what 
they were intended to mean (Schwarz, 1999 in Rossiter, 2002).  
 
As a result of the pre-testing phase, several items/questions had to be re-formulated. In 
addition, 1 item was added for deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation 
(assim2). Some items of the moderators were removed. The control variable for the 
respondent’s function was removed as well, since respondents found this irritating and 
redundant as the respondent’s function would already be checked during the telephone 
survey (section 3.6.2.3.2). The control variable for size (number of FTEs) was changed 
into a categorical question with four size-categories; when people had to fill out the exact 
size and they did not know the exact number of employees, they were inclined to leave the 
question completely unanswered.  
After the entire pretesting procedure, the final questionnaire consisted of 81 questions (3 
questions related to the control variables and 78 construct items). In Appendix II the final 
measures are shown. 
 
3.6.2.2.2 Design of the final questionnaire 
We chose to do a Web survey since this kind of survey has been shown to demonstrate 
advantages over traditional mail surveys in terms of speed of delivery and response, ease 
of data cleaning and, smaller printing, mailing, reminding and coding costs (Cobanoglu et 
al., 2001; Sills & Song, 2002; Umbach, 2004).   
In the final survey the pretest design, layout and structure were kept wherever possible, 
except in the cases where pretest results had indicated modifications. Instead of using one 
paper per content domain as we had done in the e-mail questionnaire, here one screen per 
content domain was used. So, in the Web survey respondents had to click the ‘next page’ 
button instead of scrolling down to the next page in the pre-test. The similarity between the 
pretest and final Web design does not only diminish multi-mode measurement differences 
but also rests on the methodological argument to use a conventional format for a Website 
survey, one that is similar to a paper-and-pencil format (Umbach, 2004).  
 
Since a Web survey is a self-administered survey instrument, we were especially mindful 
of potential measurement error. The importance of question wording has been well 
recognized in traditional written surveys and applies equally well to the construction of 
Web surveys. Al already mentioned this argument has motivated our pretesting procedures 
in the first place. Still, there is a growing literature suggesting that also the design of the 
Web survey could impact on measurement error (e.g., Couper et al., 2001). Hence, we tried 
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to follow design recommendations as specified in the literature on Web surveys (e.g., the 
use of few colors, the avoidance of drop-down boxes, Dillman, 2000). 
The Website format was developed in consultation with professional Website developers 
(Cap Gemini). These developers also technically programmed the Website. Respondents’ 
answers were automatically stocked into an excel file, which could be directly read into 
statistical software. In this way, later data entry errors could be avoided (Zhang, 1999). 
Before being published on-line, the Website was submitted to extensive testing procedures, 
by the technical programmers and by ourselves. In order to avoid differences in visual 
appearance and technical errors, the stability of the Website was tested for several 
operating systems and browsers (Couper, 2000; Presser et al., 2004) and for all possible 
exceptional answers.  
 
The final on-line survey consisted of 81questions, which can be found in Appendix II. The 
survey was structured as follows.  
The first Web page consisted of a general explanation of the research topic and purpose, in 
order to provide the respondents with some contextual information. Since the telephone 
survey had already indicated industrial marketing managers’ interest in SI (see section 
3.6.2.3.2), we hoped to enhance salience by stressing this aspect as being the overall 
research question of the survey. We were however careful to not reveal the specific 
research questions in order to (at least partly) avoid hypothesis guessing of the 
respondents. Hypothesis guessing may result in respondents adapting their 
behavior/answers, and may consequently threaten construct validity of putative causes and 
effects (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  
Furthermore, key sponsors and researchers were named (STEM, University of Antwerp, 
CGEY and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs) and their letterhead logos appeared 
on the Website. In addition, the expected time to fill it out was indicated on this page (15 à 
20 minutes)12. Finally, respondents were informed that the research guaranteed entire 
confidentiality and anonymity of data to them. It was also indicated that persons wishing to 
obtain a resume of the research findings could enter their e-mail address at the end of the 
survey. Respondents were ensured that this e-mail address would only be used to this 
purpose.  
At the bottom of this page, respondents had to submit their personal authorization code 
before they were able to reach the actual Web survey. 
 
The introductory Web page was followed by an instructions page. Here, the unit and level 
of analysis, the meaning of some (marketing and/or research jargon) terms and the scaling 
method were clarified. As recommended in the literature on Web surveys (Dillman & 
Bowker, 2001) clear and specific instructions about how to navigate through the Website 
and how to answer questions were provided.   
Questions related to the control variables were also included on this page. Respondents 
were asked to position their company/business unit on a 10-point scale ranging from 10: 
upstream (supplier of raw material) to 1: end customer. They also had to indicate whether 
their company/BU was mainly a service or products provider. Both these categories were 
further subdivided into corresponding BIK categories; 8 types of industrial products (e.g., 
                                                          
12 On-line surveys of 15-30 minutes completion time are considered as short and yield a 
higher response rate than do longer surveys (Deutskens et al., 2004).  
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raw materials) and 6 types of industrial services (e.g., maintenance/repair/installation). We 
finally asked respondents to provide us with the size of their company/BU, in terms of 
employees (full time equivalents, FTEs). Respondents could choose among the following 
size categories (largely based on the NIS classification): a small-sized organization was 
defined as one having less than 100 FTEs, a medium-sized 100-199, a large one 200-499, 
and a very large one as having more than 500 FTEs. 
 
The remaining part of the Website was structured according to the different content 
domains being studied. In the concrete, based on the conceptual construct definitions nine 
different conceptual domains were defined: deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition, for assimilation and for transformation respectively, SIcap, organizational 
culture (innovativeness & risk taking), cross-functional information dissemination, supply 
chain information potential (information provision by customers & by suppliers), 
organizational structure (formalization & centralization), and supply chain innovation 
potential (innovation stimulus from customers, from suppliers and general chain climate). 
All items tackling a specific conceptual domain were grouped onto one Web page. For 
example, all items measuring the cultural constructs of innovativeness and risk taking 
appeared on web page 7.  
Little is known about the exact effects of question order (Bagozzi, 1994a). Even though 
researchers are sometimes recommended to mitigate items across concepts (see e.g., 
Andrews, 1984), others argue that grouped items facilitate respondents’ cognitive 
processing (Harrison & McLaughlin, 1996). For the latter reason, Bagozzi (1994a) advises 
to group questions that tackle similar subjects, in order to “reach the proper address in 
memory” and to maintain respondents’ attention (: 41). So, by bundling the items per 
content domain, we judged that respondents could better frame the –sometimes 
complicated– questions, which would in turn enable them to fill out the rather long 
questionnaire more easily. In addition, specific methodological literature on Web surveys 
recommends dividing a long survey into several separate Web screens (Dillman & 
Bowker, 2001). For instance, Couper et al. (2001) found that the completion of a Web 
survey consisting of multiple items per screen takes significantly less time than the 
completion of a survey in which a single item per screen appears13.  
 
Consequently, nine additional Web pages appeared consecutively: the first three pages 
measuring the independent variables, a page tackling the dependent variable, followed by 
five pages on the moderators (culture, cross-functional information dissemination, chain 
information potential, structure, and chain innovation potential). We followed Salancik & 
Pfeffer’s (1977) advise to reduce common method bias by ordering the items on the 
questionnaire, such that the dependent variable followed, instead of preceded, the 
independent variables.  
On top of each of the pages a textual progress indicator appeared, informing respondents 
about the number of screens they already had completed, in function of the total number of 
                                                          
13 Consistent with Harrison & McLaughlin’s (1996) findings, Couper et al. (2001) found 
that correlations between items appearing together on a screen are higher than items 
divided across several screens. Yet, the difference in correlations was rather small and was 
not found to be significant.    
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screens of the questionnaire (Couper, 2000; Couper et al., 2001). For example: “This is 
page 6 of 9”.  
Below this progress indicator, the substance of the questions appearing on the page was 
briefly explained, a procedure which has been recommended by Bagozzi (1994a). For 
example, for the recognition-measure the following introductory sentence was included, 
“The following questions measure the degree your BU (firm) applies general mechanisms 
in order to gather more information about the market/customers. Please tick the box that 
applies most to the situation in your company/BU.” [translated from Dutch]. We included 
this explanation since several participants in the pilot test complained about, in their view, 
too similar questions across the different content domains; they felt being controlled and 
this reduced their motivation to fill out the entire questionnaire. They also indicated that it 
sometimes stimulated them to adopt corrective or affirmative answer behaviours. 
Furthermore, these reactions proved that questions were not well understood/framed.  By 
separating the different content domains and by introducing each of them, questions were 
better contextualized. Furthermore, Andrews (1984) found that this kind of a medium-
length introduction (16-64 words) in combination with medium-length questions (16-24 
words) yields the highest data quality.  
 
Concerning the answering categories, all moderator-items were measured by means of 5-
point Likert scales, in order to be consistent with most of the existing scales used. 
Answering categories corresponded to a ‘fully agree - fully disagree’ range. Likewise, for 
the newly developed measures (independent variables and dependent variable) 5-point 
Likert scales with the same labeling were used, following previous empirical research on 
formal company (marketing) practices (Reinartz et al., 2004).  
An additional ‘not applicable’ category was added to all questions. The box could be 
ticked if respondents felt they did not have sufficient knowledge to provide a correct 
answer, or if they thought that the question did not apply to the specifics of their 
company/business unit. This box was added in order to avoid the ‘missing alternative 
error’ in questionnaire design (Hunt et al., 1982). The inclusion of an explicit ‘not 
applicable’ option leads to a higher validity, lower method effects and lower residual error 
(Andrews, 1984). Furthermore, because of technical requirements, respondents were 
compelled to fill out an entire page (all questions) before the following page could be 
downloaded. The inclusion of the ‘not applicable’ category could hence prevent 
respondents from random answering in order to be able to proceed with the survey. 
The corresponding meaning of all six answer categories was repeated on top of each Web 
page. After each item, six radio buttons (one for every response option) were shown; the 5 
buttons for the Likert categories were horizontally aligned, beside them, though separated 
by a blanc space and a black line, the ‘not applicable’ button was shown. We did so 
because research has shown that a non-substantive response option should visually be 
separated from the substantive options, since respondents consider the visual midpoint of 
the scale as the conceptual midpoint (Tourangeau et al., 2004). 
 
On the final (twelfth) Web page respondents were thanked for their co-operation. As 
research on industrial response rates has shown that the non-monetary incentive of offering 
the study results can positively influence the likelihood of response (Diamantopoulos & 
Schlegelmilch, 1996), respondents could leave us their name and e-mail address to receive 
a summary report of the research results. As already mentioned, this information was not 
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compulsory, as we wanted to guarantee entire anonymity and confidentiality to the 
respondents (Umbach, 2004; Diamantopulos & Schlegelmilch, 1996). 
 
3.6.2.3 Sampling strategy 
 
While pretesting procedures can help to reduce measurement error, sampling strategy is of 
major importance to issues of sampling error, noncoverage error and nonresponse error 
(see Figure 3.3).  
 
3.6.2.3.1 Respondent type  
We already mentioned self-reports as one of the most prominent data collection methods in 
social and management science. In addition to the use of self-reports, the strategy literature 
is characterized by the frequent use of single respondents to make inferences about an 
organization’s situation (strategy, environment, processes, etc.) (Cycyota & Harrison, 
2002). More specifically, management researchers often rely on top-level managers as key 
informants of organizational processes (Venkatraman, 1989). The most cited references 
used to justify the use of these single respondents are the contributions by Snow & 
Hrebiniak (1980) and Hambrick (1981). These authors argue that a CEO or highplaced 
manager are the best positioned respondents to describe the entire organizational system, 
since they typically do have access to information about how the total system operates, 
whereas lower-placed managers do not (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). In similar vein, Parcel 
et al. (1991) argue that for organizational-level data employee reports are more erroneous 
than manager reports. Consequently, also in the marketing literature, surveying marketing 
managers/executives to examine an organization’s marketing (knowledge) processes and 
strategy has been a popular data collection technique (e.g., Hult et al., 2005; Slater & 
Olson, 2001; Han et al., 1998; Joshi & Sharma, 2004; Reinartz et al., 2004; Tsai & Shi, 
2004). 
 
Following these arguments, marketing managers or persons in charge of marketing 
strategy seemed to be the best placed respondents in the context of our research questions, 
something we had also experienced during the qualitative research phases. One could 
moreover argue that if even people in charge of the organization’s marketing strategy were 
not able to answer the questionnaire, probably nobody else in the organization would be 
(Mathews & Diamantopoulos, 1995).  
In the concrete, the questionnaire was administered to one person per organization or 
business unit; namely, the person who was in charge of marketing strategy. In large 
organizations this is usually the marketing manager; in small companies, setting the 
marketing strategy often comes within the CEO’s area of responsibility. Powell (1992) and 
Zahra & Covin (1993), amongst others, argue that in small, specialized or diversified 
businesses CEOs are appropriate single respondents (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997; 
Norburn, 1989). In the telephone survey (cfr. infra) it was ensured that all respondents did 
indeed meet the aforementioned respondent condition.  
 
Although in our study marketing managers seemed to be the most appropriate respondents, 
we still do acknowledge the potential bias in single-informant self-report studies. For 
example, Bowman & Ambrosini (1997) warn for the use of single respondents as they 
found that answers among different members of an organization’s management team may 
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be inconsistent. The potential incongruence between the theory’s level of analysis 
(organization/BU) and the level of analysis of measurement (the individual marketing 
manager) may lead to biased results (Klein et al., 1994). The measures of the independent 
constructs measured the actual application of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms; 
these questions thus left little interpretation to respondents. However, the dependent 
variable and moderators were more susceptible to interpretation heterogeneity among 
organizational members. Even though respondents were explicitly asked to answer all 
questions at a company/BU level of analysis, their personal interpretation (and knowledge) 
of organizational and environmental characteristics may have shaded their answers. Hence, 
level of analysis bias was most likely to occur regarding the measurement of the dependent 
variable and moderators. 
Ideally, we should have incorporated the answers of several respondents per organization. 
Before analyzing the data, measures of internal consistency could have been calculated per 
organization. If these proved satisfactory, an average score of all respondents’ answers 
could have been calculated per organization, and this score could have been used in the 
final data analysis. If, on the contrary, answers lacked internal consistency, these data (this 
organization) should have been excluded from the final analysis (Bowman & Ambrosini 
(1997). Yet, the telephone survey and steps 3, 5 and 6 of the pretesting procedure 
suggested possible response rate problems in the target sample. In addition, already in the 
qualitative phase we experienced problems of participation. In order to optimize the 
usability of the research data we accordingly decided to limit the survey to a single-
respondent study. With hindsight, this decision proved to be the correct one. When taking 
into account the relatively low response rates we obtained, even when using only one 
respondent per organization (see later, Table 3.10), including the requisite of several 
respondents per organization would probably have led to an even lower amount of usable 
data. This does however not change the need to treat the single-responses with caution. 
 
3.6.2.3.2 Construction of the sample 
We opted for a probability-based Web survey, more specifically a ‘pre-recruited panels of 
Internet users’ method (Couper, 2000: 487-488). In this approach, firstly a probability 
sample of the target population is drawn. Non-Internet methods (e.g., a telephone survey) 
are then used to elicit initial cooperation and to obtain e-mail addresses. Persons who 
agreed to further cooperate on the Web survey are then sent an e-mail request to participate 
in the Web survey (Couper, 2000).  
In the concrete, a telephone survey took place from June, 17 until July, 7 2003 in the 
context of the overall research project. Although this survey tackled the phenomenon of SI 
its results are of no further interest to the current research questions14. The telephone 
survey is nonetheless of importance to the sampling of the Web survey, since we could not 
approach the sample directly by means of e-mail (we did not have a list of marketing 
managers’ e-mail addresses). In addition, the telephone survey could be used as a pre-
notification instrument, which is a response-inducement technique highly valued by 
industrial respondents (Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 1996).  
 
For the telephone survey the sample was constructed as follows. Firstly, the population of 
all Dutch industrial companies was selected based on BIK-codes. From this population a 
                                                          
14 The results of this research have been published elsewhere, see Matthyssens et al. (2004). 
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stratified, proportional random sample (the proportion of each stratum within the sample is 
the same as its proportion within the population; within each stratum the sample is 
randomly selected) of 2970 companies, or one third of the population, was extracted. 8 
strata were defined: both industrial product and service companies (based on BIK codes) 
were classified into 4 categories of company sizes (number of employees (FTE): 1-99, 
100-199, 200-499, +500). Companies were selected from the DMCD company database; 
this database is proprietary of Marktselect and contains more than 95% of all Dutch 
companies, which makes it a frequently used database for sampling in the context of Dutch 
business-to-business research. 
 
During the telephone survey it was checked whether the respondent was indeed in charge 
of the organization’s or business unit’s marketing strategy. In addition to several questions 
specific to this telephone survey’s research topic, respondents were asked about general 
company demographics.  At the end of the telephone conversation, respondents were asked 
whether they were willing to participate in a subsequent Web survey. It was also verified 
whether they had access to the Internet to do so. These persons provided us with their e-
mail address. One could still argue that response rates could have been increased if we had 
asked all telephone respondents’ e-mail address without formally asking for their 
participation in the Web survey. All these persons could then have been invited to 
participate in the on-line survey. Yet, chances are low that individuals who declared 
themselves not willing to further take part in a Web survey, would eventually have done so 
when being sent an e-mail invitation. Furthermore, researchers have been warned to 
especially take the ethical issues of Web surveys into account. Some people consider 
unannounced e-mails to participate in a Web survey irritating or even threatening, which 
may in turn lower response rates (Umbach, 2004). Furthermore, with hindsight, a fairly 
high percentage of respondents to the telephone survey expressed their willingness to 
further participate in the study (75.5%, or 616 out of 816 persons, see Table 3.10 further in 
the thesis).  
 
Mid July 2003 all persons who had volunteered to take part in further research were sent 
an e-mail invitation to participate in the Web survey. This e-mail message was very simple 
(text format instead of HTML) and explained briefly the research purpose, the sponsors 
and the time needed to complete the survey. We decided to provide this information in the 
invitation e-mail since, in contrast to a traditional written questionnaire, respondents could 
not, before deciding to participate, examine the contents of the questionnaire (Crawford et 
al., 2001). The message also contained a reference to the previous telephone survey where 
persons had expressed their willingness to co-operate, the Website link to the on-line 
survey and a personal authorization code to enter the Website. This code was randomly 
created and assigned and could only be used once. All persons received a similar e-mail 
message as research has demonstrated that personalization of the e-mail contact does not 
affect Web survey response rates, in contrast to findings in the context of traditional paper 
surveys (Porter & Whitcomb, 2003).   
 
3.6.2.3.3 Coverage and sampling error 
Coverage error is an often cited threat to Web surveys. A coverage error is a mismatch 
between the target population, about which one wants to make inferences, and the frame 
population, a subset of the target population based on method of access (Couper, 2000; 
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Henry, 1998). The frame population could thus be considered as a sort of 
operationalization of the target population; the frame population consists of the records 
from which the sample is drawn in order to represent the target population (Grandcolas et 
al., 2003; Dillman, 2000). Coverage error thus occurs if not every unit in the survey 
population has a known, non-zero chance of being included in the sample. In other words, 
the list from which the sample is drawn (the frame population) does not include all 
elements of the population (Dillman, 2000).  
As all respondents were first approached by telephone, the frame population for the 
telephone (and for the Web) survey consisted of all Dutch industrial companies having a 
telephone number that have been included into the DMCD database. Since the DMCD 
database is one of the most comprehensive lists of all Dutch companies and since it is 
plausible to assume that almost all of these companies have a telephone number, the frame 
population is a reasonable approximation of the target population. From this frame 
population a stratified sample was selected for the telephone survey. Since all Dutch 
industrial companies of the DMCD database having a telephone number had an equal 
chance of being sampled for participation in the survey, the noncoverage rate is small; 
coverage error did occur for the less than 5% of companies that have not been included in 
the DMCD database or that do not have a telephone number.  
 
In contrast to coverage error, sampling error relates to the fact “that certain members of the 
population are deliberately excluded by selection of the subset of members for which 
responses were obtained” (Dillman, 1991: 227). Following this definition, a sampling 
error15 may have occurred for the Web survey as having an e-mail address and access to 
the Internet were conditions to participate. Yet, as only 8 respondents to the telephone 
survey willing to take part in the Web survey did not have an e-mail address and Internet 
access, this source of sampling error is minimal. In addition, the proportionate stratified 
sampling method we used for the telephone survey is said to reduce sampling error (Henry, 
1998). Still, the Web sample rests upon telephone respondents who expressed their 
willingness to take part in the subsequent study. It is plausible to assume that respondents 
who have a larger interest in the study’s object would be more willing to further 
participate. They may belong to companies that are either very active in SI, or that, in 
contrast, experience the need to become more active in SI. Although topic salience can be 
considered as an inherent threat in survey research: no matter how large our sample, its 
representativeness of the target population may be threatened because of this reason 
(Umbach, 2004; Grandcolas, 2004).   
In addition to an incomplete sample, the inclusion of answers of respondents who were not 
included in the population may also pose a threat to a representative sample. This is 
exactly why an authorization code was used. This code prevented persons not included in 
the sample from participating to the survey, and limited hence this source of sampling 
error (Umbach, 2004). 
Finally, as sampling error is also determined by the relative number of responses, the issue 
of nonresponse error will be tackled in the following section. 
 
                                                          
15 Couper (2000) wrongly calls this a coverage error. This would have been a coverage error 
only on the condition that the sample were drawn based on e-mail addresses instead of on 
telephone numbers. 
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3.6.2.4 Nonresponse error 
 
Nonresponse error is “a discrepancy between the frequency of a population characteristic 
and that estimated by the survey that occurs because some people did not respond” 
(Dillman, 1991:  229). It may endanger the generalizability of findings (external validity) 
and the inference quality (internal validity) of conclusions (Sills & Song, 2002; Henry, 
1998). Nonresponse error is a function of both the rate of nonresponse and of the 
differences between respondents and non-respondents to a survey (Couper, 2000) in terms 
of demographics, attitudes or the variables of interest in the study (Umbach, 2004). We 
will first tackle (non)response rate.  
 
3.6.2.4.1 Response rate 
In order to be able to generalize survey results to a population, the sample should 
accurately reflect the true population (Cobanoglu et al., 2001). As a consequence, 
researchers should try to obtain high response rates.  
Although studies on response rate (and response quality) in traditional mail surveys, let 
alone in Web surveys in particular, still lack clear findings and recommendations, overall,  
the literature agrees on the value of monetary incentives, advance notification and follow-
ups (Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 1996; Deutskens et al., 2004). Yet, these findings 
on traditional mail surveys are not per definition generalizable towards Web surveys 
(Deutskens et al., 2004). Furthermore, the majority of these (sociological and consumer 
marketing) studies apply to individual-level contexts involving consumer, public and 
employee opinions and attitudes. The assumption that findings about the effects of 
response enhancing techniques in these areas can  automatically generalize to firm-level 
surveys of company executives remains very doubtful and has been rejected by several 
studies (e.g., Roth & BeVier, 1998; Cycyota & Harrison, 2002; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 
1994). This has been exemplified by Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch’s (1996) 
observation that in industrial surveys, the use of monetary incentives is rare and is not 
highly valued by industrial respondents as an effective response inducement instrument. 
Since, in addition to this finding, the project’s budget did not leave room for monetary 
incentives, we decided not to include them.  
 
The response inducement techniques we did use were: a non-monetary incentive (resume 
of the research results), pre-notification calls (the telephone survey, cfr. supra) and follow-
up reminders (Umbach, 2004). We did so since these instruments have been found to be 
very effective in either industrial samples (Roth & BeVier, 1998; Diamantopoulos & 
Schlegelmilch, 1996; Erdogan & Baker, 2002; Jobber & O'Reilly, 1998) or on-line surveys 
(Deutskens et al., 2004).  
Concerning the follow-ups, we adopted Couper et al.’ s (2001) guidelines with regard to 
Web surveys to send an initial e-mail notification, followed by 2 reminder e-mails. No 
guidelines have been developed about the exact time period between the initial request and 
the follow-up reminders. In general, since response time in an on-line survey is relatively 
short, the reminder follow-ups should be sent early (Deutskens et al., 2004). Still, we 
wanted to make sure that most of the technical problems were solved before sending 
reminders. Due to the Summer period, many of the Web programmers however went on 
holidays, which considerably retarded the fixing of technical problems. In addition, the 
fact that several respondents were to be expected to be on holidays as well, the average 
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response time was extended. Therefore, we decided to leave enough time between 
subsequent reminders. Consequently, after 4 weeks (mid of August 2003) a first reminder 
e-mail was sent to all persons (as total anonymity had been guaranteed, we could not trace 
who had already responded and who had not). Another 90 persons responded to this 
reminder. After another four-week period (mid September 2003) a second, final reminder 
e-mail was sent, which resulted in 26 additional respondents. A total of 339 persons 
responded to the Website survey. Details of response rates can be found in Table 3.10. 
 
Table 3.10: Response rates telephone and web survey 
188/2372=7.9%Response quality relative to effective telephone sample
188/597=31.5%Response quality of effective web sample 
(% of respondents who completed the entire survey)
188/616= 30.5%Response quality of raw web sample 
(% of respondents who completed the entire survey) 
339/2372=14.3%Response rate relative to effective telephone sample
339/597=56.8%Adjusted response rate 
(= surveys answered/effective web sample size)
339/616=55%Raw response rate (= surveys answered/web sample size)
339Total Web surveys completed
26Web surveys completed after second reminder e-mail
90Web surveys completed after first reminder e-mail
223Web surveys completed first wave
616
- 8 (not having e-mail address) 
- 11(incorrect or obsolete e-mail 
address) 
=597
Effective sample size 
(= sample size – number of undeliverable):
616/2372=26% Sample size relative to effective telephone sample
616/2970=21%Sample size relative to original telephone sample
616/8984=7% Sample size relative to population
616Sample size 
(= persons willing to participate in web survey) 
WEB SURVEY
816/2372=34.4%Adjusted response rate 
(= surveys answered/effective sample size)
816/2970=27.5%Raw response rate (= surveys answered/sample size)
816Telephone surveys answered
2372Effective sample size 
(= sample size – number of undeliverable)
598Number not deliverable
2970/8984=33.1% Sample size relative to population
2970Sample size
TELEPHONE SURVEY
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Since the survey contents was developed from interviews and focus groups with the same 
type of respondents (persons in charge of marketing strategy) and since the topic proved to 
be relevant to these executives during the telephone interview, we can reasonably assume 
that a sufficient degree of topic salience existed among the sample (Tomaskovic-Devey et 
al., 1994). Furthermore, we applied popular response-inducement techniques (pre-
notification, follow-ups). Still, as can be seen in Table 3.10, the response rate remained 
relatively low. Only (339/2372) 14.3% of the original effective telephone sample 
responded to the on-line survey. The response rate relative to the web sample (i.e. the 
telephone respondents willing to further participate in the web survey) showed however 
better figures: a raw response rate of 55% was obtained; the effective response rate 
amounted to no less than 56.8% (see Table 3.10). Yet, response quality showed a far worse 
picture; due to incomplete responses only 188 of the 339 questionnaires (30.5% of the raw 
web sample, 31.5% of the effective web sample) were usable. This implies that only 
approximately 8% (188/2372) of the effective telephone sample could be used for further 
analysis. 
 
Overall, (also Dutch) response rates have shown a long-term decline over the years (Shaw 
et al., 2002). Particularly in the context of organizational and business studies (executive 
populations and firm level issues), nonresponse is considered as a common problem 
(Dillman, 2000; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 1994; Cycyota & Harrison, 2002). Low 
response rates are typical in industrial mail surveys due to for example respondents’ time 
pressure or company policies that prohibit employees’ participation in surveys (Paxson, 
1992). More precisely, an organizational survey differs from an individual one in that 
participation is not only determined by individual willingness but in that it also lies within 
the organizational processes that determine a respondent’s authority (dependent subsidiary 
versus independent establishment or headquarters), capacity (knowledge may be dispersed 
which may increase the survey’s time burden) and motive (organizations in a specific type 
of sector may be more interested in the research topic, employee identification with firm 
goals may be higher in smaller firms which may increase response rate, etc.) to respond 
(Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 1994).  
Hence, while suggested response rates for traditional mail surveys of the general public 
range from 50% to even 80% (Roth & BeVier, 1998), for industrial mail surveys, 
estimated response rates fall in the range of 10-20% (Paxson, 1992). Since few exact 
guidelines exist, we also examined by ourselves recent publications in prominent 
marketing journals and found that in studies where surveys of marketing managers were 
used, on average, a response rate of 15-20% was obtained for traditional mail surveys (e.g., 
Menon et al, 1999; Reinartz et al., 2004; Joshi & Sharma, 2004). This is also what Baker 
(1992) considers a ‘good’ industrial response rate in Europe (Erdogan & Baker, 2002). 
“Such low response rates are typical and accepted [...] researchers surveying business and 
industry also consider low response rates to be inevitable and acceptable” (Paxson, 1992:  
195).  
 
Still, the problem of low response rates becomes even worse in the context of on-line 
surveys. Web surveys have been found to show, in general, lower response rates than 
traditional paper-and-pencil surveys (Couper, 2000; Umbach, 2004). Although to date, 
research lacks a deep insight into the specific causes of nonresponse in Web surveys, 
typical factors found include membership to a racial and ethnic minority, low education 
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and limited financial resources (Zhang, 1999). These findings are however based on 
studies of the general public and do hence not apply to the marketing executives we 
targeted. Another hypothesized cause of Web survey nonresponse is related to Internet 
surveys’ technical complexity (Couper, 2000); inadequate Web browsers, unreliable 
connections and other technical problems may discourage persons from completing the 
survey (Umbach, 1999). Based on respondents’ e-mail reactions we received, we can 
hypothesize that technical complexities and breakdowns were indeed a main cause of 
nonresponse or incomplete response. Finally, Grandcolas et al. (2004) posit that low on-
line response rates are due to an over-surveying effect, similar to this found in telephone 
surveys. This so-called over-surveying effect is probably even more present among 
industrial respondents (like the ones we targeted) than among the general public; Or, as 
Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch (1996: 509) put it: “Executives of major companies [...] 
are practically inundated with questionnaires from academic researchers”.  
 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated (Couper, 2000) that nonresponse is a major 
drawback specifically in the type of Web survey we applied. “Nonresponse is likely to be 
the biggest concern and can occur at many stages of the process. Initial nonresponse to the 
RDD survey  [...] Further sample losses may occur during the telephone interview, where 
respondents (deliberately or otherwise) claim not to have Internet access or fail to provide 
a valid e-mail address. Finally, even among those who have Web access and agree to do 
the Web survey, many may fail to do so when sent the invitation” (Couper, 2000:  488). 
Couper (2000) further refers to Flemming & Sonner (1999) who report that on average, 
only 36% of persons contacted by telephone provide their e-mail address for a further Web 
survey. Of these 36% of people only one third does eventually complete the Web survey, 
which leads to an overall response rate of only 12%. In our case (see Table 3.10), the 
adjusted response rate for the telephone survey was only (816/2372) 34.4% which 
considerably limited the sample size of the on-line survey. Still, no less than 75,5% of the 
telephone respondents wanted to participate (616/816). More than half of these people 
eventually did so (339/616), which amounted to (339/816) 41.5% of the telephone 
respondents, or (339/2372) 14.3% of the original effective telephone sample. Because of 
incomplete responses, the final usable response rate relative to the total number of 
telephone respondents was (188/816) 23%, which is still much higher than the amount 
Fleming & Sonner (1999) predict. Flemming & Sonner (1999) do however not provide any 
guide number on the usable number relative to the effective telephone sample; this was  
only (188/2372) 8% in our case. In conclusion, the largest data losses occurred because of 
the low response rate to the telephone survey and the large number of incomplete surveys. 
 
To conclude, the low response rate we obtained seems still acceptable given the 
specificities of the survey context: a Web survey, where firm-level data are gathered from 
a sample of busy marketing executives. Thomaskovic-Devey et al. (1994: 456) even state 
that “because most organizational research relies on case studies or very limited samples, it 
should be remembered that even a sample survey with a low response rate is likely to 
produce more generalizable results than a design that does not attempt to contact a general 
sample at all”. We remain however cautious about the potential response bias (and 
consequently the threats to external and internal validity) a small response rate can 
produce. We are also mindful of this low response rate as being indicative of low 
respondent involvement. Low involvement respondents are said to respond in a more 
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effort-saving way, potentially resulting in stronger item-to-item consistencies and 
carryover effects (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988 in Harrison & 
McLaughlin, 1996). On the other hand, since participating to the survey was not 
compulsory and since topic salience can be assumed, respondents who did respond could 
also be considered as being more involved than non-respondents (Harrison & McLaughlin, 
1996). 
 
Statistical techniques to analyze research data are only appropriate to the degree that the 
the research data come from a probability sample (Gentry & Hailey, 1981). Since 
nonresponse occurred, the likelihood exists that the responses obtained are not randomly 
distributed in relation to the target population (respondents may possess distinct 
characteristics than the original probability sample). Consequently, the quality of 
probability sampling may be lost. This implies that response inducement techniques do not 
automatically improve the accuracy of survey results by increasing response rates. 
Inducement techniques may even generate sample composition bias when they urge only 
some specific type of respondents who systematically differ from the sample frame. 
Consequently inducement techniques may also increase response bias (Jones & Lang, 
1980).) Since this can threaten the validity of results, even for response rates as high as 
90%, it is crucial to also compare respondents to nonrespondents (Miller & Smith, 1983).  
 
3.6.2.4.2 Differences between  respondents and nonrespondents 
First, we will compare the sample compositions in the different survey stages. Then, 
differences between respondents and nonrespondents to the Web survey are tested.  
Of the original telephone sample size of 2900 companies 598 respondents could not be 
reached because of wrong telephone numbers or premature bankruptcy. Of the effective 
sample size of 2372 companies (2900-598), only 816 did participate in the telephone 
survey (see Table 3.11). As could be expected, quite a large number (866) refused to 
participate for lack of time, company policies or an over-surveying effect. 22 did not 
master the Dutch language, and the remaining 668 persons could not be reached (no 
answer on telephone, answering machine or busy signal).  
Table 3.11 shows the proportion of each stratum in the total response to the telephone 
survey (column 1) and compares this to the proportion of the stratum in the population 
(column 4). Population estimates are based on the Amadeus database (2004). Studying 
these figures makes clear that product companies are relatively over-represented in the 
telephone data, with the exception of product companies with more than 500 FTEs. These 
findings are supportive of the hypothesis that the probability of survey responding 
decreases with firm size (Cycyota & Harrison, 2002); in large firms information is more 
dispersed (which decreases respondents’ capacity to respond) and employee identification 
with firm goals is lower (which decreases respondents’ motive to respond) (Tomaskovic-
Devey et al., 1994). Yet, this line of reasoning makes the very large under-representation 
of small service companies even more remarkable.  
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Table 3.11: Sample composition (strata): telephone and web respondents 
100% = 8984 cases
(total population)
100% =188 cases
(total usable Web 
response)
100% = 616 cases
(total  tel. respondents 
willing to participate in 
Web survey)
100% = 816 cases
(total telephone 
response)
Total
8.2%7.5%6.0%6.1%Services 
+500 FTEs
10.3%10.0%9.1%9.4%Services 
200-499 FTEs
9.4%5.8%10.7%9.8%Services 
100-199 FTEs
47.4%14.2%8.0%8.0%Services 
1-99 FTEs
5.4%15.0%4.7%5.1%Products 
+500 FTEs
7.4%14.2%21.9%21.7%Products 
200-499 FTEs
6.7%15.0%22.4%21.9%Products 
100-199 FTEs
5.2%18.3%17.2%17.9%Products 
1-99 FTEs
Proportion relative 
to total population
Usable Web 
response relative to 
total usable Web 
response
Persons willing to 
participate in Web 
survey
Telephone 
response relative 
to total telephone 
response
Stratum
 
 
a) Sample composition: Web volunteers versus non-volunteers 
Concerning the telephone respondents, we can compare persons willing to participate in 
the subsequent Web survey to the non-volunteers (Couper, 2000) on stratum and position 
in the supply chain. Table 3.11 (column 2) shows the characteristics of marketers willing 
to take part in the Web  survey. The over-representation of product companies (1-499 
FTEs) and the under-representation of small service companies (1-99 FTEs) among the 
telephone respondents remain in the group of persons willing to participate in the Web 
survey (see column 2). Consequently, since the latter group will function as the final Web 
sample, chances are quite high that the final Web survey data will be biased towards (in 
particular, small) service companies and that they might apply more to product than to 
service companies.  
 
As regards the position in the supply chain both the telephone respondents and the web 
volunteers (population data not available) show a slight over-representation of midstream 
companies, at the detriment of the number of upstream companies (see table 3.12).  
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Table 3.12: Chain position: telephone respondents and web respondents 
Supply chain 
position 
Proportion of 
telephone 
respondents 
Proportion of 
persons willing to 
participate in Web 
survey 
 
Proportion of 
usable web 
responses 
 
Upstream 23.7% 24.7% 32.4% 
Midstream 42.3% 42.7% 35.1% 
Downstream 34% 32.6% 23.4% 
 
Total 
 
100% (816 cases) 
 
100% (616 cases) 
 
100% (188 cases) 
 
b) Sample composition: Telephone respondents versus Web respondents 
Firstly, response bias to the Web survey could be examined by comparing telephone 
survey  respondents to the usable Web survey respondents16 (188 cases, see chapter 5, 
section 5.1) on general company characteristics (Couper, 2000). Once again, they were 
compared on stratum and position in the supply chain. 
The stratum should however be interpreted with caution. In the telephone survey we knew 
the official stratum of each respondent. In contrast, in the Web survey we did not know to 
which stratum the respondent’s company officially belonged. We could not trace the 
stratum from the telephone survey as we guaranteed complete anonymity to the Web 
respondents. We tried to estimate the stratum since the web survey explicitly asked 
whether participants worked for a service or product company. Yet, we did not know the 
exact company size, as we asked for the size of the BU. This means that for multi-unit 
companies, respondents provided us with the size of their BU. This implies that the mean 
company size given in the Web survey will be smaller than the strata figures in the 
telephone survey. As was expected, the spread of the final Web respondents among the 
different strata shows a different pattern than those of the telephone respondents and the 
Web volunteers (see Table 3.11, column 3). The expected increase in small companies was 
however only demonstrated for the amount of small service companies, which remained 
small in comparison to population data, though their under-representation became less 
sharp. All product companies were over-represented in the final dataset, including the very 
large product companies (+500 FTEs). This means that of the respondents willing to 
further participate in the study, far more marketers of very large product companies 
actually did so. Also, medium-sized service companies (100-199 FTEs) became less well 
represented in the final data set. Still, the final data set parallels the telephone respondents 
and Web volunteers as regards the overall ratio of product versus service companies: the 
final dataset too seemed more representative of Dutch industrial product than service 
companies.  
Table 3.12 also shows that the final data set is more equally spread across up-, mid- and 
downstream companies. Even though the relative share of midstream companies is largest, 
overall, companies are well spread among the different supply chain positions.  
                                                          
16 We could however not compare respondents to the telephone survey who had also 
completed the Web survey to respondents who only had completed the telephone survey, 
because in order to guarantee total anonymity to the Web respondents we could not trace 
the specific persons who had completed both the telephone and the Web survey among the 
telephone respondents. 
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In order to compare the final Web respondents and nonrespondents in a more profound 
way, scores on the theoretical variables of interest should be compared as well. Yet, the 
telephone survey did not gather information on these constructs; obtaining data on the 
theoretical constructs had motivated the conduct of the Web survey in the first place. It 
was hence impossible to conduct a more precise statistical analysis of nonrespondents by 
comparing the telephone and the web respondents. In order to do so, early and late 
respondents to the Web survey were compared.  
 
c) Comparison of early and late respondents to the Web survey 
Firstly, several nonrespondents were randomly contacted and asked for the reason of their 
nonresponse. Lack of time was the main motive for complete nonresponse; (persistent) 
technical problems were the underlying reason of incomplete response. 
 
Then, we tested nonresponse bias statistically. After having removed missings and outliers 
which may distort the analyses, we assessed the non-response bias of the final dataset (182 
cases, see chapter 5).  
A generally accepted estimation method for nonresponse bias is to compare early versus 
late respondents (Van der stede et al., 2005). Comparing early respondents to late 
respondents is a time trend extrapolation test, which rests on the assumption that 
respondents who respond less readily (i.e. answering later or requiring more prodding to 
answer) are similar to non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). If information 
obtained from late respondents compares favorably to information from early respondents, 
it can be assumed that the received responses are representative of a probability sample of 
the population (Gentry & Hailey, 1981).  
The only drawback of this method is that, so far, a standardized definition of ‘early’ or 
‘late respondents’ does not exist. We hence initially wanted to follow Lindner et al.’ s 
(2001) guidelines to operationalize late respondents as respondents to the last wave (last 
follow-up, i.e. after the second reminder) and to compare these to respondents to the first 
wave (i.e., those having answered before a reminder was sent). Yet, in order to ensure 
sufficient statistical power each group should consist of at least 30 respondents (Lindner et 
al., 2001). After the removal of missings and outliers the third wave-group only consisted 
of 14 cases, and would thus have too limited statistical power. In this case, Lindner et al. 
(2001) propose to define the late respondents by combining responses of the last two 
waves. This makes sense as both these groups needed to be urged to respond in contrast to 
the first wave of respondents. We hence compared the respondents of the first wave (118 
cases) with respondents of the last two waves (50 + 14 = 64 cases).  
 
As already mentioned, not only the comparison of company demographics can provide 
insight into the quality of sample response (e.g., service firms might be more interested in 
the research subject than product firms), but also values on specific variables of interest 
may explain the willingness of specific respondents to cooperate to the study (Gentry & 
Hailey, 198; Couper, 2000; Dillman, 1991). Accordingly, we compared both groups on 
general company characteristics (size, position in the supply chain, product or service 
company by means of chi square tests) and on all theoretical constructs as well (PLS 
construct scores and average moderator values, see chapter 5, by means of independent 
samples t-tests). Results showed no significant differences on any variable (p2-tailed>0.05). 
We repeated the extrapolation analysis by splitting the entire sample into three equal 
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groups and compared the first one-third of respondents to the last one-third (Joshi & 
Sharma, 2004). The analysis yielded similar –insignificant– results. Results hence 
suggested that a threat of non-response bias could not be discerned. 
 
3.6.2.5 Characteristics of the final data set 
 
In Table 3.13 the characteristics of the final data set are shown.  
 
Table 3.13: Characteristics final dataset 
32.4Downstream
34.6Midstream
33.0UpstreamPosition in supply chain
10.4Other
15.4Consultancy, Counseling & Training
2.7Wholesale & Dealership
1.1Transport, Storage & Logistics
0.5Control (security, technical)
9.9Maintenance, Repair & InstallationServices
4.4Other
11.5Finished consumer products
0.5Office supplies
3.8Equipment, Manufacturing supplies & Spare material
15.9Finished machines & devices
7.1Machine components & semimanufactures
12.6Finished materials & semimanufactures
3.8Raw materialProductsMain 
activities
40.1Services
59.9ProductsMain activity type
22.6Very large (+500)
25.2Large (200-499)
21.7Medium (100-199)
30.4Small (1-99)Company/BU size
(in FTEs)
PercentCategory
 
 
Business units (firms) in the different size categories are more or less evenly distributed in 
the final data set. Company size proportions reflect well population distributions (Amadeus 
database), with the exception of the under-representation of small companies. This under-
representation is quite notable since population data are based on company sizes whereas 
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sample data are based on BU (or firm) sizes (see section 3.6.2.4.2 b), the latter probably 
being smaller.  
Concerning the BU’s main activities the final data set consists of more product companies 
than service companies. Particularly, when contrasted to population data (only 25% 
product companies) this over-representation seems in fact more severe. 
When compared to population data, type of activities are relatively well spread, with the 
exception of an under-representation of ‘consumer products’ companies, ‘transport, 
storage & logistics’ and ‘other services’ companies. In contrast, ‘consultancy, training & 
counseling’ companies represent a larger share in the survey data than they do in the 
population. Finally, all positions in the supply chain do more or less equally appear. 
Population data on supply chain position were not available. 
 
In sum, bearing in mind the findings of the nonresponse analysis and the data in Table 
3.13, findings of subsequent analyses may be biased in favor of product companies. In 
addition, findings may apply less to small service companies. Nonetheless, results of 
further analyses will be generalizable to all positions in the supply chain and to all values 
of the theoretical variables of interest. For example, findings will not be restricted to 
companies with a high/low SIcap, a specific organizational culture, specific deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms, etc. 
 
3.6.3 Analysis 
 
The data we gathered during the QUAN-phase were analyzed by means of structural 
equations modeling (SEM). 
 
3.6.3.1 General characteristics of structural equations modeling 
 
SEM is known by many (sometimes confusing) names, amongst others ‘covariance 
structure analysis’, ‘latent variable analysis’, or even ‘LISREL analysis’ (LISREL is a 
popular software package for executing SEM analyses). SEM actually originates from a 
combination of several research traditions.  
Firstly, it is rooted in a psychometric perspective where concepts are being considered as 
latent variables. A latent variable is then defined as a ‘hypothetical construct’ (McDonald, 
1996), or “an unobservable construct [which] is a theoretical notion that is not directly 
measurable, but is useful nonetheless. [...] (Iacobucci, 1994: 279-280). Being not directly 
observable, a latent variable can only be inferred from multiple measured variables (also 
called manifest variables, indicators, or observed measures).  
SEM further stems from an econometric approach, resting on a strong theoretical 
specification as a condition to the estimation of parameters and prediction (Chin, 1998a). 
Since SEM requires a clear definition of constructs and functional relationships, it adds a 
degree of precision to a theory (Hulland, 1999).  
Thirdly, it shares with the sociological tradition the notion that theoretical variables are 
ordered, and that types of effects can be decomposed (Falk & Miller, 1992). SEM can 
consequently be used in order to study more complex theories and frameworks. 
 
Basically, SEM answers typical multiple regression research questions involving factors. 
In its simplest form, where all variables are directly observed (no latent variables) and 
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where only one dependent variable is taken into account, SEM is in fact nothing different 
from a multiple regression (Rigdon, 1998). However, the major advantage of SEM lies in 
its possible extensions; it is a collection of statistical techniques that permit to estimate 
multiple and interrelated dependence relationships (Hair et al., 1998). This means that 
SEM simultaneously tests a series of separate, interdependent multiple regression 
equations (the so-called ‘structural equations’) while also being able to simultaneously 
study more than one dependent variable (Shook et al., 2004). 
In addition, as already mentioned, latent variables can be included into these relationships.  
A SEM model thus consists of a set of linear equations among latent (or observable) 
variables (Rigdon, 1998), with some parameters fixed and others free to be estimated. 
Because of the mathematical complexity of this method, many scholars prefer the use of a 
graphical representation. In the most well-known convention (e.g., Bagozzi, 1984) 
observable variables are enclosed in rectangular boxes. The latter are then linked to ovally 
represented latent variables, which are in turn linked to each other by an arrow. The 
arrowhead represents the direction of the relationship, with a single-headed arrow 
indicating a recursive (or directional) relationship and a double-headed one meaning a 
reciprocal relationship.   
 
A SEM model contains two –conceptually separated– parts. The relationships between the 
latent variables and their respective manifest indicators (i.e., the link between observations 
and theoretical constructs) are referred to as the ‘measurement model’ or ‘outer model’. 
The relationships among the latent variables (path model) are called the ‘structural model’, 
or ‘inner model’ (Williams et al., 2003; Falk & Miller, 1992). As the model is split into 
these two different parts, the assessment of the psychometric quality of the measurement 
model is explicitly included in the model testing process (Williams et al., 2003). In this 
way, reliability and validity of the measures are tested in the same context that is being 
used for assessing the structural relationships (Ullman, 2001). This is an important 
advantage over traditional methods (e.g., multiple regression) where the assumption is that 
once scales have been proved to be sufficiently reliable and valid they are ‘portable’ to 
other theoretical contexts. Yet, studies have refuted this assertion and it is now more and 
more believed that the measurement quality of latent variables should be addressed in each 
specific research context separately (Barclay et al., 1995). Researchers wanting to take full 
advantage of this SEM feature should hence better make use of multiple-item measures for 
each construct in their model. Including only one indicator per construct ignores 
unreliability of measurement, which is specifically one of the problems SEM was designed 
to solve (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). Further advantages of multi-item measures 
include the ability to average out the specificity of each individual item and the ability to 
distinguish respondents between more groups than the number of answering categories 
(Churchill, 1979). 
SEM can hence be used for testing measurement issues, for testing structural relationships, 
or for both simultaneously (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996).  
 
Since the development of a general SEM methodology and, in particular, since the 
development of different SEM-software programs, SEM has become a popular research 
method in the behavioral and social sciences (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). The use of 
SEM in management research dramatically increased from the 1980s onwards (Scandura 
& Williams, 2000). This growing interest in SEM probably stems from the method’s 
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benefits in assessing complex theoretical models (webs of relationships among multiple 
constructs), as well as from its potential to assess measurement issues (Bagozzi & 
Baumgartner, 1994; Steenkamp & van Trijp, 1991). Moreover, SEM’s recent extensions 
offer good prospects for even more complicated research questions, such as the study of 
measurement invariance in multi-sample research (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000), the 
estimation of method variance, and the use of hierarchical moderated regression models 
(Scandura, & Williams, 2001) and multidimensional constructs (Edwards, 2001)17.  
In marketing research, the method’s popularity has undoubtedly flared thanks to Bagozzi’s 
numerous contributions. In prominent marketing journals (e.g., Journal of Marketing, 
Journal of Marketing Research, International Journal of Research in Marketing) 
covariance-based SEM ranks today among one of the most popular methods.  
Yet, in the strategic management field, the technique’s popularity is still of more recent 
date (Shook et al., 2004). Shook et al. (2004) explain the increasing popularity of SEM by 
the growing prominence and theoretical sophistication of (strategic) management theory, 
requiring more advanced research methods. Core strategic constructs (e.g., capabilities, 
strategy) are often multidimensional and unobservable. In addition, relationships among 
these variables are complex. Given SEM’s characteristics, Shook et al. (2004) believe that 
its opportunities for strategic management research are vast. 
 
3.6.3.1.1 A digression on the outer model: reflective versus formative indicators 
In the measurement model, indicators can be modeled either in a reflective, or in a 
formative way.  
When measures are specified as ‘reflective’ (also called ‘mode A’) the underlying premise 
is that the corresponding latent variable produces a certain behavior that is captured by 
means of the manifest indicators (Williams et al., 2003). The variance in each indicator is a 
linear function of the underlying latent variable plus error (Diamantopoulos, 1999; 
MacCallum & Browne, 1993). Measures are thus considered as ‘reflections’ of the 
underlying latent variable; “the underlying latent variable determines its indicators” 
(Bollen & Lennox, 1991:  306). This implies that a change in a latent variable will result in 
an equal change in all of its indicators (Diamantopoulos, 1999). Modeling indicators in a 
reflective way rests on the domain-sampling strategy of classical test theory 
(Diamantopoulos, 1999): indicators are inter-changeable (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). 
Reflective indicators show high positive inter-correlations (Bollen & Lennox, 1991) 
because of the latent variable being a common cause to the indicators (Cohen et al., 1990). 
A reflective measurement model hence rests on a ‘principal factor model’ (Jarvis et al., 
2003). This makes the (traditional) assessment of unidimensionality18, validity and 
reliability all meaningful (Steenkamp & van Trijp, 1991). On the contrary, when measures 
are treated in a ‘formative’ mode (‘mode B’), they are believed to ‘form’ the latent 
construct. A change in a latent variable does not automatically result in a simultaneous 
                                                          
17 Further extensions of SEM include longitudinal and multilevel analysis (Ullman, 2001). 
More and more, SEM is also applied in the context of experimental research designs 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1994). 
18 To be methodologically correct we need to remark that in PLS not a real common factor, 
but a first principal component is being extracted (cfr. infra). This is why a PLS analysis 
does not permit the assessment of unidimensionality. 
 
Chapter 3 
 138 
change in all of its indicators. Yet, if any of the indicators changes (with the others staying 
the same), this is accompanied by a change in the latent variable (Diamantopoulos, 1999). 
Variation in the measures hence causes variation in the construct (Williams et al., 2003). 
This is exactly where synonyms for formative indicators, such as ‘cause’ or ‘causal’ 
indicators (e.g., Bollen & Lennox, 1991; MacCallum & Browne, 1993) stem from. In the 
case of formative indicators, the omission of an indicator may consequently change the 
meaning of the construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). In addition, indicators should not share 
any specific relationship among each other (Diamantopoulos, 1999); correlations should 
not necessarily share a specific pattern of signs (positive or negative) or magnitude (high, 
moderate or low) (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).  
Hence, the nature of the indicators (formative or reflective) causes the causal direction in 
the model to differ: in the case of reflective indicators the latent (independent) variable 
causes the observed (dependent) variables. This causal direction is reversed in the case of 
formative indicators; here, the observable variables serve as independent variables to the 
dependent, unobservable variable. While a collection of reflective indicators could be 
considered as a scale; formative indicators involve the creation of an index (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991). 
 
A central feature of a formative measurement model is that it rests on a ‘composite latent 
variable model’ instead of a principal factor model (Jarvis et al., 2003). This means that 
error variance is entirely associated with the prediction of the latent variables; it is 
represented by the latent variable’s disturbance term (Diamantopoulos, 1991:  447). This 
implies that formative, manifest variables do not include measurement error by 
themselves; error in the latent variable is captured by its residual (the part of the latent 
variable unexplained by its indicators) (Williams et al., 2003). In other words, a formative 
measurement model provides an estimate of the overall amount of random error in the 
collective set of items, rather than an individual error estimate for each item individually 
(Jarvis et al., 2003). Given that the recognition of measurement error is central to the 
traditional definition of a latent variable, MacCallum & Browne (1993) assert that the term 
‘latent variable’ is actually a misnomer for a construct entirely measured by means of 
causal indicators. They hence propose to use the term ‘composite variable’ (instead of 
latent variable); Cohen et al. (1990) advice the use of ‘emergent variable’. We, on the 
contrary, will use ‘latent variable’ to refer to a construct measured by either reflective or 
formative indicators. We have opted to do so because, so far, the term ‘composite variable’ 
or ‘emergent variable’ is not yet an established expression in the context of SEM. 
 
3.6.3.1.2 Two types of SEM 
In fact, two types of structural equations analysis exist: the covariance-based and the 
variance-based approach. The first, covariance-based SEM (e.g., Jöreskog, 1973), is the 
most widely known. It is primarily used to test the adequacy of a theoretical model; it is 
tested whether “the hypothesized model represents a reasonable approximation to the data” 
(Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994: 401). Parameters (path coefficients, variances and 
covariances of independent variables) are estimated in such a way that a population 
covariance matrix can be created. The underlying logic is that the model is good if this 
estimated matrix is close to the sample covariance matrix. Popular software packages for 
covariance-based SEM include LISREL, EQS and AMOS. Covariance-based SEM 
adheres to true score test theory (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) by making use of a factor 
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analytic measurement model (Iacobucci, 1994). It enables researchers to correct for 
random and specific measurement error as the latent variables used in the calculation of the 
model’s structural parameters represent ‘common factors’.  
                                                                                           
Notwithstanding the aforementioned qualities of the SEM method, especially covariance-
based SEM rests on stringent assumptions. Therefore, “there are many pitfalls that can 
make SEM a dangerous tool in the hands of inexperienced researchers” (Baumgartner & 
Homburg, 1996: 140). In similar vein, Cohen et al. (1992) argue that covariance-based 
SEM is even more sensitive to deficiencies in the operationalization of theoretical models 
than other methods of data analysis, since the method provides many different options for 
assigning meaning to covariances.  
In Hulland et al. (1996) and Baumgartner & Homburg (1996) the use of covariance-based 
SEM by marketing researchers (during the period 1977-1994, 1980-1994 respectively) has 
been evaluated in a meta-study. The authors’ findings were fairly similar: namely that, in 
general, researchers do not follow the method’s statistical assumptions and guidelines to a 
satisfactory degree. Both these studies revealed the frequent use of single-indicator 
constructs, low item loadings, too small sample sizes (in relation to the number of 
parameters estimated), little attention paid to outlier detection and to the assessment of 
multivariate normality, an over-reliance on the chi-square statistic (instead of the use of 
complementary alternative indices of fit), and specification searches primarily motivated 
on statistical grounds (no theoretical foundation for ‘ad hoc’ modifications, infrequent 
model comparisons and cross-validation). Hulland et al. (1996) further critiqued the lack of 
replicability of published studies, due to incomplete reporting of the input (covariance or 
correlation) matrix.  
In the strategic management field, Shook et al. (2004) performed a similar study. They 
assessed the quality of 92 strategic management studies where covariance-based SEM had 
been applied. The articles all appeared in one of nine prominent management journals 
(e.g., Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of 
Management) during the period 1984-2002. Methodological quality of these studies was 
checked in six areas: data characteristics, reliability & validity, evaluating model fit, model 
re-specification, equivalent models and, finally, the quality of reporting. Their findings 
were disappointing, and even alarming. Concerning data characteristics, they found that 
cross-sectional studies remain the most frequently used application and have even grown 
in importance. This makes the often used synonym ‘causal modeling’ for SEM even more 
inappropriate. Shook et al. (2004) further found that in 81% of the studies authors did not 
mention whether the indicators they used were multivariate normally distributed. Even 
more troubling was that a majority of authors paid little attention to reliability and validity 
issues of their measures. Concerning model fit evaluation, most authors did report multiple 
fit indices, but the issue of power was only discussed in 2 of the 92 studies. Although 
model re-specification was reported in almost half of the studies, the existence of 
equivalent models was explicitly acknowledged in only one. Finally, all the investigated 
studies lacked complete reporting on the analysis and on statistical procedures (e.g., 
software program used), which has prevented other researchers from replicating their 
findings.  
Despite their disappointing observations, the authors of the three aforementioned studies 
all keep a firm belief in SEM’s potential for future research. Guidelines for better 
application have been listed in their articles.  
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Since not all restrictive assumptions of covariance-based SEM could be met in our study 
(cfr. infra, section 3.6.3.4), we applied the second form of SEM: variance-based SEM. As 
this form of SEM is less well known, we will briefly discuss the main characteristics of 
this method. 
 
3.6.3.2 Variance-based SEM: Partial least squares 
 
The partial least squares (PLS) approach to latent variable path modeling has its origins in 
the work by Wold (e.g., Wold, 1980) and Lohmoeller (e.g., Lohmoeller, 1989). Further 
developers include, amongst others, Falk & Miller (1992) and Chin (e.g., Chin, 1998a). 
Basically, PLS operates as a series of interdependent ordinary least squares regressions and 
presumes no distributional form (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). The restrictive assumptions 
about measurement, distributions, sample sizes and theory required in traditional 
covariance-based SEM do not have to met. For this reason, the method has also been 
referred to as ‘soft modeling’ (Falk & Miller, 1992). Another important feature of PLS is 
that it rests on a principal component analysis, whereas covariance-based SEM is based on 
a common factor analysis (Chin, 1995). 
Software programs to execute PLS are LVPLS 1.6 and 1.8 (Lohmoeller, 1984), PLS-Graph 
3.0 (Chin, 2001), and of very recent date, SmartPLS 1.0 and 1.01 (Hansmann & Ringle, 
2004).  
 
3.6.3.2.1 The estimation procedure 
A PLS program uses composite weights to create latent variable scores and to optimize 
linear relationships between independent and dependent constructs. 
The actual estimation procedure can be described as a series of fixed point estimations. All 
parameters in the model are divided into subsets that are estimated by means of simple or 
multiple ordinary least squares regressions. These regressions involve the values of 
parameters in other subsets. By means of an iterative method, per subset, consecutive 
approximations of the estimates for weights and structural parameters are then provided 
(Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). So, PLS is a ‘partial’ procedure in that in each step of the 
procedure residual variance is minimized with respect to a selection of estimated 
parameters, while proxies given to other parameters are fixed (Chin, 1998a). Because the 
model is partitioned, smaller sample sizes are required to obtain estimates (Falk & Miller, 
1992).   
 
Barclay et al. (1995), Chatelin et al. (2002), Chin (1998a), Falk & Miller (1992), and 
Tenenhaus (1999) describe the algorithm in more detail. The relationships between a latent 
variable and its respective indicators are known as a ‘block’. At each iteration of the 
program, weights for each block of manifest variables are solved one at a time.  
First, the overall model is partitioned into the specified blocks, and an initial estimate for 
each latent variable is calculated. This step is called the ‘outside approximation’ of the 
latent variable: indicators are aggregated to obtain a composite score for the latent variable, 
with a variance set equal to one.  
After these initial estimates for the constructs are made, the estimated latent variable scores 
are then used in a new iterative estimation procedure, which is called the ‘inside 
approximation’. Component scores of all adjacent latent variables are combined to 
calculate a proxy for a specific latent variable.  Various weighting schemes exist to create 
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these proxies: centroid weighting, factor weighting and path weighting. The latter scheme 
takes account of the directionality in the structural scheme; it differentially weights 
adjacent latent constructs depending on whether they are precursors (weighted by multiple 
regression coefficient) or consequents (weighted by correlation coefficients) to the latent 
construct under consideration. For this reason, the path weighting scheme is preferred for 
models with hypothesized directional relations (Chin, 1998a), like ours. 
After latent variables are replaced by proxies, a new round of outside approximation starts. 
New weights are calculated by regressing the indicators on these proxies. These weights 
are then consecutively used to calculate new component scores. These new component 
scores are, in turn, used to calculate new proxies in another inside approximation, and so 
forth.  
Hence, PLS continues to iterate back and forth between outside and inside approximation 
and hence minimizes all variables’ residuals, until the parameter change (e.g., change in 
R2s) after an iteration becomes extremely small. At this point, the estimated parameters are 
considered to be stable, and residuals are considered to be minimized.  
 
During the estimation procedure, simple or multiple regressions are executed, depending 
on the measurement specification and the weighting scheme. Mode A (reflective 
indicators) requires simple regressions whereas mode B (formative indicators) requires 
multiple regressions in order to obtain the indicators’ weights. Proxies calculated by means 
of a path weighting scheme are also based on multiple regressions. Because of the ‘partial’ 
character of the estimation procedure, the required sample size is this which is required for 
the largest multiple regression in the model. This means that the required sample size 
should equal ten times the largest of two possibilities: a) the block with the largest number 
of formative indicators, or b) the dependent construct with the largest number of precursor 
constructs (Barclay et al., 1995; Chin, 1998a).  
 
3.6.3.2.2 Specification of the outer model: reflective or formative indicators 
As scores for latent variables are determinate, PLS leaves researcher the opportunity to 
model measurement relations in mode A or in mode B, with the same ease. Due to the 
complexities of using traditional covariance SEM for index construction, the use of PLS is 
particularly beneficial to further research in the creation of formatively specified constructs 
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). 
Apart from taking into account a method’s technical constraints for modeling observed 
indicators, the choice for a specific measurement mode should above all be justified on 
theoretical grounds. Fornell & Bookstein (1982) and Chin (1998a) list several issues which 
are to be considered before choosing a measurement mode. 
 
Firstly, the intention of the study matters greatly. If the study is designed to explain 
observed variances reflective indicators should be opted for. In a reflective mode PLS 
minimizes the residuals on the manifest variables; it minimizes the residual variances in 
the outer (measurement) equations (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). This is based on the 
assumption that theory is less precise (‘softer’) than empirical observations. By minimizing 
residuals on manifest variables, the prediction of composite scores is optimized. Since 
prediction and parameter accuracy cannot be optimized simultaneously, a reflective 
specification deemphasizes structural parameter estimation (paths between constructs) 
(Falk & Miller, 1992). In contrast, formative indicators are the best choice if one wants to 
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explain abstract, unobservable or ‘component-level’ variance. Formative indicators are not 
used to account for observed variances or covariances, but they are used to minimize 
residuals in structural relationships in the inner model (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). 
Indicators in each block are weighted optimally in order to maximize the variance 
explained at the component level (Chin, 1998a). Furthermore, both modes could also be 
combined in a so-called ‘mode C’. “[...] if one intends to explain variance in the observed 
criterion variables by way of the unobservables, the indicators of the endogenous construct 
should be reflective and those of the exogenous construct should be formative” (Fornell & 
Bookstein, 1982:  442). Performing a PLS analysis on this kind of model equals a 
redundancy analysis, since the mean variance in the indicators of the dependent latent 
variable is predicted by a linear composite of the indicators of the independent latent 
variable (Chin, 1998a).  
 
Secondly, the theoretical conceptualization of the latent constructs should be taken into 
account (MacCallum & Browne, 1993). If constructs are viewed as underlying factors 
giving rise to something that can be observed (e.g., the construct of attitude gives rise to 
certain observable behaviors), indicators should be modeled in a reflective way. If, on the 
contrary, constructs are determined by an explanatory mix of variables (e.g., the construct 
of marketing mix), one should opt for mode B. Chin (1998a) advises researchers to ask 
themselves whether a change in the underlying latent variable will necessarily result in a 
similar change in all of its indicators. If this is not the case, the construct should be 
modeled in a formative mode. Similar criteria have later been specified in a more detailed 
way by Jarvis et al. (2003).  
 
Finally, empirical contingencies sometimes restrict a researcher’ s choice, such as sample 
size and multicollinearity among formative indicators (cfr. infra). Modeling indicators in a 
reflective mode minimizes these problems as parameter estimates are based on simple 
regressions.  
In case the aforementioned guidelines lead to contradictory choices, Fornell & Bookstein 
(1982) further advise to test the model twice, once in each measurement mode.  
 
Since formative indicators do not rest on a domain-sampling strategy and should, by 
definition, not be positively correlated, traditional measures of internal consistency, and of 
convergent and discriminant validity are totally irrelevant (Jarvis et al., 2003; Bagozzi, 
1994b). “Internal consistency is of minimal importance because two variables that might 
even be negatively related can both serve as meaningful indicators of a construct” (citation 
of Nunnaly & Bernstein, 1994:  489 in Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001:  271). This is 
because in classical test theory or factor analysis it is implicitly assumed that the latent 
variable determines its indicators (Bollen & Lennox, 1991), whereas a formative 
specification reverses these causal relationships. “Researchers relying on factor analysis or 
the examination of correlation matrices for selecting indicators may be overlooking valid 
measures of a construct if the indicators determine the latent variable. Consequently, 
“always using internal consistency as a criterion can have dire consequences” (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991:  307). 
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Though clear guidelines have been developed for scale construction (e.g., Churchill, 1979) 
alternative approaches suited for index construction are scarcely out of the egg. In 
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer (2001) a first attempt has been made to formulate specific 
steps that should be undertaken in order to assess the quality of indexes based on formative 
indicators (for an excellent illustration, see Arnett et al., 2003). 
First, the content specification of the construct the index is intended to capture should be 
well specified. Whereas specifying the construct domain is also crucial in the development 
of scales (Churchill, 1979), in index construction this danger becomes even more 
prevalent; a failure to include all relevant aspects of the construct  will lead to incomplete 
measurement of the construct and hence to a failure to capture the entire scope of the 
construct.  
Secondly, content specification should be intertwined with the correct specification of 
indicators:  “the items used as indicators must cover the entire scope of the latent variable 
as described under the content specification” (: 271). Since an index does not rest on a 
domain-sampling strategy and since the latent variable is entirely determined by its 
indicators, Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer (2001) stress the need to be sufficiently 
inclusive. Bollen & Lennox (1991) argue for the use of a so-called ‘census’ of items of the 
construct’s content domain. 
A third issue of concern is indicator multicollinearity. Since the indicator’s weights are 
determined by a multiple regression19, their stability is affected by sample size and 
indicator inter-correlations. In the case of multicollinearity, precise estimates of the 
separate effect of each formative indicator (independent variable here) on the latent 
construct (dependent variable here) cannot be obtained (Allison, 1999).  
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer (2001) finally point to the issue of external validity. The 
decision to keep indicators (with the risk of ending up with too many indicators which is 
unfavorable from a practical perspective) or to eliminate them (with the risk of changing 
the construct’s meaning) should be a well-considered one. To simplify this decision three 
different methods can be applied. Firstly, each indicator could be related to another 
variable (e.g. an item that summarizes the construct) and could then be inspected for 
significance. Insignificant items should be removed. A second option is to estimate a so-
called MIMIC model (‘Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes’, see e.g., Bagozzi et al., 
1981). A third, and final, validation method consists in linking the index to another 
(reflective) construct to which the index can be theoretically related (e.g., antecedents 
and/or consequences). This model should show a good fit and the structural parameter 
linking the index to the other construct should be significant and of the expected sign.  
 
Undoubtedly, Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer’s (2001) contribution can be considered as a 
valuable attempt to fill a gap in the existing measurement literature. Williams et al. (2003) 
however criticize their third and fourth issue (multicollinearity and external validity). 
According to Williams et al. (2003) these issues could imply the elimination of indicators, 
possibly resulting in an altering of the construct’s meaning (which in itself conflicts with 
their issues of content and indicator specification). Yet, Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer 
(2001) have refuted this criticism in their own article, by urging caution in the elimination 
of formative indicators: “Indicator elimination – by whatever means – should not be 
                                                          
19 As indicated in section 3.6.3.2.1, in a reflective measurement specification only simple 
regressions are involved. 
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divorced from conceptual considerations when a formative measurement model is 
involved” (: 273). The authors mean by this that as all indicators point to different facets of 
the construct; removing some might jeopardize content validity.  
 
3.6.3.2.3 Assessing the measurement model 
Low reliability of measures may cause structural paths to falsely appear non-significant, 
regardless of whether the links do exist in reality (Shook et al., 2004). Yet, contrary to 
covariance-based SEM, PLS does not correct structural path estimates for attenuation. 
Hence, if measures are less reliable and theory only tentative, Hair et al. (1998) propose to 
follow the two-stage model, in order to maximize the interpretability of both measurement 
and structural model. For this reason, a PLS model is usually assessed by a two-stage 
model (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988); it is hence analyzed and interpreted in two phases. 
More specifically, the reliability and validity of the measurement model are ascertained 
before the  structural model is evaluated (Hulland, 1999).  
Assessing the psychometric qualities of the measures shows much resemblance to the way 
this is done in the context of covariance-based methods. Individual item reliability is 
evaluated by examining loadings for reflective indicators and by checking statistical 
significance of the weights for formative indicators (Chin, 1998a). Low loadings could 
point to low reliability, a methods factor or a multidimensional construct (Barclay et al., 
1995). The latter problem can occur since PLS, based on a principal component analysis, is 
not decisive about unidimensionality of constructs.  
Also, internal consistency and average variance extracted (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) are 
calculated to test for convergent validity. Discriminant validity is assessed by comparing 
average variance extracted to the squared multiple correlation between two constructs. In 
addition, by inspecting the loadings of all (reflective) indicators it should be ensured that 
no indicator loads higher on another construct than it does on the construct it was intended 
to measure in the model. 
 
3.6.3.2.4 Assessing the structural model 
PLS does not provide the researcher with a global measure of fit. “‘Where is [are] the 
goodness of fit measures?’ has become the 90s mantra for any SEM based study. Yet, it 
should be clear that the existing goodness of fit measures are related to the ability of the 
model to account for the sample covariances and therefore assume that all measures are 
reflective. SEM procedures that have different objective functions and/or allow for 
formative measures (e.g., PLS) would, by definition not be able to provide such fit 
measures” (Chin, 1998b: xii-xiii). Furthermore, the covariance-based SEM algorithm takes 
the specified model as true and estimates parameters in order to re-produce the sample 
covariances. Measures of fit only indicate how well these parameter estimates match the 
observed covariances. They do not indicate how well the constructs or observed measures 
are predicted. Consequently indicators’ error terms may be increased in order to better 
match the sample variances and covariances (Chin, 1998b). Bagozzi (1977) warns that 
probabilities as low as 0.1 have been shown to establish a good fit.  
 
In contrast to covariance-based SEM, the evaluation of ‘fit’ in PLS follows a logic similar 
to regression analysis (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). PLS provides the amount of variance 
accounted for (R2) by the specified relationships in the model. In addition, the strength of 
the paths among latent variables determines to what degree the hypothesized, theoretical 
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model can be considered as true (Chin, 1998a). Paths between theoretical constructs are 
standardized path coefficients (beta weights). The structural paths are hence evaluated by 
inspection of their size and significance (cfr. a traditional regression analysis). For a model 
with a reflective measurement specification Fornell & Bookstein (1982) advise researchers 
to use the Stone Geisser Q2 measure of redundancy (measures the power of the 
independent constructs in predicting the dependent ones). In a model with formative 
indicators jackknifed or bootstrapped standard errors can be studied, or Miller’s F-test 
(tests the statistical significance of the predictive power of the structural model, without 
regard to the measurement model) can be applied. In addition, one can study the size of 
correlations between constructs where there are no relationships hypothesized (Falk & 
Miller, 1992). High correlations may then point to the existence of additional paths. 
 
3.6.3.2.5 An evaluation of PLS applications by management scholars 
In Hulland (1999), four strategic management studies (of beginning 90s) that used PLS 
have been evaluated. Hulland’s conclusions appeared to be very similar to the previously 
mentioned evaluations of covariance-based applications (see section 3.6.3.1.2). Though 
Hulland stresses PLS’ potential to methodologically enrich strategic management research, 
so far, some strategic management researchers apparently lack the ability to apply PLS in a 
consistent and appropriate way.  
More specifically, Hulland (1999) found that some researchers did not specify their 
theoretical model well in advance. Furthermore, the operationalization of constructs lacked 
precision: multi-dimensional constructs were treated as though they were unidimensional 
and constructs were measured by single-item measures. In two of the four studies, items 
with low item reliability and constructs showing low internal consistency were retained for 
the final analysis. Furthermore, discriminant validity was not clearly demonstrated in all 
studies. Concerning the measurement specification, many authors failed to justify the 
epistemic relationships between measures and constructs; their choice for modeling in a 
formative or reflective mode was not well documented and argued. Finally, the evaluation 
of the model by the R2 value for all endogenous constructs was incomplete in some 
studies. Hulland (1999) concludes from his review that strategic management researchers 
should meet the “the level of rigor and clarity” (: 203) that PLS requires, in contrast to the 
requisites of more traditional methodological approaches. 
 
3.6.3.3 Covariance- versus variance-based structural equations modeling 
 
Anderson & Gerbing (1988) view the distinction between the covariance- and variance- 
based structural equations approach primarily as one between a full information (ML or 
GLS) estimation approach in conjunction with a common factor model, versus a partial 
least squares estimation approach in conjunction with a principal component model.  
Basically, the difference between a common factor model and a principal component 
model is related to the way variance of manifest variables are treated in the analysis.  
The variance of a manifest variable always equals common variance (variance it shares 
with other indicators of the same construct) and unique variance. This unique variance, in 
turn, consists of measure-specific variance (valid variance of the indicator that is not 
shared with the other indicators) and measurement error. In a common factor model only 
shared variance is extracted. All else, namely the specific variance and measurement error 
variance, is contained in the uniqueness (or error) term of the indicator (Stephenson & 
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Holbert, 2003). In this way, random error variance and measure-specific variance are 
excluded from the definition of the latent constructs. In a common factor model 
correlations between the measurements are accounted for in the latent variable; a common 
factor analysis maximizes the reproduction of the covariances among variables (Falk & 
Miller, 1992). In other words, a latent variable explains all covariation among its indicators 
(MacDonald, 1996). As a latent variable has by definition an unobservable nature, it can 
never be expressed as a composite of a finite number of indicators. This is exactly why, in 
a common factor model, the latent variable is treated as a common factor to its indicators. 
Hence, if a researcher wants to understand the latent structure of a set of manifest 
variables, as is often the case, the common factor model is to be preferred over the 
principal components model (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003). Furthermore, as unique (specific 
and error) measurement variance is explicitly separated out of the model, the attenuation of 
structural estimates due to measurement unreliability can also be avoided (Steenkamp & 
van Trijp, 1991). Stephenson & Holbert (2003), for example, produced proof that path 
coefficients are greater to the degree that error is extracted from the data.  
Yet, because of the assumption of random error and measure specificity the method does 
not provide any case values (scores) for the latent variables; an infinite number of scores 
consistent with the parameter estimates can be found. This is what is understood by  ‘factor 
indeterminacy’ (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). Due to the latter, the method does not permit 
researchers to estimate values for the underlying latent variables, and predict from it values 
for measured variables (in the case of reflective indicators).  
 
The latter deficiency is exactly one of the strengths of PLS. Resting on a principal 
components model, PLS does not differentiate between common and unique variance. A 
PCA extracts a maximal amount of total variance (common and specific) from the 
observed indicators into the components (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Iacobucci, 1994). 
Parameters are estimated in such a way that variance explained in the observed indicators 
(reflective mode) or in the latent constructs (formative mode) is optimized. As latent 
variables (the components) are considered as linear combinations of their observed 
measures, PLS offers the opportunity to calculate component scores.  
This advantage is nonetheless at the expense of the assessment of unidimensional 
measurement and efficient statistical parameter estimates. Since components contain both 
common/shared variance and unique variance (the latter being measure-specific variance 
and measurement error), measurement error is not explicitly separated out. As a 
component is considered a linear composite of its indicators, technically speaking, a 
component does not yield a latent variable, since it contains a mixture of both common and 
unique variance (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003). Consequently, in the context of PLS, Falk & 
Miller (1992) –correctly– speak of a ‘component’ or a ‘composite variable’ instead of 
using the term ‘latent variable’. Also, McDonald (1996) warns to avoid the confusing 
convention of referring both to common factors (common factor model, cfr. covariance-
based SEM) and to composites (principal component analysis, cfr. PLS) as latent variables. 
They assert that composite variables are often interpreted in applications as though they 
were common factors, “even though there is no clear justification for such an 
interpretation, since they cannot explain the covariation of their indicators except 
approximately” (McDonald, 1996:  240). Even though we explicitly acknowledge the        
–conceptual and mathematical– difference between a common factor and a composite 
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variable, we will nonetheless maintain the term ‘latent variable’ in the remaining 
discussion on PLS, in order to be consistent with other authors’ usage.  
In conclusion, PLS permits the calculation of component scores, but these scores may be 
inconsistent because they are aggregates of manifest indicators and may still include 
measurement error (Chin, 1998a).  
 
Furthermore, since PLS makes no distributional assumptions, regression estimates are not 
asymptotically efficient. Still, PLS estimates are said to be ‘consistent at large’20, meaning 
that they become asymptotically correct under a large sample size and a large amount of 
indicators per latent variable21 (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Barclay et al., 1995; Fornell & 
Bookstein, 1982). If the condition of consistency at large is however not met, it often leads 
to the over-estimation of correlations between indicators and their constructs and to the 
under-estimation of correlations among latent variables in PLS (Dijkstra, 1983 in 
Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). On the contrary, in covariance-based methods the only way 
low observed correlations can be compensated for is by assigning low loadings to the 
indicators. When correlations among indicators are low, the estimated covariances between 
latent variables increase; this is the so-called disattenuation effect in covariance-based 
methods. Hence, Chin (1998a) asserts that if the researcher believes that both the structural 
model is correct and that the indicators only covary though their respective construct, 
credence can be given to the covariance-based structural estimates. Yet, under conditions 
of low theoretical knowledge, the more conservative PLS estimates for structural paths 
may be more appropriate. For example, in misspecified models the PLS estimates for 
wrongly hypothesized structural paths will not be as large as the equivalent estimates 
provided for by a covariance-based analysis (Chin, 1995). In similar vein, Fornell & 
Bookstein (1982:  450) note that: “If one had reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
theoretical model and/or the validity of the indicators, the LISREL estimate would be 
exaggerated and more credence could be given to the PLS estimate”.  
 
The statistical inelegance of PLS is however compensated for by greater data, 
measurement and sample flexibility. The segmented procedure in PLS requires 
considerably smaller sample sizes. As already mentioned, the required size is one that 
would support the largest multiple regression involved in the model. Furthermore, since 
solutions are calculated in a ‘partial’ (partitioned) way and since scores for latent variables 
are calculated and constrained to have unit variance, a model can never be under-identified 
(Falk & Miller, 1992). In addition, PLS puts no restrictions on the measurement scale; it 
can be used with nominal, ordinal or interval scales (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).  
Yet, as PLS is not a population-based method (whereas the covariance-based method is) it 
rests on a nonparametric estimation procedure. This implies that PLS does not provide 
significance tests based on statistical distributions. Instead, resampling (bootstrap or 
jackknife) procedures can be used to calculate the empirical distribution of the estimated 
                                                          
20 “A consistent estimator is one that converges in probability to the value of the parameter 
being estimated as the sample size increases” (citation of Kotz & Johnson, 1982 in 
McDonald, 1996:  248). 
21 The inclusion of more indicators would normally enrich the empirical content and would 
consequently ameliorate the researcher’s ability to capture the latent construct. It also 
decreases standard errors (Chin, 1998a). 
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parameters, instead of assuming a probability distribution. Then, the standard deviation for 
parameter estimates and t-approximates for these estimates can be computed (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). In a bootstrap procedure a large number of samples (in PLS this is often 
100, 200 or 500) are created as random subsets from the original sample; the original 
sample actually serves as the population for sampling purposes. Each of these samples is 
obtained by sampling with replacement from the original data set. Then, each parameter in 
the PLS model is re-estimated using each of these N samples, so N estimates for each 
parameter are obtained22. This vector of N parameter estimates is used to compute the final 
parameter estimates as the average of the parameter estimates across all the samples. 
Standard errors (as the standard deviation of the estimated means) are then used to 
calculate the confidence interval. Parameters can hence be evaluated in terms of 
significance without assuming a statistical distribution of the parameters (Hair et al., 1998; 
Chin, 1998a). 
 
In conclusion, the above-mentioned discussion demonstrates that the statistical superiority 
of the covariance-based technique over PLS should not be called into question. Next to the 
advantage of the underlying common factor model, relying on a full-information approach, 
covariance-based parameter estimates are in fact more efficient and the method also 
provides a measure for overall model fit. The problem, however, lies within its stringent 
restrictions that are very hard to meet in social science research. As a consequence, 
covariance-based statistics may lead to false conclusions. Falk & Miller (1992: 2) exactly 
criticize covariance-based SEM for this reason: “These [assumptions of covariance-based 
methods] are unrealistic assumptions of most social science data and, in order to produce 
results, researchers often must make computational and theoretical compromises”. The 
latter compromise means that researchers are often tempted to adapt their research 
questions to fit this method (and its assumptions), instead of doing the reverse. The 
application of covariance-based SEM has made, for example, researchers in marketing 
over-emphasize theory-testing rather than theory-construction, though both are necessary 
for a research field to advance (Hulland et al., 1996).    
 
An overview of the main distinctions between covariance- and variance-based structural 
equation modeling can be found in Figure 3.5 
 
                                                          
22 Jackknifing creates samples without replacement. Every new sample contains the original 
sample with each time a different observation omitted. Each sample contains N-1 
observations and the total number of new samples created is equal to the original sample 
size N. If the sample size is not large enough, the amount of newly created samples can be 
insufficient to calculate confidence intervals. Although both methods are quite similar, 
more confidence is given to the bootstrap procedure (Hair et al., 1998).  
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Figure 3.5: Main distinctions between covariance- and variance-based SEM 
COVARIANCE-BASED
• Theory-oriented 
(test of well-specified theoretical model)
• Accounts for observed co-variances
Æ parameter estimates to minimize the
fitting function between sample corre lations and those 
implied by the model
• Close to the theory
• Theory confirmation
• Assessment of overall fit by means of 
chi-square (Ho = hypothesized model)
VARIANCE-BASED
• Prediction-oriented
• Accounts for observed (mode A) or
unobserved (mode B) variances
Æ parameter estimates to minimize the residual variance o f 
the dependent variable
• Close to the data (guided by theory)
• Theory development 
(possible precursor to covar-based analysis)
• Assessment of predictive power 
(cfr. regression analysis)
• Statistical precision: full information 
approach (mostly ML or GL)
• Common factor model: shared variance
Æ Specific variance & measurement error separated out: 
‘real latent variables’
ÆStructura l coefficients adjusted
ÆRisk o f overestimation o f path estimates
• Random error & measure-specific variance 
Æ factor indeterminacy: loss in predictive 
accuracy
• Less parameter efficiency: fixed point estimation 
(partial LS)Æ ‘consistency at large’
(standard errors via jackknifing or bootstrapping)
• Principal components model: all variance
Æ Irrelevant variance (specific & systematic measurement 
error) separated out:‘components’
ÆRisk o f underestimation of path estimates
• Components are completely defined by their 
indicators 
Æ component scores:  predictive accuracy
• Few assumptions:
No identification problem
No distributional assumption ( jackknifing or boot-
strapping for estimation of standard errors)
Nominal, ord inal or in terva l scales possible
Small sample size possib le
Uncorrelated error terms assumed
• Complex model (many variables, paths, 
indicators possible )
• Reflective or formative measurement 
specification
• Mostly non-recursive relationships
• Stringent assumptions:
Identification
Multivariate  normality
Continuous measurement sca les
Moderately large sample
Correlated error terms possible
• Simple model (risk of non-convergent or 
improper solutions)
• Reflective measurement specification 
(formative possible but complicated)
• Recursive or non-recursive relationships
Figure based on: Anderson & Gerbing (1988), Bagozzi & Yi (1994), Barclay et al. (1995), Chin (1995), Chin 
(1998a), Falk & Miller (1992), Fornell & Bookstein (1982), Hulland (1999), McDonald (1996) 
 
 
3.6.3.4 Justification of our choice for PLS 
 
The above mentioned distinction between covariance- and variance-based SEM clarifies 
Fornell & Bookstein’s (1982) advice against the use of covariance-based methods. They 
discourage researchers from using covariance-based SEM unless “(1) its objectives are 
consistent with the objectives of the study and (2) its assumptions are verifiably true; if 
they are not, PLS is a feasible alternative” (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982: 451). In the same 
vein, Baumgartner & Homburg (1996) assert that covariance-based techniques are best 
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used for well-defined theoretical frameworks of moderate complexity, where constructs are 
measured by a relatively small set of indicators. They consequently discourage researchers 
from its use for exploratory purposes; when relationship patterns among constructs are not 
yet crystal-clear and when measurement structures of constructs are not well established.  
Falk & Miller (1992) list detailed conditions and circumstances that may call for the use of 
PLS. We will justify our use of PLS by applying their list of considerations (see Figure 
3.6) to the specificities of our research. In Figure 3.6, the conditions that apply to our 
research have been indicated by an asterisk. 
 
Figure 3.6: Conditions PLS (after Falk & Miller, 1992) 
Theoretical conditions
1. Hypotheses are derived from macro-level theory in which all salient and/or relevant variables are 
not known*
2. Relationships between theoretical constructs and their manifestations are vague*
3. Relationships between constructs are conjectural*
Measurement conditions
4. Some or all of the manifest variables are categorical or they represent different levels of 
measurement*
5. Manifest variables have some degree of unreliability*
6. Residuals on manifest and latent variables are correlated (heteroscedasticity).
Practical conditions
8. Cross-sectional, survey, secondary data, or quasi-experimental research designs are used*
9. A large number of manifest and latent variables are modeled*
10. Too many or too few cases are available*
Distributional condition
7. Data come from non-normal or unknown distributions*
 
a) Theoretical conditions 
In covariance-based SEM the exclusion of possibly relevant variables can seriously bias 
estimates for structural parameters. In contrast, PLS does not aim for invariant structural 
parameters, but, by minimizing residual variance, it tries to optimally predict a specified 
set of variable relationships. In our research, constructs such as absorptive capacity and SI 
are theoretically not well delineated. Let alone the fact that this entire research area suffers 
from robust and consistent empirical findings. Furthermore, an inherent characteristic of 
organizational behavior research in general is the influence of many endogenous and 
exogenous variables on the specified relationships. Although we try to control for several 
organizational and environmental specificities, the failure to consider all relevant variables 
is still quite probable.  
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Secondly, in covariance-based SEM constructs are operationalized by homogeneously 
valid representations of the construct. Indicators are assumed to share in common only the 
latent construct (nonrandom measurement error should be minimized). In regard to our 
previous discussion: if established scales or indexes do not exist and if measures are hence 
considered to be not entirely valid and reliable, prudence is called for in accepting the 
estimated (disattenuated) structural path coefficients of a covariance-based structural 
equation analysis. Since the constructs in our theoretical model have not yet been 
operationalized in the literature, we were forced to develop our own measurements. Risks 
of unreliability and invalidity are hence probable. For this reason, the use of PLS seems to 
be more appropriate. In PLS, all common variance (principal component based) is 
extracted from the (reflective) measures and in this way constructs maximally predict the 
variance in the observed indicators. Therefore, PLS is said to be ‘close to the data’ (Chin, 
1998a).  
Furthermore, we will demonstrate later (section 4.3.3) that the independent variables in our 
model should be conceptualized as criterion variables to the indicators (formative mode), 
more than as underlying causes giving rise to the measures (reflective mode). In 
management studies, measures are modeled in a formative mode when they describe 
different facets or aspects of a general concept (Williams et al., 2003). Jarvis et al. (2003) 
argue that especially managerial constructs in marketing research (e.g., market 
intelligence) are frequently conceptualized in a formative mode and should hence also be 
modeled accordingly. Rossiter (2002) even posits that for most marketing constructs 
formative indicators would be the most appropriate measurement specification. 
Furthermore, Bagozzi (1994b) asserts that the use of formative indicators is particularly 
meaningful when the unit of analysis is the firm or group because it has much relevance 
for dealing with organizational and social constructs. Modeling the measurement model in 
a formative mode is far less complicated in PLS than it is in covariance-based SEM. The 
complicated requirements of using mode B in covariance-based SEM have many 
researchers, using covariance-based SEM, made model their constructs in a reflective way. 
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer (2001), for example, show several existing marketing 
constructs that have been measured by means of reflective indicators, though, in the 
authors’ view, a formative measurement approach would have been far more appropriate. 
In Cohen et al. (1990) a similar list of wrongly measured constructs is shown. Jarvis et al. 
(2003) found that almost one third of constructs appearing in the top-four marketing 
journals, over the period 1977-2000, were modeled incorrectly. These authors warn for 
“potentially serious consequences of measurement model misspecification”. Measurement 
model misspecification may not only lower construct validity, but may also bias structural 
estimates (Jarvis et al., 2003). 
Finally, as research on deliberate strategic ACAP learning mechanisms and SI is still 
embryonic, theory and previous empirical findings only allow us to specify conjectured 
relationships among the constructs of interest. Relationships among the constructs we 
defined have never been empirically studied. Consequently, our aim is not to offer a 
complete description of the theory and to test an overall model against empirics (i.e. to test 
hypothesized covariances against a sample covariance matrix). Instead, our goal is to study 
the effects (variance explained) of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms on an 
organization’s (BU’s) SIcap. This, however, does not mean the analysis is theoretically 
meaningless. Falk & Miller (1992: 31) assert: “because we have soft theory, arrows 
between circles tend to be conjectural and not necessarily firmly held relationships. They 
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represent relationships and may be thought of as paths of influence. [...] lacking the 
precision necessary to make invariant structural interpretations does not negate the 
importance of theoretically blocking manifest and composite variables and specifying 
relationships between constructs. This type of specification improves our understanding, 
and we see this approach as moving us closer to the precision needed for future causal 
analysis.” Moreover, in this respect the accepted theoretical supremacy of covariance-
based methods could be questioned as well. Radically different theoretical models, 
suggesting entirely different relationships among latent constructs, while being tested on 
the same data set, may still yield equivalent levels of fit (Shook et al., 2004). This leads 
MacCallum et al. (1993) to assert that the existence of equivalent models could call into 
question the conclusions drawn from most covariance-based studies as well. 
 
b) Measurement conditions 
Covariance-based methods (and the maximum likelihood statistic) assume continuous data. 
Nonetheless, continuous methods can be used with little worry when variables are interval 
data with at least four categories (Bagozzi, 1994a; Bentler & Chou, 1987 in Bagozzi & 
Baumgartner, 1994; de Heus et al., 1995). As all measures of the theoretical constructs we 
studied consisted of 5-point Likert scales, measurement requirements would not have 
prevented us from using covariance-based SEM in the basic analyses. However, the 
control variables we used were categorical variables which would have led to measurement 
problems in a covariance-based analysis. 
As regards the second measurement condition, because we used many newly developed 
measures unreliability problems could be expected.  
Finally, Falk & Miller (1992) warn that heteroscedasticity (correlated residuals) could lead 
to identification problems in covariance-based methods. In PLS, identification constraints 
do however not exist. 
 
c) Distributional conditions 
As we have already indicated, most statistics in covariance-based methods assume 
multivariate normality of the data distribution. Checking the assumptions of the 
exploratory factor analyses we performed (see chapter 5), we found that that even the 
assumption of univariate normality was violated for some variables in our sample. PLS, in 
contrast, does not assume any distributional form. Drawback of this quality is however that 
additional resampling procedures, such as bootstrapping or jackknifing techniques, are 
required in PLS to estimate standard errors. 
 
d) Practical conditions 
Falk & Miller (1992) assert that limitations of non-experimental research in drawing 
general causal conclusions are implicitly recognized in PLS. In contrast to covariance-
based results, PLS results are restricted to predictive inferences. We do however not 
entirely share this point of view. Firstly, inferring causality from a non-experimental 
method is always dangerous. The popular synonym ‘causal modeling’ for SEM has 
however led to some confusion concerning the qualities of SEM. When used in a cross-
sectional study SEM does by no means infer causality, being essentially based on 
correlational data. This applies to both covariance- and variance-based SEM. Attributing 
causality is hence more of a design issue than of a statistical issue (Ullman, 2001; 
Scandura & Williams, 2000). Secondly, also in PLS studies researchers’ aim is always to 
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generalize their conclusions beyond the sample studied. Hence, we do not believe PLS is a 
more legitimate method for a survey design than is covariance-based SEM, contrary to 
what Falk & Miller (1992) contend.  
Concerning the second practical condition, complex models involving many variables and 
indicators often cause problems in covariance-based software. Complex models may lead 
to identification problems, improper solutions (e.g., negative variances, correlations larger 
than one) (Barclay et al., 1995; Fornell & Bookstein, 1982) and computational problems. 
PLS, being a partial method (it partitions complex models into segments) that furthermore 
makes use of the highly efficient least squares algorithm, avoids this problem. On the other 
hand, the additional bootstrapping procedures in PLS require much computer capacity. 
Since the model we specified is relatively simple and since the number of indicators we 
used is rather limited, we believe that, as for model complexity, the use of a covariance-
based method would have been possible. Nevertheless, as already indicated, covariance-
based SEM would have much complicated the formative specification mode we used on 
the independent variables. 
Finally, sample size requirements in covariance-based methods are much more stringent 
since covariances are less stable when estimated from small samples (Ullman, 2001). 
Furthermore chi-square statistics used to evaluate overall model fit are quite sensitive to 
sample size. A minimum sample size of 200 (Ullman, 2001) is advised for small to 
medium models. As a general rule of thumb, Tabachnick & Fidell (2001a) propose a 
sample size of 300, or 10 cases per variable; Rigdon (1998) even calls for 5-10 cases per 
estimated parameter. As the estimated effect size and the distributions of the measured 
variables influence the power of the analysis, Ullman (2001) claims that fewer than 10 
cases per estimated parameter may only lead to stable results on the condition that the 
estimated effect size is large and that variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. In 
MacCallum et al. (1996) tables of adequate sample sizes for goodness of fit tests are 
provided. In our study, with outliers and missing values removed, the effective sample 
consisted of 182 respondents and 27 observed variables. The ratio of cases to observed 
variables would hardly be seven. The ratio of cases to estimated parameters would even be 
much lower; a ratio that would not have been satisfactory given our data were not 
multivariate normally distributed. On the contrary, analyzing our model by means of PLS 
does not pose any problem. Following the PLS rules of thumb of sample size needed (cfr. 
supra), the largest multiple regression in our model is related to the formative indicators of 
the construct ‘recog’ (see chapter 5). As this block consisted of eight formative indicators, 
a sample size of only 80 respondents would have sufficed. 
 
In conclusion, especially theoretical and practical conditions made us opt for PLS. 
Choosing PLS as the method of analysis however implies that we compromised ourselves 
with lower statistical elegance. Even though the main purpose of the QUAN phase was to 
test the theoretical model, both the specifics of our sample and the conceptual and 
empirical development of our study object made it appropriate to do this testing still in a 
rather exploratory way. We hence remained ‘close to the data’ and theory was tested in a 
prediction-oriented, rather than in an entirely theory-oriented way (see Figure 3.5). Using 
PLS to test our theoretical model hence implies that, in a sense, we followed a sort of mid-
way between the full theory development purposes of the conceptual and QUAL research 
phases and the full theory testing purpose that is normally associated with quantitative 
testing methods (such as covariance-based SEM). 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASES 
 
 
As indicated in the methodological chapter, the qualitative phase served to refine and 
operationalize a nascent theory on ACAP and SI, making it amenable to statistical testing 
procedures in the QUAN phase. More specifically, the main purposes of the qualitative 
phase within the entire research design were threefold: 1) to select and refine relevant 
constructs for the theoretical model, 2) to develop hypotheses and additional research 
questions, and 3) to design quantitative measurement instruments. Given these purposes, 
the theoretical cone of the qualitative phase centered on QUAL2, where strategic 
innovators, and their capacity to systematically create SIinitiatives, were further studied. 
QUAL1 served the subgoal to select these strategic innovators. 
 
As SI, by definition, entails a deviance from the industry recipe, in QUAL1 industry 
recipes had to be uncovered in order to select SIinitiatives and strategic innovators for 
further study. Since QUAL1 functioned, in this respect, only as an input to QUAL2 (and is 
as such no full, stand-alone phase) we will restrict ourselves here to a summary of the main 
findings. 
 
 
4.1 FINDINGS OF QUAL 1 
 
4.1.1 Industry recipes 
 
In chapter 1, we explained how the mutual enactment of socially-constructed beliefs 
among industry parties presses toward a shared mental model (Porac & Thomas, 1990, 
Hodgkinson, 1997): a ‘macro-culture’ (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994), or ‘industry 
recipe’ (Spender, 1989). This industry recipe comprises the common perceptions that 
gradually arise among industry parties (Huff, 1982). These perceptions, reflecting common 
assumptions about appropriate strategies and competitive boundaries (Porac & Thomas, 
1990) restrict the strategic possibilities considered by an individual firm (lowered 
information recognition and initiation of SI). In this way, industry recipes intensify 
imitative tendencies (Diamaggio & Powell, 1983). In chapter 1 we emphasized that the 
central idea of SI is however one of strategy divergence (Markides, 1997), where firms 
play a new and different strategic game (Baden-Fuller, 1995). Furthermore, firms play this 
different game in order to produce dramatic improvements in customer value 
(Schlegelmilch et al., 2003). SIinitiatives hence entail the creation of new and substantially 
superior customer value by deviating from the industry recipe (see our definition of SI in 
chapter 1).  
 
We employed desk & expert research and methods of semi-structured interviewing (focus 
groups-1 and expert interviews) to uncover managers’ shared assumptions (see chapter 3, 
section 3.4.2). These are both popular methodological approaches to study cognition on an 
industry level (e.g., Spender, 1989; Porac et al., 1989; Huff, 1982). 
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We did not consider conformity or deviation from industry rules as a binary choice (Miller 
& Chen, 1996), but in line with Huff (1982) and Porac et al. (1989) we took intra-industry 
variation (firm-level) in core beliefs as a given. Still, in our empirical and secondary data 
we looked for central core beliefs and assumptions that were widely shared and often 
repeated across all sources investigated. In all industries, we were able to identify some 
common perceptions about the competitive arena, i.e. the industry recipe. SI could then be 
assessed relative to this industry recipe.  
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the industry recipes of the five industries studied23: functional food 
(FF), trucks & trailers (T&T), graphics printing, traffic management systems (TMS) and 
energy (limited on electricity). In line with Spender (1989), the industry recipe is depicted 
along several dimensions (the rows in Table 4.1). We felt that the core strategic beliefs 
structuring parties’ strategic choices (Spender, 1989) involved beliefs about the 
role/mission of each party, beliefs about the traditional, current critical success factors 
(products and services to be offered and appropriate business model) and, given the 
dynamism in each industry, beliefs about the new and future critical success factors and 
parties’ missions (appropriate reactions to industry tendencies). We hence focused on ‘de 
facto’ norms, i.e. observable norms of competitive behavior in an industry (Miller & Chen, 
1996). In addition, the mental models about the competitive arena that form the basis for 
competitive battles (Hodgkinson, 1997) also involve beliefs about power relationships and 
vertical and horizontal competitive relationships. These beliefs also manifest themselves in 
the sort of co-operation efforts industry parties undertake.  
 
In Table 4.1-part 1 and Table 4.1-part 2 the main strategic roles and beliefs are 
summarized. The terms in italics indicate the metaphors parties generally use to depict 
themselves and other parties in their industry. In simple words they make clear the 
role/mission industry parties are believed (and expected) to play now and in the future and, 
in this respect, largely affect companies’ strategic choices. In Table 4.1-part 3 we describe 
the perceived center of power and the power play in all industries studied. Part 3 also 
demonstrates where pressure is mostly felt along the chain and indicates the main victims 
of it. In addition, the vertical and horizontal relationships along the supply chain are 
typified and the nature of co-operation efforts is indicated.  
 
Given the limited theoretical value of QUAL1 in the entire research project, we restrict 
ourselves to a short description of the findings. We summarize the overall findings across 
the five industries. For an extensive discussion of these five industries, see Matthyssens et 
al. (2004) and Berghman et al. (2004a-e). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 We would like to stress that the industry recipes provided in Table 4.1 reflect the recipes 
at the moment of study (i.e. 2003). Given the highly dynamic character of many of the 
industries studied (e.g., energy), it is reasonable to believe that these industry recipes have 
been evolving meanwhile. 
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Table 4.1: Industry recipes-part 1 
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Table 4.1: Industry recipes-part 2 
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, c
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 p
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f t
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 p
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pr
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 d
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 m
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at
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ra
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e p
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t c
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e c
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e p
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 b
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at
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 c
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 c
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 d
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e c
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e c
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re
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 m
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 c
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at
io
n,
 fo
cu
s o
n 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 (c
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e l
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n d
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s b
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 c
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c c
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os
e)
Cl
os
e 
co
-o
pe
ra
tio
n,
 st
ro
ng
 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nc
e a
lo
ng
 ch
ai
n
U
p 
ve
rs
us
 m
id
: c
lo
se
, 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
: p
re
fe
rre
d 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
(d
es
pi
te
 cu
ltu
ra
l d
iff
er
en
ce
s f
oo
d 
ve
rs
us
 p
ha
rm
ai
nd
us
try
)
M
id
 v
er
su
s d
ow
n:
 st
ro
ng
ly
 
ho
sti
le
V
er
tic
al
U
p:
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l b
ut
 fi
er
ce
 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
w
ith
 fo
re
ig
n 
pr
od
uc
er
s
M
id
: f
rie
nd
ly
D
ow
n:
 fi
er
ce
, l
ar
ge
 d
ist
ru
st 
(g
ro
w
in
g 
th
re
at
 fr
om
 fo
re
ig
n 
en
er
gy
 su
pp
lie
rs
)
U
p:
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l t
o 
fie
rc
e 
(c
on
so
lid
at
ed
)
M
id
: h
ar
sh
 (o
lig
op
ol
ist
ic
)
D
ow
n:
 n
/a
 (p
ol
ic
y 
m
ak
er
s a
t 
di
ffe
re
nt
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l l
ev
el
s 
no
t w
el
l g
ea
re
d 
to
 o
ne
 
an
ot
he
r)
U
p:
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l (
sta
bl
e, 
ol
ig
op
ol
ist
ic
, i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l)
M
id
: f
ie
rc
e 
D
ow
n:
 h
ar
sh
 p
ric
e-
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
(lo
w
er
ed
 e
nt
ry
 
ba
rri
er
s, 
co
m
m
od
iti
za
tio
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n,
 
co
rp
or
at
e i
n-
ho
us
e 
pr
in
tin
g)
U
p:
 fi
er
ce
 (c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
is 
kn
ow
n 
an
d 
str
uc
tu
re
d,
 
th
ou
gh
 fr
ag
m
en
te
d 
fig
ht
er
s’
bu
sin
es
s)
M
id
: f
ie
rc
e 
(c
on
so
lid
at
ed
)
D
ow
n:
 fi
er
ce
 (n
ew
 en
tra
nt
s 
du
e 
to
 b
lo
ck
 e
xe
m
pt
io
n,
 
pr
ic
e p
re
ss
ur
e 
cu
sto
m
er
s)
U
p:
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l, 
fri
en
dl
y 
(c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 o
r f
ra
gm
en
te
d 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 se
gm
en
t)
M
id
: p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l (
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 
or
 fr
ag
m
en
te
d 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 
se
gm
en
t)
D
ow
n:
 fi
er
ce
 (c
on
so
lid
at
ed
)
H
or
iz
on
ta
l
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
am
on
g 
in
du
st
ry
 
pa
rt
ie
s
Pr
es
su
re
 in
 e
nt
ire
 c
ha
in
Pr
ov
ok
ed
 b
y 
1)
 fe
ar
 o
f l
ar
ge
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
(a
cq
ui
sit
io
n?
), 
2)
 ac
co
m
m
od
at
io
n 
to
 
lib
er
al
iz
at
io
n 
(e
x-
m
on
op
ol
ist
ic
), 
3)
 u
nc
le
ar
 a
nd
 p
er
m
an
en
tly
 ch
an
gi
ng
 
na
tio
na
l a
nd
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
4)
 co
m
m
od
ity
 p
ro
du
ct
M
os
tly
 fe
lt 
by
 e
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
lie
rs
 (n
ew
 
do
w
ns
tre
am
 en
tra
nt
s)
Pr
es
su
re
 o
n 
en
tir
e c
ha
in
, b
ut
 
la
rg
es
t v
ic
tim
s i
n 
up
str
ea
m
Pr
ov
ok
ed
 b
y 
na
rro
w
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 te
nd
er
s a
nd
 
pr
od
uc
t c
om
m
od
iti
za
tio
n 
(h
ar
dw
ar
e)
V
ic
tim
iz
at
io
n 
in
 e
nt
ire
 
ch
ai
n 
(in
cl
. p
ow
er
 ce
nt
er
) ,
 
bu
t l
ar
ge
st 
vi
ct
im
s i
n 
 m
id
-
an
d 
do
w
ns
tre
am
 (s
ha
ke
-
ou
t) 
Pr
ov
ok
ed
 b
y 
co
m
m
od
iti
za
tio
n 
of
 e
nd
 
pr
od
uc
t (
en
d 
cu
sto
m
er
, 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l r
ev
ol
ut
io
n)
V
ic
tim
iz
at
io
n 
in
 e
nt
ire
 
ch
ai
n,
 b
ut
 m
os
tly
 2
nd
an
d 
3d
 
tie
r-u
ps
tre
am
 su
pp
lie
rs
 
(jo
bb
er
s)
 a
nd
 sm
al
l, 
do
w
ns
tre
am
 g
ar
ag
e 
ow
ne
rs
Pr
ov
ok
ed
 b
y 
 p
ric
e 
pr
es
su
re
 
fro
m
 le
as
in
g/
tra
ns
po
rt 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 (=
en
d-
cu
sto
m
er
s)
 
&
 co
m
m
od
iti
za
tio
n 
(e
sp
ec
ia
lly
  t
ra
ile
rs
)
Pr
es
su
re
 fe
lt 
in
 e
nt
ire
 ch
ai
n,
 b
ut
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 v
ic
tim
iz
in
g 
up
str
ea
m
 
pa
rti
es
Pr
ov
ok
ed
 b
y 
co
m
m
od
iti
za
tio
n 
 
of
 n
on
-e
xc
lu
siv
e 
in
gr
ed
ie
nt
s a
nd
 
en
d-
pr
od
uc
ts
V
ic
tim
s
N
o  
re
a l
 p
o w
e r
 p
la
y  
in
 c
h a
in
 (a
ll 
pa
rti
es
 b
el
on
g 
to
 sa
m
e 
co
nc
er
n)
(b
ad
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t v
er
su
s 
en
er
gy
 c
om
pa
ni
es
)
Ru
in
e d
 a t
m
o s
p h
e r
e : 
fie
rc
e  
po
w
er
 p
la
ys
 a
nd
 fi
gh
ts 
1)
up
str
ea
m
 v
er
su
s m
id
str
ea
m
, 
an
d 
2)
cu
sto
m
er
 (R
W
S)
 v
er
su
s 
al
l o
th
er
 in
du
str
ia
l p
ar
tie
s
N
o  
re
a l
 p
o w
e r
 p
la
y  
in
 
ch
ai
n 
(p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
at
m
os
ph
er
e)
N
o  
re
a l
 fi
g h
ts,
 b
u t
 st
ill
 
po
w
er
 p
la
y 
by
 O
EM
H
a r
sh
 fi
g h
t m
id
str
e a
m
 v
e r
su
s 
do
w
ns
tre
am
, p
ro
vo
ke
d 
by
 
re
ta
ile
rs
Po
w
e r
 p
la
y
U
p -
m
id
str
e a
m
(e
n e
rg
y  
p r
o d
u c
e r
s  a
n d
 d
is t
rib
u t
o r
s )
M
id
-d
o w
n s
tre
a m
(la
rg
e  
c o
n s
tru
c t
io
n /
in
s ta
lla
tio
n  
c o
m
p a
n i
e s
, R
ijk
sW
a t
e r
S t
a a
t)
U
p -
m
id
str
e a
m
 
(O
EM
s, 
in
k  
p r
o d
u c
e r
s, 
so
m
e  
p o
w
e r
fu
l l
a r
g e
 m
u l
ti-
b r
a n
d  
d e
a l
e r
s)
M
id
str
e a
m
 
(O
EM
 a
n d
 b
y s
ta
n d
e r
s: 
sy
ste
m
 su
p p
lie
rs
 +
im
p o
rte
rs
)
M
id
-d
o w
n s
tre
a m
(fo
o d
 c o
m
p a
n i
e s
 a
n d
 re
ta
ile
rs
)
Po
w
e r
 
c e
n t
e r
Pe
r c
e i
v e
d  
p o
w
e r
 c
e n
te
r  
a n
d  
p o
w
e r
 
p l
a y
En
er
gy
TM
S
G
ra
ph
ic
s P
ri
nt
in
g
Tr
uc
ks
 &
 T
ra
i le
rs
Fu
nc
tio
na
l  F
oo
d
Chapter 4 
 160 
Overall, upstream parties are believed to emphasize technological development 
(‘technologists, engineers’). Especially in the printing, TMS and energy industry, upstream 
parties traditionally try to ‘push’ technological innovations. Hedging against industry 
tendencies, upstream parties seek even more refuge in technological innovation.  In 
addition, commoditization tendencies make them simultaneously foster their internal 
efficiency (T&T), scale (FF, TMS, Energy), or market-driven innovation (T&T, printing, 
TMS). The harmful consequences of power plays and commoditization tendencies are felt 
most fiercely upstream (FF, T&T, TMS).  Upstream competition is yet still ‘professional’ 
(with the exception of the T&T industry). Despite their often weak position, upstream 
parties have fairly good relationships with other links in the chain. Yet, they complain 
about being squeezed out by more downstream positioned supply chain links. “Our 
technical expertise is not valued enough” and “we are held hostage by the OEMs” are 
statements that were frequently mentioned by diverse upstream parties. Upstream 
companies try (and often are compelled) to co-operate with midstream companies, 
although this co-operation chiefly remains ad hoc and limited to the R&D area.  
Midstream companies, often OEMs, are usually the pivot of the industry.  They take up a 
bridging function between the upstream technologists and the downstream sellers, being 
the ‘product creators’ (FF, T&T, TMS). Fast incremental product innovation, scale and 
internal efficiency are key competitive factors. In this sense, they form the breaking point 
of the chain; both downstream and upstream parties ‘look along the chain up to them’ and 
expect a pioneering and leading role from them (FF, T&T). Their scale and knowledge of 
both technology and market makes them powerful players and chain directors (FF, T&T). 
Nonetheless, this does by no means imply that these parties are entirely spared the profit 
squeeze that is felt along the entire supply chain. Midstream competition is oligopolistic 
and harsh. In the regulated monopolistic energy and in the technology-driven printing 
industry, power rests (rested) primarily with upstream parties.  However, industry 
tendencies in both these industries are gradually shifting power centers more midstream as 
well. In many industries, midstream parties are starting to realize that a closer focus on 
‘down’ might be fruitful: they are all interfering in downstream activities in an attempt to 
come closer to the end market, clashing with traditional downstream parties (FF, T&T, 
TMS). They have come to emphasize marketing competencies over manufacturing, which 
is outsourced to upstream companies. Likewise, midstream parties try to ‘reform’ the 
entire supply chain into a more demand-driven one, closely directing, and co-operating 
with, their upstream suppliers (FF, T&T).  
Downstream parties form the link with the end customer. In the T&T and TMS industry 
end customers are corporate, whereas in FF downstream parties are real B2C players. The 
energy and printing industry serve both consumer and business markets. For downstream 
companies, distribution and customer knowledge are competitive weapons. Their 
knowledge in these areas makes them especially ‘interesting’ to midstream (FF, T&T) and 
upstream (TMS, printing, energy) parties, who are trying to come closer to end customers.  
In all industries, downstream parties experience how product commoditization sharpens 
price competition, which is –partly or largely– passed on upwards in the supply chain, 
putting the entire chain under pressure. Downstream parties themselves seek salvation in 
consolidation or in service differentiation. Only few downstream companies are fierce 
price fighters (energy, FF); most seek to profile themselves as full-service or one-stop-
shopping providers (FF, T&T, TMS, printing, energy). Downstream companies do seldom 
if ever initiate structural co-operations with other –more upstream– supply chain parties. 
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The power they exert on other industry parties is dependent on their traditional scale and 
professionalism; in the TMS and FF industry they are powerful parties, whereas they are 
the weakest link in the printing and energy industry. In the T&T industry, large 
(midstream) OEMs are gradually hauling the downstream industry segment (often by 
means of concession and franchising formulas). 
 
4.1.2 Selection of strategic innovation initiatives and strategic innovators 
 
The selection of strategic innovators was based on two methods. Either way we tried to 
map SIinitiatives to strategic innovators, or strategic innovators to SIinitiatives. 
On the one hand, we inventoried the various SIinitiatives mentioned in the course of 
QUAL1. Departing from the ‘true’ initiatives selected, we looked for their initiators and 
checked whether these business units (firms) had recently launched several other 
SIinitiatives than the one inventoried. On the other, we inventoried the names of business 
units (firms) that had been mentioned during the different QUAL1 phases as business units 
(firms) known in the industry for launching several SIinitiatives. For these strategic 
innovators, we looked for additional information on the SIinitiatives they recently 
launched and checked whether they satisfied the criteria of true SI (see chapter 1).  
 
We found that the detection of SIinitiatives was far from straightforward. Firstly, they 
consist of strategic ‘embryo’s’ that are difficult to detect, even by industry insiders. 
Second, since SI implies the deviance from traditional industry conventions and 
assumptions, the identification of ‘real’ SIinitiatives (and hence real strategic innovators) 
required a systematic contrasting with the industry recipe, and could hence not be entirely 
left to the respondents, being often industry insiders. The inclusion of industry experts 
(such as consultants) in QUAL1 proved especially useful in this respect. Nevertheless, 
QUAL1 yielded an unequal harvest of true SIinitiatives and strategic innovators across the 
different industry contexts studied.  
 
The following initiatives are exemplar:  
• Functional food: In co-operation with an IT company, an ingredient producer 
created a database to let small and midsized food manufacturers experiment fast 
and easily with more than 2000 diverse tastes and smells for new food products 
they want to develop. The customer can retrieve information about price, 
regulation, safety, etc. for specific ingredient combinations.  
• Functional food: A pharmaceuticals company, a biotech company and a food 
packaging specialist formed a triple alliance. Bundling  their expertise in diverse 
areas enables them to sell a total solution to food manufacturers (optimizing 
vitamins, legal assistance, prolonged shelf life, better taste & processing) 
• Graphics printing: Three independent printers formed a joint venture to bundle 
their specialized experiences. The integrated back-office increases their efficiency 
and scale, enabling them to economize on investments and to participate in public 
tenders for large assignments. On the other hand, their diverse specializations 
offer the customer a combination of scale, efficiency, flexibility and high 
expertise in very diverse printing techniques.  
• TMS: A system producers entered into a patnership with a city to sell video 
images of traffic behaviors on intersections and roundabouts (recorded by a traffic 
Chapter 4 
 162 
system) to a producer of motorcycles. In this way, the motorcycle producer gets 
deep insights into motorcyclists’ driving behavior. He pays part of the system 
investment to the system producer and pays the city for the images.  
• Truck & Trailer: Cave-in dangers of yard cellars in a large Dutch city 
complicated the supply to cafés located in the city center. A trailer producer and 
several transport companies put their heads together and jointly invented the 
‘booze boat’. They developed a ‘rolling container’ system to enable bi-modal 
transport/supply. These rolling containers are easily transferred from a truck to a 
ship. Café owners are since then supplied over the water.    
• Truck & Trailer: Confronted with a decreasing market for damage repair, a 
coating producer jointly invented a franchise concept with its customer-body 
shops. The coating producer acts as the franchisor, whereas body shops take up 
the role of franchisees. The new damage repair service targets private persons 
with small car damages that are generally not covered by car insurances. Private 
persons use fixed price menus to have their car repaired cheaply and fast.  
• Energy: An energy supplier developed a franchise concept, involving local and 
regional service/maintenance companies. The private customer is offered a total 
solution, including purchase/lease/rent of central-heat boilers, installation and 
maintenance of appliances (e.g. air-conditioning), subscription to a 24h-
emergency damage repair service (incl. completion of home insurance), and a 
broad range of other subscriptions (e.g. unblocking drain pipes). The energy 
supplier-franchisor takes care of the entire back-office, provides training, takes 
care of branding, and controls the franchisees’ service performance. 
 
 
As already mentioned, for each strategic innovator we explicitly checked whether their 
SIinitiatives met the defining criteria of SI (see chapter 1). The following index cards 
exemplify (in a summarized form) how the characteristics of the SIinitiative were 
contrasted with the industry recipe, and indicate how the SIinitiative creates new and 
substantially superior customer value. Per industry, we provide one illustrative example 
(index card) of a strategic innovator and one of its recent SIinitiatives.  
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Take over market and legal risk from food manufacturer (complete patented end product concept sold, market demand already created).
New and substantially superior customer value
Develop and produce finished sports drink (invention & production of active 
ingredient, production of drink, design of packaging, publicity product)
Sell license for complete product concept to (sports) food company
Margin on total concept (incl. co-branding)
Focus on technological and product innovation, control technological, legal 
and market risks
Æconsumer market(ing) knowledge, knowledge of end-product
Horizontal & vertical view: sell to traditional customer, but partnerships 
with outside parties (e.g. Sports Federation)
Exclusive finished product concept with market demand: increased power 
v.-à.-v. food companies (e.g., co-branding)
Good margin 
(leverage own technological and market knowledge, which were already 
required for demand-based innovation)
Invent, develop and produce radically innovative ingredients 
Sell ingredient or ingredient license (often exclusivity contracts) to food 
manufacturers
Margin on product (or license)
Focus on technological innovation, research alliances, patent management: 
control technological investment & legal risks, demand-driven development 
(co-operation with food manufacturers), large customers
Ætechnological application expertise (limited market knowledge)
Vertical chain view: sell ingredient to large, powerful food manufacturer 
(price pressure)
Ad hoc co-operation with upstream parties (research centers, biotech 
companies, other ingredient producers) and with customer (demand-driven 
ingredient development) 
Margin pressure (commoditization ingredients & end products)
SIinitiativeTraditional industry assumptions and conventions
Confrontation of the SIinitiative with the industry recipe:
Company: Large, international chemical company
Business unit: Food specialties (The Netherlands)
FUNCTIONAL FOODS INDUSTRY
 
 
Take over (non-core) time-consuming, awkward and complicated accident management process from end customer.
Fast efficient accident management improves customers’ up-time significantly.
New and substantially superior customer value:
Direction of entire accident management process: direct different  repair 
and claim management parties & processes
Sell this service to fleet/leasing/rental companies
Margin on total service package
Focus on service efficiency, project management, relationship management
Æknowledge about entire accident management process + about end 
customer
Horizontal view: main contractor but for realization partnerships with 
outside (insurance companies) and inside (body shops) parties
Steer entire process, direct end customer contact
Good margin: no commodity
(leverage own knowledge in repair management)
Automotive paint development & production (& gradually own distribution)
Sell paint to body shops
Margin on paint (customer loyalty by free training programs & technical 
support)
Focus on product quality (technical/application product innovation)
Ætechnical application knowledge
Vertical chain view: Ad hoc R&D co-operations with upstream parties
Power over artisanal (dying) body shops but squeezed out by large body 
shop chains 
Margin pressure exerted by demanding end customer and large body shop 
chains, shrinking market share (diminishing damage)
SIinitiativeTraditional industry assumptions & conventions
Confrontation of the SIinitiative with the industry recipe:
Company: Large, international chemical company
Business unit: Car coatings (Europe)
TRUCK & TRAILER INDUSTRY
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Increase efficiency (cost savings) and effectiveness (BPR) of customers’ document flow (non-core activity for customer)
New and substantially superior customer value:
Offer integral document management: optimize costs & flow of total 
process of document management 
Sell integral service to corporate customer
Margin by means of performance contracting (in function of customer’s 
cost savings)
(integrate sales & maintenance departments)
Focus on complete project management, consultative selling
Æ end customer knowledge, organizational knowledge (BPR), IT knowledge 
(networks), hardware knowledge
Horizontal view: strategic alliances with outside parties (IT & consulting 
companies)
Increased power v-à-v end customer (total solution, no commoditization) 
Good margin
(leverage own knowledge of technology/applications and customers, which 
was already required for maintenance)
Hardware production & maintenance 
Sell hardware + maintenance contract to corporate customer
Margin on supplies & maintenance 
(Organizational separation of hardware sales and maintenance)
Focus on technological (application-based) product innovation, efficient 
maintenance/repair service
Æ technological application knowledge, efficient back-office
Strong vertical chain view
Ad hoc R&D co-operations with upstream parties
Relative strong power v-à-v other supply chain parties, but demanding end 
customer: price pressure
Strong margin pressure (commoditization + IT competitors)
SIinitiativeTraditional industry assumptions & conventions
Confrontation of the SIinitiative with the industry recipe:
Company: Large, international hardware producer
Business unit: Services (Benelux)
GRAPHICS PRINTING INDUSTRY
 
 
Customer gets real-time insight in the city’s traffic flows. Based on this information, customers may inform their citizens, implement dynamic traffic management 
(diversions) and implement more effective traffic policy measures.
New and substantially superior customer value:
Provide traffic information (collect real-time traffic information from existing, 
installed traffic systems, bundle information, analyze information, report 
information)
Sell (real-time) traffic information reports to municipal traffic management 
departments
Margin by means of yearly fee in function of information used by municipality
(plan to commercialize information to private parties too: travel information)
Focus on technical integration of diverse systems (complicated software), 
relationship management (with municipalities, parties outside industry, 
competitors), advise/consulting in pre-development phase
Ætechnical knowledge (software interfaces), customer knowledge (needs), 
marketing & commercial knowledge
Co-operation with outside parties (ANWB, BP,…) and inside parties (other system 
suppliers, IT software development companies) 
Sole provider of this service: increased power v-à-v customer, skirt price 
competition of tendering procedures
Service extendable to private customers (no tendering)
Good margin: no commodity
(leverage own installed hardware base, software knowledge to provide content 
services without much capital investment)
Develop, produce and/or assemble traffic systems: primarily hardware (gradually 
more software embedded)
Sell systems to national (RWS) and municipal traffic management departments
Margin on system (gradually by means of performance contracting, incl. 
maintenance, in function of system’s up-time)
Focus on technological innovation, product differentiation, low price (internal 
efficiency & vertical integration)
Æ technical knowledge
In the grasp of traffic management departments
(especially on a national level)
Squeezed out by large installation/construction companies
Hybrid and opportunistic project-driven co-operation with all supply chain parties
Fierce margin pressure (commodization hardware, tendering procedures)
SIinitiativeTraditional industry assumptions & conventions
Confrontation of the SIinitiative with the industry recipe:
Company: Dutch hardware producer 
Business unit: Traffic systems
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT  SYSTEMS INDUSTRY
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Take over (non-core) time-consuming and technically complicated total energy management (purchasing, invoicing, saving measures, etc.) from end 
customer-facility managers.
Effective energy management leads to fundamental cost savings for customer.
New and substantially superior customer value:
Offer total energy management service: scan & monitor energy 
consumption on-line via IT-expert system, advise & implement measures for 
energy savings, hardware leasing & installation, purchasing (brokering), 
maintenance, invoicing
Offer service to corporate customers (2/3 not former customer of energy 
or installation company)
Margin by means of performance contracting (in function of customer’s 
energy savings realized)
Focus on efficient project management, market segmentation, consultative 
selling
Æknowledge about facility management, energy systems (installation), IT-
systems, customer knowledge
Horizontal view: joint venture with outside party (installation company)
Personal contact with corporate end customer
Good margin: no commodity
(leverage/ bundle own knowledge in energy, facility management &
installation)
Supply energy (and guarantee supply) to consumer
Sell to consumer (general public, retail)
Margin on energy supplied (consumed)
Focus on attaining large market share, efficiency (back-office), product 
differentiation
Æ knowledge (forecasting) about energy consumption, energy market
Vertical, closed chain view
Focus on retail commodity market (no corporate customers)
Strong margin pressure (commodity + liberalization + growing international 
competition)
SIinitiativeTraditional industry assumptions & conventions
Confrontation of the SIinitiative with the industry recipe:
Company: Large Dutch energy supplier (ex-regional monopolist)
Business unit: Retail (i.e. consumer supply)
ENERGY INDUSTRY
 
The ‘real’ strategic innovators, selected during QUAL1 were further studied during the 
QUAL2 phase. 
 
 
4.2 FINDINGS OF QUAL 2: FINDINGS PER INDUSTRY 
 
As indicated in the methodological chapter 3, QUAL2 consisted of a focus group session 
and additional interviews with strategic innovators (and their customers) for each industry 
(see chapter 3, section 3.5 for more details). The interview data were triangulated on two 
levels. First, we applied within-method triangulation. More specifically, the in-depth 
interviews with strategic innovators were triangulated by means of additional 
organizational documents about the organizational structure and processes. Since the issue 
of new and superior customer value creation is a pivotal element in SIinitiatives, we 
additionally studied customer documents and, wherever possible, interviewed customers 
(and other parties) involved in the SIinitiatives. In addition, we applied between-method 
triangulation and combined the interview findings with findings from the focus groups-2 
per industry. Finally, we made a cross section of the findings of all five industries in order 
to select and refine relevant constructs, to formulate hypotheses and additional research 
questions, and to develop appropriate measures. 
In this section we show the findings of the focus groups-2 and the interviews per industry. 
In the following section, we make a cross-section of these findings across all five 
industries in order to develop the theoretical model (incl. appropriate measures) to be 
tested in the QUAN phase. 
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Tables A-E in Appendix III present a summary of the major findings per industry. The 
findings related to the basic independent variables were categorized based on the 
conceptual findings of chapter 2. Findings about deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
for recognition, assimilation and transformation appear in the first part of each table. 
Findings related to potential effects of organizational and supply chain characteristics are 
shown in the second part of each table. They were structured along the main categories of 
critical organizational and supply chain characteristics derived from the literature review in 
chapter 2. More specifically, findings were attributed to the conceptual categories: 
organizational culture, organizational structure, cross-functional information 
dissemination, supply chain information potential, and supply chain innovation potential.  
 
 
4.3 GENERAL RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
After having studied the findings per industry, we made a cross-section of all QUAL2-data 
across all five industries. This cross-section served to identify and refine relevant 
constructs, to formulate hypotheses & additional research questions and to develop the 
measurement instruments to be used in the subsequent QUAN-phase. In the next sections, 
we will frequently use quotations to better illustrate our interpretations (Morse, 1994). Due 
to space limitations, citations are exemplar and do obviously not cover the full data set. All 
citations were translated from Dutch. 
 
4.3.1 Identification and refinement of relevant constructs 
 
4.3.1.1 The basic constructs: independent and dependent variables 
 
Regarding the dependent variable, both the defining elements of SI were central during 
discussions. All customers spontaneously stressed the deviant character of SIinitiatives vis-
à-vis the industry recipe.  For example, a TMS customer (city) states: “in fact, the system 
in itself is not that innovative, but the fact that a market party offers this kind of system 
is…well…to be called quite revolutionary in this industry”. The aspect of creating new and 
substantially superior customer value shimmered through in all discussions as well. The 
following citation of a strategic innovator in the truck & trailer industry is exemplary: “we 
don’t just produce coatings…our core business is damage repair; our mission statement is 
to help our customers grow”.  
Across all five industries, managers mentioned the importance of recurrent 
experimentation, as captured by the concept of SIcapacity. A printer notes: “you learn by 
doing it [SI]. You develop knowledge about setting up new concepts and gradually you 
become better at it”. This view is echoed by another printer: “go to the market and see 
what happens, sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t; new initiatives are established by 
experiment and experience”. In turn, a TMS systems supplier remarks: “we learnt the most 
out of failed SIs”. In the truck & trailer industry, a supplier kept going on about 
experimenting: “try, try, try, and keep on trying in the market. The only way to succeed is 
to continuously take up new ideas. By the way, life cycles of SIinitiatives are not any 
longer than those of product innovations; other parties are always on the lurk, so what you 
need is a continuous flow of new initiatives”. 
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A comparison of all separate industry analyses (Appendix III: Tables A-E) validated the 
relevance of strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and 
transformation. In fact, similarities largely outplayed the different industry characteristics. 
Independent of the industry, interviewees stressed the importance of recognition, 
assimilation and transformation. For example, an installation company (strategic 
innovator) was indignant about many energy companies’ lack of SIcap: “they [energy 
companies] just dive into the market. They invest a lot of money in the market, because 
money they have plenty of. But they simply don’t understand how the market works. They 
don’t know anything about the market! They acquire companies for too much money.  They 
submit offers to the market for a price that is far too low and they consequently spoil 
things for other industry players. That’s a pity. And it costs them a lot, a huge lot of money. 
Instead, they’d better first look, study and think before offering it to customers!”. In a 
similar vein, a printer says: “you should develop deep customer insight, and know what the 
market is like, now and in the future. It takes an awful lot of energy to deeply think about 
this, to think beyond your traditional business. But it is crucial, very crucial…only then 
you can tailor your offer to this and adapt your organization in turn”. 
 
Furthermore, the deliberate establishment of mechanisms fostering the organization’s 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity was being emphasized as well. 
Strategic innovators mention the value of a structured approach to crank up the 
organization’s recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity. For example, one 
strategic innovator (printer) remarks: “the radical strategic newness that is so typical of SI, 
stimulates us to structure things internally better. Maybe this sounds rather paradoxical, 
but it is the success formula”. 
For recognition, popular mechanisms are CRM-tools and the invitation of innovative 
customers. Often, recognition aspects are incorporated within performance appraisal 
criteria of sales (account management) and maintenance people.  Non-sales people (e.g. 
marketers, strategic planners) take a lot of time to join account managers on customer 
visits and to talk with users.   
Strategic innovators also stress the need to structure and deliberately stimulate the 
assimilation process. A supplier in the truck & trailer industry remarks that “this 
[assimilation] can’t be done once in a while, in-between daily business. Then, there is 
never time to do this. This should be stimulated structurally”.  Another strategic innovator 
in the truck & trailer industry notes: “Time to reflect, especially on market and customer 
information, is crucial. You should involve sales people in this process, but sales people 
are no thinkers, they are doers. It is an awkward and time-consuming process to find the 
right formula for this. Especially SMEs do often not find the energy to put a systematic 
effort in this activity”. A strategic innovator in the food industry emphasizes that a 
structured stimulation of assimilation is also important since it prevents the BU to be too 
enthusiastic about particular ideas; i.e. to offer concepts to customers without preparatory 
reflections about the market. In all the strategic innovating firms studied, strategic learning 
mechanisms often take place as periodical cross-functional meetings where, amongst other 
functional areas, especially sales, BU management and marketing are represented.  
Finally, most strategic innovators prefer a structured approach to transformation 
stimulation. A truck & trailer supplier remarks that the process of SI should be routinized 
as soon as possible. He argues that routinization fastens internal anchoring, which in turn 
speeds up the roll-out of a SIinitiative, and hence its time-to-market. As such, many 
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strategic innovators are in favor of a ‘transformation blueprint’ that describes new 
processes beforehand. Changes are specified and explained up to the lowest level. A 
graphics printing systems supplier argues: “‘creating the future’ and ‘proactive behavior’, 
that is plain management language. You should know what this means in reality, you 
should create action plans for your entire organization. […] Good channeling of market 
signals and discussions about this may create awareness, but executing it is a different 
story. You should translate a change management program in a simple language so that 
every employee in the organization understands the strategy. You’ll understand, it should 
become one complete, coherent picture”. Still another strategic innovator tries to 
deliberately foster transformation by the appointment of a ‘transformation manager’.  
 
The data analysis did not only reveal the benefits of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms, it furthermore confirmed the (in chapter 2 assumed) semi-structured character 
of these mechanisms (cfr., Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Overall, the data laid bear the 
general, steering nature of the mechanisms used. In this way, the mechanisms stimulate 
specific goals, but do not specify in detail how these goals should be reached. Practices for 
recognition, assimilation and transformation are hence not blindly followed but stay open 
to constant change.  
For example, to stimulate recognition, a BUmanager took the time to explain to all of the 
BU’s 600 service engineers, face-to-face in small groups of 6 engineers, the importance of 
noticing customer signals, of careful listening to the customer and user, and of 1:1 relation 
management. He gave examples to them how this could be done, but in practice, service 
engineers are free to decide how they handle this. They are additionally trained in 
commercial and communication skills and in entrepreneurship. In turn, an energy service 
provider said they are convinced one should be as close as possible to the market, 
especially to innovative customers and non-customers, to know what their problems are, 
what their worries are. So, the company tried anything to invite and visit them but they 
were hard to reach. In the course of time, the company learnt how to tout for them and is 
now organizing conferences about specific industry topics, with well-known international 
speakers as customer baits. He argues that as the market changes, one should always look 
for new ways to approach it. As regards strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, a 
technical manager of a food ingredient supplier explained how she meets cross-
functionally every six weeks with marketing, sales and management executives to discuss 
the business unit’s market and marketing approach. Even though the meeting appointments 
are fixed, she stresses how they jointly try to regularly change the formula (e.g. by inviting 
external people) to stir things up, to breathe new life into the meetings, in order to prevent 
the process from getting rusted. Finally, the semi-structured nature of strategic learning 
mechanisms is also manifested in the area of transformation. Although a strategic 
innovator in the printing industry speaks of the creation of a ‘written organization’, he adds 
that enough freedom is left to deviate from general rules. A truck & trailer supplier shares 
this viewpoint. “we create a sort of scenario script, a blueprint you could say, which 
details how procedures might be changed as part of the initiative. It’s always best to 
describe processes in detail beforehand. This prevents chaos, you know. Still, these are of 
course general guidelines and local deviation is possible, dependent on specific 
organizational and market requirements. In fact, it is about establishing best procedure 
‘patterns’. We learn from one SI to the other and adapt the blueprint to the lessons learnt”. 
Exactly the same remark was spontaneously brought up by a TMS systems supplier, a food 
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ingredients producer and an energy services company. A truck & trailer supplier indicates 
the use of detached, temporary cross-functional teams to launch initiatives (before they are 
incorporated within the organization). How these teams function and who they consist of, 
is however dependent on the specifics of the initiative.  
 
In conclusion, the cross-industry analysis demonstrated the value of semi-structured 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation to foster 
SIcap.  
However, this is only part of the story. Our discussion in chapter 2 additionally highlighted 
the stimulation of path-breaking focus areas in a company’s recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity. The QUAL2-data enabled us to reveal the focus areas that were 
given high attention by strategic innovators. As regards the contents of the basic 
independent variables, insights from the literature (see chapter 2) were refined.  
Across all five industries, a pattern arose where similar path-breaking contents areas were 
deliberately stimulated (see Appendix III, Tables A-E). The data hence suggested that 
these content areas did not depend on specific industry characteristics. Even though one 
individual strategic innovator may stress one particular area to a greater or lesser degree 
than another strategic innovator, overall similar areas are being stimulated. 
 
As regards recognition, strategic learning mechanisms primarily stimulate insight into: 
• future customer needs 
• industry tendencies 
• deep customer insight  
• general environmental information (macro-tendencies, regulation, etc…) 
• innovative customers 
• other industries 
• end customer 
• non-customers 
 
The focus on future customer needs and industry tendencies matches SI authors’ stress on 
the development of industry foresight (e.g., D’Aveni, 1994; Markides, 1999a).  
In contrast to Christensen’s assertions (e.g. Christensen et al., 2002), strategic innovators 
do stress the need to deeply study existing customers and to build a 1:1 learning 
relationship with them. However, many strategic innovators emphasize the need to focus 
primarily on the most innovative customers to acquire innovative ideas. For example, 
many firms indicated they use special user groups, where they invite a limited number of 
innovative customers to jointly discuss their problems and suggested solutions. Strategic 
innovators share the view that personal, deep customer relationships increase a proactive 
market interpretation. The following quotations were typical: “everything is about a good 
interaction between supplier and customer, not only about technical issues, but also about 
real needs”, “show him you know his processes and show him where these processes touch 
your own core competences”, “study the customer’s business process and take over the 
bottleneck activities that are non-core to him”, “if you want to sell something, talk to the 
customer about his business, his processes, not about technologies and machines”. A 
customer (document manager) of a strategic innovator says: “this printer [the strategic 
innovator] often chatters with me: How are you doing this, how does this work then? How 
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could we do this or that? We could do it this way for you, what do you think about that? 
This is really unusual for a printer; most printers are too busy scoring printing 
assignments. I never see them. Yes, when they sign the contract and when they supply the 
prints. Account managers are very crucial in the introduction of new concepts and in 
hearing and seeing our real needs. Relations fail because of this, never because of the 
quality of their prints”. However, some (not all) strategic innovators mention the value of a 
market push. They use expressions such as ‘sticking your neck out’, ‘taking initiative’ and 
‘precede the market’. A printer notes: “you should know the customer’s needs and 
problems…but the solution, the concept… this is something you should develop by 
yourself. If you await his question, you are slaughtered in this market”. Others 
(independent of the industry) stress the use of customers to jointly develop pilots for 
SIinitiatives. In addition, all strategic innovators strongly reject the value of large-scale 
market research. They share the view that it never reveals world-shattering information and 
new innovative ideas, and that it is too time-consuming. It is usually used ex post, as a kind 
of confirmation of the usefulness of existing initiatives.   A truck & trailer supplier even 
takes up a more radical position: “Darn it, large-scale market research, I don’t believe a 
damn thing about it”. In this respect, data tend to confirm the more traditional B2B 
marketing literature, stressing  personal deep learning relationships with customers (e.g., 
Day, 1999; Ford et al., 1997).  
In line with the literature on SI (e.g., Markides, 2004b), no one strategic innovator 
indicated the value of centralized gatekeeping functions for recognition. Especially the role 
of the marketing department was somewhat marginalized in this respect. “Marketing 
aspects grow in importance, but we have no separate marketing function. I am convinced 
that all people in the entire process of SI development should possess marketing 
competences. The core of marketing is the entire organization” (printer). “We don’t use the 
marketing department. A marketing department is good at ‘packaging’ new concepts, but 
not at inventing them. They are too far away from the market, too theoretical, too model-
driven. You may never make the mistake to think that what marketing says is holy.” 
(energy company). “Marketing is too far away from what is happening in the market. They 
need the market information from sales” (food ingredients producer). Strategic innovators 
stress the responsibility of the entire organization for recognition activities: “During years, 
service was considered the necessary evil, now they are the market information antennas” 
(graphics printing systems supplier). “We don’t have a marketing department, but the joint 
development of new concepts with customers is our top priority and it is everyone’s 
responsibility to know what is happening outside. In fact, we all do marketing. Only, we 
prefer not to use the word ‘marketing’. In a technical company, it still has a bit the wrong 
taste, you see”.  
Finally, strategic innovators indicate the importance of gaining insights into the end-
customer, non-customers and innovative industries. For example, a system supplier in the 
graphics printing industry tries to enter into partnerships with printers with the sole aim of 
knowing the end customers’ needs better. An energy services provider developed a 
detailed scheme of all its non-customers, categorized them and linked per category the 
reasons why they are not interested in the firm’s services. These findings show the 
importance of peripheral vision (e.g., Day & Schoemaker, 2004a).  
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Concerning strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, interviewees mentioned the 
stimulation of: 
• critical reflections on customers 
• critical reflections on markets 
• critical reflections on the marketing approach 
• keeping alive past critical reflections on customers & markets 
• sharing critical reflections on customers & markets 
 
Findings reflect the conceptual insights, developed in chapter 2, quite well. Strategic 
innovators stress the need to broach discussions about customers, the market and the 
business unit’s marketing approach (cfr. Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Markides, 2004b).  An 
energy service provider mentions: “thinking and discussing about market developments 
has become almost  part of our daily business”. Even though all strategic innovators 
studied pay attention to the deliberate stimulation of assimilation, many indicate these 
activities should be developed even more. A supplier of printing systems argues:  “In a 
B2C market you fragment yourself completely color-blind; in a B2B business, you should 
deeply think about who you approach, why and how. And believe me; this is even more 
required when considering a SI” 
Critical reflections do not only tackle long term market developments and new customer 
needs, but often focus on a new market segmentation, new customer approaches, new 
advertising methods, new pricing mechanisms and new distribution methods as well (cfr. 
Markides, 1997, 2004b). Sometimes, the entire industry and supply chain is being 
discussed and topics such as: ‘how far to interfere downstream?’, ‘should we stay away 
from our customer’s business?’, ‘in fact, what is our business?’, ‘how to deal with the 
exclusivity issue of SI?’ and ‘how to manage the incompatibility of the SI and the 
traditional business?’ are dealt with. 
Strategic innovators furthermore emphasize the need to involve people with perspectives 
as diverse as possible (cfr. Weick, 2002, Thomas et al., 2001, Markides, 1997). Often, 
assimilation activities take place as periodical, cross-functional meetings, but sometimes 
external parties such as customers, specific user groups, partner-companies, or university 
professors are involved as well. Strategic innovators indicate that different perspectives 
deepen discussions and help develop market scenarios for the future. A printer remarks: 
“Internal soundboards are extremely important. They let you think, hear other visions. 
They keep you ‘on edge’”. A truck & trailer supplier talks about “cross-fertilization”. 
Besides the temporary external participants, the discussion boards consist of a few core 
persons. Most often these are marketers, sales people and business unit managers. The 
central core helps to keep alive the past reflections and the insights learnt from previous 
discussions and SIinitiatives. In multinational companies, discussions also take place 
cross-regionally to exchange the reflections and lessons learnt between different regions. 
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Data showed that strategic learning mechanisms for transformation primarily stimulated 
the following areas: 
• adapt the organizational structure 
• support new initiatives, even to the detriment of existing business 
• adapt procedures 
• replace skills (competencies) 
• change the way of working 
• prevent organizational chaos 
 
The demarcation of these six areas makes the transformation aspect (related to SI) much 
more concretized than the relatively vague transformation aspects currently available in the 
SI-literature (see chapter 2).  
Almost all SIinitiatives imply an adaptation of the organizational structure. Many strategic 
innovators mention the set-up of detached temporary project teams (with members selected 
from other units in the organization). These teams take care of marketing and commercial 
aspects (they usually consist of marketers and sales people); for other issues they hire 
resources from the existing units. Afterwards, project teams are disbanded and initiatives 
are gradually incorporated within existing units, or the temporary project teams grow out 
into fully separate units. Interviewees mention that especially the latter approach limits and 
smoothes a sudden, drastic structural adaptation. In a limited number of companies 
SIinitiatives set into motion a complete restructuring of the organization in units better 
fitted to serve specific product-service markets. For example, a truck & trailer supplier 
realized that many of its SIinitiatives would be better backed if the organizational structure 
reflected a distinction between the commercial vehicles and personal vehicles end-market. 
The managers interviewed indicate that this structural change was well supported by the 
organization, since it was felt as a natural reaction to market developments, and not as a 
sudden, unexpected change imposed by the top of the organization.  
The incompatibility of SIinitiatives with traditional business, in terms of market image, is 
an often-cited problem. For example, a producer of printing hardware mentions the 
difficulty to profile itself as an independent full service provider, while traditionally 
producing and selling one specific hardware brand. A business unit manager of an energy 
company remarks: “In order to gain credibility in the market, you should have both the 
knowledge, which you have as an insider, and an independent image, which you do not 
have as an insider. This implies a paradox that is very difficult to manage for most 
parties”. Despite these problems, interviewees highly emphasize the need to carry 
initiatives through.  They also indicate support from the top for new initiatives. Strategic 
innovators largely share the view that SIinitiatives should be evaluated on their market 
potential; interference with existing business is to be considered as ‘a secondary problem’. 
Most strategic innovators warn against brand interference; in all cases but one (an energy 
company), SIinitiatives are consequently put on the market with a different brand name. 
Initially, even other industry parties do hence not realize that the initiative is launched by 
this well-known incumbent.  
Furthermore, a printer indicates: “you should continuously revise your procedures; it’s just 
a question of reacting to market needs”. A printing supplier mentions the use of an 
advanced CRM/knowledge management-system, where new procedures are detailed to the 
letter. Employees are stimulated to add needed revisions to the system. In addition, deep 
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and frequent communication with employees, he says, signals the need to adapt 
procedures. New procedures are reformulated in the system and communicated. The data 
base hence serves as a –frequently changing– manual. An energy company uses 
operational meetings with customers and franchisors as an input to update and optimize its 
back-office procedures. 
New SIinitiatives often also involve new and different, sometimes company-foreign, skills 
and competencies. To fill in new skills, almost all interviewees deliberately recruit new, 
external people experienced in different industries. A printer says: “If you want to do 
something different with your core competences in a structured way, you’ll need other 
people, with different skills”. For example, a truck & trailer supplier hired people from the 
insurance sector, a printing producer engaged IT experts, and an energy company recruited 
FMCG-marketers. Often, the own employees are mixed with the newly employed ones. In 
some highly technical companies, company courses are used to train technical and 
maintenance people in marketing, commercial and softer skills, such as communication 
and entrepreneurship. Only one TMS supplier mentions they adapted the recruitment 
criteria for developers: more stress is put on their market insight and entrepreneurial 
competences than on their technical knowledge. 
SIinitiatives imply new ways of working. For example, a printer started to work with 
cross-functional teams per product/market segment. All strategic innovators mention the 
value of strong top-down communication to convince and persuade people about the need 
to think and act differently. A manager of an energy installation company says: “you can 
not solve an organizational problem, just by implementing a tool like SAP”. Managers 
emphasize how they continuously proclaim that “people are the new production system” 
(printing supplier), and that “to win outside is to start inside” (printer). The CEO of an 
energy service provider mentions the use of joint project teams, involving the customer’s 
employees: “I keep hammering so that people who work here feel as if they work at the 
customer’s”. The CEO tells that he frequently draws the employees’ attention to the fact 
that in the near future he wants part of his people to be actually employed by the customer. 
Furthermore, in many companies the development and set-up of new initiatives is included 
in the formal performance evaluation criteria of, not only marketing and business unit 
managers, but of sales and technical managers as well. Strategic innovators also stress the 
need to involve people early in the process to increase commitment. For example, a 
graphics printing supplier stresses the value of involving lower levels in the development 
of the blueprint, in order to enlarge the supportive basis. A similar approach is mentioned 
by a truck & trailer supplier and an ingredients producer: “to stimulate sales to execute 
initiatives in the market we need to involve sales and marketing already in the phase of 
concept development, in the past they were only involved at the end…we have to get used 
to that”.  
Strategic innovators strongly agree that chaos should be avoided because it worsens market 
credibility and considerably retards implementation and roll-out: “There’s one key 
principle: Avoid chaos at all times” (energy company). Many interviewees spontaneously 
bring up that behavioral change is a long-winded process. A TMS producer says: “the 
launch is quick, but the execution takes time”. Therefore, strategic innovators seem to 
agree on the benefits of a gradual, careful and structured approach to manage behavioral 
change. A printer remarks: “setting up initiatives is not a storm, it is a babbling process”. 
The use of a strict project-driven approach (with process patterns, demarcated phases, and 
fixed evaluation points) and the set-up of separate units is frequently mentioned as a highly 
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valuable tool in this respect.  One strategic innovator notes: “we try a lot, but if we take up 
something we do it seriously and in a structured way”. Hence, the earlier mentioned use of 
blueprints is especially important to run things smoothly. Only one strategic innovator (a 
food ingredients producer) developed a separate unit of business development where 
initiatives are invented, fully developed, crammed and launched, in order to be 
implemented only afterwards in the existing units for further roll-out. Likewise, a truck & 
trailer producer remarks that using temporary project teams are less risky and interfere less 
with daily business. A truck & trailer supplier appoints a ‘project support manager’ to take 
care of the roll-out and marketing aspects of the initiative.  
 
4.3.1.2 Critical organizational and supply chain characteristics 
 
The conceptual study (chapter 2) revealed the potential influence of some organizational 
and supply chain characteristics. Likewise, the QUAL2-data suggest that these 
organizational and supply chain characteristics might strengthen or weaken the effects the 
strategic learning mechanisms have on SIcap. This means that, statistically, these ‘side 
conditions’ may be modeled as interaction effects. Therefore, these characteristics may be 
placed under the heading of ‘moderators’.  
Findings were classified into the following broad conceptual categories derived from the 
literature in chapter 2 (section 2.6): organizational culture, organizational structure, cross-
functional information dissemination, supply chain information potential, and supply chain 
innovation potential. 
The cross-industry analysis enabled us to further refine these categories of moderators. 
 
As regards the category of cultural characteristics, two subcategories arose out of the data. 
On the one hand, managers mentioned the importance of an innovative mindset. A TMS 
supplier says: “New things always cost a lot of time and energy, but we are convinced they 
will eventually work out”. A food ingredients producer remarks: “anyone here is convinced 
innovation is needed”, and a truck & trailer supplier notes: “people here should be able to 
cope with continuous change and they all should expose the right mentality for innovation. 
If they can not, they can not stay; such a mentality may destroy entire departments”. Many 
strategic innovators indicate that people are not punished when SIinitiatives do not succeed 
because of the market risk inherent to SI. However people are reprimanded when their 
effort and commitment to the initiative were below par. An energy service provider: 
“people really like working on new things, they even spend their evenings and weekends on 
it! Commitment is far more important than technological knowledge. They [employees] 
know they are not punished if ideas don’t work out, what’s important is the right 
atmosphere, an innovative atmosphere”. Many strategic innovators stress the leader’s 
(often this is the business unit manager’s) responsibility in stimulating such an innovation-
minded culture. A printer says: “the director determines the culture, the atmosphere. And it 
is the atmosphere that determines your innovation potential in the end”. 
On the other, strategic innovators stressed a risk-taking attitude. A truck & trailer supplier 
says: “every SI is risky, it is a new venture, it is unknown territory, you go off the beaten 
track to a market you don’t know”. The verb ‘dare’ is frequently brought up; strategic 
innovators talk about “dare to change your business”, “dare to lose customers, if there is 
an opportunity to gain others”, “dare to interfere with your customer”, “dare to clash with 
other industry parties”, etc. A printer: “you set off on an adventure and you don’t know 
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where it is going to bring you”.  A hardware producer in the printing industry remarks 
“sticking your neck out and starting something completely new is far more important than 
defending your traditional market”. However, most of them talk about taking smart and 
calculated risks (e.g. in terms of brand interference). A truck & trailer supplier says: “you 
need SI to escape price competition, to gain profits. But next to this, you still need the 
traditional business, to spread risks. It’s just a matter of not putting all eggs in one 
basket”. Some mention to pay explicit attention to clear budgeting and calculating net 
present values. Only one energy company explicitly says “in fact, in our business unit, we 
are a bit like cowboys”. 
 
Concerning organizational structure, both the aspects of centralization and formalization 
arose from the data. Especially the structural effects of (de)centralization were highly 
emphasized.  Yet, and contrary to chapter 2, the findings regarding the benefits of 
decentralization as emphasized in the literature on SI, provide a mixed picture. On the one 
hand, strategic innovators mention the importance of a flat structure when SIinitiatives are 
developed. All interviewees mention the importance of a strong bottom-up approach. 
Strategic innovators indicate that ideas arise everywhere in the organization: in all 
functional areas and at all hierarchical levels. A printing supplier says: “often, the sting is 
within the management, not within the people who are in the market. They see what is 
happening and needed out there. So, it is evident they should come up with ideas”.  
Strategic innovators stress the value of short lines. In addition, especially interviewees of 
larger or multinational companies stress the strategic freedom of the specific business unit 
vis-à-vis the corporate level. An energy company says: “we have almost entire strategic 
freedom to launch new SIs in our BU, and it should be this way”. On the other, the use of 
blueprints and process patterns seem to point to a more centralized and formalized 
approach. Interviewees furthermore mention that ‘walking the right channels’ is important, 
and that the actual implementation decision is largely dependent on the business unit 
management. For instance, a truck & trailer supplier indicates how the number of 
SIinitiatives effectively launched improved drastically after a switch in the business unit’s 
management. 
 
Thirdly, the value of the cross-functional dissemination of market information throughout 
the organization was highly emphasized because of several reasons. First, all strategic 
innovators indicate that the wealth of customer and market information sales people 
dispose of, should be disseminated across the business unit. This is because “sales people 
have the market information, but developing concepts and setting things up is however not 
their [sales people’s] strongest point, here marketing comes in. But marketing is too far 
from the market. So, a close and frequent information exchange between sales and 
marketing is requisite” (truck & trailer supplier). A printer notes “there is a continuous 
feeding of market and customer information from sales”. Secondly, cross-functional 
information dissemination is a condition to effective assimilation. We already mentioned 
the value of discussions and reflections cross-functionally. Thirdly, cross-functional 
information dissemination speeds up the set-up of SIinitiatives. An energy service provider 
says: “most SIs arise between people”. A printing hardware producer says: “the 
development of SIinitiatives is in fact one process of customer information reaction. Sure, 
everyone has his own role in this process, but it remains one interlinked process with, 
obviously, much cross-functional  information sharing […] every employee should know 
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how and what the customer thinks”. A truck & trailer supplier hence indicates they put 
much effort to structure and formalize internal information dissemination in order to make 
market information available to everyone in the organization. A TMS supplier stresses the 
need of market information dissemination in order to avoid “the trap of being technology-
driven”.  
 
Regarding the supply chain information stimulus, strategic innovators mentioned primarily 
the usefulness of information that can be obtained through working relationships with 
(direct) customers and (direct) suppliers. Essentially, customers provide valuable 
information about market developments and competitors; suppliers about competitors, new 
regulations, technological developments and potential industry entrants. Strategic 
innovators mention that these data help to gain new SI ideas and to predict market and 
industry reactions towards SIinitiatives. For example, a truck & trailer supplier tells about 
a customer who informed him that the customers’ branch federation was selling a 
benchmark service similar to the one the supplier was planning to offer (in a more 
advanced format) to its customers for free, as part of a total business solution. In this way, 
the supplier received an early warning about potential hostile reactions of the branch 
federation. The total business solution was consequently marketed under a different name, 
and it took the branch federation months to find out the solution was sold by this 
incumbent. 
 
Fifthly, interviewees mentioned the impact of a (dis)encouragement and co-operative 
innovation attitude of customers and, albeit to a lesser extent, of suppliers.  
The relationships that business units have with their customers may considerably stimulate 
the development of SI. A hardware producer in the graphics printing industry remarks:  
“the fact that we are innovative is for sure dependent on our own innovation capacity, but, 
above all, we have good customers”. Many strategic innovators indicate the benefits of 
joint SI development with customers. Sometimes, SIs are developed as an extension to a 
normal working contract. Close co-operation within the scope of the working contract 
increases trust between both parties, and it locks in the customer. In this way, the BU is 
given a head position for subsequent SI-development with this customer and the 
customer’s free-riding behavior is constrained.  
Benefits of joint SIdevelopment are essentially related to the spread of investment risks, 
the possibility to refine a concept, and an increased power base vis-à-vis other industry 
parties. Furthermore, in the case of joint development interviewees note it is easier to 
convince a customer about the potential benefits of the SIinitiative. Indeed, many 
interviewees indicate that some customers tend to adhere to the ‘not invented here 
syndrome’, and interviewees stress that the issue of gaining the credibility to offer SI is 
extremely important. However, the exclusivity many customers require in the case of joint 
development prevents a further roll-out of the SI towards other market parties.   
As such, customer behavior may also become an obstacle. Strategic innovators emphasize 
the importance of customers’ openness towards SI. For example, in the food industry, 
retailers are adherents to the “efficiency mantra”, which limits their acceptance of SIs. 
Many interviewees indicate that the customer’s purchasing department should be willing to 
think non-traditionally. A truck & trailer supplier notes: “you want to make life easier for 
your customer, but some just want to keep doing it the old-fashioned way”. Another 
supplier remarks: “My dream is that when I’m 50, my customers won’t think in terms of 
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components anymore”. The importance of investing in customer education is hence highly 
stressed throughout the data. A TMS supplier additionally remarks: “Smart relationship 
management of our customers [cities] is necessary. It takes up a lot of time but it may 
prevent the largest bottleneck in this industry:  free-riding behavior”. 
 
Besides the values of different forms of customer cooperation, interviewees mention the 
value of close relationships with suppliers as well. Suppliers really stimulate strategic 
innovators to jointly innovate, but apart from the printing industry, where supplier-OEMS 
really push printers into the development of new and better offers to the end customer, co-
operations are primarily confined to technological areas. However, strategic innovators 
mention the indirect value of supplier cooperation forms. Early supplier involvement 
(conceptual & design phase) prevents many practical technical problems in later phases. 
Furthermore, since SI has often a technical component as well, innovative suppliers 
indirectly facilitate SIs. A truck & trailer supplier remarks: “suppliers push us to outsource 
part of the production, this frees up resources to develop new market concepts”. 
Furthermore, some parties mention the benefits of involving non-traditional suppliers in 
the early phases of concept development. For example, an energy service provider jointly 
developed an advanced energy expert system with an American software firm. This expert 
system has become one the backbones of its total energy solution.  TMS suppliers mention 
the input of German software suppliers, used to operate in one the most advanced TMS 
markets of the world.   
 
Next to the direct innovation stimulus supply chain partners may exert, the QUAL2-data 
suggest that SIcap is also stimulated or curbed by the general climate of the supply chain. 
A printer tells that, due to the increasing hostility in the industry, many innovations are not 
welcomed by industry parties. Several strategic innovators remark that the traditional 
market has become so small and commoditized that the majority of incumbents fear that 
“one man’s breath is the other one’s death”. A truck and trailer supplier says: “in our 
industry, every party watches the others with Argus’ eyes”. Interviewees assert that this 
hostility considerably obstructs innovative efforts: many parties are ‘expectant’ or even 
reluctant to take up SI, out of fear of acts of revenge by other industry parties. This view is 
echoed by a TMS supplier who complains that the trust between public and private parties 
has gone since long. He remarks that, still, trustful co-operation is key for the industry’s 
development in the longer run. Strategic innovators hence stress to ‘manage’ carefully all 
stakeholders along the entire supply chain, even if there are no real strained relationships 
among the different parties. In addition, apart from conflicts with ‘traditional enemies’, 
new SIinitiatives sometimes elicit clashes with new, different enemies (e.g. insurance 
companies) as well. The potential hostile reactions from other supply chain parties (e.g., 
from customers, branch federations) explains why most of the SIinitiatives studied have 
been launched under ‘hidden’ names.  
 
4.3.1.3 Control variables 
 
The previous discussion shows that the QUAL2-findings revealed striking similarities 
across the different industries, both in terms of strategic learning mechanisms, and in terms 
of moderators. As we wanted to test the heterogeneity between companies/BUs as regards 
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SIcap, we still wanted to control for additional homogenization effects. A closer study of 
the qualitative findings showed a potential influence of three additional variables.  
 
More specifically, some interviewees shared the opinion that a company’s SIcap is largely 
influenced by its size. Size is indeed one of the most frequently studied structural 
characteristics by researchers on strategy and organizational behavior (Liao et al., 2003). 
The role company size plays in stimulating SIcap seems to pull in opposite directions. 
Resource dependency arguments on the one hand and institutional and bureaucratic views 
on the other conflict each other (Miller & Chen, 1996). 
Some authors argue that most strategic innovators consist of small niche players or new 
entrants that are less weighed down than large players by the burden of structural, cultural 
and mental inertia (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Henderson & Clark, 1990), by the specifics 
of the value network (position in the marketplace, system of use and product performance 
offered) in which they have been operating (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995), by the fear 
of cannibalizing or destroying current business (Stringer, 2000; Christensen & Overdorf, 
2000; Markides, 1999a,b), or by an impatient, risk-averse financial environment eager for 
short-term results (Lynn et al., 1996). These arguments in favor of new entrants are also 
backed by Dimaggio & Powell (1983), arguing that the greater an organization’s 
dependence on other organizations (in a specific organizational field, e.g. an industry), the 
more similar it will become in structure, climate and behavioral focus. In addition, the 
longer an organization has been exposed to a specific industry recipe, the more likely it 
will conform to it (Miller & Chen, 1996). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
contranormative innovations (i.e., those deviating from the industry recipe) tend to diffuse 
among firms in a ‘trickle-down’ way, i.e. from low- to high reputation organizations 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). This is because high-reputation organizations are not 
willing to adopt an innovation that puts their own reputation in the industry at risk, 
whereas low-reputation firms do take these risks with the view of economic rents or an 
improved reputation. Other scholars assert that the underlying problem established 
companies cope with is not size in itself, but the organizational hubris that goes with it, the 
so-called ‘paradox of success’ (e.g., Miller, 1994; Tushman et al., 1986). Companies grow 
because of (past) success; size then constitutes a barrier to strategic resilience to the degree 
that the delusion of self-perpetuating success prevails in these organizations (Hamel & 
Välikangas, 2003). Past success has thus determined managerial cognition (Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1996; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). In other words, underlying corporate values and 
processes have evolved in these organizations to support the status quo (sustaining 
innovations instead of disruptive innovations) (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). The 
perspective that highlights the inert nature of established organizations most is the 
population ecology model (Leavy, 1997). Population ecologists believe that inertia to 
change is endemic to large companies, and that any change effort is an abortive attempt. 
Industry change only takes place on the population level by a variation-selection-retention 
process that favors better-fitted newcomers at the detriment of established, outdated 
companies. The paradox in this process is however that in the short and medium-term, 
selection processes favor ‘reliable’ organizations, whose structure is difficult to change 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  
Yet, others have pointed out that there is mounting evidence that also large complex 
established organizations can change (e.g., Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997; Volberda et 
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al.’s (2001a) illustration of ING’s and Rabobank’s renewal processes)24. Indeed, empirics 
have shed doubt on the universality of the pro-convention (legitimacy) argument 
propounded by institutionalists (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), showing that especially 
large and diversified organizations can largely benefit from unconventional strategies 
(Miller & Chen, 1996). Some scholars even argue that established companies can not 
afford not to strategically innovate, if only out of defensive motives, i.e. to pre-empt others 
from destroying them by their respective SIs (Markides, 1999a,b; Kim & Mauborgne, 
1997; Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). It was actually shown that also incumbent firms, 
whenever threatened by innovative new entrants, may react and pre-empt fiercely 
(Charitou & Markides, 2003).  
Founding their argument on empirical research, Kim & Mauborgne (2004) hence assert 
that incumbents are not at the disadvantage when it comes to creating new market spaces. 
Their early studies (1997) had already indicated that the discriminating factor between 
high-growth and low-growth companies was the firm’s strategic logic; no significant 
differences were found between start-ups and established companies. In later empirical 
research (2004) their findings were even more convincing in that they showed that most 
innovations come from within and not from beyond the traditional industry. Govindarajan 
& Trimble (2005) and Hamel (1999) have put forward the same argument. They explicitly 
argue that incumbents are at the advantage over start-ups because of their capital, brand, 
distribution and human resources.  
Empirics have however not yet given a decisive answer to the question whether company 
size is favorably related to technological innovation (Scherer, 1992), let alone how it 
affects a company’s market creation and strategic innovation capacity. “The theoretical 
quandary of whether firm size is a source of inertia or a source of resources for strategic 
flexibility, remains unanswered” (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996: 48-49). Jaworski et al. 
(2000) consequently consider this as an important avenue for future research.  
 
Indeed, the theoretical quandary proved itself in the QUAL2-data. On the one hand, 
strategic innovators regularly warn against brand interference between SIinitiatives and the 
traditional business, which is proof of the arguments developed by  Stringer (2000), 
Christensen & Overdorf (2000), and Markides (1999a,b). On the other, strategic innovators 
do not consider such brand interference as an insurmountable problem, and mention the 
importance of careful brand and image management. The stimulating or hindering power 
exerted by traditional customers, suppliers and the general chain climate (see the previous 
section) do however point to the influence of the existing value network (cfr. Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). Yet, we found no real evidence of 
Miller’s (1994) ‘paradox of success’. The fact that several incumbents were selected as 
strategic innovators in the industry takes the edge off Miller’s argument and enfeebles the 
population ecology model. A strategic innovator remarks indeed: “Thinking about 
tomorrow, beyond the daily business, is the hardest part…it all comes down to the CEO, 
                                                          
24 In the context of technological innovation, also Schumpeter (1942) replaced his original 
1912-belief in small, entrepreneurial firms as innovative leaders, by the conviction that it is 
especially large, established (often monopolist) companies, favored by e.g. economies of 
scale, deep pockets and attractability towards the labor market, that innovate more 
intensively than do small, pioneer firms (in Scherer, 1992).  
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but he has of course so many other things on his mind…and well, daily business comes 
first, you know…or tomorrow is even out of the question for these companies”. The 
quotation: “our right to exist is justified by setting up new SIconcepts, to redefine the 
industry” comes from a large, multinational truck & trailer supplier. Accordingly, Kim & 
Mauborgne’s (2004) assertion that institutional factors are of minor importance and that it 
is a firm’s strategic logic that is key, seems quite plausible.  
In contrast, we did find evidence of the bureaucratic inertia large companies have to cope 
with: “If you are at the level of decision power about new offers and new market 
approaches, you’re often at the level where there is no market sensing at all” (energy 
company). A printer marks: “I am convinced that flexibility stops at 60 [persons]”, and an 
energy service provider remarks: “You should remain small; we couldn’t do this with more 
than 100 persons”. A municipal traffic manager of a large city (i.e. a TMS customer) 
indicates that large ponderous organizations are often slower to come up with market-
based innovations than smaller or midsized players. 
Large companies’ relative resource advantage was however highlighted as well. For 
example, an adhesives supplier to the truck and printing industry asserts: “being a large 
company, we have the capital to try things out. When business is bad, there is less money 
for innovation but…yeah…bad is relative here…we still have a considerable budget for 
this kind of initiatives”. A 2nd-tier supplier in the truck & trailer industry notes: “the others 
know we’re not Tom Thumb, we’re big and we’re powerful. When we launch 
something…they know we have the capital to really make it work…and if it comes to the 
worst, well…we just do some acquisitions”. A supplier of TMS: “since we’re merged with 
X [a large construction  & contracting company], I feel our power base and credibility in 
the industry has considerable increased. It has really been a boost for the development of 
new initiatives…that’s because we have deeper pockets and we can also rely on the 
competences of our mother company, yes, I must say that others [potential customers] 
realize this quite well”. 
In conclusion, size seems an important factor. Even though interviewees mentioned the 
effect of size on a business unit’s capacity to create and launch SIinitiatives, much to our 
surprise, size apparently only influenced the dependent variable. Indeed, smaller 
companies stressed the value of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms to promote 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity to the same extent as had done the 
larger companies25. Smaller strategic innovators also applied blueprints, strict project 
management, fixed meeting appoints etc. Only, cross-functional information dissemination 
was formalized to a lesser extent in smaller companies. However, this variable is 
considered as a moderator and not as one of the strategic learning mechanisms.   
Given these findings, we decided to control for size effects on the dependent variable 
SIcap. 
 
Besides the issue of size, data suggested that the extent to which market behaviors can be 
shaped seem not so much determined by the specificities of the industry the firm operates 
in, rather than by the specific position a firm takes up in the industry supply chain. 
Upstream companies’ distance to the end-market and their (traditionally) technological 
mindset may prove SI more difficult for them than for mid- and downstream companies. A 
                                                          
25 This finding is consistent with Chaston et al.’s (2004) findings that also small firms largely 
recognize the importance of formalized knowledge management programs. 
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TMS supplier notes: “we consciously try to be not technology-driven and that’s not so easy 
for a technological company upstream in the chain”. A producer of printing hardware 
says: “We’re a machine producer, we are far away from the end market. We really do 
anything to come as close as possible to the end market. Many of the co-operations we 
start up with printers are only to serve this one goal, to get end customer information, to 
feel this end market”. In addition, as indicated in the previous section, interviewees highly 
stress the stimulating or impeding role customers may play in the development of 
SIinitiatives, and upstream companies (traditionally more technology-focused) may hence 
be harder to persuade about the values SI may bring to them. Upstream companies 
supplying to other upstream companies may suffer from this. Avlonitis & Gounaris (1997) 
found furthermore that industrial companies, compared to consumer companies, are less 
inclined to develop a market orientation. Following this finding, Jaworski et al. (2000) 
argue that more traditional business-to-business markets are probably less amenable to 
altering customer behaviors, and point this out as an important avenue for future research. 
In this sense, mid- and downstream companies could be at the advantage to achieve higher 
levels of SIcap.  
Hence we controlled the effects on the dependent variable for the business unit’s supply 
chain position. 
 
Finally, the fact whether a company is a product- or service firm may affect its SIcap. 
Although empirical studies that compare product and service firms are scarce (Coviello et 
al., 2002), in general, manufacturing and service companies have been attributed a 
different way of innovation adoption (Damanpour, 1991). Both types differ moreover in 
the type of activities and in their future strategic emphasis (Parasuraman & Varadarajan, 
1988). In service firms outputs are intangible and the producer is very close to the client 
(Damanpour, 1991). Empirics confirm indeed that business-to-business service firms apply 
more relationship marketing practices than do business-to-business product firms (Coviello 
et al., 2002). Customer interaction is in turn considered to positively influence the 
discovery of customer value opportunities (Carrillat et al., 2004). As service firms rely 
more on person-to-person interactions, market-oriented strategies have shown better results 
in service firms than in manufacturing markets (Cano et al., 2004). Since SI implies the 
creation of new value propositions, the previous line of logic would suggest that service 
firms are at an advantage over manufacturing firms in terms of SIcap. In addition, some 
interviewees mention the ease and speed at which new services can be created, in contrast 
to the long and awkward process of product development: “Services are much easier to 
launch than new products; you sign a few contracts with some parties and you’re off” 
(truck & trailer supplier). A manager of an energy company consequently complained 
about the difficulty of his marketing department to ‘think in terms of services’, which is 
often crucial in the development of SI-total solutions: “Furthermore, SI often involves 
services, total solutions, and marketers find it tricky to think in services. They are not 
trained to think in terms of services. Product thinking is much more theoretical, whereas 
services involve day-to-day worries and much practical organization, and this is 
something they find extremely difficult to consider”. Furthermore, services are less 
tangible, more perishable, and the fulfillment of customer needs requires a higher degree of 
customization in service firms than in manufacturing firms (Kirca et al., 2005). Therefore, 
service firms may also be at a disadvantage in terms of SIcap. Hence, ‘business unit type’ 
(i.e. product or service firm) was added as a third control variable to the model.  
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4.3.2 Development of hypotheses and additional research questions 
 
4.3.2.1 Hypotheses regarding the basic model 
 
Our main research objective was to detect organizational mechanisms that could foster 
SIcap. Referring to the discussion in chapter 2, we proposed that deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms fostering specific path-loosening elements of recognition, 
assimilation and transformation capacity would increase SIcap. As the previous discussion 
indicates, the QUAL2-findings showed the relevance of these strategic learning 
mechanisms and enabled us to specify the path-breaking areas that these mechanisms 
essentially target in business units with a high level of SIcap. These deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms are hence taken as the independent variables in our study. Now it 
remains us to hypothesize the specific effects these independent variables will have on 
SIcap. Therefore, we will combine theoretical insights from the sensemaking and ACAP 
literature with the findings of QUAL2. 
 
When we asked interviewees (especially during the in-depth interviews) to tell us more 
about the process of creating SIinitiatives, a full mediating cycle seemed general practice. 
A strategic innovator notes: “you cannot just do something without deep knowledge of your 
market. This implies listening to your market, your customers and, above all, much 
discussion about the trends you see in the market and in your industry. Then, your 
organization has to be adapted to this”. Furthermore, the systematic stimulation of this 
cycle was emphasized. A supplier to the truck & trailer industry remarks: “you should 
build the systematic capacity to see, discuss, and set up turnkey projects, since the clue is 
to keep on repeating this cycle”. A hardware supplier in the printing industry notes that “it 
is a question of structuralizing the market information flows. From what is heard in the 
market by our sales people and what users tell our engineers, to eventually turning and 
tuning our organization to it” A printer says: “a market signal is often a stimulus to deeply 
think about the market, and then to reorganize our business and our confrontation with the 
market, say, our market approach. One should consciously trigger this entire process”. A 
TMS supplier notes: “you should watch and study and discuss and reflect on your market 
before offering something new to customers. And this process should be structured, as 
much as possible”. The QUAL2 data hence suggested the overall existence of full 
mediating effects.  
 
Relying on both ACAP and sensemaking theory, these full mediation effects (see the black 
arrows in Figure 4.1) may be further justified.  
This basic full mediating relationship is foremost grounded in Zahra & George’s (2002) 
argument that for the creation of ACAP as a coherent dynamic capability, all dimensions 
play complementary roles since they build upon each other. Hence, when fostering SIcap, 
recognition, assimilation, and transformation all need stimulating, since these dimensions 
build upon each other to jointly produce a dynamic capability (Zahra & George, 2002). 
Similarly, Lane & Lubatkin (1998) consider the different ACAP dimensions as 
[sequential] steps in the learning process.  
In the development of dynamic capabilities, therefore, recognition and assimilation have 
not been directly associated with outcome variables (Lane et al., 2001).  
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These arguments can be enriched by insights from the sensemaking literature as well. 
There, similar ideas have been conceived. More specifically, it is argued that noticing 
environmental information will only lead to effective renewal if this noticing leads to a 
renewed understanding (Becker, 2001). External scanning thus facilitates strategic action 
through its effects on strategic interpretation (Thomas et al., 1993). 
First, the causal link between recognition and assimilation is based on the argument that 
the amount and type of information searched for and used will affect interpretation (Dutton 
& Duncan, 1987). Thomas et al. (1993) empirically demonstrated that attention to a broad 
range of information positively influences strategic interpretation (i.e. the attribution of 
meaning to strategic issues). Interpretation means translating information, developing 
models for understanding it, attributing meaning to it, and sharing perceptions (Daft & 
Weick, 1984). Information gathering is thus considered as an antecedent to interpretation. 
Furthermore, Barr et al.’s (1992) study suggested that noticing new environmental 
information increases the likelihood and speed by which firms can change their mental 
models. New environmental information indeed provides stimuli and substance for internal 
reflection and discussion on possible strategic and operational implications (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). “The ways in which openness to new information and knowledge is 
achieved […] establishes processes whereby that knowledge is handled within an 
organization and which will impinge on the use made of it” (Child, 1997: 69). Hence, 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition capacity will increase assimilation 
capacity.  
Assimilation in turn leads to transformation. As rational thought is assumed to be closely 
linked to chosen actions (Thomas et al., 1993), mental maps direct action (Barr et al., 
1992). Likewise, Walsh (1995), referring to Read (1987), suggests that knowledge 
structures may play an enabling role in shaping behavior. Hult (2005) empirically 
confirmed that market information processing increases the organization’s responsiveness. 
Interpretation is hence the process which determines the actions chosen (Daft & Weick, 
1984). However, information can only effectively acted upon if first a common 
understanding of this information is developed (Hult et al., 2005). Effective organizational 
action, defined as any significant change in ongoing organizational practices hence 
depends on managers’ understanding of their environment (Thomas et a., 1993).  
Moreover, Tranfield & Smith (1998) found that cognitive change (changing mindsets) was 
the driver of behavioral change. A renewed understanding hence guides the adoption of 
new behaviors (Barr et al., 1992). New routines replacing old ones rely on processes of 
forgetting (de Holan & Phillips, 2003). Successful transformation thus relies on effective 
assimilation processes. Moreover, Maltz & Kohli (1996) found that formal communication 
channels (often used to stimulate assimilation) encourage people to act on the information 
shared. Hence, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms triggering assimilation capacity 
will hence positively affect transformation capacity. 
Finally, transformation will lead to SIcap. Barr et al.’s (1992) study of the US railroad 
industry showed that major changes in mental models were reflected in more proactive 
strategies. Therefore, we can propose that an organization’s assimilation capacity is 
positively associated with SIcap. However since cognitions are manifested in actions, 
cognitions only affect outcomes in an indirect way, i.e. through taking actions 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). This was already discussed at length in chapter 2 (section 
2.3). Hence, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms triggering transformation capacity 
will positively affect SIcap. 
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Taking into account this sequential character of the ACAP and sensemaking process, the 
full effects of fostering recognition capacity are only realized on the condition assimilation 
and transformation capacity are triggered as well. In turn, the full effects of a stimulation 
of assimilation capacity will only be materialized if transformation capacity is also 
triggered. This implies that the effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition will be optimized on the condition deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation and transformation are in place as well. Similarly, deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for assimilation will most positively affect SIcap on the condition deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for transformation are in place.  
As a consequence, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition are fully 
mediated by deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation and transformation, 
and deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation are fully mediated by 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation (see the black arrows in Figure 
4.1). 
However, this is only part of the story. In fact, some additional effects should be taken into 
account. 
 
First, even though the sequential execution of all stages from scanning to action undergirds 
both the ACAP and the strategic sensemaking construct, some shortcuts can be discerned. 
The influence of politicking on this process (e.g., Hall, 1984) may give rise to nonlinear, 
direct and indirect influences of all the antecedent dimensions, more than is predicted by 
the traditional linear models (Thomas et al., 1993). Although the influence of politicking 
could not be discerned in the data (only one printing hardware producer and one food 
ingredients producer brought up this issue), still, data did point to deviances from the 
sequential full cycle. Shortcuts are often associated with (deliberate or undeliberate) timing 
issues. Information and ideas should be brought up at the right moment, and change should 
be initiated when times are ripe. For example, a manager of an adhesives supplier in the 
TMS industry mentions that much attention is paid to the application of strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition and assimilation. However, he stresses the importance of 
timing aspects in the launch of a SIinitiative. He tells that often, based on recognition and 
assimilation, an initiative is developed and stored until the company receives a market 
signal that ‘times are ripe to launch’. Transformation is hence retarded. As a consequence, 
at the moment the SIinitiative is considered to be launched there is a direct link from 
recognition over transformation to SIcap. Even though, some other companies emphasized 
the importance of ‘pushing the market’ (hence neglecting timing issues), the issue of 
timing, reducing the importance of assimilation at the moment of the market launch, was 
raised by many interviewees.  
 
Furthermore, previous research findings have shown that both information search and 
interpretation also directly affect action and performance (Thomas et al., 1993), i.e. 
deviating from the linear recognition-assimilation-transformation model. This direct effect 
could be attributed to the cyclicity of the sensemaking process, in the sense that 
assimilation or transformation are not turned useless, but in that past experience may 
enable organizations to sometimes circumvent the systematic assimilation and 
transformation stages. Based on new information, previous experience may further guide 
interpretations and decisions, so that reinterpretation and altered action may not be 
required every time new information is used. The QUAL2-data seemed to confirm this 
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assertion. The process stories companies told us suggest that the full cycle capacity pays 
off more than once. Often, different SIinitiatives are launched, based on the market 
insights generated in the course of previous SIinitiatives. We could detect a shortcut, 
especially concerning transformation.  
Even though the path loosening effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms may 
inhibit complete reliance on experience, our discussion on path dependencies in chapter 2 
would still suggest the occurrence of direct effects, going from deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition to transformation or even SIcap and direct effects going from 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation to SIcap (see the grey arrows in 
Figure 4.1). For example, to better tailor its offerings to emerging market needs, a truck & 
trailer supplier adapted its organization to achieve a closer fit between the internal 
organizational structure and new or changing markets segments. Interviewees stressed that 
this renewed structure facilitated the organization to recently launch several specific 
SIinitiatives. In a sense, some new SIinitiatives seem to lift on the transformation capacity 
that was required (and built) for previous SIinitiatives. Likewise, a manager of an energy 
company mentioned the creation of a separate ‘retail services’ business unit, with the aim 
of providing full service concepts to the customer. The unit is smaller, closer to the end 
market and has the autonomy to launch radically new service concepts better fit to the end 
market. The interviewee told us that this autonomy has considerably eased the 
development and market introduction of recent SIinitiatives, without having to turn upside 
down the entire organization with every new initiative. A similar story was told by a 
printer and a printing hardware producer. Their stories all point to a shortcut from 
recognition (and assimilation) to SIcap.  
 
Apart from the non-sequentiality of the process itself, an additional effect may occur. Our 
research question led us to focus on deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. This implies 
we restrict our attention to what essentially are ‘flow’ variables. ‘Stock’ variables 
(meaning recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity as they are) are not taken 
into account. Our discussion in chapter 2 (section 2.5) on the idiosyncratic nature of 
capabilities, and the existence of path dependencies, leads us to propose that the effect 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms will exert depends also on these stock variables. 
In the concrete, the effect deliberate strategic learning mechanisms produce on a firm’s 
SIcap will also be determined by the firm’s level of development (in terms of path-
breaking focus areas) of recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity. The full-
mediating effects may therefore be reduced and direct effects may occur (see the grey 
arrows in Figure 4.1). For example, when assimilation and transformation capacity are 
highly developed, chances are high that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition directly affect SIcap, without much intermediateness of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation and transformation.  
The QUAL2-findings did indeed suggest that over time the importance of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms may diminish as recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity have grown. A manager of a TMS systems supplier remarks: “we 
gradually learnt how to use a more marketing- and commercially-based approach. But we 
are a technological company; in the beginning, this was a harsh process and much formal 
stimulation was needed. Now this view has become ingrained in the people working here 
and it has become part of our daily business”. Interviewees hence pointed to the 
importance of additional informal (i.e. not deliberately stimulated) recognition, 
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assimilation and transformation capacity. Some strategic innovators state that stimulating 
recognition capacity should not be entirely formalized. A printing hardware supplier and 
an energy service provider both remark that it is often during unforeseen, occasional, 
informal conversations with customers where one learns the most of their business, their 
problems and their needs. A manager of a truck & trailer supplier indicates the importance 
of informal assimilation capacity: “Sure, formal and structured channels to discuss 
markets and to develop new ideas and concepts are very important, but … there’s also 
something as the ‘coffee machine channel’. I must say that our informal discussions are 
much extended, especially when considering that this is an international company!”  
Stock effects of informal capacity may thus cause the earlier mentioned deviance from the 
sequential path as well. In an attempt to speed up the cycle, deliberate mechanisms may be 
by-passed. For example, assimilation is often stimulated by formal (cross-functional) 
meetings. Yet, meetings are only held at certain time intervals, running the risk the idea 
will be forgotten in the mean time due to daily pressure, or its initiation will be needlessly 
retarded (Koput, 1997). Furthermore, the preplanned nature of assimilation meetings may 
give potential opponents the time to develop politically advantageous positions (Maltz & 
Kohli, 1996). 
 
In conclusion, insights based on the conceptual study and the analysis of the QUAL2 data 
led us to hypothesize a partial mediation model (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1: A partial mediation model 
Deliberate 
strategic learning 
mechanisms 
for recognition
Deliberate 
strategic learning 
mechanisms 
for assimilation
Deliberate 
strategic learning 
mechanisms 
for transformation 
SIcap
 
 
This model shows we hypothesize that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition will positively affect SIcap. This influence is partially mediated by the effects 
of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation and for transformation.  
Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation will, for their part, positively 
affect SIcap. This influence is in turn partially mediated by the effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for transformation. Finally, deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation will positively and directly affect SIcap.  
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More specifically, the test of this entire model comes essentially down to testing the 
following three hypotheses26 . 
 
H1: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition will positively affect SIcap. 
This influence is partially mediated by the effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for assimilation. 
 
d.s.l.m.
RECOG
d.s.l.m
ASSIM
d.s.l.m
TRANSF
SIcap
++
+
 
 
 
 
H2: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition will positively affect SIcap. 
This influence is partially mediated by the effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation. 
 
d.s.l.m.
RECOG
d.s.l.m
ASSIM
d.s.l.m
TRANSF
SIcap
+
+
+
 
 
                                                          
26 We use the term ‘hypotheses’ instead of ‘propositions’ since we follow Whetten (1989: 
491) that “the primary difference between propositions and hypotheses is that propositions 
involve concepts, whereas hypotheses require measures”. So, while both propositions and 
hypotheses articulate relationships, propositions are more abstract and also relate to more 
abstract constructs. In contrast, hypotheses build on specific, operationalized variables 
derived from these constructs, and involve more concrete and operational statements 
(Bacharach, 1989). The qualitative phase enabled us to further refine and operationalize 
the constructs we use (see the next section). The relationships we hypothesize here are 
defined in terms of these refined and operationalized concepts and will be tested in the 
quantitative phase. We judge the term ‘hypothesis’ hence more appropriate here. 
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H3: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation will positively affect SIcap. 
This influence is partially mediated by the effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation. 
 
d.s.l.m.
RECOG
d.s.l.m
ASSIM
d.s.l.m
TRANSF
SIcap
+
++
 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Research questions regarding the moderators 
 
External validity is related both to generalizing to particular target persons, settings, and 
times, and to generalizing across types of persons, settings and times. The latter answers to 
the question how far one can generalize (Cook & Campbell, 1979). “Tests of the extent to 
which one can generalize across various kinds of persons, settings, and times are, in 
essence, tests of statistical interactions. [...] Where effects of different magnitude exist, we 
must then specify where the effect does and does not hold and, hopefully, begin to explore 
why these differences exist” (Cook & Campbell, 1979: 72). Hence, in addition to the main 
hypotheses we developed, additional research questions concerning potential moderating 
effects were formulated.  
 
The QUAL2-findings did not enable us to formulate specific hypotheses concerning 
moderator effects on the (mediated) relationships between strategic learning mechanisms 
and SIcap. 
First, research on potential moderators on the ACAP-cycle is rather limited, not to say non-
existent. Besides Zahra & George’s (2002) conceptual propositions and Jansen et al.’s 
(2006) attempt to study the antecedent effects of ‘coordination, systems and socialization 
capabilities’ (Van den Bosch et al., 1999) on the four ACAP dimensions (Zahra & George, 
2002), the literature lacks (both empirical and conceptual) insights regarding whether and 
how moderators affect the ACAP cycle in itself. The development of hypotheses about 
moderating effects renders even more difficult in a study like ours, which focuses not on 
the general ACAP dimensions in themselves, but on the deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms fostering specific path-breaking focus areas in them.  
Secondly, the qualitative phase was primarily focused on the selection of strategic 
innovators (QUAL1), the operationalization and refinement of the constructs, and the 
development of a basic research model (i.e. hypotheses regarding the effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms on SIcap). Given the lack of a robust theoretical framework 
to fall back on, the data proved not sufficiently detailed to provide well-founded insights 
into the mechanisms that several moderators prime on the basic relationships.  
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Finally, the development of hypotheses regarding moderating effects is further 
complicated by the ‘flow’ character of the independent variables. For example, many 
interviewees indicate that the involvement of various functional areas in discussions and 
reflections on the market should be stimulated (see section 4.3.1.1). In companies where 
cross-functional information dissemination (one of the moderators) is highly developed, 
the effect deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation will have on SIcap can 
hence be expected to be larger than in companies with less-developed capacities for cross-
functional information dissemination. However, the opposite effect could be argued as 
well. In line with Zahra & George’s (2002) propositions concerning the effects of social 
integration mechanisms, we could hypothesize that cross-functional information 
dissemination would increase the efficiency of assimilation capacity. Companies where 
market information is well disseminated across all functional areas would hence have a 
lower need for deliberate strategic mechanisms that stimulate individuals to share 
reflections about the market. In these companies, the establishment of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation could hence turn out redundant as well. For all 
moderators, we were confronted with similar contradictory arguments. In addition, the 
influence moderators could exert on the (partial) mediation effects would have to be taken 
into account as well. In other words, the development of specific hypotheses was even 
more complicated as hypotheses regarding ‘moderated mediation’ effects (e.g. James & 
Brett, 1984) had to be formulated. 
In conclusion, a profound study of the literature and of the QUAL2-findings turned out 
fruitless, and we were forced to restrain ourselves from the formulation of directional 
hypotheses regarding moderating effects. 
 
Hence, we confined ourselves to the formulation of research questions, instead of the 
development of concrete hypotheses. This strategy has been used in prominent journals. 
For example, Duxbury & Higgins (Journal of Applied Psychology, 1991) justify the 
specification of research questions instead of hypotheses when existing empirical evidence 
is lacking. The formulation of research questions implies that our study on the moderating 
effects of several organizational and supply chain characteristics is essentially 
exploratory27.  
Research questions were formulated for all the key influential constructs that were derived 
from the QUAL2 analysis in section 4.3.1.2. 
 
RQ1: What are the effects of an innovative culture on the hypothesized partial-mediation 
model? 
 
RQ2: What are the effects of a risk-taking culture on the hypothesized partial-mediation 
model? 
 
RQ3: What are the effects of the cross-functional dissemination of market information on 
the hypothesized partial-mediation model? 
                                                          
27 Since we combined an exploratory investigation (i.e. research questions instead of 
hypotheses) with a quantitative data collection (survey) and statistical analysis (PLS) in the 
QUAN-phase (see chapter 5), this is actually a mixed type III of ‘mixed model research’ 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
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RQ4: What are the effects of information provision by customers on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ5: What are the effects of information provision by suppliers on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ6: What are the effects of a formalized organization structure on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ7: What are the effects of a centralized organization structure on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ8: What are the effects of the innovation stimulus from customers on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ9: What are the effects of the innovation stimulus from suppliers on the hypothesized 
partial-mediation model? 
 
RQ10: What are the effects of the general chain climate on the hypothesized partial-
mediation model? 
 
4.3.3 Development of quantitative measurement instruments 
 
In the early stages of questionnaire design and development, both an extensive literature 
study and a qualitative research prove useful. 
First, it is important that operationalizations depend on the results of a conceptual analysis 
in which essential features of the construct are revealed. “A precise explication of 
constructs is vital for high construct validity since it permits tailoring the manipulations 
and measures to whichever definitions emerge from the explication” (Cook & Campbell, 
1979: 65). Hence, each construct was first theoretically conceptualized based on the 
literature (see chapter 2).   
Second, as already mentioned, these conceptual definitions served as guidelines during the 
QUAL study. More specifically, the QUAL findings enabled us to further specify, refine, 
supplement and validate these definitions. The value of in-depth interviews, discussions 
with experts, and focus groups with respondents and experts have been stressed in this 
respect (Bagozzi, 1994a: 39). The development of all indexes and scales was consequently 
based on a conceptual study of relevant literature and on the results of our qualitative 
research. Wherever possible, validated operationalizations of constructs developed by 
other researchers were adopted (Creswell et al., 2003).   
 
For every category of variables, both the contents of the construct and the measurement 
mode was first specified before a sample of reflective indicators or a census of formative 
indicators were formulated to measure the construct.  The purpose of following this logic 
is to explicitly relate theoretical notions to the empirical model, and in this sense to better 
be able to make (content) valid research conclusions (Bagozzi, 1994a; Rossiter, 2002). The 
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formulation of the operational construct definitions is based on the conventions developed 
by Rossiter (2002). 
 
4.3.3.1 Operationalization of the independent variables 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Operational construct definition 
The QUAL findings (see section 4.3.1.1), enriched by the conceptual study in chapter 2, 
led to the following operational construct definitions of the independent variables:  
 
‘RECOG’: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition (‘recog’) are 
deliberate mechanisms, as perceived by people in charge of the organization/BU’s 
marketing strategy (raters), that foster the path-breaking focus areas in an organization’s 
recognition capacity. The object of recog is the Dutch industrial organization/BU.   
Recog is a second-order formed attribute, consisting of 8 components, of which two are 
eliciting attributes: mechanisms for the stimulation of 1) the collection of general 
environmental information (macro-economic and societal, ‘envinfo’), and 2) the 
development of deep customer insight (‘insight’). The remaining six components are 
formed attributes: the stimulation of 1) insights into future customer needs, 2) market 
research on other industries, 3) the detection of fundamental changes in the industry, 4) 
the collection of information about the needs of end customers, 5) the consultation of 
innovative customers for new ideas, and 6) the study of non-customers.  
 
‘ASSIM’: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation (‘assim’) are 
deliberate mechanisms, as perceived by people in charge of the organization/BU’s 
marketing strategy (raters), that foster the path-breaking focus areas in an organization’s 
assimilation capacity. The object of assim is the Dutch industrial organization/BU.  
Assim is a second-order formed attribute, consisting of 5 components. All five components 
are in turn formed attributes as well: mechanisms for the stimulation of 1) the critical 
reflection on customers, 2) the critical reflection on markets, 3) the critical reflection on 
the marketing approach, 4) the exchange of critical reflections on customers and markets, 
and  5) the memory of critical reflections on customers and markets. 
 
‘TRANSF’: Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation (‘transf’) are 
deliberate mechanisms, as perceived by people in charge of the organization/BU’s 
marketing strategy (raters), that foster the path-breaking focus areas in an organization’s 
transformation capacity. The object of transf is the Dutch industrial organization/BU.  
Transf is a second-order formed attribute, consisting of 6 components. All six components 
are in turn formed attributes as well: mechanisms for the stimulation of 1) the adjustment 
of the organizational structure to better meet the needs of a new (planned) offering, 2) the 
replacement of skills/competencies to better meet the needs of a new (planned) offering, 3) 
the adjustment of procedures to better meet the needs of a new (planned) offering, 4) the 
change of the way of working to better meet the needs of a new (planned) offering, 5) the 
prevention of organizational chaos when a new offering is being launched, and 6) the 
support of new initiatives, even at the detriment of existing products/services. 
 
These operational definitions reveal the multidimensional character (Law & Wong, 1999; 
Law et al., 1998; Chin & Gopal, 1995) of the independent variables, found in the QUAL 
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analysis. More specifically, the qualitative findings pointed to the appropriateness of a 
‘molar approach’. This means that the independent constructs are conceptualized as 
superordinate constructs; no interdependencies among their (own) components are studied. 
The independent construct only connects its dimensions to other constructs in the model 
(Chin & Gopal, 1995). The independent constructs are in fact second-order formed 
attributes, in themselves consisting of several first-order attributes, or dimensions or facets 
(Rossiter, 2002). This implies that the direction of causality is from the dimensions to the 
construct, or to put it in another way, that the arrows go from the dimensions to the 
construct. 
 
4.3.3.1.2 Indicator specification 
Knowing that all independent variables are molar, multidimensional, constructs concrete 
indicators can be specified. First of all, the contents of the constructs (with all its 
dimensions) should be reflected in the items. Since the constructs are molar and include 
several different facets, unidimensionality is precluded. This implies that reflective 
measures of distinct dimensions may not be forced into a unidimensional model (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991).  Basically this situation leaves us with two alternative indicator 
specification modes, between which we can choose the most appropriate one.  
The first alternative consists of building a second-order model in which each dimension is 
separately measured by its own set of reflective indicators (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). The 
second option consists of capturing each dimension by one well chosen formative 
indicator. We decided to follow the latter approach because of the following reasons. First, 
this option has often been referred to in the literature (e.g., Cohen et al., 1990; Chin & 
Gopal, 1995): “[...] multidimensional constructs are often conceptualized as composites of 
their dimensions, such that the paths run from the dimensions to the construct. In such 
instances, the dimensions of the construct are analogous to formative indicators” (Williams 
et al., 2003: 909). Secondly, opting for the first alternative (measuring each dimension by 
its own set of reflective indicators) would have extended the –already long– questionnaire 
even more. We think the disadvantages of a long survey (e.g. low response rate) would 
have outweighed its potential advantage in terms of an increase in measurement qualities. 
The more since Rossiter (2002) stressed the value of one well chosen formative indicator 
to capture a formed attribute. Finally, the exploratory character of the study made us 
prioritize on revealing the importance of certain dimensions, more than on specifying the 
indicators’ measurement properties (by measuring each significant formative indicator by a 
domain-sampling strategy). 
 
Hence, all independent variables are operationalized in a formative specification mode; the 
formed attribute measures are not unidimensional and their indicators form an index. The 
independent constructs are thus determined by an explanatory mix of manifest variables.  
To check the appropriateness of the formative measurement mode, the guidelines 
developed by Fornell & Bookstein (1982), Chin (1998a), Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer 
(2001) and Jarvis et al. (2003) were followed (see chapter 3). In short, the QUAL2 findings 
revealed the specific path-breaking focus areas the independent variables target. 
Consequently, the indicators are conceptualized as defining characteristics of the construct. 
This implies that changes in the indicators would cause changes in the construct; dropping 
one indicator would change the conceptual domain of the construct. Indicators share a 
common theme (the specific ACAP dimension), still they are not interchangeable. The 
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different deliberate learning mechanisms of a construct are by definition not positively 
correlated; a change in one of the indicators is not necessarily associated with a change in 
all the other indicators. Alternatively, an increase of the construct value does not per 
definition lead to an increased value of each and every deliberate learning mechanism 
measuring this construct. In contrast, a change in one deliberate learning mechanism 
changes the overall construct value. For example, the QUAL2 findings indicated that the 
stimulation of the study of non-customers does not necessarily imply that insights into 
future customer needs are stimulated as well, in each and every case. If the construct recog 
increases, this does not necessarily imply that all of the eight domains are stimulated to a 
higher degree. However, if one of the eight focus areas is stimulated more, recog will have 
a higher value. A similar logic can be applied to all indicators and to every independent 
variable. 
In the concrete, recog, assim and transf consist of respectively 8, 5, and 6 dimensions or 
components that are captured by one good item per component; all the indicators hence 
cover all the construct’ s components (Rossiter, 2002).  As a consequence, the number of 
indicators used to capture these constructs should equal the number of construct 
components; the indicators are all defining items for the attribute. This explains why a 
formative specification mode requires being fully inclusive; too few indicators would 
mean ignoring certain construct dimensions and would consequently alter the construct’s 
contents (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). This is why an extensive literature and 
QUAL research were needed to refine dimensions before operationalizing them.   
 
In the case of recog the situation becomes still more complicated. This construct was in 
fact operationalized by combining the aforementioned two options for molar constructs. 
Both the dimensions ‘mechanisms for the stimulation of the collection of general 
environmental  information’ (envinfo), and 2) ‘mechanisms for the stimulation of the 
development of deep customer insight’ (insight) were measured by means of several 
reflective indicators: recog4, 5 & 6 for envinfo, and recog3, 7, 8 & 9 for insight (see 
Appendix II). For envinfo we decided to do so because this enabled us to use an existing 
scale (Matsuno et al., 2002: measure for market intelligence generation).  For insight, 
reflective indicators were used since they illustrated the specific contents of the dimension 
in a clearer way. Moreover, although the insight-indicators had all separately been 
mentioned in the QUAL research, they were conceptually much related to each other. For 
this reason, we decided to combine them into one single ‘insight’-dimension.  
Yet, the reflective operationalization of both the dimensions envinfo and insight turned the 
recog construct into a so-called ‘reflective first-order, formative second-order model’ 
(Jarvis et al., 2003). Yet, we wanted to keep the measurement model parsimonious by 
keeping consistency with the operationalization of the other components (i.e. one 
formative indicator per component). Moreover, we were especially interested in the paths 
from the dimensions onto the constructs, more than in the paths from the reflective 
indicators onto the dimensions. In the case a second-order model is not preferred two 
possibilities are left.  
The first possibility was to operationalize all recog indicators in a formative mode, 
including all the envinfo and insight indicators (e.g., Fornell et al., 1990 for an illustration). 
Still, this approach lacks methodological correctness since “lumping together items across 
dimensions in an index could misleadingly yield a weighted average and obscure the 
differential contributions of the dimensions” (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994: 36; see also 
Chapter 4 
 194 
Carver, 1989 for a more detailed critique). Hence, we opted for the second possibility, 
which consists of aggregating the reflective indicators of these eliciting components 
(Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994; Cohen et al., 1990; Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). The 
use of composites is quite popular in SEM; for example, Baumgartner & Homburg (1996)  
report that in 38 percent of SEM applications published in prominent marketing journals 
(1977-1994) items were combined into composites prior to entering them into a structural 
equations model.  
 
Despite the popularity of aggregation, it has rarely been documented and substantiated in 
methodological publications. The approach became finally more delineated through 
Bagozzi & Heatherton’ s (1994) framework on ‘partial aggregation models’. In a partial 
aggregation model separate dimensions of a construct are treated as indicators of a single 
latent variable, with each dimension being an aggregation of items (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 
1994)28. In this way, model complexity is minimized (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). 
More specifically, we opted for a so-called ‘discrete components partial aggregation 
model’ (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994: 40). An illustration of this approach is given in 
Ravichandran & Rai (2000). This approach should be followed when the dimensions do 
not share significant amounts of common variance.  The appropriateness of this approach 
is justified by the fact that our constructs were conceptualized as being emergent (second-
order formed attributes).   
 
In the concrete, we averaged the reflective item scores for the envinfo and insight 
dimensions. Then, these averages were used as formative indicators.  Consequently, all 
independent variables were entirely operationalized by means of formative indicators (see 
Figure 4.2).  
In chapter 5, we will demonstrate that there are no empirical contingencies on the use of a 
formative mode since sample size was acceptable and multicollinearity among the 
formative indicators was absent (Chin, 1998a; Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). The full 
indicator descriptions (question wording) can be found in Appendix II. As can be seen 
there, negatively or reversed-worded items have been included to control for acquiescence, 
leniency bias, and spurious response conditions (Harrison & McLaughlin, 1996). 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 A good illustration of this approach can be found in Hull et al. (1991). 
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Figure 4.2: the measurement model for the independent variables 
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*: The final measure for assim consisted in fact of 6 formative indicators. The formative indicator ‘assim6’ was 
added based on the pre-testing results (see chapter 3, section 3.6.2.2.1). 
 
4.3.3.2 Operationalization of the dependent variable 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Operational construct definition 
In chapter 1, we defined SI in the following way: “SI entails the creation of new and 
substantially superior customer value by a new and fundamentally different way of playing 
the game in an existing industry. It implies the deviance from traditional industry 
assumptions and conventions and, as such, has the potential of altering the rules of the 
game in an industry. SI can be achieved by redefining the business model, the roles and 
(power) relationships in the industry included”. Resting on conceptual and empirical 
arguments (chapter 1), we however treat SIcapacity as the dependent variable (DV) of our 
study. We defined SIcap as “an organization’s capacity to systematically create SI 
initiatives”. 
 
The following operational construct definition of SIcap was adopted: 
‘SIcap’: Strategic innovation capacity as perceived by people in charge of the BU’s 
(firm’s) marketing strategy (raters) is the BU’s (firm’s) capacity, relative to its main 
competitors’ capacity, to systematically create SI-initiatives that entail: 1) the creation of 
new and substantially  superior customer value, by 2) a redefinition of the business model 
(incl. market approach), and by 3) the altering of roles & relationships (incl. partnerships 
and power relations) among industry players. SIcap is an eliciting attribute, its object is 
the Dutch industrial organization/BU. 
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In chapter 3, we justified the study of SIinitiatives and the BU level of analysis in multi-
unit organizations. Furthermore, as the aforementioned operational definition shows, we 
measured a BU’s (firm’s) level of SIcap in relation to competitors. We decided to follow 
Baden-Fuller’s (1995) advice to not relate SIcap to some absolute standard, but to consider 
it in relation to the SIcap of main competitors. This implies that an external reference point 
was used instead of measuring a differential score over time between a pre- and post-SI 
organizational situation (for a critical assessment of the latter method, see Bergh & 
Fairbank, 2002). In this way, emphasis is put on the deviance of SI from industry rules, 
more than on the internal deviance from past strategy contents. This external focus reflects 
the external aspect of the SIconcept (in contrast to e.g. the concept of strategic renewal, 
which is more inwardly focused, see chapter 1). Concerning the operationalization of the 
crucial aspect of ‘new and substantially superior customer value’, we experienced that the 
lack of conceptual consensus about the nature of customer value is also reflected in the 
lack of unanimity about its measurement (Payne & Holt, 2001). Some authors even oppose 
against any low-level operational measurement of he construct, given its higher level 
nature (Woodall, 2003). For this reason, we decided to define customer value in broad 
terms at the beginning of the survey, but not to operationalize it in a separate measure. 
Finally, the operational definition of SIcap relative to the SIcap of main competitors 
moreover reflects the nature of this variable as being continuous, rather than dichotomous. 
The question is not whether SIcap is present or absent, but it is a matter of degree. This is 
in consistence with Jaworski et al.’s (2000) conceptualization of market-driving behavior; 
where the degree of market-driving behavior depends on the number of market changes 
and on the magnitude of these changes.  
 
4.3.3.2.2 Indicator specification 
SIcap can be conceptualized as an underlying factor giving rise to several observable 
manifestations; it can be considered as an organizational trait or disposition and not as a set 
of discrete activities (Rossiter, 2002; Jarvis et al., 2003). All the indicators were hence to 
be considered as a set of specific manifestations or ‘proximal consequences’ of the 
underlying latent variable (Rossiter, 2002: 316-317).  To measure the trait adequately, 7 
items were included.  
SIcap was operationalized by means of a reflective specification mode. This implies that 
for SIcap to be present, all different manifestations of the construct had to be observable; a 
change in the underlying construct implied a similar change in all of its manifest 
indicators.  The construct was hence operationalized according to a domain-sampling 
strategy of interchangeable indicators; all indicators had to be positively correlated to each 
other (Jarvis et al., 2003; Chin, 1998a). The study’s aim was to explain the observed 
variances in the manifest variables of the dependent variable (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). 
The final measure consisted of 7 reflective indicators. The final indicators can be found in 
Appendix II. All items were formulated according to a comparative perspective (‘in 
relation to our main competitors’) since the construct definition specified to do so. An 
additional advantage was that comparative questions have been found to lead to a higher 
measurement quality (Andrews, 1984).  
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4.3.3.3 Operationalization of the moderators 
 
As previously mentioned, the selection of moderators was based on a study of relevant 
literature and on the results of QUAL2.  
In contrast to the independent variables in our research, many of the moderators we 
included have already been operationalized in the literature. In this case, it has been 
recommended to use existing scales as much as possible in order to compare and 
accumulate findings (e.g., Churchill, 1979; Creswell et al., 2003). Whenever possible, (a 
Dutch translation of) existing (validated) scales were hence used to operationalize the 
moderators. Still, some scales had to be altered or combined in order to enhance content 
validity of the moderators in the context of SI. The scales for information provision by 
suppliers, innovation stimulus from suppliers and general chain climate were entirely 
newly developed. They were however based on the QUAL2 study and were 
operationalized by analogy with existing scales. As regards the measure for general chain 
climate, we explicitly chose to use a perceptive measure, instead of using existing, 
objective measures of industry dynamism or hostility. We did so in order to avoid so-
called ‘aggregation’ problems. All variables were measured on a business unit level. Since 
environmental effects are not likely to have an impact on organizations in a homogenous 
way, this variable was not operationalized on an industry but on a business unit level. 
Furthermore, research has indicated the influence of perceived environmental factors (see 
chapter 1). 
All moderators were measured in a reflective mode since a) all moderators could be 
considered as traits or dispositions of the organization/BU giving rise to observable 
manifestations, and b) existing scales for these constructs have been specified in this mode. 
All operational construct definitions could hence be considered as eliciting attributes. They 
were rated by people in charge of marketing strategy and their object was the Dutch 
industrial organization/BU. 
Table 4.2 shows for each moderator the operational construct definition and the existing 
scales we relied on for the final Web survey (see chapter 3). Once again, full indicator 
descriptions can be found in Appendix II.  
 
4.3.3.4 Operationalization of the control variables 
 
The QUAL2 findings revealed potential homogenization effects of three additional 
variables on business unit’s (firm’s) SIcap. More specifically, we controlled for the 
potential impact of the business unit’s (firm’s) size, its supply chain position and its type.  
The organization’s position in the supply chain had to be indicated on a 10-point scale 
ranging from 1: raw material to 10: end customer. Levels 1-4 represented upstream 
companies, levels 5-7 were considered as midstream companies and levels 8-9 stood for 
downstream companies.  
To measure the business unit’s (firm’s) type, the main activities of the organization were 
asked for (product firm or service firm). Industrial product activities were further 
subdivided into 8 corresponding BIK classes; industrial service activities were classified 
into 6 BIK categories. 
Business unit (firm) size was defined as the number of full time employees. This number 
was distinguished into four categories: <100, 100-199, 200-499, and >500, resulting from 
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respondents’ remarks during the pretest (see chapter 3, section 3.6.2.2.1). The 
operationalizations of the control variables can be found in Appendix II as well. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Moderators: constructs definitions and scales used 
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In conclusion, the QUAL study enabled us to select and refine relevant constructs, to 
develop hypotheses and additional research questions and to develop measurement 
specifications for the constructs to be further studied. As predicated by the 
QUALÆQUAN design that we applied, the hypothesized partial mediation model was 
further tested in a quantitative study. The purpose of the additional quantitative phase was 
to increase the statistical conclusion, construct and external validity of the (preliminary) 
qualitative results. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE 
 
 
The QUAN phase essentially served to test and validate the preliminary insights derived 
from the QUAL-analysis. Building on the constructs, model and measurement instruments 
selected and developed during the QUAL-phase, we created a survey instrument and 
administered it to a sample of target respondents.  The survey data were used to test the 
hypothesized partially-mediated model by means of Partial Least Squares. A technical 
explanation of this statistical method can be found in chapter 3. This chapter also provides 
details about the survey development process, the survey administration, the respondents 
and the characteristics of the final data set. 
Over the next sections we are confining ourselves to the analytical results of the QUAN 
analysis. First, we will briefly describe how data were cleaned before entering them into 
the analysis. The second section tackles results regarding the measurement model. This 
essentially comes down to tests on the reliability and validity of the measures. The analysis 
and results of the structural model are elaborated on in the final section of this chapter. 
 
 
5.1 DATA SCREENING AND CLEANING 
 
We examined the accuracy of the data. First, we checked for possible mistakes during the 
data entering process by means of frequencies. Then, missing value and outlier patterns 
were examined. Finally, we tested for the existence of common method bias. 
 
5.1.1 Accuracy of input 
 
Although the data entered onto the website were directly stacked into an excel file, we still 
studied univariate descriptives (‘Frequencies’ module in SPSS 11.0) to check the accuracy 
of the input. We looked for out of range values (minimum and maximum values) and 
examined whether means (or medians for the ordinal variables) and standard deviations 
were plausible (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001a). All values were plausible; no problems were 
detected. 
  
5.1.2 Missing values analysis 
 
Results may be biased if missing values do not follow a random pattern. For this reason, in 
the analysis of missing data, much attention should be paid to the pattern of the missing 
data. We followed Tabachnick & Fidell’s (2001a) and Hair et al.’s (1998) guidelines to 
analyze the missing data. 
A first raw examination of the data set indicated that the number of missings was related to 
the sequence of questions in the survey; the later questions appeared in the survey, the 
more missing values they seemed to have. Inspection of the missing and data patterns 
(missing value analysis in SPSS 12.0) confirmed this triangular pattern. Of the 339 
respondents who had initiated the survey, only 221 had completed the survey up to the last 
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recog-item, 188 up to the last SIcap-item, and only 155 had completed the entire survey 
(up to and including the last nwinno-item). 
We already had expected this pattern given the number of technical breakdowns we noted, 
and given the low response rates of marketing managers found in the literature (see the 
methodological chapter). Although the website had been tested extensively, technical 
breakdowns could apparently not be avoided. We contacted several respondents with a 
high-missings profile and our suspicions proved to be correct. Many persons indicated that 
the system broke down while they were trying to complete the survey. For example, after 
the first two identifications screens, almost 82 respondents quit the survey. Although we 
provided respondents with new authorization codes to make another attempt, respondents 
indicated that when the site did not work properly at this second attempt they eventually 
gave up. In addition, respondents mentioned that their job workload and time pressure did 
not leave time to complete the survey.  
 
No exact guidelines exist on the level of missing values for exclusion; decisions should be 
built upon theoretical and empirical arguments (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001a). Since 
research data are scarce and valuable, we needed to choose between making full use of all 
available data, and prioritizing the consistency in the subsequent analyses, which meant 
substantial loss of subjects.  
Restricting data to respondents who had entirely completed the survey, the so-called 
‘complete case approach’ (Hair et al., 1998: 51), would result in an inappropriate sample 
size of only 155 respondents. As the survey was built according to the following sequence: 
1) independent variables, 2) dependent variable, 3) moderators (see chapter 3), we decided 
to compromise by including all respondents who had adequately completed the survey 
items at least up to the moderators. In this way, we could make full use of the data on the 
main variables of interest (the independent and dependent variables), while maintaining 
consistency in the basic analyses.  
We however first verified whether item missingness was not related to the moment of 
survey completion. Results showed no relationship. Indeed, despite the numerous attempts 
made during the survey process to reduce the number of technical breakdowns, 
respondents kept on reporting technical problems. Furthermore, the fact that some 
respondents quit the Web survey before finishing it because of time constraints remained 
an important issue in the entire process as well. Hence, it was not surprising that the study 
of missing patterns revealed no relationship between item missingness and time of 
completion (Van der Stede et al., 2005). We further compared the early and late 
respondents by means of a chi-square test (a dummy variable to indicate missingness on an 
item was related to a dummy variable indicating early or late response) (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001a). Once more, results proved insignificant. Hence, we decided it was safe to 
remove the 151 cases reporting too many missings on the independent and dependent 
variables from the dataset. This however implied that of the 339 respondents to the survey, 
only 188 respondents could be kept for analysis.  
This reduced sample was once more subjected to a missing value analysis. Missing 
patterns in this set of 188 cases did not reveal systematic missing values on the items of the 
independent variables (IV) and the dependent variable (DV). In addition, t-tests were 
performed to see whether missingness was related to any other variables, (with α = 0.05 
and test done only for variables with at least 5 percent missings). Results showed no 
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significance for the IV- and DV-items, so missings can be assumed to be randomly 
distributed in the remaining data matrix of the main theoretical constructs.  
 
After carefully weighing up the pros and cons of imputation, we decided to not impute the 
remaining missings. Our final decision was built upon the following arguments. Firstly, the 
number of remaining missing values on the independent and dependent variables was 
small and random. Secondly, popular imputation methods, such as mean substitution and 
regression, reduce the variance of a variable. Thirdly, the partial least squares program 
PLS graph 3.0 (Chin) that was used for the main analysis can easily handle missing values, 
and applies imputation on the conditions the researcher specifies; for example, only when a 
small number of values is missing (Chatelin et al., 2002). Fourthly, the only block of 
missing values interesting enough to impute would be the systematic missings on the 
moderators. Yet, when missings appeared, they mostly appeared for all the items of a 
construct (respondents seemingly quit the survey when a new web page appeared), so 
scores on remaining items could not be used to impute the missing items; imputation of an 
entire construct should hence only be based upon values of other constructs. In our opinion 
this would obscure the data too much; variance of constructs would be reduced such that 
constructs would fit together better than they should. Finally, although a smaller sample 
size implies a reduction in statistical power and generalizability towards the population, 
the sample size (N=188) was still large enough to perform the main statistical analyses.  
 
5.1.3 Outliers 
 
Since outliers may distort solutions, their presence was examined.  
The presence of univariate outliers (extreme scores on one variable) was examined by 
studying the standardized z-scores of the data. Z-scores smaller than -3.3 or larger than 3.3 
were regarded as outliers. The number of univariate outliers was expected to be small since 
Likert-scores had been used for measurement. Only for the centralization construct one 
univariate outlier was found (case 69 on struct3).  The case was removed from the 
analysis. 
Multivariate outliers (peculiar combination of scores departing markedly from others) were 
identified by calculating the Mahalanobis distance29 for each variable. To identify 
multivariate outliers a regression analysis was conducted with all indicators (of the IVs, 
DV and moderators) serving as independent variables and the response number as the 
dependent variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001b). Mahalanobis distances pointed to the 
existence of six multivariate outliers. After careful examination, we found that all these 
outliers showed inconsistent answering patterns to the items of several constructs (so per 
construct). Inconsistency across/among different constructs was however limited. 
Specifically, cases 6, 86, 98, 119, and 169 showed inconsistent scores on the items of the 
independent variables. Respondents 86 and 98 completed the items of the dependent 
                                                          
29 The Mahalanobis distance is the distance from the gravity center, or the centroid of the 
sample determined by the means of the variables. The Mahalanobis distance is Chi-square 
distributed with df = number of variables. Each Mahalanobis distance is compared to a 
critical chi-square value (α = 0.001). Cases with a Mahalanobis distance exceeding this 
critical value represent multivariate outliers and are discarded (see e.g., Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001a). 
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variable in an inconsistent way as well. In addition, for cases 86, 98, 119 and 169 
inconsistent patterns were found in several moderators (e.g respondent 86 answered 
inconsistently on innovativeness and risktaking). All these outliers were removed from 
subsequent analyses.   
 
5.1.4 Common method bias assessment 
 
Since self-reports were used for data collection, it is especially important to control for 
potential common method variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
To this end, we applied Harman’s one-factor test. All measured variables were entered into 
a factor analysis (principal axis factoring) and results of the unrotated factor solution were 
examined (Podsakoff  & Organ, 1986). Results indicated that no single factor emerged; 20 
factors were extracted of which 13 factors (= the same number as the number of 
hypothesized constructs entered) had eigenvalues >1. Moreover, no general (first) factor 
accounted for the majority of variance: the first factor accounted for only 20,4% of the 
62,8% of variance extracted by the entire factor solution. Both results point to the absence 
of common method bias (e.g., Schriesheim, 1979). 
In addition, we trimmed scales and evaluated discriminant validity (see section 5.2.1.2). A 
satisfactory level of discriminant validity can be considered as an additional proof of the 
absence of common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
 
 
5.2 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE MEASUREMENT MODEL 
 
If measures are less reliable and theory only tentative, Hair et al. (1998) propose to follow 
a two-stage model evaluation, in order to maximize the interpretability of both the 
measurement and structural model. Particularly in a PLS analysis, this two-stage approach 
has often been applied and advised (e.g., Hulland, 1999)30. Hence, we will first asses the 
psychometric qualities of the measures, before analyzing the structural model.  
Basically this comes down to assessing whether measures are sufficiently valid, meaning 
that they measure what they are intended to measure (Bagozzi, 1994a), before testing for a 
significant relationship in the structural model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Valid measures 
are measures that demonstrate a satisfactory level of reliability, content validity, and 
convergent and discriminant validity (Bagozzi, 1994a).  
 
The observed score on a measure always equals the true score plus systematic error plus 
random error.  Systematic error then consists of a) method variance (e.g., respondents each 
interpret the answer categories in a different way) and b) response sets (e.g., respondents 
answer in a socially desirable way). Random error occurs because of chance errors, e.g. 
careless responding due to fatigue or mood.  
Reliability then depends on how much of the variation in scores is attributable to random 
or chance errors. In other words, if a measure is perfectly reliable, there are no random 
                                                          
30 A true two-stage model evaluation in the strict sense is however not possible in PLS. 
Whether formative or reflective, loadings and weights can change dependent on the 
nomological context in which the measures are used (Chin, 1998a). This implies that 
measurement properties partly depend on the structural model. 
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sources of error. Consequently, a measure is reliable to the extent that independent but 
comparable attempts to measure the same trait or construct of a given object agree 
(Bagozzi, 1994a; Churchill, 1979).  
In contrast, a measure is valid on the condition that “the indicators accurately measure 
what they are supposed to measure” (Hair et al., 1998: 612). This implies that the 
differences in observed scores only reflect the true differences on the characteristic being 
measured and nothing else; or, the observed score equals the true score (Churchill, 1979).  
These definitions of reliability and validity imply that if a measure is valid, it is reliable, 
but that the converse is not necessarily true; when random sources of error do not exist 
(perfect reliability), the observed score could still equal the true score plus systematic 
sources of error (no perfect validity). Measures can be consistent for the wrong reasons, 
such as method biases or halo effects (Andrews, 1984; Bagozzi, 1994a).  Thus it is often 
said that reliability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for validity; Bagozzi 
(1994a) even considers reliability as one of the aspects of validity.  
 
This implies that for the examination of a measure’s validity, next to testing its reliability,   
content (and face) validity and construct validity should be checked as well. Whereas 
content validity and face validity have already been examined and verified during the 
extensive pre-testing procedure, construct validity will now be assessed as well. 
Construct validity relates to what the instrument is in fact measuring; does the 
operationalization of a construct, trait or concept really measures this construct, trait or 
concept? In this way its meaning is quite similar to the general definition of validity 
(Bagozzi, 1994a). Construct validity consists of convergent validity (the extent to which a 
measure covaries with other measures designed to measure the same construct) and 
discriminant validity (the extent to which measures of a construct differ from measures 
measuring another construct). Both need to be assessed since a high level of convergent 
validity alone can be caused by method variance or other extraneous factors (Bagozzi, 
1994a).  
The best way to check for convergent and discriminant validity is through Campbell & 
Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod matrix. Yet, this matrix implies that the same 
constructs have been measured by different methods. Due to time and resource constraints 
we were not able to do so. This is why we only tried to assess convergent and discriminant 
validity between the different indicators of the final survey. Moreover, we deliberately 
grounded the survey indicators in previous qualitative research in order to enhance 
construct validity.  
 
As mentioned in the methodological chapter, traditional validity criteria do not apply to 
formative indicators. Therefore, the analysis had to be conducted separately for the 
reflective constructs and the formative constructs. We will first study the reflective 
constructs: the dependent variable and the moderators.  
 
5.2.1 The reflectively specified constructs 
 
Even though psychometric qualities of the measures are often directly assessed in PLS, we 
chose to perform a separate, preparatory exploratory factor analysis (EFA).  
EFA groups manifest variables that are intercorrelated under a common factor (Heck, 
1998). Although an EFA can not be considered as a confirmatory technique testing for 
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factor unidimensionality (Heck, 1998), it is still very useful in revealing, or even 
confirming, the underlying data structure the researcher expects (Iacobucci, 1994). It plays 
hence a useful role in the development and validation of a scale (Conway & Huffcutt, 
2003)31.  
 
We explicitly chose to perform a common factor analysis (principal axis factoring) instead 
of the very popular principal component analysis (PCA).  As the DV and the moderators 
were defined as being latent (see chapter 4), we tried to explain covariance among the 
measured variables by extracting common factors corrected for unique variance of the 
observed variables (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Iacobucci, 1994). PCA, which creates 
linear combinations that contain as much as possible common and unique variance of the 
original data, would only have been appropriate if our purpose had been one of data 
reduction.   
An even more important argument for the use of a common factor model is that in 
subsequent analyses PLS will be used. Since PLS rests on PCAs (maximizing all variance; 
assuming the nonexistence of uniqueness terms), the factor extraction method used in these 
preparatory EFAs would probably produce more conservative results than those obtained 
in the subsequent PLS analysis32.  
 
5.2.1.1 Exploratory factor analyses 
 
We followed a stepwise approach. First an EFA was conducted for each conceptual 
domain separately. Constructs belonging to the same domain can be assumed to be 
conceptually and empirically most related. Performing first an EFA among the most 
related constructs helped to keep the analysis structured (by purifying measures in 
advance), and facilitated the interpretation of the factors. More precisely, first six EFAs 
were conducted: 1) on the cultural constructs: innovativeness (innovat) and risk taking 
(risktak), 2) on cross-functional dissemination of market information (crossf), 3) on chain 
information potential: information provision by customers (infocus) and information 
provision by suppliers (infosup), 4) on organizational structure: formalization (form) and 
centralization (central), 5) on chain innovation potential: innovation stimulus from 
customers (innocus), innovation stimulus from suppliers (innosup) and general chain 
climate (chainclim), and 6) on the dependent variable: SIcap. The corresponding items per 
construct in these conceptual domains are indicated in Appendix II. 
Based on these results, we proceeded by performing a complete EFA with all moderators 
and the dependent variable entered en bloc. All EFAs were run in SPSS 12.0 (‘data 
reduction-factor’ module). 
 
 
                                                          
31 In fact, in order to gain full evidence of construct unidimensionality, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) should be performed. Yet, we would like to refer here to the same 
arguments as the ones that we developed in chapter 3 regarding the inappropriateness of 
covariance-based SEM in this research. In our view, it is exactly due to these arguments that 
CFA has, to our knowledge, never been used in the PLS tradition. 
32 The smaller the uniqueness, the larger the communality, the more PCA and FA will show 
similar results. 
Findings of the quantitative phase 
 207
5.2.1.1.1 Separate exploratory factor analyses 
Before starting the EFAs, all assumptions underlying factor analysis were profoundly 
checked (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c; Hair et al., 1998). In appendix IV, more details are 
provided. After having verified these assumptions, for each EFA analyses with/without 
all/only largest outliers were compared. No structural differences were found in the factor 
patterns. Results are only reported for the analyses with all outliers removed.  
 
Inspection of the factor intercorrelations demonstrated the appropriateness of the oblique 
rotation method33, except for the constructs belonging to the domain of chain innovation 
stimulus (see Table 5.1). Results of the scree test and the Kaizer criterion indicated that the 
hypothesized number of factors could be retained. The proportion of variance extracted (of 
each factor and of all factors as a group) was examined and proved satisfactory in all factor 
solutions. Finally, loadings and communalities were studied. Clear cut-off values are 
lacking in the literature (Wijnen et al., 2002), but, in general, it is said that higher 
communality estimates and high loadings concentrated on one factor (not spread across all 
factors) suggest stronger measures of the factors (Heck, 1998: 191).  
 
Regarding the loadings, we followed Comrey & Lee’s (1992) rules of thumb (in 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c: 625): loadings > 0.71 (50% overlapping variance) are 
‘excellent’, loadings > 0.63 (40% overlapping variance) are ‘very good’, loadings > 0.55 
(30% overlapping variance) are ‘good’, loadings > 0.45 (20% overlapping variance) are 
‘fair’, loadings > 0.32 (10% overlapping variance) are ‘poor’, and loadings < 0.32 are not 
interpreted. Based on these guidelines we took 0.45 (‘fair’) as the loading cut-off. Also, in 
terms of statistical significance, considering our sample size (150 to 200) only loadings 
exceeding 0.40 to 0.45 could be considered as statistically significant, with α =0.05 and 
power (1-β) = 0.80 (Wijnen et al., 2002). 
In oblique rotations, it is more common to interpret and report the pattern matrix than the 
structure matrix (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). Hence, in the case of oblique rotation the 
pattern matrices, in one-factor EFAs the factor matrix, and for the domain of chain 
innovation potential the rotated factor matrix were analyzed.   
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the final loadings and communalities of all items; loadings smaller 
than 0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c) are not reported (except when necessary for 
interpretation, e.g. struct3). No indicator loaded on more than one factor. 
 
                                                          
33 We preferred to use an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) since, as is often the case in 
organizational research (Heck, 1998), we can assume most moderators to be somewhat 
related to each other (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Iacobucci, 1994). Orthogonal rotation 
would impose an orthogonal, meaning independent, structure upon the factors. If, in 
reality, factors proved to be correlated, results would have been biased. We examined the 
factor correlations matrix in the (oblique rotation) EFA output; correlations exceeding 0.32 
were considered as indicative of the appropriateness of an oblique rotation (Iacobucci, 1994; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). If factors did not correlate highly, we opted for the more 
parsimonious orthogonal rotation (Heck, 1998; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). 
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Table 5.1: Results of the separate explorative factor analyses 
CULT Loading on innovat Loading on risktak Communality Result Factor correlations 
Cult1 
Cult2 
Cult3 
Cult4 
Cult5 
Cult6 
Cult7 
Cult8 
Cult9 
0.532 
0.371 
0.740 
0.926 
0.638 
 
 
 
0.313 
 
 
 
 
 
0.447 
0.764 
0.796 
0.294 
0.187 
0.602 
0.805 
0.404 
0.224 
0.650 
0.568 
0.408 
Item of innovat 
Removed: low communality 
Item of innovat 
Item of innovat 
Item of innovat 
Item of risktak  
Item of risktak 
Item of risktak 
Removed: low loading & high cross-loading 
0.520 
CROSSF Loading on crossf Communality Result Factor correlations 
Crossf1 
Crossf2 
Crossf3 
Crossf4 
Crossf5 
Crossf6 
Crossf7 
Crossf8 
Crossf9 
0.667 
0.601 
0.687 
0.785 
0.633 
0.767 
0.583 
0.697 
0.539 
0.444 
0.361 
0.472 
0.616 
0.400 
0.589 
0.340 
0.486 
0.290 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
Item of crossf 
n/a         
NWINFO Loading on infocus Loading on infosup Communality Result Factor correlations 
Nwinfo1 
Nwinfo2 
Nwinfo3 
Nwinfo4 
Nwinfo5 
Nwinfo6 
0.912 
0.848 
0.634 
 
 
 
 
0.779 
0.903 
0.915 
0.777 
0.729 
0.465 
0.646 
0.794 
0.828 
Item of infocus 
Item of infocus 
Item of infocus 
Item of infosup 
Item of infosup 
Item of infosup 
0.323 
STRUCT Loading on formal Loading on central Communality Result Factor correlations 
Struct1 
Struct2 
Struct3 
Struct4 
Struct5 
Struct6 
Struct7 
0.848 
0.496 
7.535E-02 
 
 
 
0.375 
0.695 
0.772 
0.840 
0.944 
0.681 
0.444 
0.183 
0.482 
0.596 
0.706 
0.891 
Removed: method bias 
Removed: method bias 
Removed: method bias (loads on wrong construct) 
Item of central 
Item of central 
Item of central 
Item of central 
0.658 
 
NWINNOV Loading on innocus Loading on innosup Loading on chain clim Communality Result Factor correlations 
Nwinno1 
Nwinno2 
Nwinno3 
Nwinno4 
Nwinno5 
Nwinno11 
Nwinno14 
Nwinno6 
Nwinno7 
Nwinno8 
Nwinno9 
Nwinno10 
Nwinno12 
Nwinno13 
Nwinno15 
0.762 
0.805 
0.736 
0.621 
0.633 
0.176 
1.035E-02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.840 
0.880 
0.741 
0.764 
 
 
 
 
 
0.231 
0.278 
 
 
 
 
0.322 
0.658 
0.615 
0.566 
0.612 
0.652 
0.549 
0.390 
0.436 
0.105 
9.992E-02 
0.720 
0.789 
0.605 
0.593 
0.201 
0.447 
0.389 
0.330 
Item of innocus 
Item of innocus 
Item of innocus 
Item of innocus 
Item of innocus 
Removed: low loading, low comm., high crossload. 
Removed: low loading, low comm., high crossload. 
Item of innosup 
Item of innosup 
Item of innosup 
Item of innosup 
Removed: low loading & low comm.. 
Item of chainclim 
Item of chainclim 
Item of chainclim 
Innosup-innocus: 
 0.341 
Innosup-chainclim: 
2.497E-02 
Innocus-chainclim:  
0.107 
SICAP Loading on SIcap Communality Result Factor correlations 
Explo1 
Explo2 
Explo3 
Explo4 
Explo5 
Explo6 
Explo7 
0.734 
0.617 
0.754 
0.690 
0.763 
0.659 
0.600 
0.538 
0.380 
0.568 
0.476 
0.583 
0.435 
0.360 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
Item of SIcap 
n/a 
 
 
For the constructs of the conceptual domain ‘culture’, cult2 and cult9 were removed. 
Although the loading for cult6 scored marginally below the formal 0.45 cut-off value we 
decided to –provisionally– keep this item and await the results of the measurement model 
in PLS graph, since its loading is a borderline value. Furthermore, removing this item 
would leave us with only two indicators for risktak.  
In the crossf construct, the communality value pointed to a potential problem with item 
crossf9. Nonetheless this item was provisionally kept because of its ‘good’ loading.  
For chain information potential all items showed good results and were hence remained. 
Concerning the structure constructs, struct3 was hypothesized as an item of formal. Yet, 
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this item loaded on the central construct. After studying the potential cause of this, we 
found that the other formal-items struct1 and struct2 were both reversely coded, whereas 
struct3 was not (like the items of central). Although central and formal were conceptually 
different (and this was correctly reflected in different questions in the questionnaire), the 
only reason the terms clustered together in this way seemed to be due to the formulation of 
the items in the questionnaire (negatively or positively formulated). Due to its unreliability, 
we decided to remove the entire construct of formal. Removing the construct 
‘formalization’ could be justified because of two additional reasons. First, the interviewees 
of the QUAL2-phase had stressed the importance of (de)centralization to a much greater 
extent than they had done for the issue of formalization.  Secondly, Tsai (2002) 
operationalized organizational structure by only measuring the centralization-dimension. 
He draws on Goshal et al’s (1994) argument that “centralization alone represents a 
somewhat partial but parsimonious operationalization of the structure domain”. We hence 
operationalized the structural domain by restricting ourselves to the ‘centralization’ 
measure. This did however imply we had to drop the study of RQ6 (see chapter 4). 
For the constructs in the domain of chain innovation potential, all items of innosup were 
kept. For innocus the items nwinno11 and nwinno14 were removed because they loaded 
higher on the chainclim construct than they did on the innocus construct, though 
conceptually this could not be explained. In chainclim one item (nwinno10) was removed 
because of a low loading and communality.  
The EFA results of SIcap did not show any problems. 
All communalities of the items we retained largely exceeded 0.35, meaning that at least 
35% of the measures’ variance was explained by the factors (Iacobucci, 1994; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001c). Yet cult1, cult6 and crossf9 gained lower scores (0.294; 0.224; 0.290). 
Since their loadings were reasonable, we provisionally kept them for further analysis.  
 
On the items retained after the separate EFAs a joint EFA was performed in which all the 
items of the reflective constructs were entered en bloc.  
 
5.2.1.1.2 Joint exploratory factor analysis 
Once again, the assumptions underlying the use of EFA were first checked, in an 
analogous way to the separate EFAs (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c; Hair et al., 1998) (see 
Appendix IV).  
Results are given for the EFA with all outliers removed, although the analysis without 
removal did not indicate structural differences.  
 
The oblique rotation results showed relatively low inter-factor correlations. The highest 
correlation (innocus-SIcap) was 0.325. Although this value formally exceeds the 0.32 limit 
for orthogonal rotation it is still a borderline value. Moreover, all other correlations were 
much lower. Hence, the more parsimonious orthogonal rotation was chosen for further 
examination.   
We hypothesized ten factors to be extracted (items of 10 reflective constructs). The scree 
test confirmed this number. Although the Kaizer criterion only indicated 8 factors with 
eigenvalues surpassing 1, we retained the hypothesized ten factor-solution. Firstly, the 
correctness of the Kaizer criterion has much been debated (Iacobucci, 1994). Furthermore, 
the cumulative proportion of variance of the ten-factor solution –only– amounted to 60%, 
which is reasonable (Heck, 1998) but not excellent. Reducing the number of factors to 
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eight would further reduce this amount to 54%.  Finally, the eight-factor solution was not 
interpretable. 
Inspection of the rotated factor matrix showed the following results (see Table 5.2). 
Loadings smaller than 0.32 (=less than 10% common variance, Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001c) are not reported. No indicator loaded on more than one factor. 
 
Table 5.2: Results of the joint exploratory factors analysis 
0.318
0.630
0.806
0.469
0.307
0.674
0.543
0.508
0.506
0.583
0.650
0.450
0.655
0.358
0.559
0.317
0.806
0.695
0.530
0.639
0.828
0.839
0.534
0.653
0.637
0.871
0.657
0.664
0.633
0.492
0.522
0.723
0.767
0.674
0.669
0.376
0.599
0.403
0.687
0.622
0.606
0.511
0.606
0.495
0.402
0.759
0.649
0.677
0.554
0.645
0.536
0.445
0.530
0.638
0.491
0.802
0.839
0.777
0.774
0.736
0.751
0.748
0.635
0.581
0.685
0.716
0.731
0.882
0.708
0.839
0.837
0.832
0.758
0.538
0.666
0.636
0.735
0.769
0.589
0.745
0.522
0.619
0.468
0.447
0.681
0.664
0.466
0.697
0.839
0.593
Cult1          
Cult3
Cult4
Cult5
Cult6
Cult7
Cult8
Crossf1
Crossf2
Crossf3
Crossf4
Crossf5
Crossf6
Crossf7
Crossf8
Crossf9
Nwinfo1
Nwinfo2
Nwinfo3
Nwinfo4
Nwinfo5
Nwinfo6
Struct4
Struct5
Struct6
Struct7
Nwinno1
Nwinno2
Nwinno3
Nwinno4
Nwinno5
Nwinno6
Nwinno7
Nwinno8
Nwinno9
Nwinno12
Nwinno13
Nwinno15
Explo1
Explo2
Explo3
Explo4
Explo5
Explo6
Explo7
CommunalitySIcapChainclimInnosupInnocusCentralInfosupInfocusCrossfRisktakInnovat
 
 
By analogy with the separate EFAs, and following guidelines concerning loading size 
(Comrey & Lee, 1992 in Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c) and statistical significance (Wijnen 
et al., 2002), 0.45 was considered as the loading cut-off. Evaluation of loadings was based 
on Comrey & Lee’s (1992) rules of thumb.  
For the construct of innovat, cult1 is a fair, cult5 is a good, cult3 is a very good and cult4 is 
an excellent measure. The communality of cult1 was relatively low though still sufficiently 
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important.  Since 32% of its variance was explained by the factor solution, the item could 
be considered as relevant in the factor definitions (Wijnen et al., 2002). 
Concerning risktak, we decided to retain all the measures, although cult6 could be 
considered as a borderline value. The other items, cult7 and cult8, showed very good 
loadings and communalities.  
Overall, the crossf items could be considered as good to excellent measures of the 
construct, though the loadings and communalities of crossf7 (0.522; resp. 0.358) and of 
crossf9 (0.468; resp. 0.317) were considerably lower than those of the other items. 
The items of infocus and infosup scored well and could consequently be retained for 
further analysis. 
The central items showed very good results as well; the smallest loading and communality 
being these of struct4 (0.685; 0.534 resp.). 
The measures of chainclim gained fair to good loadings, though not excellent (the loading 
of nwinno15 being 0.491). In this scale, nwinno12 had the lowest communality of 0.376. 
Given that in this case a newly developed scale was dealt with, results were more than 
acceptable. 
Finally, all measures of SIcap showed good results, all the more since this was a newly 
developed scale. Only explo7 could be considered as a borderline value (loading=0.445; 
communality=0.402). This item was retained because it was the only negatively 
formulated item of this construct; which could explain its lower score. Method bias was 
however not present, since the EFA solution clearly pointed to a one-factor solution.  
 
In conclusion, the joint EFA revealed the same results pattern than did the separate EFAs. 
Overall, all items showed very good results; only cult1, cult6, nwinno12, nwinno15, 
crossf9 and explo7 could be considered as borderline values. 
Psychometric qualities of these –preliminarily– purified measures will now be dealt with in 
more depth, using PLS-analysis. 
 
5.2.1.2 Measurement model in PLS 
 
We used the analyses provided in PLS-Graph 3.0 (Chin, 2001) to assess the reliability and 
validity of the moderators’ and the dependent variable’s measurement model 
(bootstrapping with 500 resamples, construct-level sign change: see, Chatelin et al., 2002).  
The psychometric properties of interest we will explicitly treat are reliability, average 
variance extracted and convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
First, individual item reliability, composite reliability and average variance extracted are 
assessed. Then, measures are examined on their degree of discriminant validity. 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Reliability and convergent validity 
As already mentioned, reliability can formally be defined as the proportion of variance of 
the true score relative to the total variance (which is the sum of true and error variance) 
(Bagozzi, 1994a; Ullman, 2001). The multiple squared correlation (MSC) of a measured 
variable is interpreted as the variable’s reliability, and as the proportion of variance in the 
measured variable that is accounted for by the latent variable (the communality).  
In order to ensure individual item reliability, statistical significance of each estimated 
loading should first be achieved. Furthermore, a general rule of thumb is to accept 
indicators with significant, standardized loadings exceeding 0.707, implying that at least 
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50% (communality, or MSC=0.7072) of the variance in the observed indicator can be 
attributed to the construct (Ullman, 2001). Other authors relax this constraint to even 0.5 
(Chin, 1998a; Hulland, 1999; Falk & Miller, 1992). 
 
As expected, when examining the PLS results, a similar data pattern appeared as the one 
previously revealed by the EFAs. PLS results showed that all loadings were significant at 
p<0.001. In addition, all standardized loadings exceeded 0.707, except for one item of 
innovativeness (cult1: 0.673), one item of risk taking (cult6: 0.680), one item of chain 
climate (nwinn15: 0.696), several items of cross-functional information dissemination 
(crossf1: 0.685, crossf2: 0.687, crossf5: 0.645, crossf7: 0.629, crossf9: 0.594) and two 
items of SIcap (explo2: 0.670, explo7: 0.672). Yet, these items should not be removed 
without further examination. Firstly, the rule of thumb of 0.707 can be relaxed in the early 
stages of scale development;  loadings of 0.6 or even 0.5 may still be acceptable if there 
exist additional indicators in the block for comparison basis (see for example, Hulland, 
1999; Barclay et al., 1995, Chin, 1998a). Consequently, as all loadings still exceeded 0.6 
they could be considered as acceptable. Secondly, before removing items it is important to 
study the potential causes of the low loadings (Hulland, 1999). Low loadings may be the 
result of poorly worded items, the improper transfer of an item from one context to 
another, or, an inappropriate item.  
After carefully reviewing the items, we could see that none of the innovativeness, risk 
taking, chain climate or SIcap-items demonstrated one of these problems. We decided to 
keep all the items of these constructs because 1) their loadings fell only marginally below 
the formal cut-off value of 0.7 (max. 0.03 too low), 2) cult1 scored an acceptable loading 
and communality in the more conservative EFA, removing cult3 would imply changing an 
existing scale, and imposing a cut-off of 0.707 on the items nwinn15, explo2 en explo7 
would be too strict since all of them were newly developed items, and, 3) we judged that 
content validity would deteriorate after deletion of the ‘worse’ scoring items cult1, cult6, 
nwinn15, explo2 and explo7.  
Yet, conclusions differed for the items of cross-functional information dissemination. We 
considered crossf9 (showing the lowest loading of all items) as an inappropriate item since 
further inspection indicated that it tackled more the issue of cross-functional co-operation 
than information dissemination. In this sense, not excluding crossf9 would lead to low 
content (and construct) validity. 
 
In multiple-item measures, next to the importance of individual item reliability, measured 
constructs should also demonstrate sufficient internal consistency (or, often called 
convergent validity, Hulland, 1999; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Hence, before removing 
crossf9, we studied the Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and average variance 
extracted of all scales.  
The internal consistency of a measure is the degree of agreement between two or more 
measures of the same concept gathered at the same point in time (Bagozzi, 1994a); e.g., 
the level of correlations among the different indicators of a multi-item measure. In a 
domain sampling model (reflective indicators) all items, if they belong to the domain of 
the concept, are assumed to have an equal amount of common core. Consequently, 
responses to those items should be highly intercorrelated (Churchill, 1979). The traditional 
measure for the internal consistency of a set of items is coefficient alpha. The generally 
agreed upon lower limit for alpha is 0.7 (Nunnaly, 1978) or 0.6 for a newly developed 
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scale (Hair et al., 1998), or 0.60 ≤ a < 0.8 for a reasonably good and ≥ 0.8 for a good scale 
(de Heus et al., 1995; Wijnen et al., 2002). Next to Cronbach’s alpha, Werts et al.’s (1974) 
measure of composite reliability (CR) can be applied. While Cronbach’s alpha assumes all 
items to equally contribute to the construct (loadings are set to unity) (Barclay et al., 1995), 
Werts et al.’s (1974) measure does not assume all items to be equally weighted (Chin, 
1998a). A scale’s CR should exceed 0.7 (Wijnen et al., 2002).  
The measurement model showed that the criteria of alpha and CR were met. 
Finally, in order to study better the shared variance in the measurement model, Fornell & 
Larcker (1981) developed the measure of average variance extracted (AVE). AVE 
measures the amount of variance captured by the construct, in relation to the amount of 
variance due to measurement error. If this measure shows values < 0.5 this means that the 
variance due to measurement error exceeds the variance captured by the construct, which 
makes the validity of the individual indicators as well as the validity of the full construct 
questionable. Hence values > 0.5 should be aimed at (Fornell & Larcker, 1981: 46). 
Fornell & Larcker (1981) indicate that their measure is more conservative than Werts et 
al.’s  (1974) measure of composite reliability. 
Inspection of the AVE values indicated that all scales demonstrated satisfactory levels 
(>0.5), except for cross-functional information dissemination where an AVE value of only 
0.490 appeared. The inadequacy of crossf9 was once more demonstrated and crossf9 was 
consequently removed.   
The model was rerun without the item crossf9. Item loadings were all significant 
(p<0.001). Concerning the level of item loadings the same pattern appeared in the cross-
functional information dissemination construct. Although this construct now achieved a 
satisfactory level of AVE (0.514), crossf1, crossf2, crossf5 and crossf7 still showed 
loadings marginally below the 0.7 cut-off value. We decided to remove the lowest loading 
item crossf7 as we thought it added little value to the contents of the scale. Furthermore, 
for reasons of consistency, we decided to simultaneously remove the item crossf8; as we 
borrowed all three items crossf7, crossf8 and crossf9 from the same existing scale (Martin 
& Grbac, 2003). The removal of crossf7 would otherwise have resulted in only keeping 
crossf8 from this scale (remember that crossf9 had already been removed).  Moreover, 
after further examination of the items borrowed from Martin & Grbac (2003), we found 
that these items all added little valuable contents to the scale.  
 
Hence, we reran the analysis without the items crossf7, crossf8 and crossf9 (see Table 5.3). 
Results finally proved satisfactory. Of the cross-functional dissemination construct, only 
crossf5 did not formally reach the 0.707 value, but the loading fairly approached this value 
(0.689). For this reason, we decided to leave the existing scale intact and to keep the item 
included.  
Table 5.3 shows an overview of the final item loadings, CR, AVE and Cronbach’s alpha. 
All figures in Table 5.3 display a satisfactory level of item loadings, composite reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha and average variance extracted. For all constructs acceptable levels of 
CR were obtained; all values largely surpassed the 0.7 value. The AVE of each construct 
reached the minimal value of 0.5 as well. Concerning coefficient alpha, for all the 
measures that were based upon existing scales, values met the recommended 0.7 level. For 
the construct of supply chain climate, a value of only 0.64 was reached, which is 
acceptable for a newly developed scale.  In addition, item-to-total correlations and the 
alpha-if-item-deleted values (not reported) did not indicate further elimination of items.   
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Table 5.3: Reliability and convergent validity of the reflective measurement model 
0.860.5440.893
0.740
0.670
0.771
0.801
0.791
0.707
0.672
1.03
0.98
0.94
0.90
0.90
0.85
0.83
3.12
2.96
3.31
3.12
3.16
3.21
3.49
SIcap
Explo1
Explo2
Explo3
Explo4
Explo5
Explo6
Explo7
0.640.5620.793
0.772
0.778
0.696
0.86
0.93
0.98
4.16
3.91
3.35
Chainclim
Nwinn12
Nwinn13
Nwinn15
0.890.7330.917
0.853
0.889
0.838
0.845
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2.85
Innosup
Nwinno6
Nwinno7
Nwinno8
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5.2.1.2.2 Discriminant validity 
Finally, the discriminant validity of the measurement model was assessed. In other words, 
we examined whether measures of a construct sufficiently differed from measures of other 
constructs. Discriminant validity can be assessed by comparing the AVE to the squared 
correlations among the constructs (alternatively the square root of the AVE can be 
compared to the inter-construct correlations) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
To this end, the standardized construct scores provided by the PLS analysis were imputed 
into SPSS 12.0 to conduct a correlational analysis. The results of the two-tailed Pearson 
correlations are displayed in Table 5.4. Diagonal elements represent the square root of 
AVE (of the reflective constructs). Table 5.4 shows that all diagonal elements (square root 
of AVE) exceed the lower-left triangle of inter-construct correlations, meaning that all 
reflective constructs shared more variance with their own indicators than they shared with 
all other latent constructs in the model, the formatively specified independent constructs  
included (Chin, 1998a; Barclay et al., 1995; Hulland, 1999).   
 
Table 5.4: Correlations among the construct scores 
Diagonal elements represent square roots of AVEs
F: Formatively specified construct
* Significant at 0.05 (2-tailed); ** significant at 0.01 (2-tailed)
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0.8980.350**0.280**0.0770.150Infosup
0.8680.287**0.275**0.233**Infocus
0.7510.206**0.231**Crossf
0.7930.406**Risktak
0.791Innovat
SIcapTransf FAssim FRecog FChaincliInnosupInnocusCentralInfosupInfocusCrossfRisktakInnovat
 
Another test for adequate discriminant validity is to compute cross-loadings. For this 
analysis, once again the standardized (reflective) indicator scores and construct scores of 
the PLS output were imputed into SPSS 12.0 and a Pearson correlational analysis was run. 
The results are shown in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5 Loadings and cross-loadings of the measurement model 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
 *
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 0
.0
5 
(2
-ta
ile
d)
; *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 0
.0
1 
(2
-ta
ile
d)
0.
67
2*
*
0.
39
9*
*
0.
41
0*
*
0.
33
7*
*
0.
18
7*
0.
17
1*
0.
29
2*
*
-0
.1
33
0.
20
1*
0.
26
4*
*
0.
35
6*
*
0.
37
3*
*
0.
34
4*
*
ex
pl
o7
0.
70
7*
*
0.
39
0*
*
0.
32
0*
*
0.
33
3*
*
0.
20
7*
*
0.
16
5*
0.
30
7*
*
-0
.3
40
**
0.
18
5*
0.
29
8*
*
0.
24
1*
*
0.
30
9*
*
0.
38
5*
*
ex
pl
o6
0.
79
1*
*
0.
39
2*
*
0.
43
1*
*
0.
34
9*
*
0.
15
9*
0.
27
1*
*
0.
42
1*
*
-0
.2
31
**
0.
17
0*
0.
25
1*
*
0.
20
6*
0.
32
5*
*
0.
40
7*
*
ex
pl
o5
0.
80
1*
*
0.
55
5*
*
0.
49
5*
*
0.
51
0*
*
0.
22
0*
*
0.
13
6
0.
37
2*
*
-0
.2
79
**
0.
10
9
0.
29
4*
*
0.
29
5*
*
0.
31
0*
*
0.
41
7*
*
ex
pl
o4
0.
77
1*
*
0.
35
4*
*
0.
37
5*
*
0.
36
4*
*
0.
12
8
0.
13
9
0.
38
8*
*
-0
.2
73
**
0.
13
8
0.
30
1*
*
0.
29
9*
*
0.
30
0*
*
0.
26
8*
*
ex
pl
o3
0.
67
0*
*
0.
25
9*
*
0.
35
2*
*
0.
35
0*
*
0.
29
2*
*
0.
21
0*
0.
22
3*
*
-0
.0
88
0.
22
2*
*
0.
16
8*
0.
20
7*
0.
32
5*
*
0.
26
3*
*
ex
pl
o2
0.
74
0*
*
0.
17
5*
0.
32
1*
*
0.
31
2*
*
0.
20
4*
0.
20
2*
0.
27
8*
*
-0
.0
59
0.
26
4*
*
0.
27
0*
*
0.
18
0*
0.
28
7*
*
0.
26
7*
*
ex
pl
o1
0.
24
6*
*
0.
21
5*
0.
21
5*
*
0.
14
6
0.
69
6*
*
0.
04
8
0.
10
4
-0
.3
14
**
-0
.0
64
0.
19
4*
0.
13
8
0.
28
6*
*
0.
29
3*
*
nw
in
n1
5
0.
23
6*
*
0.
16
2*
0.
24
7*
*
0.
32
8*
*
0.
77
8*
*
0.
08
8
0.
04
6
-0
.2
35
**
0.
28
1*
*
0.
37
5*
*
0.
28
0*
*
0.
16
0*
0.
14
5
nw
in
n1
3
0.
13
2
0.
12
2
0.
11
0
0.
12
0
0.
77
2*
*
-0
.1
08
-0
.0
31
-0
.3
22
**
-0
.0
10
0.
08
5
0.
10
0
0.
07
5
0.
18
8*
nw
in
n1
2
0.
17
5*
0.
12
0
0.
23
9*
*
0.
21
7*
*
0.
01
5
0.
84
5*
*
0.
21
4*
*
0.
06
1
0.
33
7*
*
0.
04
6
0.
22
4*
*
0.
10
1
0.
06
8
nw
in
no
9
0.
16
1
0.
07
2
0.
18
8*
0.
17
0*
0.
00
7
0.
83
8*
*
0.
32
4*
*
-0
.0
60
0.
30
0*
*
0.
12
7
0.
11
2
0.
13
1
0.
06
5
nw
in
no
8
0.
26
4*
*
0.
08
9
0.
25
0*
*
0.
23
6*
*
-0
.0
07
0.
88
9*
*
0.
26
0*
*
-0
.0
50
0.
34
4*
*
0.
15
6
0.
20
3*
0.
12
2
0.
07
2
nw
in
no
7
0.
27
2*
*
0.
12
6
0.
22
2*
*
0.
19
6*
0.
02
3
0.
85
3*
*
0.
22
9*
*
0.
01
2
0.
32
3*
*
0.
11
9
0.
25
3*
*
0.
06
2
0.
05
8
nw
in
no
6
0.
42
3*
*
0.
25
1*
*
0.
25
8*
*
0.
30
4*
*
0.
04
2
0.
25
1*
*
0.
74
8*
*
-0
.1
26
0.
34
3*
*
0.
32
3*
*
0.
15
7
0.
26
0*
*
0.
29
2*
*
nw
in
no
5
0.
32
0*
*
0.
38
0*
*
0.
22
2*
*
0.
34
7*
*
0.
07
3
0.
16
0
0.
72
4*
*
-0
.1
11
0.
17
2*
0.
21
9*
*
0.
28
3*
*
0.
12
0
0.
28
8*
*
nw
in
no
4
0 .
3 3
4 *
*
0 .
2 3
3 *
*
0 .
2 4
3 *
*
0 .
2 5
5 *
*
0 .
0 2
8
0 .
2 1
4 *
*
0 .
7 8
1 *
*
-0
.1
2 8
0 .
0 8
2
0 .
1 8
7 *
0 .
2 3
9 *
*
0 .
1 3
0
0 .
2 3
4 *
*
n w
in
n o
3
0 .
3 8
0 *
*
0 .
2 5
2 *
*
0 .
2 1
1 *
*
0 .
3 3
5 *
*
0 .
0 3
2
0 .
2 2
7 *
*
0 .
8 4
5 *
*
-0
.0
7 5
0 .
2 7
4 *
*
0 .
2 9
3 *
*
0 .
1 0
1
0 .
1 6
0 *
0 .
1 5
4
n w
in
n o
2
0 .
3 1
5 *
*
0 .
1 2
8
0 .
1 6
1
0 .
1 7
5 *
0 .
0 2
0
0 .
3 0
1 *
*
0 .
7 8
6 *
*
-0
.0
4 4
0 .
3 8
2 *
*
0 .
2 1
8 *
*
0 .
1 4
8
0 .
0 4
8
0 .
1 9
9 *
n w
in
n o
1
SI
C
A
P
T
R
A
N
SF
A
SS
IM
R
E
C
O
G
C
H
A
IN
C
L
IM
IN
N
O
SU
P
IN
N
O
C
U
S
C
E
N
T
R
A
L
IN
FO
SU
P
IN
FO
C
U
S
C
R
O
SS
F
R
IS
K
T
IN
N
O
V
A
T
Chapter 5 
 218 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, each reflective indicator loaded higher on the construct it 
intended to measure than on other constructs. Furthermore, each block of reflective 
indicators loaded higher on its respective latent construct than did the indicators of all 
other latent constructs. Formative indicators have not been reported since their 
interpretation should not be based on the indicators’ loadings (Chin, 1998a).  
In conclusion, results suggest that all final –reflective– measures proved to have a 
satisfactory level of reliability and validity. 
 
5.2.2 The formatively specified constructs 
 
5.2.2.1 Measurement quality of the formative indicators 
 
All the independent variables have been operationalized in a formative mode (see chapter 
4).  
The evaluation of the measurement properties of the formatively specified constructs will 
however be incorporated into the assessment of the structural model, and will hence be 
dealt with in section 5.3.3.1. As such, the two-stage model evaluation (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988) will be abandoned for the formatively specified constructs.  
We were bound to do so since the measurement qualities of formative indicators largely 
depend upon the specified structural relationships. In other words, they can not be 
disconnected from the structural model. Moreover, in our study, the formative indicators 
represent specific path-breaking focus areas stimulated by deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms. Our discussion in chapter 2 clarifies why the study of these path-breaking 
focus areas is of specific theoretical interest in the context of SI. As such, the assessment 
of the formative measurement model should be regarded as an integral part of the research 
results, more than as a mere validation of measurement quality.  
 
5.2.2.2 Test of the hypothesized semi-aggregate model for recognition 
 
However, before measurement properties of the formative indicators could be studied in a 
later section, the correctness of the semi-aggregate model used for recog had to be verified.  
More specifically, in chapter 4 we justified our choice for the ‘discrete components partial 
aggregation model’ (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994) to operationalize the dimensions 
‘envinfo’ and ‘insight’ of the recog construct.  
Yet, before items could be aggregated into a single composite, their unidimensionality (per 
component) had to be demonstrated (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996). We hence modeled 
the relation between each component and its measures with a separate confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) model (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994: 40). A CFA provides a statistical test 
of how closely the data fit the hypothesized structure, in other words, how well the 
individual items fit with the hypothesized factor (Heck, 1998).  
 
Before conducting a CFA, a preparatory EFA (principal axis factoring) was run with the 
items of both dimensions. As hypothesized, the two-factor solution appeared with 
acceptable loadings.  
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Then, assumptions underlying a CFA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c) were assessed: sample 
size, missing values34, outliers (case 50 was a multivariate outlier on insight), normality 
and linearity. All assumptions were met, except for the latter two, which showed less 
satisfactory results. The solutions could hence be deflated. 
 
By means of the software Amos 5.0 a CFA was performed for each dimension separately. 
Model fit was assessed35.  
First, concerning the envinfo dimension, the evaluation of the overall model fit seemed 
impossible at first sight. As the degrees of freedom (df) were zero (three indicators), the 
chi-square test would always indicate a perfect fit. Consequently, in order to test the fit of 
this just-identified model, all factor loadings were constrained to one, which resulted in 
two additional df (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994). The chi square was given with two df and 
amounted to 3.90. Since p= 0.142 (>0.05) the model suggested that the three items all 
loaded on a single factor and equally reflected this factor. The alternative fit indices 
indicated a good fit as well:  χ2/df=1.952, GFI=0.986, AGFI=0.958, CFI=0.985 and 
RMSEA=0.071. We freed the two factor loadings to further study convergent validity and 
reliability. All items showed significant standardized loadings, largely exceeding 0.5. 
Standardized residuals were all < |2.58|. CR was 0.75; AVE was with 0.50 an accepted 
borderline value.  
As regards the insight dimension, an even better model fit was achieved: χ2= 3.026, 
p=0.220, χ2/df=1.513, GFI=0.992, AGFI=0.961, CFI=0.995 and RMSEA=0.053.  
In addition, all standardized loadings were significant and larger than 0.5, all standardized 
residuals were < |2.58|, CR was 0.79 and AVE scored a just-accepted 0.50. 
 
The CFA results demonstrated that the partial aggregation model could be applied in the 
subsequent analyses. We hence aggregated the items (means) of both recog-dimensions 
into one formative indicator for each dimension. 
 
                                                          
34 As AMOS-software for CFAs can not handle missing values, missing values had to be 
imputed. They accounted for less than 5% of the dataset and showed a random distribution 
(see also section 5.1.2). We imputed the missings by series means and reran the EFA; 
exactly the same data structure was found and loadings were only a few tenths of 
percentages lower (this is evident as imputation by series means reduces variance) than in 
the non-imputed EFA. We concluded that it was safe to run the CFA with missings 
imputed. 
35 The overall model fit (test on unidimensionality) in a CFA can be evaluated by studying 
the chi-square value, which should be insignificant relative to the degrees of freedom in 
the model (p>0.05). An insignificant result (a failure to reject the model) suggests that each 
of the indicators measures a single underlying factor (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994). As the 
chi square statistic assumes multivariate normality and is affected by sample size it should 
be combined with alternative fit indices (Ullman, 2001). For example, GFI, AGFI and CFI 
are measures of the relative amount of variance and covariance accounted for by the 
model, and should consequently approximate 1.00. RMR and RMSEA indicate the average 
unexplained variances and covariances so should be as close as possible to 0 (Heck, 1998). 
 
Chapter 5 
 220 
5.3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the hypothesized structural model. The model also includes the indicators 
of the basic constructs as measured in the final web survey. The corresponding survey 
questions can be found in Appendix II. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The hypothesized model 
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Before testing and discussing the hypothesized model, the influence of control variables on 
SIcap was studied. 
 
5.3.1 Analysis of the control variables 
 
As previously three control variables were included in the model: 1) the organization’s 
position in the supply chain (‘poschain’): upstream (levels 1-4 on a 10-point scale), 
midstream (levels 5-7) or downstream company (levels 8-9), 2) the organization or 
business unit size (‘orgsize’) defined as the number of full time employees: a small-sized 
organization was defined as one having less than 100 FTEs, a medium-sized 100-199, a 
large one 200-499, and a very large one as having more than 500 FTEs, and finally, 3) the 
main activities of the organization (‘orgtype’): product firm or service firm.  
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All control variables, being categorical, were recoded into dummies (k-1 categories) (see 
e.g., Chatterjee et al., 2002)36. Each control variable was specified in a formative way; 
each dummy-category served as a formative indicator (Falk & Miller, 1992).  
To test the impact of the control variables in the model, we used a method to test whether a 
block of two or more variables significantly increases the R2 above the R2 predicted by a 
set of variables already in the equation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001b; Chin et al., 2003; 
Kenny, 2004; Bass et al., 2003). More specifically we tested three nested models by means 
of an F-test: the full model (with the hypothesized independent variables and the control 
variables), the theoretical model (the hypothesized model), and the control model (without 
the hypothesized independent variables; i.e. only with control variables) (see e.g., Bontis et 
al., 2002; Teo et al., 2003). The three models were run in PLS-Graph 3.0 (bootstrapping 
with 500 resamples, construct-level sign change, path weighting, metric=1, see Tenenhaus 
et al., 2005; Lohmöller, 1984). 
Table 5.6 shows that on the one hand the theoretical model is to be preferred over the full 
model; the control variables do not significantly add explained variance to the dependent 
variable (F3, 175 = 2.34, p>0.05). On the other hand, the full model is to be preferred over 
the control model; the hypothesized independent variables do apparently significantly 
increase the R2 of SI over and above the impact of the control variables (F3, 175 =28.88, 
p<0.00). Moreover, none of the control paths were found to be significant (all p2-tailed >0.1): 
poschain (β= 0.111, t=1.38), orgsize (β= 0.108, t=1,26) and orgtype (β= 0,098, t=1,55).  
 
Table 5.6: F-tests on the influence of the control variables 
 Full model Theoretical 
model 
Control 
model 
F (3, 175) Sign. of F 
 
R2 of SIcap 
 
0,378 
 
 
0,353 
 
- 
 
2,34 
 
 
n.s. 
(p > 0,05) 
 
 
R2 of SIcap 
 
 
0,378 
 
- 
 
0,070 
 
28,88 
 
p < 0,001 
 
 
The analyses (nested models and significance of paths) indicated that the inclusion of the 
control variables would not add value to the model. Following the principle of parsimony, 
which requires the use of a model with equal predictability than the full model but with 
fewer variables and paths, we decided to run all subsequent analyses on the hypothesized 
model, i.e. without the inclusion of the control variables.  
 
Since the structural model was hypothesized as a partial-mediation model, the correctness 
of the hypotheses regarding partially mediated relationships is first formally verified in the 
next section, before the structural results are studied in a more detailed way.   
 
                                                          
36 For the control variable of supply chain position the reference category was 
‘downstream position’, for organization size the reference category was ‘small-sized’, and 
for the organization activities the reference category of ‘product firm’ was chosen. 
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5.3.2 Tests on the correctness of the hypothesized partial mediation model 
 
So far, some ambiguity exists as to how mediation should be tested; in MacKinnon et al. 
(2002) no less than fourteen different mediation tests have been described and evaluated. 
The confusion is even greater in the context of SEM. For example, some authors do not 
structurally test for mediation, but directly infer the existence of a mediator from their 
structural model, by comparing the total effect with the direct effect of an IV (see e.g., 
Bass et al., 2003).  
We, however, followed McDonald’s (2001) and MacKinnon et al.’s (2002) advise to test 
mediation in a more profound way. This ‘profound’ mediation check comes down to: a) 
Baron & Kenny’s (1986) test on conditions for mediation, and b) McKinnon et al.’s (1995) 
test on the statistical significance of the indirect effects. For the latter, both tests for the 
separate mediation relationships and the full model were performed.   
 
First, Baron & Kenny’s (1986) mediation test comes essentially down to running a set of 
OLS regressions (which have been graphically represented in the path diagrams in Figure 
5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Testing mediation conditions: Baron & Kenny (1986) 
Independent variable
X
Mediator
M
Dependent variable
Yc
ε1
Condition 1: Y= βo+cX+ε1 Æ c signif.
Independent variable
X
Dependent variable
Y
ε2
ε3
Condition 2: M= βo+ αX+ ε3 Æ α signif.
Condition 3: Y= βo+ c’X+ βM+ε2Æ β signif. and |c’| - |c| < 0 
(if c’ still signif.: partial mediation)
c’
α
β
Adapted from MacKinnon et al. (2002); Baron & Kenny (1986). 
 
These regressions serve to test three conditions:  
1) Regress the DV on the IV and show that the IV significantly influences the DV (c is 
significant), 
2) Regress the potential mediator on the IV and show that the IV significantly influences 
the potential mediator (α is significant),  
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3) Regress the DV on the IV and on the potential mediator and show that the mediator 
significantly influences the DV (β is significant). Furthermore, if the regression 
coefficient of the IV (c') approaches 0 (becomes insignificant) this is proof of full 
mediation. If the regression coefficient is smaller than in regression 1), though still 
significant, there is partial mediation (|c|-|c'| >0, but c' is significant). 
 
Table 5.7 (left-hand part) shows the results of this analysis.  
 
Table 5.7: results of the different mediation tests 
Indicated are two-tailed significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01,  *p < 0.05
0.376***
0.276***
SIcapAssim
Transf
Condition 3 (c’)
(β)
0.626***TransfAssimCondition 2 (α) 0.088*0.173***
0.559***SIcapAssimCondition 1 (c)
H3: Assim → Transf → SIcap?
0.293*
0.326***
SIcapRecog
Transf
Condition 3 (c’)
(β)
0.642***TransfRecogCondition 2 (α) 0.087*0.209***
0.536***SIcapRecogCondition 1 (c)
H2: Recog → Transf → SIcap?
0.286**
0.344***
SIcapRecog
Assim
Condition 3 (c’)
(β)
0.699***AssimRecogCondition 2 (α) 0.183***0.234***
0.536***SIcapRecogCondition 1 (c)
H1: Recog → Assim → SIcap?
Indirect effect
Hypothesized full model
Indirect effect
Separate modelStand. βDVIVsCondition
PRODUCT OF COEFFICIENTS MEDIATION TESTS
(Sobel, 1982; MacKinnon et al., 1995)
CONDITIONS OF MEDIATION TESTS
(Baron & Kenny, 1986)
 
For each of the three hypothesized mediated relationships, Table 5.7 shows the 
standardized β coefficients.  Although all hypotheses were formulated as being directional 
in nature, we indicated 2-tailed significance levels because these tests are more 
conservative (lower chance of Type I-errors).  
The results shown in the left-hand side of table 5.7 indicate that all three partial mediation 
hypotheses could be accepted. In other words, for each of the hypotheses, Baron & 
Kenny’s three conditions were met: c is significant (p<0.001), α is significant (p<0.001), β 
is significant (p<0.001) and |c|-|c'|>0. Since c' is still significant there is proof of partial 
mediation for all three hypotheses.  
 
The mediation test developed by Baron & Kenny (1986) has been based rather on 
conceptual than on statistical grounds; it can actually be considered as a test on mediation 
conditions (MacKinnon et al., 2002). Although this approach compares the coefficient of 
the IV on the DV between the simple model (c in condition 1, see Figure 5.2) and the 
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mediation model (c' in condition 3, see Figure 5.2), it provides no formal test on the 
statistical significance of the indirect effect.  
Therefore, we also performed MacKinnon et al.’s (1995) test. MacKinnon et al. (1995) 
have demonstrated the equivalence of testing c-c' to testing αβ (see Figure 5.2). This is the 
so-called ‘product of coefficients’ mediation approach, where the estimated indirect effect 
αβ is divided by its standard error and compares this to a standard normal distribution 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). In general, the product coefficients approach is regarded as 
being more appropriate in the context of path modeling (MacKinnon et al., 2002). We 
added the results of this approach to the right-hand side of Table 5.7.  
 
The right-hand side of Table 5.7 shows that actually two sets of product of coefficients 
analyses were run: one for the separate models and one for the full model. The reason for 
this is that in the context of a SEM (or a path modeling) framework no clear guidelines 
exist as to whether mediation hypotheses should be tested individually, or as part of the 
whole multiple regression framework. In other words, when testing mediated relationships, 
should additional predictor variables of the mediator and the dependent variable be 
included (i.e. controlled for) in the tests or not?  
 
Controlling for all other variables’ influence (the so-called ‘full model’) should be 
preferred if the researcher believes that the true effect of the IV on the mediator and on the 
DV is this which exists after removing any potential effect of any other independent 
variables (Heath, 2001: 94). We could justify this ‘full model approach’ in our study since 
we wanted to test the entire hypothesized model, including all three mediated relationships 
simultaneously. This would logically imply controlling for the influence of all other 
variables in the model. However, including all other potential predictors of the mediator 
means that all other assumed, and yet to be tested, mediation effects should be considered 
as true. In other words, this would imply that only the ‘surplus’ mediation effects could be 
studied, controlling for all other mediation effects. For example, when testing the 
mediation effect of transf for recog on SIcap, only the mediation effect beyond and above 
the mediation effect of transf for assim on SIcap could be studied (for assim is assumed to 
be an additional predictor of the mediator transf, it should be included in the regression 
equation). Furthermore, including other predictors may lead to ambiguous results, due to 
collinearity problems among predictor variables. For example, if another predictor variable 
accounts for almost all of the shared variance between the independent variable and the 
mediator, this may disguise a true mediating effect. Since only mediation of the 
independent variable’s unique component (the shared variance with the mediator, that is 
not shared with another predictor) is tested, the variable’s remaining shared variance is 
ignored. However, it could be exactly the latter part which is mediated (Heath, 2001).  
 
Accordingly, we decided to estimate the indirect effects for both separate models (only 
containing the mediation hypothesis under study; so only containing three constructs) and 
for the full, hypothesized model (with all constructs and hypothesized mediation relations 
included). The latter controls for effects of other IVs (and hence for other mediating 
relationships) and, consequently, tests only the ‘surplus’ mediation effect. Results are 
shown in the right-hand side of Table 5.7.  
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To calculate the statistical significance of the indirect effects, the approximate formula 
developed by Sobel (1982)37 was applied. 
Both the full model and the separate model product of coefficients results demonstrated 
significant mediation effects of assim for recog (H1), and of transf for both recog (H2) and 
assim (H3). However, when comparing both methods, it can be seen that the mediation 
role of transf for recog significantly diminishes when being controlled for other 
relationships, such as the mediation effects of assim for recog. Although transf is in and of 
itself an important mediator for recog, its role is apparently reduced by assim. The same 
applies to the mediation effect of transf for assim. When controlling for all other direct and 
mediation effects the mediating role of transf for assim becomes rather small, yet still 
significant. These attenuated effects could however be due to collinearity effects (Heath, 
2001).  
In general, assim seems to have a more important mediating role than does transf. These 
results will be studied more profoundly in the discussion of the final structural model (see, 
section 5.3.3.2). 
 
Even though the above mentioned mediation tests indicated the existence of three partial 
mediation effects, and even though the direct effects remain rather large, in view of 
parsimony, we finally tested whether, on statistical grounds, a fully-mediated model could 
possibly not be preferred over a partially-mediated one. We did so since the structural 
model we hypothesized is a full model. As all possible unidirectional relationships have 
been specified in this model, the model has maximum predictability. The scientific 
principle of parsimony however dictates ‘simplicity of the model until proved otherwise’ 
(Lehmann, 2001). This means that models with fewer relationships specified, but with an 
equal level of predictability, should be preferred (Falk & Miller, 1992). Therefore, we 
tested whether the direct paths from recog and assim to SIcap explained significant 
additional variation in order to be retained in the final model (Lehmann, 2001). 
To this end, we performed a nested models F-test to compare the R2s of the full and partial 
mediation model (e.g., Subramani, 2004). In the full mediation model direct paths running 
from recog and assim to SIcap were removed. The test result (F2,178 =10,179; p<0.01) 
clearly demonstrated the superiority of the partial mediation model. 
 
Having demonstrated the correctness of the hypothesized partial mediation model, we will 
finally discuss the results of the hypothesized model in a more detailed way.  
 
5.3.3 Analysis of the partial mediation model 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the PLS-results of the partially mediated model.  
First, the importance of the formative indicators of the independent latent variables is 
discussed. Then, the findings concerning the structural relationships will be treated. 
                                                          
37  
2222
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+=z
 
with the path coefficients between the IV and M (α), and between the M and DV (β) 
respectively, and their standard errors (see MacKinnon et al., 2002: 85). 
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Figure 5.3: PLS results of the partial mediation model 
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ASSIM
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Recog1 InsightRecog12 Recog13 EnvinfoRecog11Recog10Recog2
Trans3Trans2Trans1 Trans4 Trans5 Trans6
0.683***
0.374***
0.368***
0.268***
0.236**
0.175*
explo7
explo6
explo5
explo4
explo3
explo2
explo1
R2=0.353***
0.187*
0.180 n.s. 0.372***
-0.043 n.s. 0.172 n.s.
0.217* -0.013 n.s.
0.343**
0.284***
0.160*
0.290**
0.327***
0.366***
0.125 n.s.
0.740***
0.672***
0.707***
0.791***
0.801***
0.771***
0.670***
0.472***
0.001 n.s. 0.253** 0.277** 0.252*
0.330**
One-tailed significance: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
5.3.3.1 Analysis of the formative indicators 
 
As already indicated in section 5.2.2.1, in the case of formative indicators, the application 
of traditional reliability and validity criteria is meaningless (e.g., Bagozzi, 1994b, Hulland, 
1999). The analysis of loadings is misleading since the intra-block correlations are not 
taken into account in the estimation procedure (Falk & Miller, 1992). Instead, since 
formative indicators have a regression-like relationship with the latent constructs, 
interpretation should be based on the indicators’ weights (Chin, 1998a).  
The indicators’ weights can be considered as standardized (multiple) regression weights, 
estimated in such a way that the latent variable is predicted in the best way, without regard 
to the residual variance of the predictor indicators. The weight thus indicates the relative 
importance of the indicator in the formation of the component (Chin, 1998a). As such, 
each indicator contributes variance to the ‘latent’ variable, but there need not be common 
variance among the manifest variables themselves.  
 
Hence, as explained in chapter 3, in the case of formative measures, the indicators’ paths to 
their corresponding construct are not determined by the covariance of these indicators 
among each other (by definition they may not have any covariance), but by their 
covariance with indicators of other latent constructs in the model. This implies that the 
indicators’ weights will vary according to different measures and different structural 
relations included in the model (Williams et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important to remark 
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that the estimated weights we report are determined by estimating the hypothesized 
structural model. Weights hence indicate the relative importance of the indicators, given 
the partially mediated model. We would like to stress that all results should be interpreted 
in this way. 
 
Since the weights are determined by multiple regressions, indicator inter-correlations may 
affect their stability. Therefore, first indicator multicollinearity was examined for each 
independent construct separately (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). Bivariate inter-
item correlations never exceeded 0.7 (Wijnen et al., 2002). In addition, collinearity 
diagnostics were run in SPSS 11.0. For each formative indicator, the analysis showed 
condition indices far below 30 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001b) and tolerance levels each 
largely surpassing the –very conservative– 0.4 threshold (Allison, 1999). We took this as 
proof of the absence of indicator-multicollinearity. 
 
As no minimum threshold values for indicator weights have been established, the 
significance of the weights can be used to determine the relative importance of the 
indicators in the formation of the construct (Chin, 1998a). The significance of the weights 
was obtained using a bootstrapping technique with 500 resamples (construct level sign 
change). In Table 5.8 results are shown. Indicators noted in bold are those that are 
significant at p<0.05 (one-tailed since relationships are unidirectional and since a two-
tailed significance level would be too conservative with these newly developed measures). 
 
Table 5.8: Characteristics of the formative measurement model (IVs) 
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As regards the recog construct, recog2, recog11, recog12 and envinfo seem to be of no 
importance (the corresponding survey questions can be found in Appendix II). Recog11 
and envinfo even show (insignificant) negative values. Apparently, deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms fostering the detection of fundamental changes in the industry 
(recog2), the broadening of market research towards other industries (recog11), the 
collection of information about the needs of end customers (recog12) and the gathering of 
general macro-economic and societal information (envinfo) do not pay off in the context of 
SI. 
Results suggest that only recog1, recog10, recog13 and insight have a significant impact 
with weights of 0.187, 0.372, 0.217 and 0.343, respectively.  This means that stimulating 
the consultation of innovative customers for new ideas (recog10) is the most important 
recog practice, followed by mechanisms to develop deep insight into customers (insight). 
Also, mechanisms stimulating to find out why non-customers are no customers (recog13), 
and to focus market research more on future customer needs (recog1), have a –though 
smaller– impact on SIcap.  
 
Concerning deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, in particular, 
mechanisms that stimulate the systematical questioning of all aspects of the marketing 
approach (assim5) and keeping alive past critical reflections about customers/markets 
(assim4) seem to have the most impact. Likewise, mechanisms that foster organizations to 
question the very way the marketplace is being perceived (assim3), to share critical 
reflections on customers/markets (assim1), and to critically reflect on the shared 
assumptions that have been made about customers (assim2) seem to be effective in 
fostering SIcap. The analysis further suggests that deliberately fostering the filing of 
critical customer/market reflections, e.g., in a computer system, (assim6) is not useful.  
 
Finally, a closer inspection of the transf-items reveals that all but one indicator (trans2) are 
significant. Mechanisms stimulating the adjustment of the organizational structure to new 
initiatives (trans1) outperform the impact of all other mechanisms. Mechanisms fostering a 
change in the way tasks are being carried out (trans6) are shown to be very effective as 
well.  The analysis further suggests the usefulness of mechanisms to deliberately support 
new initiatives, even to the detriment of existing products/services (trans4), mechanisms to 
prevent chaos when a new initiative is being launched (trans3) and mechanisms fostering a 
change in established procedures to cater the needs of a new initiative (trans5). Yet, 
mechanisms facilitating organizations to replace one set of skills with a different set of 
skills in order to better adopt a new initiative (trans2) do apparently not affect SIcap.  
 
Although not all indicators proved to be relevant (insignificant weights) we still decided to 
keep them all in subsequent (structural) analyses. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, 
since PLS is based on standard OLS regressions, the inclusion of non-significant indicators 
does not bias the estimates of significant indicators. Standard error estimates could only be 
increased if the irrelevant items were highly correlated with the other items. The 
collinearity analysis demonstrated that this was however not the case. Since estimates will 
not be affected, any re-analysis after dropping the insignificant items is not required 
(Mathieson et al., 2001). Secondly, the operationalization of the independent constructs 
originates from a well-considered process, where existing literature and qualitative 
research results have guided indicator selection. As each indicator measures a specific 
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path-breaking focus area of the construct, removing indicators would alter the contents of 
the constructs (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Williams et al., 2003). Since we deal 
with newly developed indices we decided not to prioritize on the refinement of the 
measurement model at this point in theory development (e.g., Ravichandran & Rai, 2000).  
Having discussed the measurement properties and the importance of the formative 
indicators, we turn now to the results of the structural model. 
 
5.3.3.2 Analysis of the structural relationships 
 
The results of a structural PLS analysis are traditionally explained in terms of R2 and path 
coefficients (Chin, 1998a).  R2 is then the squared multiple correlation coefficient, it 
measures the effect size, or the ratio of explained to total variance. It shows the proportion 
of variance in a dependent variable explained by all independent variables jointly (Allison, 
1999; Andrews, 1984). Path coefficients can in turn be interpreted as standardized beta 
coefficients (Falk & Miller, 1992) and are a measure of the strength of a relationship 
between a dependent variable and an independent variable, while holding constant the 
effects of all other independent variables (Allison, 1999).   
Not only the statistical significance but also the size of the R2 statistic and beta coefficients 
should be reported. Statistical significance tests do not provide information on the size of 
an effect; it is not because Type I errors are lower that the effect will be larger (Sawyer & 
Peter, 1983)38; a very small effect can be statistically significant in a large sample, whereas 
a sizable effect can become statistically insignificant in a small sample. For this reason, it 
is important to also study the size of the path estimates (Chin, 2000b). 
 
In Table 5.9 the main results of the structural analysis are shown.  
Overall, deliberate learning mechanisms seem to be good predictors of SIcap; no less than 
35% of variance in SIcap is explained by the three categories of deliberate learning 
mechanisms. Also, transf (R2=0.46), respectively assim (R2=0.47), seem to be well 
predicted by recog and assim, respectively assim. The R2 values were all tested for 
significance by an F-test (Falk & Miller, 1992; Cohen et al., 2003). All values proved to be 
highly significant (p<0.001).  
 
                                                          
38 A common misinterpretation is to consider the p-value as the probability that the results 
occurred because of sampling error or chance fluctuations. In real, a p-value of  0.05 simply 
means that, if the null hypothesis is true, there is a 5% chance of getting a mean difference 
this large or larger and the odds are 19 in 20 of getting a smaller mean difference. However, 
statistical significance testing does not determine whether the null hypothesis is really true 
or the probability that it is true (Sawyer & Peter (1983). 
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Table 5.9: Results of the structural model 
One-tailed significance: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
R2 SIcap: 0.353***
R2 Transf: 0.463***
R2 Assim: 0.467***
--F 2,178=9.52***0.11----Recog + AssimÆ
SIcap 
34%0.121F 1,179=5.23*0.030.236-0.236**0.513TransfÆ SIcap
41%0.143F 1,179=10.50***0.060.3560.374*0.236
=0.088
0.268***0.535AssimÆ SIcap
25%0.088F 1,179=1.66 n.s.0.010.505
(0.683 X 0.268) + 
(0.368 X 0.236) +
(0.683 X 0.374 X 0.236) 
= 0.330
0.175 *0.505RecogÆ SIcap
8
Relative 
contribution 
to 
R2 of DV
7
Variance 
explained 
in DV
6
Effect size:
F-test
5
Effect 
size:f2
4
Total 
effect
3
Indirect path
(stand. β)
2
Direct path
(stand. β)
1
Correlation
 
In addition (see Figure 5.3), recog highly affects assim (β=0.683***); organizations 
applying deliberate learning strategic mechanisms for recog, seem to do this as well for 
assim. The same argument applies to the relationship between recog and transf 
(β=0.368***) and the one between assim and transf (β=0.374***).  
 
As regards the partial mediation effects that we hypothesized, results were studied more 
profoundly (see the different columns in Table 5.9).   
Concerning the effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms on the ultimate DV 
(SIcap), all three categories of mechanisms seem to show considerable path estimates to 
SIcap (see Table 5.9, column 2). The path coefficient between assim and SIcap amounts to 
0.268***, this of transf on SIcap to 0.236**. The direct effect of recog on SIcap is the 
lowest (0.175*). Multiplying the path estimate with the correlation gives an estimate of the 
variance the IV explains in the DV (Falk & Miller, 1992) (see Table 5.9, columns 7 and 
8)39. Taking into account the estimates of the direct paths, it is not surprising to find that 
the direct contribution of recog to SIcap is lowest (0.088, or 25% of the variance explained 
in SIcap), followed by transf (0.121, or 34%). Assim explains the largest part of SIcap 
(0.143, or 41%).  
                                                          
39 Comparison of the correlations and path coefficients shows furthermore that there is 
consistency in sign between both; so-called ‘suppressor effects’ seemed to be absent (Cohen 
et al., 2003; Falk & Miller, 1992). 
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The picture however changes when taking into account the total effects (direct + all 
indirect, i.e. mediated effects) of the independent variables (see Table 5.9, column 4). It is 
here where mediating roles of assim and transf become manifest. Recog shows the highest 
total effect on SIcap (0.505), being channeled by both assim and transf. Assim also shows 
a substantial effect of 0.356, because of its considerable direct effect and its partial 
mediation by transf. The lowest total effect is caused by transf (0.236).  
The mediation effects become even clearer when studying the effect sizes. The effect size 
can be calculated in order to know whether a specific IV has a substantive impact on a DV, 
above and beyond the effects of other IVs (Chin, 1998a; Cohen et al., 2003). This effect 
size can furthermore be tested for significance (Mathieson et al., 2001). We found that all 
effect sizes (see Table 5.9, column 5 and 6) were ‘small’ (relying on Cohen et al.’s (2003) 
conventions for a small, medium and large effect size in behavioral science). The low 
value of the individual effect sizes indicates that it is apparently the combined action of the 
independent constructs that causes the high variance explained of SIcap. The contribution 
of recog in the total variation of SIcap, above and beyond the effects of assim and transf, is 
very small and not significant (0.01n.s.). Since we know that the total effect of recog is high 
(column 4), this implies that deliberate learning mechanisms for recog only fully pay off 
because of the mediating effects of both assim and transf. Contrary to what was expected, 
the effect size of assim was largest (0.06***). Transf serves as a mediator for assim, but 
the direct effects assim has on SIcap are still considerable (see column 2). The effect size 
of transf is smaller (0.03*) than this of assim, yet larger than the effect size of recog. 
 
In conclusion, when the three categories of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms are 
studied in isolation, assim seem to be the most crucial element in the stimulation of SIcap 
(largest effect size). Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation are 
important too. In contrast, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition show 
the smallest contribution to SIcap in and of their own. To put it another way, of all 
deliberate learning mechanisms not having assim in place is the worst, whereas not having 
recog does the least harm.  
Yet, the study of total effects shows that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition have on the contrary the largest total effect on SIcap: recog hence becomes the 
most important factor in stimulating SIcap, on the condition that both assim and transf are 
in place to channel its effects. The above mentioned mediation analysis (section 5.3.2) 
sheds further light on this result.  
 
Let us therefore digress on the difference in effect size between assim and transf.  
A first reason of the smaller effect size of transf can be found in its mediating role for 
assim. The mediation analysis (see Table 5.7) suggested that transf is a mediator for assim 
(0.173*** in the separate model; 0.088* in the full model). Yet, the direct path from assim 
to SIcap remains substantial (0.268***). This implies that transf can be considered as a 
mediator for assim, but that its mediating role is truly partial in nature; we noted an even 
larger direct path estimate between assim and SIcap than this between transf and SIcap 
(see Table 5.9). 
Secondly, a comparison of the mediating function that assim and transf exert for recog 
indicates that the mediating role of assim is larger than this of transf. More specifically, the 
analysis of the separate models in Table 5.7 indicates 0.234*** for assim versus 0.209*** 
for transf. In the full model this difference becomes even more notable: 0.183*** versus 
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0.087*. Although results should be interpreted with caution due to potential (and expected) 
collinearity effects in the full model analysis (Heath, 2001), results may suggest that assim 
‘takes over’ the mediating role of transf for recog. Hence, the mediating effect assim has 
for recog is more crucial than is that which transf has. This implies that the absence of 
assim practices will reduce the relation between recog and SIcap far more than in the case 
transf is lacking. 
 
In conclusion, the large total effect of recog, in combination with its small effect size is 
remarkable. The mediation analysis (see Table 5.7, Baron & Kenny’s mediation test) 
suggested that recog was considerably mediated by both assim and transf. This explains 
the limited effect size of recog over and beyond the effects of assim and transf. Despite the 
small direct relation between recog and SIcap, the large mediated effects through assim 
and transf amount to a large total effect of recog (see Table 5.9). The effects of recog need 
to be ‘channeled’ by assim and transf. 
Furthermore, assim mediates the effects of recog to a larger extent and has consequently a 
more important function in channeling the effect of recog on SIcap, than does transf. In 
addition, asim’s relation to SIcap is in turn mediated by transf, though only to a certain 
extent. Assim also has a considerable direct relation with SIcap. It is the combination of 
these effects which explains the smaller effect size of transf, compared to this of assim.  
Transf does still have a considerable impact, yet, the ‘potential ACAP’-block of recog and 
assim amounts to a larger effect size than the ‘realized ACAP’-component transf (see 
Table 5.9, third and fourth row).  
 
Next to mediating effects, we studied several moderating effects on the specified structural 
relationships. We will treat the results in the following section. 
 
5.3.4 Analysis of the moderating effects 
 
We studied the impact of several organizational and supply chain moderators on the 
strength (incl. moderated mediation) of the structural relationships. 
 
In order to examine moderating effects on structural relationships in a multiple regression 
or PLS framework, two methods can be applied.  
The first option is the traditional mean/median-split approach, which consists of splitting 
the entire sample on the moderator variable in an above- and below-median group (see 
e.g., Bagozzi & Yi, 1994). The model is then run in PLS for each group separately and 
path coefficients between both groups are compared by means of unpaired t-tests (Chin, 
2000a,b). Despite the method’s relative simplicity, its major pitfall lies within its lack of 
statistical precision (loss of both power and the multi-item character of the moderator) 
(Carte & Russel, 2003)40.  
For this reason, the median-split approach has been substituted for hierarchical moderated 
regression (Williams, 2003), in which the independent and moderator variables are entered 
                                                          
40 Irwin & McClelland (2003), for example, found serious reductions in the squared 
correlation, and in the significance of the interaction term (Irwin & McClelland, 2001), after 
dichotomization of a continuous predictor variable. 
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first, followed by their product. The increase in variance explained by the product term 
provides evidence for moderation (Cohen et al., 2003; Jaccard et al., 1990).  
 
However, the application of the latter method in our study turned out to be not as 
straightforward as initially thought. More specifically, in a latent variable framework, the 
interaction term is created by cross-multiplying all indicators of all independent variables, 
including the moderator (Chin et al., 2003). Yet, this method only applies to reflectively 
specified constructs (Chin et al., 2003). The only possibility to model interaction effects 
with formatively specified independent variables is the so-called ‘latent variable score 
approach’ (Schumacker, 2002). This method consists of two steps: first, construct scores 
for the independent and moderator variables are computed by means of PLS, then a single 
interaction term is created by multiplying these construct scores. This interaction term is 
then entered into the PLS analysis (Chin, 2000a; Chin et al., 2003). Still, the latter method 
has not yet been validated within a PLS framework and has, to our knowledge, never been 
applied (personal e-mail correspondence with Chin, 2004). 
In conclusion, up till now the –suboptimal– median-split method has been the only 
validated possibility to examine moderating effects with formative indicators (personal e-
mail correspondence with Chin, 2004). This explains the method’s lasting popularity in 
PLS applications in marketing and management research (e.g., Avolio et al., 1999; 
Venkatesh & Morris, 2000; Duxburry & Higgins, 1991; Howell & Avolio, 1993; Lee & 
Tsang, 2001; Kleijnen et al., 2004). Furthermore, an additional advantage of the method 
lies in its potential to compare entire models across different moderator levels. In other 
words, a median-split analysis permits to compare mediating effects among the moderator 
subgroups and can, as such, reveal moderated mediation effects (James & Brett, 1984). 
This is especially interesting in the context of our study, for existing literature and 
qualitative research results did not enable us to specify hypothesized effects in detail (see 
chapter 4).  
 
In order to apply the median-split method, first, for each (reflectively measured) moderator 
a summated scale was created. Averages were computed for each scale. Then, for each 
scale the median was computed and the sample was split into an above- and below-median 
group (cases with exact median values were excluded from the analysis).  
Table 5.10 shows the ranges, medians, means and standard deviations of these average 
moderator scales.  
 
Table 5.10: Descriptives of the moderator scales 
 min max median mean s.d. 
 
INNOVAT 1.50 5.00 3.75 3.67 0.68 
RISKTAK 1.00 5.00 3.00 2.87 0.74 
CROSSF 1.17 5.00 3.50 3.31 0.78 
INFOCUS 2.00 5.00 4.00 4.08 0.65 
INFOSUP 1.00 5.00 3.33 3.39 0.95 
CENTRAL 1.00 4.00 2.00 2.19 0.76 
INNOCUS 1.00 5.00 3.60 3.45 0.81 
INNOSUP 1.00 5.00 3.00 2.99 0.89 
CHAINCLIM 1.67 5.00 4.00 3.82 0.71 
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Apparently, medians/means are all relatively high, except for the central, the risktak and 
the innosup constructs. These high scores might stem from hypothesis-guessing or 
evaluation apprehension by the survey respondents (Cook & Campbell, 1979). However, 
in the moderator analysis, these effects could be ignored since only values relative to the 
median point were taken into account. 
 
Before analyses could be run, two problem areas of the median-split method had to be 
tackled first: the issue of statistical power and the equivalence of weights in the subgroups.  
Concerning power, we adopted the two more complex rules of thumb (one for R2s, and one 
for beta coefficients) that Green (1991) developed, based on the power-analytical work by 
Cohen (1988). These formulas yielded a minimum sample size of 31 to 60 for an α =0.05, 
power =0.80, and medium-large effect sizes: see Appendix V).  Since the average sample 
size of the subgroups was 67 (the smallest subgroup, low-infocus, consisting of 49 cases, 
the largest subgroup, low-risktak consisting of 86 cases) all subgroup sample sizes could 
be considered as adequate. The median-split analysis could hence be assumed to have a 
sufficient power level in the subgroups. 
 
Besides the issue of power reduction, a second drawback of the median-split method 
concerns its assumption that underlying weights in the formation of the construct scores 
are approximately equivalent across subsamples (Bagozzi, 1994b; Chin 2000b). Yet, since 
construct scores are estimated in PLS using different weighted combinations in each 
subsample, differences in path coefficients can be caused by differences in latent construct 
composition. This is why in view of construct validity, equality of construct composition 
(equality of indicator weights) should be tested before separate subgroup PLS models can 
be compared. Carte & Russell (2003) accordingly advise to first perform Box’s M tests per 
block of indicators. Box’s M tests the assumption of homogeneity of covariance matrices 
(=H0). Only if test results are insignificant, item covariance matrices can be assumed to be 
similar among the subsamples and a median-split analysis can be interpreted (Carte & 
Russell, 2003). Box’s M tests were performed on the indicators of each construct in the 
hypothesized model and for every moderator-subgroup. Results indicated that inter-item 
covariance matrices of no single construct differed significantly (p<0.05) between low- 
and high-groups, which suggests equal construct composition in the subsamples41.  
                                                          
41 In each PLS model indicators are weighted optimally in order to predict dependent 
variables (observed or latent variables, dependent on the measurement mode). 
Consequently, in the case of formative indicators, intra-block covariances are never taken 
into account in the estimation process (Chin, 1998a); in contrast, indicators are weighted to 
optimally predict the correlation between construct scores. Therefore, in the case of a 
formative mode equality of weights does not entirely parallel equality of loadings (the 
latter being tested by Box’s M). In other words, testing homogeneity of covariances among 
items in a block does not prove equality of construct composition. Nonetheless, the 
methodological literature has, to our knowledge, never treated this issue (personal e-mail 
correspondence with Chin, 2005). We think probably a Chow test could shed light on equal 
construct composition across the different moderator groups. Still, as far as we know, this 
test has never been applied in this context. In addition, such tests have not yet been 
incorporated in the PLS software (personal e-mail correspondence with Chin, 2005). 
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After having ensured a sufficient power level and equal construct compositions, separate 
models for each subgroup were run in PLS-Graph3.0. For each model, 200 bootstrap re-
samplings (construct level sign change) were created. Standard error estimates were treated 
in a parametric sense via unpaired t-tests (with degrees of freedom = sample size low-
group plus sample size high-group minus 2) to know the difference in path estimates 
between groups (Chin, 2000a; 2000b).  
 
In Table 5.11 results of the moderator analysis are shown42. Columns indicate standardized 
beta weights for the structural relations, the last column shows the R2 of SIcap.  Per 
moderator, results of the low-group and high-group models are shown, followed by the t-
test difference results.  
Before analyzing the moderator results, first additional unpaired t-tests were performed on 
PLS construct scores between the low- and high-group of every moderator. The t-tests 
indicated significant differences on some construct scores, for some moderators. Results of 
the median-split moderator analysis (see Table 5.11) should thus sometimes be interpreted 
as partly stemming from differences in the patterns of relationships among the constructs, 
and as partly stemming from different construct scores (Duxbury & Higgins, 1991). When 
significant differences were found on the construct scores, we explicitly report them. 
 
Results in Table 5.11 will now be discussed in more depth. Mediation effects in the 
subgroup-models (moderated mediation) were studied applying the ‘products of 
coefficients’ approach (MacKinnon et al., 1995). 
 
                                                          
42 Although three significance levels have been indicated in the table, it is especially the 0.05 
level that should be considered as the real cut-off value, since power has been examined for 
this confidence level only. 
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Table 5.11: Results of the moderator analysis 
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5.3.4.1 Innovativeness (RQ1) 
 
In the case of high innovativeness, the direct effect of recog on SIcap is largely intensified 
and becomes very important. In addition, the direct effect of assim on SIcap increases, 
though remains insignificant. Finally, the effect of transf (in particular the mediating role 
for recog) is weakened but remains largely significant.  
A comparison of both groups sheds further light on moderated mediation effects. In the 
low-group assimilation has neither a direct, neither a mediation role (recog on assim is 
significant, but assim on SIcap is insignificant). Transf serves as a full mediator, though 
only for recog (assim on transf is insignificant). In contrast, in the high group the 
mediating role of assim for recog is enhanced, but still remains negligible. Transf fully 
mediates the effects of assim and partially mediates the effects of recog through assim.  
In conclusion, an innovative culture increases the level of SIcap and fosters the use of 
deliberate ACAP learning mechanisms (higher construct values). Moreover, deliberate 
learning mechanisms resulted in a higher variance explained of SIcap. In other words, 
deliberate learning mechanisms to foster SIcap seem to be more effective in organizations 
characterized by a highly innovative culture. A closer inspection of the results 
demonstrates that particularly recog seems key in this. Innovativeness largely intensifies 
the direct effect of recog on SIcap. In addition, transf becomes less effective, but still plays 
an important role as a full mediator for assim and a partial mediator for recog. The 
implementation of transf hence seems still useful in fostering SIcap, being the catalyst of, 
in particular, assim. In contrast, a non-innovative culture lowers SIcap and, moreover, 
curbs the use of deliberate ACAP learning mechanisms (lower construct values) and their 
effectiveness. A lack of informal RACAP capacity makes transf practices a necessary 
condition to leverage the effects of formal recog practices. Still, our findings suggest that a 
lack of innovativeness turns the implementation of assim useless; assim has no effect 
whatsoever. In order to gain any effect of assim an innovative culture is apparently 
required. 
 
5.3.4.2 Risk taking(RQ2) 
 
As risk taking did not influence the height of the recog- and assim- construct scores, it is in 
fact the pattern of relationships between recog, assim and SIcap which is changed by the 
level of risk taking, Firstly, risk taking strengthens the mediating role of assim; the direct 
effect of recog on SIcap lowers to insignificance but the effect of assim on SIcap is largely 
sharpened. Secondly, even though the high-group scored significantly higher on the transf-
construct, the effect of transf on SIcap did not significantly differ in comparison to the 
low-group. In the case of high risk taking, the mediating role of transf for recog decreased 
whereas its mediating role for assim was enhanced. A remarkable findings is however that 
although organizations characterized by a high risk taking culture scored significantly 
higher on the level of SIcap, deliberate learning mechanisms are apparently less effective 
in fostering SIcap (lower R2). 
In conclusion, comparing both groups reveals that the level of risk taking particularly 
strengthens the effect/role of assimilation; in the high-risktaking-group assimilation 
becomes a full mediator for recog (while only being a partial mediator in the low-
risktaking-group). In analogy with the effects of innovativeness, the key difference centers 
on assim. 
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5.3.4.3 Cross-functional information dissemination (RQ3) 
 
T-tests on the construct scores demonstrated that the high-crossf-group scored significantly 
higher on SIcap. Moreover, deliberate learning mechanisms (apparently only those for 
recog and assim) seem to be more effective in this case (higher R2 of SIcap). 
The positive effects of crossf are particularly observable on the effectiveness of both recog 
and assim. In the high-crossf-group not only the direct effect of recog on SIcap is 
dramatically sharpened, the effect of assim on SIcap is largely enhanced as well. Likewise, 
the mediating role of assim for recog is intensified. It is however important to remark that 
the high-crossf-group achieved significantly higher scores on both these constructs. In 
contrast to the positive effects of crossf on the impact of recog and assim, crossf largely 
reduces the impact of transf on SIcap (to a level of insignificance). This is even more true 
since the high-crossf-group achieved significantly higher scores on the transf construct. 
In conclusion, in the case of low cross-functional information dissemination, a pattern 
similar to this of low innovativeness can be discerned. More specifically, when crossf is 
low, transf serves as a full mediator, yet only for recog. Assim has no effect whatsoever. 
When organizations lack the capacity to disseminate market information across different 
functions any attempt to increase assim will hence be in vein.  
 
5.3.4.4 Information from customers (RQ4) 
 
A high level of infocus enhances the direct effect of recog on SIcap, though it remains 
insignificant. In particular, the direct effect of assim is heightened, as is its mediating role 
for recog. Moreover, the increased effectiveness of assim can not be caused by different 
assim levels since both groups did not significantly differ on their construct score. In the 
high infocus group, the effect of transf on SIcap considerably diminishes and even drops to 
insignificance. This weakening effect is remarkable, all the more since the high-infocus-
group scored significanty higher on the transf-construct.  
As regards the effectiveness of deliberate learning mechanisms in stimulating SIcap, the 
same conclusions apply to this moderator as to risk taking: although the high-infocus-
group scored significantly better on SIcap, the effectiveness of deliberate learning 
mechanisms is lower in this group (lower R2). This might be explained by the 
insignificance of transf in both cases. 
In conclusion, a high level of infocus enhances the (full) mediating role of assim for recog 
and eliminates the role/effect of transf (becomes insignificant). Although companies with 
high infocus apply more transf practices, their effect is completely ignorable. In contrast, 
in the case of low levels of infocus, transf plays a prominent role in (fully) mediating the 
effects of assimilation, which in turn fully channels the effects of recog. Unfortunately, 
organizations with low infocus do not seem to pay much attention to this category of 
learning mechanisms.  
 
5.3.4.5 Information from suppliers (RQ5) 
A comparison of the effects of infosup with the effects of the previously studied 
moderators indicates that the effects of infosup are less drastic. Firstly, even though the 
level of infosup does not influence the construct level of recog, it augments the direct 
effect of recog on SIcap. A comparison of both groups shows furthermore that it is in 
particular the effect of assim on SIcap which is intensified by a high level of infosup 
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(although assim does not mediate recog more strongly). This can partly be explained by 
the higher score the high-infosup-group achieved on assim. As regards transf, both groups 
gained equal scores and the effect of transf on SIcap did not differ significantly either (in 
both groups significant). Furthermore, infosup did not affect the level of SIcap. Still, 
deliberate learning mechanisms prove to be more effective in the case of high infosup 
(higher R2). 
Conclusions are hence more or less analogue to the infocus construct, though the pattern 
found here is less pronounced. Organizations getting much information from their 
suppliers pay more attention to PACAP mechanisms (recog and assim) and gain, in turn, 
far more results of them in terms of an increase in SIcap. Deliberate ACAP mechanisms 
seem to be extremely effective (R2=0.525) in this case. Both the effect of recog and assim 
are intensified. Trans practices prove to remain useful, independent of the level of infosup.  
 
5.3.4.6 Centralization(RQ7) 
 
A highly centralized structure especially increases the direct effect of recog on SIcap. This 
is even more true since both the high-central and the low-central-group did not 
significantly differ on their recog-scores. Furthermore, though both groups scored similarly 
on the assim construct, the effect of assim on SIcap is weakened in the high-group (but 
remains important), as is its mediating effect for recog. Finally, centralization decreases the 
effect of transf on SIcap, despite the high-central-group’s higher score on transf. The 
mediating effects of transf for both recog and assim are reduced in the high-central-group 
as well.  
Highly centralized organizations achieved higher levels on SIcap. Still, in decentralized 
organizations deliberate learning mechanisms are a little bit more effective, the difference 
in effectiveness in comparison to centralized organizations is nevertheless negligible. 
In conclusion, in a highly centralized organization both recog and assim seem useful 
mechanisms for stimulating SIcap. Especially the large direct effect of recog is remarkable 
(the full mediation of recog by assim apparent in a decentralized structure disappears).  A 
centralized structure will apparently more easily lift the direct effects of recog.  
 
5.3.4.7 Innovation stimulus from customers (RQ8) 
 
The direct effect of recog on SIcap is considerably enhanced in the case of a high level of 
innocus; it is increased from a low, insignificant value in the low-innocus-group to a 
considerable, significant value in the high-innocus-group. This effect might also be 
explained by the high-innocus-group’s higher score on the recog construct. Both groups 
scored however equally on the assim and transf constructs. This even strengthens the 
observation that high innocus attenuates the effect of assim on SIcap (the effect did 
nonetheless remain considerable). Furthermore, it reduces the mediating role of assim for 
recog. Another important result relates to transf; the effect of transf on SIcap largely drops 
to a (negative) non-significant value in the high-innocus-group.  
Furthermore, although the high-innocus-group scored significantly higher on the SIcap 
construct than did the low-innocus-group, it is the latter case in which deliberate learning 
mechanisms gained effectiveness. In analogy with the results for the moderators risk 
taking and infocus, the lower R2 of the high-innocus-group is probably due to the drop in 
the effectiveness of transf. 
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5.3.4.8 Innovation stimulus from suppliers (RQ9) 
 
Given the fact that both groups scored similarly on all constructs, differences revealed by 
the moderator analysis can be entirely explained in terms of differences in the patterns of 
structural relationships. The comparison of both groups shows that the direct effect of 
recog on SIcap strongly increases in the case of high innosup. Yet, in this case the effect of 
assim on SIcap falls, but still remains important. Also, the mediating role of assim for 
recog is weakened by innosup. As regards the effect of transf on SIcap, no significant 
difference could be detected between the high-innosup and the low-innosup group.  
Innosup hence clearly impacts on the learning mechanisms for the PACAP cycle.  
Both groups did not significantly differ on their SIcap scores. The variance explained in 
SIcap by the different deliberate learning mechanisms neither did. 
 
5.3.4.9 Chain climate (RQ10) 
 
Both groups gained similar scores on all constructs, except for recog on which the high-
chainclim-group scored significantly higher. Yet, despite this group’s higher score on 
recog, a lower direct effect of recog on SIcap could be observed (though still significant). 
Nevertheless, in the high-group the effect of assim on SIcap is increased to a large, 
significant value (while being insignificant in the low-group). Also the mediating effect of 
assim for recog is considerably larger in the high-chainclim-group. Concerning the 
(mediating) effect of transf, the influence of a favorable chainclim is however negative. 
Whereas transf is an important mediator in the low-chainclim-group, the effect of transf on 
SIcap dramatically falls to non-significance in the high-chainclim-group.  
Even though no difference on SIcap level could be detected between both groups, 
deliberate learning mechanisms explain more variance in SIcap in the case of a favorable 
chain climate.  
 
 
In this chapter, we analyzed the data of quantitative research phase. The results of the 
measurement model demonstrated that all reflectively specified constructs (the moderators 
and the dependent variable) are reliable and valid. In addition, mediation tests showed the 
correctness of a partial mediation model. A further analysis of this model revealed several 
significant path-breaking focus areas in recognition, assimilation and transformation that 
firms may stimulate by deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
structural results indicate important mediating mechanisms that channel the effects of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, in particular. Overall, deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation seem the most crucial factor to foster SIcap.  
Finally, the results of the moderator analysis indicated the occurrence of important 
moderated mediation effects.  
 
The straight results we derived from these analyses will now be discussed in chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
 
In this section the major findings of the QUAN phase will be further discussed. As 
indicated in the methodological chapter, the qualitative findings were sometimes used to 
help interpreting some of the quantitative results. This re-interpretation of the qualitative 
findings revealed once more the value of mixed method research.  
 
6.1 RELEVANT PATH-BREAKING FOCUS AREAS 
 
Our quantitative findings provided early empirical confirmation of the role deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation may play in 
fostering SIcap. We will discuss the relevant path-breaking focus areas for the three ACAP 
dimensions.  
 
6.1.1 Deliberate strategic learning mechanism for recognition 
 
The significance of the items ‘insight’, recog1, 10 and 13 (see Appendix II for the 
corresponding questions) indicate that strategic innovators establish deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms to develop more and deeper insight into their current customers. For 
example, a food ingredients supplier remarked: “it [the creation of a SIinitiative] is not 
reacting to a crisis, neither is it pure proactiveness. Instead, it is a sort of logical 
implication of carefully listening to your customers and mapping their needs to your own 
competences”. However, strategic innovators’ efforts to develop more customer insight 
largely surpassed the activity of –simply– ‘hearing the voice of the customer’ (Day, 1999). 
More seems required that just asking customers what they currently value (Flint et al., 
2002). In fact, the significance of the indicators ‘insight’, recog1, recog10 and recog13 fit 
the more recent insights of the market orientation literature. 
 
Essentially founded on the cultural definition by Narver & Slater (1990) and the 
behavioural (market information processing) definition by Kohli & Jaworski (1990), 
market orientation has evolved towards an extensively studied marketing construct (Hult et 
al., 2005; Han et al., 1998; Day, 1994; Deshpandé et al., 1993). Recent pleas in the market 
orientation literature have however attributed more proactive shades of meaning to market 
orientation, which stand in sharp contrast to the prevailing reactive, or ‘market-driven’ 
interpretation of market orientation (Jaworski et al., 2000). 
More specifically, Slater & Narver (1998), in response to the attacks on their reactive 
notion of ‘market orientation’, later distinguish between ‘responsive’ and ‘proactive’ 
market orientation. Whereas a responsive approach is customer led, focusing on the short-
term satisfaction of expressed customer needs (reactive), a proactive market orientation is 
longer term in focus and enables an organization to proactively lead and anticipate 
customers by aiming towards the satisfaction of their latent needs. A focus on latent needs 
prevents price competition, so they argue (Slater & Narver, 1998). Latent needs are by 
definition impossible for the customer to articulate, and what can not be articulated can 
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evidently not be articulated to competitors either (Slater & Narver, 1999). Narver et al. 
(2004) furthermore demonstrated that proactive approaches will lead to more innovative 
products and services, and to more new product success. Authors endorsing this viewpoint 
keep stressing the importance of market sensing but emphasis is put on a proactive market 
interpretation (Lynn et al., 1996; Johnson, 1999)43.  
 
The high value of recog10 (mechanisms that stimulate the consultation of the most 
innovative customers for innovative ideas) confirms the importance of the ‘lead-user 
technique’ to uncover and visualize latent and unexpressed market needs (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993) and to discover new customer solutions (Slater & Narver, 1998). Our 
findings indicate that lead users can be used as “a window to the future” instead of an 
“anchor in the past” (Slater & Narver, 1998: 1003), in particular for industrial markets 
(von Hippel, 1988). Lead users face new market needs earlier than do the majority of 
customers. Therefore, they may generate innovations that substantially differ from existing 
market offers (Lüthje & Herstatt, 2004). The significance of recog10 indicates that the 
usefulness of the lead user technique extends well beyond the area of product development 
(Sharma et al., 2001). Kodama (2002) found that dialogue and interaction with innovative 
customers (sophisticated, well-educated and experienced customers) may lead to new 
business models as well. The QUAL2 findings indeed showed that strategic innovators use 
their customers for new idea generation, or for further development and refinement of their 
SIinitiatives by means of pilots.  
 
The QUAN results (‘insight’) furthermore confirm that the study of the different stages in 
the buyer experience process (from purchase to disposal) can shed light on how a 
product/service may provide value to the customer (Kim & Mauborgne, 2000). “whatever 
the customer does not do, or does not do well, represents a business opportunity, for 
oneself – or for one’s competitors” (Ramírez, 1999: 59). Indeed, to acquire new or latent 
customer needs, firms with a proactive market orientation record and observe customers 
closely in their use of products or services (Slater & Narver, 1998). Davenport et al. (2001) 
found that firms excelling in customer knowledge management focused explicitly on these 
                                                          
43 Still more recently, the market orientation literature has made a distinction between a 
‘market driven’ and ‘market driving’ market orientation (e.g., Carrillat et al., 2004). The 
former centres on ‘keeping the status quo’: a focus on existing customer preferences (Day, 
1999) within an existing market structure (Jaworski et al., 2000). In contrast, driving markets 
implies not accepting the present market structure and/or market behavior (Jaworski et al., 
2000). Kumar et al. (2000) posit that market driving implies a substantially new customer 
value proposition and business system. As market drivers address deep-seated, latent or 
emerging customer needs (Kumar et al., 2000), a market driving approach logically involves 
a proactive market orientation (Narver et al., 2004). Since the type of business logic adopted 
is reflected in the type of market orientation applied (Tuominen et al., 2004), it is especially 
market-driving organizations that have been argued to be more likely to adopt preemptive 
strategic maneuvers (Johnson et al., 2003) and to propose radically new offerings valued by 
customers (Carrillat et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2003). Companies acting as ‘market drivers’ 
revolutionize the industry and change the rules of the game (Kumar et al., 2000). Hence, the 
market driving approach exceeds the –traditional– concept of market orientation, and 
rather fits our conceptualization of SI (see chapter 1). 
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‘human data’. Attentive listening is needed to decode these observations and customer 
stories (Day, 2002). This is because research indicates that the formation of new customer 
preferences takes place through the customer’s engagement with specific products or 
concepts (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994b). The perceived value of a product or service may 
moreover change over time, through its use (van der Haar et al., 2001). New value 
positions can then be discovered by linking data about these different buyer experience 
stages to different utility levers (e.g., convenience, productivity) (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2000).  
 
In addition to better customer insight, strategic innovators, with a proactive market 
orientation, scan the market more broadly (Slater & Narver, 1998). The study of non-
customers (recog13) prevents the path dependency implied by a too narrow focus on 
existing customers (Danneels, 2003). The study of non-customers prevents a ‘contraction 
of the opportunity horizon’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994b) and may reveal new value 
propositions. For example, a printer remarked: “we focus on non-customers, but just to get 
new ideas of serving our customers differently. Then we target our existing customers with 
cross- and deep-selling techniques”.  
Furthermore, since customers periodically change what they value, suppliers should 
anticipate customers’ desired value change, if only to retain their current customers (Flint 
et al., 2002). Flint et al. (2002) make a plea for the importance of a customer-oriented 
culture (Slater & Narver, 1995) and a marketing information system that is customer-value 
oriented, including information about customers’ experiences and desired customer value 
changes. Proactive marketers that actively influence customers’ desired value changes may 
not only help customers to interpret, they also arm themselves against expected 
environmental changes (Flint et al., 2002). Stimulating the study of future customer needs 
(recog1) and the effects changes in the business environment may exert on customer needs 
(recog3 incorporated in ‘insight’), proved indeed significant deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms.  
 
Yet, contrary to what was expected, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms that stimulate 
the development of a better insight into current and future (direct) customer needs and 
behavior are of more importance than do mechanisms targeting a deeper knowledge of end 
customers, other industries or of more general, macro-level tendencies.  
Some deviant citations of the QUAL2-phase, which did not seem to structure the 
qualitative findings at first glance, proved however useful when re-inspecting in light of 
these quantitative findings. 
 
Although some interviewees indicated the value of studying the end customer (recog12), 
this was often done with the view of better satisfying the needs of the direct customer. For 
some upstream suppliers the end customer is simply perceived as ‘too far away’. The 
distance to the end market can be so large that a) a study of the end customers becomes 
inefficient, or b) irrelevant. For example, whereas Procter & Gamble had been targeting 
their market research efforts on end customers in the 1980s, it shifted its focus on large 
retailers because of their growing concentration (Davenport et al., 2001). Others mentioned 
another reason. A truck & trailer supplier: “the question is: how far can you go, and how 
far do you want to go without simply taking over the function of your direct customer. One 
rule: do never interfere with his business, don’t poach on his territory”. Much study on the 
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end-customer may hence give direct customers the impression of a coming forward-
integration move. A food ingredients supplier endorsed this view by noting that the direct 
customer should never get the impression the supplier wants to jump across, wants to make 
shortcuts in the chain. Of course, this is highly dependent on the degree of market 
fragmentation. Both the functional food and the truck & trailer industry are very 
professional industries, where OEMs keep on rationalizing their supplier base. A supplier 
taking over the role of one of its customers (e.g., responsible of 40% of his total returns) 
exposes itself to a very large risk.  All the SIinitiatives studied (in each of the five 
industries) were indeed built ‘around’ the existing business; they were linked to an existing 
product or service. For example a printer noted: “we do much things that are ‘unusual’ or 
‘strange’ for a printer to do, but we always try to involve a graphical product in it”. 
Interviewees mentioned two reasons for this. First, traditional business is still needed to 
spread risks. Secondly, for many it is a credibility issue to create the image towards other 
industry parties (incl. customers) to remain an insider of the traditional industry.  
 
As regards the study of different industries (recog11), the QUAL2-findings indicated that 
when other industries were studied, these industries were still closely related to the 
traditional industry. For example, TMS suppliers study the industry of in-car telematics 
and truck & trailer parties study the vehicle insurance industry. Perhaps, these industries 
were not considered as ‘different industries’, but interpreted as different segments or 
evolutions of the traditional industry. The underlying cause of the insignificant result for 
this indicator might also be attributed to the credibility issue mentioned above. In fact, in a 
business-to-business context the buyer’s decision is motivated by his belief that the value 
proposition offered by a supplier (perceived value) will positively affect its own business 
(Woodall, 2003). Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) however argue that this belief is in itself 
rooted in a wider set of beliefs that may in turn be influenced by the industry recipe. A 
buyer’s perception of how his firm competes will thus influence his belief in the value 
creating potential of an offering. Possibly, suppliers may feel that studying other industries 
may produce new business ideas and value propositions that deviate too much from the 
customer’s business perception. In this way, the problem of mental inertia moves in fact 
from the supplier to the customer.  
 
The QUAN findings also pointed to the limited value of general macro-level or societal 
information (‘envinfo’ and recog2). General market information is often provided by 
independent market information suppliers (e.g., newspaper articles, trade magazine 
reports). Anand & Peterson (2000) found that these general market information suppliers 
are important media through which producers observe each other and other market 
participants. The scope of the information provided restrains actors’ focus of attention. In 
this way, participants ‘cognize’ their competitive fields by all receiving and interpreting 
this same information. In this sense the study of general macro-level information may 
reinforce industry recipes, path dependencies and do consequently restrain market 
participants from the creation of SIinitiatives. Following Dimaggio & Powell’s (1983) 
institutional theory, it could hence be argued that this information reflects common 
industry knowledge and will hence enhance chances of mimetic strategic behavior, instead 
of promoting a contravention to the industry rules of the game. For example, Dimaggio & 
Powell (1983) hypothesized that the greater managers’ participation in trade and 
professional associations, the more likely the organization will imitate other organizations 
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in the industry. In addition, most of this macro-level information is gathered by means of 
desk research. Moreover, this desk research is often performed by the marketing 
department. A second reason of the insignificant result may hence be found in the low 
value interviewees attributed to both desk research and the role of the (corporate) 
marketing department in the creation of SIinitiatives (see chapter 4).  
 
In conclusion, findings only partly confirmed the ideas put forward in the SI literature. On 
the one hand, findings corroborated the proposition that companies have to develop a deep 
insight into customer needs and priorities in order to create new and substantially superior 
customer value (Markides, 1997; Kim & Mauborgne, 1997). On the other, sceptics’ 
warnings against the blinding effects of studying the existing value system (see e.g., 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Zhou et al., 2005; Hamel & Getz, 
2004) could not be confirmed. In fact, we found evidence of Danneels’ (2003) empirical 
results. Danneels (2003) concludes that a tight and loose coupling with existing customers 
is no dichotomy (as often presented in the literature) but that both are reconcilable.  
 
6.1.2 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation 
 
In general, QUAN-results regarding the assim-indicators seem to support the insights of 
extant sensemaking literature (e.g., Louis & Sutton, 1991). Our findings furthermore 
corroborate the value deliberate strategic learning mechanisms may have in triggering 
path-breaking cognition. In this respect, further evidence is provided for Barr et al.’s 
(1992) empirical findings that strategically proactive organizations stay open to continuous 
adjustments to their mental frameworks. The value deliberate efforts may have for 
sensemaking and changing mental frameworks has indeed already been exemplified in the 
literature (e.g., Thomas et al., 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
 
More specifically, the results illustrate how strategic innovators do invest in deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms to identify and discuss their implicit mental models of the 
market (Day, 2002). The significance of assim2, assim3 and assim5 (see Appendix II for 
the corresponding questions) shows that a stimulation of critical reflections on the market, 
customers and the marketing approach are to be considered as relevant path-breaking areas 
in the creation of SIcap. This finding validates Slater & Narver’s (1995) proposition that 
exposing new information to multiple interpretations and holding constructive discussions 
on long-held assumptions about customers and markets leads to a redefinition of the 
business in a frame-breaking way. In this sense, the QUAN results also substantiate 
arguments developed in the literature on SI regarding the importance of questioning 
assumptions that the firm has about its customers (Markides, 2004b) and its marketing 
strategy (e.g., Hamel & Getz, 2004; Slywotsky, 1996). 
Already in 1975, Schon advised companies to “be effective at shared inquiry”. The 
significance of the indicators assim1 and assim5 sheds further light on the value that 
collective critical reflections and discussions may have for changing cognitive frameworks 
(Kuwada, 1998). The findings indicate how strategic innovators seem to put high emphasis 
on deep internal dialogue (Schein, 1993).  
 
Some authors have posited the beneficial effects of codifying reflections and 
understandings of action-performance implications in written (ICT-)tools. For example, 
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Nonaka (1994) and Day (2002) point to its value for knowledge diffusion, while Zollo & 
Winter (2002) stress the learning effects of the codification process itself. In fact, assim6 
tackled the aspect of codifying ‘know-why’ knowledge (Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
Yet, the effect of indicator assim6 proved nonsignificant. This result is not surprising since 
this item had originally not been included in the index, based on the QUAL2 findings (see 
chapter 4). It was added as a result of the pre-testing procedure (Delphi-round), where 
certain persons of the steering committee insisted upon the inclusion of this item. Although 
the qualitative research had not revealed this aspect as being crucial, we did add this to the 
index since being not inclusive is worse than including irrelevant items in index 
construction with formative items (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).  
 
The nonsignificance of assim6 indicates that stimulating the path-breaking elements in 
assimilation capacity requires in particular the stimulation of interpersonal discussion and 
reflection upon customers/markets, more than it does the structured filing of these 
reflections. A better storing or filing system may facilitate the use of market knowledge 
needed for innovation, but it is the sensemaking system in itself that has a direct link to a 
firm’s innovation capacity (Dougherty et al., 2000). 
First of all, codification implies considerable additional costs, such as time, resources and 
managerial attention. For example, research by Haas & Hansen (2005) showed that 
knowledge flows in the form of electronic documents may sometimes hurt competitive 
performance. For highly experienced persons, they argue, the additional search costs that 
the consultation of these digital documents implies is not compensated for by the potential 
learning effects of it. This reason was also emphasized in the QUAL2 findings. Although 
some strategic innovators did make attempts to store critical market insights and market 
lessons learnt throughout prior SIinitiatives, many interviewees were (literally) laughing 
away the idea of actually consulting the intranet for these purposes.  
Furthermore, although IT systems may be used to capture useful insights, some authors 
criticized their user-friendliness. Often, incompatible formats, nonintegrated databases, or 
software impediments prevent people from actually retrieving the information (Day, 2002). 
A similar problem of the non-effectiveness of intranet-sites was reported in the context of 
CRM-programs (Campbell, 2003).  
A final reason could be found in literature on high velocity markets. For example, Bogner 
& Barr (2000) argue that fast changing environmental conditions make reliance on 
experience and past reflections far less useful. Instead, the use of real-time information is 
advised (cfr. Eisenhardt, 1989; Bogner & Barr, 2000). This information is not only richer 
and results in faster feedback (Eisenhardt, 1989a), but through its use the negative (path-
dependent) consequences associated with the use of historic information may be 
circumvented (Bogner & Barr, 2000). 
 
6.1.3 Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation 
 
The QUAN-results regarding the transf-indicators generally confirmed the relevant focus 
areas that were identified during the QUAL2-phase. Deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms that foster transformation capacity targeted the following areas: adapting the 
organizational structure (trans1), adapting procedures (trans5), changing the way of 
working (trans6), preventing organizational chaos (trans3), and supporting new initiatives 
even to the detriment of existing business (trans4). The final element corresponds to the 
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kind of defensive behavior strategic innovators deliberately try to circumvent. Firms’ 
unwillingness to cannibalize their prior investments until some entrant changes the rules of 
the game is regarded as a large bottleneck by incumbent firms (Christensen, 1997). The 
significance of trans4 backs Chandy & Tellis’ (1998) findings that a firm’s willingness to 
cannibalize leads to radical innovation.  
The high significance of trans1 validates insights developed in the SI literature. To 
increase a company’s ability to create (or cope with) disruptive innovations, Christensen & 
Overdorf (2000) have indeed stressed the value of creating new organizational structures in 
which new procedures can be developed. They furthermore point to the value of new team 
boundaries that change the ways of working within the organization. A re-inspection of the 
results of QUAL2 suggests that trans1 is perhaps positioned at a more fundamental level 
than the other dimensions. In this way, it may be considered as a necessary condition to 
leverage the effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms targeting the other path-
breaking areas.  
Yet, for deliberate strategic learning mechanisms fostering the replacement of a set of 
organizational skills/competencies (trans2) the analysis showed a nonsignificant result. 
The QUAL2 findings and the insights developed in the SI literature can shed more light on 
the potential grounds of this result.  
 
First, as we explained in chapter 1, one the main differences between contributions on 
strategic renewal versus those on SI is whether the degree of frame-breaking novelty 
associated with an innovation is to be considered vis-à-vis the existing competence base, or 
vis-à-vis the market and the industry rules of the game. Yet, change inside the organization 
does not necessarily imply innovation in market terms. Alternatively, the fact whether 
competencies need developing, changing, stretching, reconfiguring or mere exploiting 
when deviating from, or changing, the rules of the game, has not been clearly tackled in SI 
discourses. Lilien et al. (2002) found however that breakthrough innovations seem to fit 
organizational competencies as well as do more incremental innovations. Moreover, 
initiatives that fit existing competencies have a greater chance of acceptance and funding 
(Lilien et al., 2002), and will therefore pass more easily the organizational ‘screening’ 
barrier. This brings further evidence to the argument that strategic innovators will be more 
inclined to leverage than to completely transform their existing competence base when 
creating a SIinitiative. Baden-Fuller’s (1995) insights on SI may further clarify this issue. 
 
In his framework, Baden-Fuller (1995) explicitly distinguishes between external and 
internal innovation effects, asserting that “what is frame-breaking to the firm isn’t 
necessarily a challenge to the industry recipe” (: S10). In his ‘staircase of innovation’ 
innovations producing large external effects while imposing only small internal effects are 
positioned at the top.  
In this respect, the concept of ‘architectural innovation’ (Henderson & Clark, 1990) may 
bring valuable insights to the SI literature. Although born in a research tradition of 
technological and product innovation, architectural innovation shares the idea of SI that 
even modest internal changes can have dramatic competitive consequences. Henderson & 
Clark’s (1990) idea is that, instead of improving components within a stable architecture, 
the way components are integrated (i.e. their architecture) may be changed too, leaving 
intact the core design concepts (i.e. the component knowledge). These authors themselves 
have posited the future research idea that their concepts could stretch beyond product 
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development and design to the strategic, firm level, in the sense that other tasks performed 
by an organization could also be described as “a series of interlinked components within a 
relatively stable framework” (1990: 28). This idea of novel competence configurations has 
in fact been put into concrete empirical research by Galunic & Rodan (1998) and Galunic 
& Eisenhardt (2001) in the context of multi-business firms.  
The idea to reconfigure and leverage existing resources in view of new value propositions 
and offerings has been echoed in more recent contributions to the resource-based view as 
well. For example, Peteraf & Bergen (2003) have asserted that for competitive advantage, 
it is not rareness of resources in terms of resource type that matters, but rareness in 
resource functionality.  
 
Second, a reconfiguration or rebundling of competencies may well extend beyond the 
organizational border. Hitt et al. (2000) found that firms in developed markets (such as the 
Dutch firms in our sample) select alliance partners in order to leverage their own 
competencies. Therefore, partner selection is primarily based on partners’ unique 
competencies and market knowledge or access. The literature on relationship marketing 
has since long propagated the value of combining competencies and experience inter-
organizationally with the view of joint value creation (e.g., Ford et al., 1998; Håkansson et 
al., 1999; Day, 2000). The insignificance of trans2 hence brings the issue of ‘value co-
production’ (Ramírez, 1999), or the creation of synergistic effects through bundling the 
different value-creating activities of different parties into one ‘value constellation’ 
(Normann & Ramírez, 1993), to the center stage of SI.  
Continuing on this line of argument, some authors have even argued that the possibility of 
inter-organizational ways of competence leverage puts the weapons in the hands of 
incumbents. In the context of product innovation, Mitchell & Singh (1993: 175) found for 
example that “when many supporting assets retain their value despite major core product 
innovation, leading industry incumbents possess very strong advantages relative to 
newcomers, no matter how innovative”. Likewise, Markides & Geroski’s (2003a,b) results 
on radical innovation in B2C markets may be portable to the domain of SI. These scholars 
point to an incumbent’s capacity to leverage its existing competencies and experience (e.g. 
deeper pockets to invest in manufacturing, distribution and logistics, market credibility, 
after-sales service, strong marketing skills) in order to have an existing, premature 
innovation of a pioneer expand into a mass market. Their findings show that especially 
established companies have a competitive advantage over pioneers in this activity. In 
similar vein, Christensen et al. (1998) have doubted the existence of first-mover 
advantages in fast-changing industries. Even though we could not find further evidence for 
Markides & Geroski’s (2003a,b) arguments, the QUAL2 findings did confirm that the 
combination of internal competencies with those of other parties was a prominent aspect in 
SIinitiatives.  
 
Third, strategic innovators furthermore argued during the QUAL2-phase that in the case 
external competence combinations do not suffice and new competencies have to be 
integrated within the existing organization, they often hire people from different industries, 
with different experiences. These newly hired people are then mixed with internal 
members, for example to form a temporary project team. In this way, competencies are 
‘added’ instead of ‘replaced’.  The combination of newly attracted skills with existing 
skills hence leverages existing competencies into a reconfiguration.   
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Finally, focusing on a study of SIinitiatives, it is plausible to expect that SIinitiatives in 
this premature stadium of SI, exist alongside the traditional business. Moreover, Ramírez 
(1999) argues that even if new value-creation initiatives do succeed and do ‘take hold’, 
they are not likely to automatically replace existing ones. 
 
 
6.2 PARTIAL MEDIATION EFFECTS 
 
The QUAN results point to the value of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for the 
creation of SIcap. 35% of variance in SIcap is explained by deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation. This is regarded as a large 
effect in behavioral science (Cohen et al., 2003; Falk & Miller, 1992), considering the 
potential impact of numerous other organizational and environmental characteristics and 
conditions. All three categories of learning mechanisms show a considerable association 
with SIcap (path coefficients).  
 
The structural results confirm the three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3, see chapter 4).  
First, our results point to important mediating mechanisms through deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation and transformation. The QUAN analysis hence 
confirmed the insights generated through the conceptual study of the sensemaking 
literature (chapter 2) and the analysis of the QUAL2 findings (chapter 4). Our results 
validate Thomas et al.’s (1993) proposition that noticing external information facilitates 
strategic action through its effects on strategic interpretation. In other words, deliberately 
increasing recognition capacity will affect the outcome variable SIcap to a larger extent on 
the condition assimilation and transformation capacity are triggered as well. In turn, 
fostering assimilation capacity will more intensively affect the outcome variable SIcap if 
transformation capacity is triggered. In this respect, our findings empirically validate Zahra 
& George’s (2002) argument that for the creation of ACAP as a coherent dynamic 
capability, all dimensions play complementary roles since they build upon each other. The 
development of recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity respectively, can be 
considered as differential steps in the learning process (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
 
Second, the confirmation of H1, H2 and H3 (and the mediation analysis in chapter 5, 
section 5.3.2, Table 5.7 in particular) showed that these mediation effects are only partial 
in nature.  
Building upon the line of reasoning that we developed in chapter 2 and chapter 4 (the 
idiosyncrasy of capabilities and the existence of path dependencies) the occurrence of 
partial mediation is probably caused by the firm’s existing ‘stocks’ of assimilation and 
transformation capacity. During the QUAL2-phase, interviewees mentioned the possibility 
of learning effects in the development of recognition, assimilation and transformation 
capacity. Over time, stimulation may trigger a process where recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity become gradually embedded within the ordinary, daily way of 
operating, in turn diminishing the need for any additional deliberate stimulation. In this 
respect, past experience may enable organizations to sometimes circumvent the systematic 
assimilation and transformation stimulation stages. Even the linearity of the ACAP stages 
in themselves may become debatable. Van den Bosch et al. (2003) indeed mentioned the 
need for a dynamic of model for the ACAP construct. As Weick (2002) asserted: since 
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cognitions are manifested in actions, cognition starts and begins with action. Or, 
sensemaking both precedes and follows decision making (Maitlis, 2005). The assumed 
linear sequence of the different ACAP stages, and the deliberate stimulation of these 
ACAP stages, hence becomes questionable, and multiple nonlinear (i.e. positive and 
negative) feedback loops should be taken into consideration (see e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Day & Schoemaker, 2004b). Similarly, recent observations on the innovation process blur 
the sequential model (e.g., Amis et al., 2004). Due to delays, reversals and oscillations, 
innovation may be considered as involving complex feedback structures in which the 
search and implementation stages are intertwined (Koput, 1997). Feedback effects and 
shortcuts are hence likely to occur among the different independent variables mutually, 
and among the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
 
Our findings do not only confirm the occurrence of partial mediation effects, they 
furthermore indicate an unexpected difference in effect size between deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation and those for transformation (see chapter 5, section 
5.3.3.2). In the concrete, when the three categories of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms are studied in isolation, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition show the smallest contribution to SIcap in and of their own, pointing to the 
value of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation and transformation to 
channel their effects. In addition, the effect size of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for assimilation surpasses the effect size of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation, hence suggesting the superiority of the former as a 
stimulator of SIcap. This difference in effect size is a remarkable finding.   
At first sight, this finding may suggest the existence of ‘knowledge-enhancing use’ 
(Menon & Varadarajan, 1992). This means that a time lag exists between the knowledge 
creation and the actual behavioral change following it. Slater & Narver (1995) argue that in 
the case of frame-breaking, generative learning (i.e. a redefinition of the way business is 
done) the change of managerial perspectives (assimilation) may form the foundation for a 
radical behavioral change (transformation), though this behavioral change will only take 
place at some point in the future. In analogy to our research, we may posit that deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation capacity will lead to SIcap through the 
behavioral effects of a deliberate stimulation of transformation capacity. Yet, 
transformation capacity may be developed at some point later in time, which would 
diminish the immediate need for deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
transformation. As illustrated in chapter 4, some of the qualitative findings indeed pointed 
in this direction. Yet, contrary to the QUAL2-phase, our survey questions did not target the 
creation process of one specific SIinitiative through time, but measured the general 
organizational efforts to deliberately foster transformation capacity in general. This means 
that the timing effects of stimulating transformation capacity for different SIinitiatives 
should normally average themselves out. This implies that the partial mediation role of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation is unlikely due to timing 
effects. 
Still, the difference in effect size may be attributed to five other potential reasons. 
 
First, our findings may provide evidence for the argument that, in the context of SIcap, 
learning at a cognitive level is more fundamental than learning at the action level 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Authors have argued that exploration is mainly triggered 
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by means of cognitive efforts to develop new intuitions and ideas (Zott, 2003; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). More specifically, it is argued that noticing environmental information will 
only lead to effective renewal if this noticing leads to a renewed understanding (Becker, 
2001). Hamel & Välikangas (2003) consequently refer to the term ‘cognitive challenge’ 
and Marinova (2004) found that only when interpretation updates market knowledge, an 
increased innovation effort could be discerned. These arguments all place assimilation 
practices to the centre stage of SIcap development.    
In addition, the path-breaking character of SI matches extreme exploration. We could 
adopt Zahra & George’s (2002) arguments here that it is foremost ‘potential ACAP’ that 
enhances a firm’s strategic flexibility and its reconfiguration capacity. Hence, the more 
extreme and path-breaking the level of innovation, the more cognitive aspects may come to 
the fore.  The extreme innovation construct of SIcap, being the dependent variable, may 
explain the superior value of PACAP compared to deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation (a RACAP component). 
 
A second reason may be found in the character of the independent variables, namely 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. During the QUAL2-phase, strategic innovators 
strongly emphasized the value of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms in fostering 
assimilation capacity (see chapter 4). Maybe, assimilation capacity is more susceptible to a 
deliberate stimulation than is transformation capacity. Zollo & Winter (2002) have 
emphasized how deliberate cognitive activity (articulation and codification) can stimulate 
the creation of dynamic capabilities. Departing form the sensemaking literature, we saw 
however no reason to not extend their discussion to the value of deliberate learning 
mechanisms for behavioral change as well, i.e. deliberate learning mechanisms triggering 
transformation capacity. However, our results may prove us to be in the wrong. Indeed, 
also the literature concerning the deliberate triggering of sensemaking seems more 
concerned with steering cognitive aspects than behavioral aspects (e.g., Thomas et al., 
2001). Although transformation capacity may in and of itself still have an important 
mediating role, this role may need less deliberate managerial fostering, or may be less 
susceptible to it. 
 
Thirdly, the smaller effects of deliberate strategic mechanisms for transformation, relative 
to those for assimilation may also be due to the way we decided to operationalize the 
concept of SIcap. We funded the operationalization on the original conceptual definition of 
the exploitation-dimension provided by Zahra & George (2002), Recall that Zahra & 
George (2002: 190) defined exploitation as the capability to persistently create new outputs 
such as new ventures, goods or services. As argued in chapter 2, we equated this 
exploitation-dimension with SIcap. Since SIcap has been measured as the number of 
SIinitiatives (relative to competitors’ SIcap), it does not incorporate any measure of 
success, such as the commercial roll-out of the initiative on a larger scale, or the additional 
(financial) value the firm may capture with it. In this respect, an important distinction can 
be noted with definitions provided by other authors. For instance, Cohen & Levinthal 
(1990: 128) originally defined exploitation as a firm’s ability to apply new, external 
information to commercial ends, Lane & Lubatkin (1998: 465) describe exploitation as the 
organization’s ability to commercially apply new knowledge to achieve organizational 
objectives, and Lane et al. (2001) even operationalized it as business strategy. Compared to 
these approaches, our SIcap-operationalization stands somewhat midway between full 
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exploitation (successfully commercialized) and full exploration (ideas, concepts not yet 
materialized in any way). In this respect the lower mediating effect of deliberate strategic 
mechanisms for transformation would be entirely logical. Since the SIcap 
operationalization is not entirely explorative in nature either, deliberate strategic 
mechanisms for transformation do still have a considerable impact. Yet, maybe, having 
operationalized SIcap in a different, i.e. fully exploitative, way would have proved a larger 
mediating role of deliberate strategic mechanisms for transformation.  
 
Fourthly, the relative importance of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation may validate one of the tentative findings of QUAL2-phase. In chapter 4, we 
indicated that different SI-initiatives often ‘lift’ on one and the same transformation-
change. Strategic innovators mentioned that the establishment of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for transformation may build a so-called ‘transformation-platform’ 
on which the creation of different SIinitiatives rests. Interviewees emphasized the 
difficulty of triggering behavioral change and stress the long-winded character of it. Yet, 
once transformation capacity is adapted it often leverages the creation of more than just 
one SIinitiative. In this way, transformation capacity may show a kind of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ pattern, where longer periods of small changes are interrupted by sudden, 
drastic changes. For instance, a new organizational structure may shorten market links, 
which considerably enhances and speeds up the set-up of several SIinitiatives.  
Interviewees associated the creation of such a leveraging platform only with 
transformation capacity. This suggests that relatively more and frequent deliberate strategic 
mechanisms for recognition and assimilation are needed, than are deliberate strategic 
mechanisms for transformation.   
 
A fifth and final argument builds upon the literature on ambidexterity.  
Essentially, the issue of SI by established industry incumbents raises questions of a) the 
surplus value, and hence appropriateness of strategically innovating over the value of 
retaining the acquired industry position and, b) the chance of succeeding in executing dual 
strategies, or playing both games simultaneously (Markides, 1998; Markides in Mang, 
2000). The latter issue pertains to the concept (or even problem) of ambidexterity 
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  
Even though it has been empirically demonstrated that companies can in fact successfully 
manage dual business models (Markides & Charitou, 2002), no agreement exists so far as 
to how this can be achieved with SIinitiatives. Studies on the management of new ventures 
within established businesses essentially pivot on arguments of a) maximizing synergies 
(total integration of new unit within existing organization,), or b) minimizing conflict and 
risk (total separation of new unit).  
Among the adherents of the first approach is for example Kodama (2001; 2003). Based on 
his findings on SI in large, traditional Japanese corporations, he makes a plea for the 
inclusion of paradoxical elements (incremental innovation versus radical innovation) 
inside large corporations as essential triggers for growth. He proposes to incorporate new 
entrepreneurial organizations into the existing traditional organization and to form strategic 
communities to better integrate both. Other proponents of this integration strategy are 
Hamel & Getz (2004).  
However, others have stressed reasons why the incorporation of new ventures in existing 
operating operations does not go without any problems (Burgelman, 1984, 1991; 
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Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Christensen et al., 2002; Stringer, 2000): the existing 
culture and processes reflecting a well-established logic of exploitation (Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003) may regard the new initiative as threatening and may consequently try to 
‘suffocate’ it (Levinthal & March, 1993; Schein, 1993; Markides & Charitou, 2004). The 
addition of other dominant logics to the existing ones imposes the need upon organizations 
to deal simultaneously with different, often conflicting, logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). 
Alternatively, experiments may risk premature termination under the pressure of short-
term operational goals (Hamel & Getz, 2004) and traditional resource allocation processes 
(Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Burgelman, 1983). Moreover, managers are confronted 
with strategic role conflict (Floyd & Lane, 2000).  
The alternative solution that has been offered in the literature is this of ‘spatial separation’ 
(Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997), or ‘isolation’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992), a tactic that 
comprises to launch new initiatives (potentially including conflicting business models) by 
creating autonomous and physically separated stand-alone units (Burgelman, 1985; Benner 
& Tushman, 2003; Christensen et al., 2002; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Floyd & Lane, 
2000).  
Empirics have demonstrated that incumbents adopting SIs do indeed highly prefer to set up 
independent new units (Charitou & Markides, 2003). Yet, research by Block & MacMillan 
(1995) has shown that most corporate ventures involve merely incremental innovations, 
due to difficulties to commercialize breakthrough innovations in this semi-independent 
structure. Furthermore, intra-corporate (inter-unit) organizational learning and synergies 
may be limited (Volberda et al., 2001a). Finally, managing parallel activities and new 
venture divisions requires a considerable amount of slack resources (Floyd & Lane, 2000). 
The differing opinions on the management of SIinitiatives were finally reconciled by 
Markides & Charitou (2004) who proposed four different strategies to manage dual 
business models, depending on two key dimensions: 1) the degree the new and established 
business conflict with one another, and 2) the similarity between the new and established 
business (strategic relatedness). The four strategies range from total separation, over 
phased separation, phased integration to a total integration strategy. They argue that when 
the initiative does not make any use of existing assets and capabilities a spin-off or a 
financial investment in an external start-up is to be preferred. If, on the other hand, 
initiatives do not strongly deviate from the existing business model and definition, and 
strongly involve borrowing and leveraging existing assets and capabilities, a total 
integration strategy should be pursued (see also, Christensen et al., 2002; Burgelman, 
1984).  
However, many SI initiatives can not be classified as one of these extreme cases. Instead, 
they typically involve both a deviation from the existing business and a leverage of 
existing assets and capabilities (as discussed in section 6.1.3). Very recent research on SI 
in established companies (not yet available at the time our empirical study was performed) 
has gradually come to agree on the benefits of separating organizational subunits for new 
ventures that simultaneously maintain extensive links with the mother company in order to 
leverage existing assets and capabilities. In this case, what Govindarajan & Trimble (2005) 
call, a ‘dual-purpose organization’ possesses the ideal characteristics for SI. A ‘dual-
purpose organization’ is characterized by new SI initiatives located in separate subunits, 
managed by their own general manager who reports to an overarching general manager of 
the entire company. Even though the new venture is geographically isolated from the 
established business, operational links with it enable the new venture to borrow core assets 
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from the latter (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005). In his study of strategic innovators, 
Markides (1998; Markides & Charitou, 2004) indeed found that adopters that pursued a 
total separation strategy, all excelled at also integrating the two different businesses by 
implementing appropriate tactics (e.g., the use of cross-functional teams at 3M, a strong 
family culture at Leclerc, team-based incentives at Lan & Spar Bank). Empirics 
demonstrated that the more a company can exploit synergies between the established 
business and the new unit, the more effective the firm is in managing the two games 
simultaneously (Charitou & Markides, 2003). Charitou & Markides (2003) argue that these 
synergies moreover enable incumbents to play their trump card against start-ups (by means 
of their existing brands, skill sets, customer relationships and manufacturing and 
distribution capacity). Nevertheless, scholars assert that a sufficient level of operational 
(own CEO, own culture, decision autonomy) and financial autonomy of the new unit are to 
be guaranteed in order to minimize conflict and structural inheritance (Christensen & 
Overton, 2000; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005; Charitou & Markides, 2003). 
 
The low relative effect size of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation 
that we found may follow from this line of argument. More specifically, the QUAL2-
findings (see chapter 4) designate that strategic innovators have to cope with different 
ambidextrous frictions, dependent on the phase of the SIcreation: formulation of the 
SIinitiative versus implementation of the SIinitiative. The higher effect of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for the PACAP dimensions, relative to those for 
transformation, may indicate that the search and formulation of SIinitiatives takes place 
within the operating core, whereas the actual implementation is less so. This argument can 
also be founded upon Kanter (1983) who argued that the generation of an innovation 
involves frequent contact and closer integration with other parts of the organization, 
whereas the completion or implementation of an innovation could best be done in isolated 
and separate parts of the organization. The QUAL2 findings provide early confirmation of 
this proposition. More specifically, interviewees mention how the implementation of the 
initiative often takes place by the establishment of a separate unit (though seldom 
separated geographically), which still keeps strong bonds with the rest of the organization. 
The detachment of the implementation from the existing business implies that initiatives 
exist alongside the existing business44, which diminishes the need for a continuous 
behavioral transformation of that part of the organization operating the existing business.  
In contrast, the search and development (the ‘initiation’) of the SIinitiative tends to take 
place within the operating core, which proves the value of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition and assimilation. Indeed, during the QUAL2-phase, only one 
strategic innovator indicated that the initiation of SIinitiatives was the sole responsibility of 
the firm’s business development department.  This finding hence sheds doubt on the value 
of separate ‘exploration labs’ or business development departments for the formulation of 
SIinitiatives. Baden-Fuller (1995) indeed argued that in order to achieve strategic 
innovations corporate entrepreneurship should be embedded in the entire organization and 
should not be limited to an isolated function in the organization. The focus on developing 
deep knowledge about the latent and future needs of existing customers and the use of 
                                                          
44 One interviewee mentions that over time, the initiative may be phased in. This is 
however only in a later stage, when the initiative is no ‘initiative’ anymore, and has become 
‘part of normal business’. 
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innovative customers as a source of SI-ideas, as shown by the significant recog-indicators 
(see, section 6.1.1), brings further evidence to the argument that the ideas for SIinitiatives 
mostly develop through the ‘normal’ business operations and through the people involved 
in these operations.  
In sum, the ambidexterity required to create SIcap is likely to center on different, 
complementary strategies. The initiation mainly rests on the principle of ‘enriching’ (Adler 
et al., 1999), or ‘reconciliation’ (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004): recognition and 
assimilation is incorporated within normal daily activities, such that the operating core is 
also made responsible for signaling and initiating SIinitiatives. In this respect, the 
establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms proves especially useful to 
trigger path-breaking focus areas in recognition and assimilation. Yet, implementation 
often rests on a ‘partitioning’ (Adler et al., 1999) or ‘separation’ strategy (Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996; Benner & Tushman, 2003). Separate SI-units exist alongside traditional 
business departments. Alternatively, the QUAL2-data show (see chapter 4) that firms may 
also apply ‘switching’ approaches (Adler et al., 1999), where individuals are temporarily 
dispatched to SI-units or divide their responsibilities between both. The latter approach 
ensures the existence of a satisfactory level of organizational links to the traditional 
business (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2005).  
Although the separation strategy of SI-implementation diminishes the need for deliberate 
strategic mechanisms for transformation, they do however still keep part of their value in 
stimulating SIcap. The establishment of new units and the creation of new operational 
linkages with them still require some changes to the organizational structure or a revision 
of procedures in the operational core. Only, changes can be expected to be less drastic and 
less frequent. 
 
 
6.3 THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
In this section, we attempt to interpret the findings of the moderator analysis. We restrict 
ourselves to a discussion of the most important effects.  
In essence, two broad categories of effects can be discerned. Firstly, the impact of these 
characteristics on the general level of SIcap (height of SIcap), and secondly their impact on 
the effectiveness of the deliberate strategic learning mechanisms (R2), which is also related 
to the effects these characteristics produce on the pattern of mediation relationships. 
Answering the first question is a relatively straightforward exercise. Yet, pronouncing 
upon the value of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms to foster SIcap, given these 
side-conditions, is however far more complex. This difficulty can be attributed to the 
earlier-mentioned ‘flow’ character of the independent variables. More specifically, 
organizational and supply chain characteristics may make the establishment of strategic 
learning mechanisms indispensable and they may intensify the effects of strategic learning 
mechanisms. On the other hand, they may turn the establishment of deliberate learning 
mechanisms in vein, or may in contrast produce such an increase in a firm’s recognition, 
assimilation or transformation capacity that the establishment of strategic learning 
mechanisms fostering these capacities becomes less needed or even redundant. The 
exploratory character of the research questions that we formulated regarding potential 
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moderating effects, implies that the results and interpretations are only tentative. We will 
discuss the findings per conceptual domain. 
 
6.3.1 The influence of the cultural characteristics of innovativeness and risk taking 
(RQ1 & RQ2) 
 
The QUAL2 analysis showed that innovativeness and risk taking are two critical cultural 
aspects for SIcap. Existing literature in the fields of market orientation and 
entrepreneurship resonate this finding. Slater & Narver (1995) stressed how a focus on 
understanding (latent) customer needs requires an organizational culture promoting 
entrepreneurial values. This is because an entrepreneurial culture promotes exploration and 
experimentation (Baker & Sinkula, 1999). Entrepreneurial values of innovativeness and a 
high risk taking tolerance (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) enhance the firm’s willingness to 
experiment, a predisposition that is needed for SIcap. These general cultural values 
determine how the organization is designed (Matsuno et al., 2002) and can in this respect, 
not only be considered as a moderator but also as an antecedent to the establishment of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms.  
 
Let us first study the effects of innovativeness. The results of the moderator analysis show 
a higher SIcap level and a higher R2 in firms characterized by an innovative organizational 
culture. This means that cultural factors seem to work in concert with deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms. In other words, an innovative culture increases the effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. Adler et al. (1999), for example, demonstrated 
how culture fosters the effectiveness of meta-routines. Entrepreneurial values seem to 
provide the right focus for the organization’s deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. 
Chaston et al.’s (2004) findings provide support for this argument, showing that the 
management of market and customer knowledge is perceived as more important within 
entrepreneurial firms. 
The positive effects of innovativeness can essentially be attributed to two reasons.  
First, innovativeness increases the direct pay-offs of deliberate strategic mechanisms for 
recognition; stocks of assimilation and transformation capacity seem to lift their effects. A 
well developed culture, fostering path-breaking innovation may make the establishment of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation and transformation less needed. 
Han et al. (1998) contend that innovativeness may stimulate a continuous and proactive 
disposition toward meeting customer needs and emphasize a greater use of information. 
Hurley & Hult (1998) furthermore demonstrated the beneficial effects of an innovative 
culture on a firm’s potential to effectively implement innovations. As such, innovativeness 
triggers assimilation and transformation capacity and may make the establishment of 
mechanisms to stimulate assimilation and transformation capacity less needed. 
Furthermore, the moderator results indicate that innovative organizations reach higher 
levels of SIcap. In this respect, positive feedback effects of prior initiatives may be 
expected to occur. More specifically, firms may have developed assimilation and 
transformation capacity through their prior experience in creating SIinitiatives.  
Secondly, the results indicate that, next to the direct effect of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition, the establishment of strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation and transformation increase SIcap even more. The results show that 
stimulating a critical reflection on customer and market information requires an innovative 
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culture. Non-innovative organizations are apparently making a shortcut in the cycle; 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms to stimulate assimilation capacity do not pay off 
for them. Menon & Varadarajan (1992) suggested that an innovative culture facilitates the 
sharing and use of information. Moreover, Matsuno et al.’s (2002) findings showed that 
entrepreneurial values such as innovativeness and risk taking prevent market learning 
activities from being too narrowly focused upon the existing value system (cfr. Christensen 
& Bower, 1996), suggesting a positive effect of innovativeness on assimilation. When 
assimilation capacity is deliberately triggered, this effect is manifested all the more. The 
structural analyses furthermore showed that assimilation is the most critical element in 
SIcap. During the QUAL2-phase, strategic innovators stressed the value of deliberately 
stimulating assimilation in particular. The value of assimilation seems to suggest that 
deliberate ACAP learning mechanisms lose a great deal of their impact in organizations 
that do not have an innovative culture. The question hence remains whether non-
innovative organizations, restricting assimilation, will ever achieve successful SIinitiatives 
(not captured in our dependent variable of SIcap). 
 
In one of his most recent articles, March (2006) argues that exploration (like SI) does 
almost always involve risk (large variance and low means in returns). March (2006: 206) 
hence concludes that “a bias against risk is effectively a bias against exploration”. In 
similar vein, Day (2002) makes a plea for an ‘experimental mindset’ to develop a better 
market insight. In line with the literature, the QUAL2 findings identified risk taking as a 
second potential moderator. As regards the influence of risk taking, two effects catch the 
eye. 
Firstly, and contrary to intuitive thought, a risk taking culture attenuates the direct effects 
of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition; the sole establishment of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition has no effect on SIcap 
whatsoever, since its effects are largely mediated by assimilation. Results indicate that 
organizations with a high risk taking profile do not impulsively set up SIinitiatives without 
stimulating prior reflection on the market. A high level of risk taking may indeed stimulate 
organizations to set up too many new SI-ventures. Unless the organization has unlimited 
slack resources (which is never the case), the number of SIinitiatives set up may simply 
render uneconomical. Organizations with a high risk profile may therefore establish 
screening activities to a greater extent. Screening in fact separates the initiation and 
implementation phases of innovation (Koput, 1997). The discussion and evaluation during 
‘screening’ meetings will result in some ideas being selected, some ideas postponed, some 
ideas changed in form or content, and some simply abandoned (Koput, 1997). Screening 
may be enhanced through market learning activities (Matsuno et al., 2002), such as those 
associated with assimilation. Matsuno et al. (2002) found indeed that a better process of 
market learning can be a potential safeguard against undue risk-taking tendencies. In 
similar vein, an interviewee during the QUAL2-phase remarked: “mechanisms that 
stimulate us to collectively discuss our market and our envisioned market strategy are a 
way to temper our –sometimes– blind enthusiasm”. Even though deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation are not applied to a larger extent by risk-taking 
organizations than by risk-averse organizations, the effects these mechanisms have on 
SIcap are significantly larger in the former case.  Organizations with a high risk taking 
attitude hence need deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation to leverage 
the effects of recognition, but once established they render much. In a sense, the full 
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mediating effect of assimilation lifts organizations to a higher step in the path-breaking 
cycle by channeling the path-breaking elements of recognition. Assimilation entails the 
questioning of existing assumptions, and results seem to suggest that a risk taking attitude 
encourages and enables organizations to takes these efforts seriously. 
Secondly, the large direct effect that deliberate strategic mechanisms for assimilation exert 
on SIcap, suggests that a risk taking culture partially eliminates the need for deliberate 
transformation stimulation. A risk taking attitude intensifies managerial support for new 
ideas. This support seems especially required in the implementation phases of an 
innovation when coordination and conflict resolution are essential (Damanpour, 1991). A 
risk taking culture may also affect people at the middle level and operational core to 
change behavior. This is since risk taking values are incorporated in the organizational 
culture, and “culture can be a de facto governance system as it mediates the behavior of 
individuals and economizes on more formal administrative methods” (Teece & Pisano, 
1994: 544). Triggering transformation capacity, risk taking may reduce the effectiveness 
of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation.  
 
In conclusion, the cultural aspects of innovativeness and risk taking both enhance the value 
of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, either directly (risk taking), 
either indirectly via the stimulation of transformation capacity (innovativeness). This 
difference between the direct and indirect effect of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for assimilation is a logical result of the conceptual meaning of both 
constructs. Even though innovativeness is sometimes considered as a behavioral variable, 
we conceptualized it as ‘openness’ and ‘willingness’ to change (e.g., Calantone et al., 
2002). We hence follow Hurley et al. (2005: 281) that innovativeness is a cultural 
precursor that provides the social capital to facilitate innovative behavior. In this sense, 
being conceived as “cultural readiness” and “appreciation of innovation” (Hurley et al., 
2005: 281), it corresponds more to the initiation stage than to the implementation stage of 
innovation (Hurley & Hult, 1998). Innovativeness can hence be expected to stimulate 
primarily the value of PACAP (Zahra & George, 2002), but fosters behavioral 
transformation to a lesser extent. Therefore, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
transformation are still required to channel the effects of assimilation to the concrete 
creation of SIinitiatives. In contrast, a risk taking culture (‘willingness to undertake risky 
ventures’) incorporates a behavioral transformation component as well. A risk taking 
attitude will hence affect the stock of the entire ACAP cycle and attenuates as such the 
needs of deliberately stimulating behavioral transformation.  
 
6.3.2 The influence of the cross-functional dissemination of market information 
(RQ3) 
 
A third moderator that we selected was the extent to which organizations disseminate 
market information cross-functionally throughout the organization. Marketing researchers 
have emphasized the dissemination –both lateral and vertical– of market information 
throughout the organization (e.g., Kohli & Jaworski, 1990).  As formal and informal 
contacts among different organizational departments increase the sharing and use of 
information, it has been found as an important antecedent to market orientation (Kirca et 
al., 2005). Especially, the dissemination of market information gathered by ‘front-line’ 
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people (e.g. customer service, sales) is highly valued in the literature (e.g., Day, 2002), as 
was also emphasized during the QUAL2 phase.  
Results of the moderator analysis show that companies characterized by a high level of 
cross-functional information dissemination invest more in all three categories of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms than companies with a low information dissemination 
profile. However, only the effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition and assimilation (i.e. PACAP) is intensified by these efforts.  
 
It seems logical that the outputs of a deliberate stimulation of assimilation capacity will be 
limited when critical reflections and discussions on customer and market issues (assim) do 
not involve distinct organizational functions, or when their outputs are not communicated 
across distinct functional domains (crossf). The dissemination of market information 
enables unlearning as more different perspectives are spread throughout the organization 
(Slater & Narver, 2000). It helps to absorb new insights into collective mental models 
(Day, 2002) because in organizations with many communication flows, new information is 
regarded with less hostility and given more value and credibility (e.g., Zaltman, 1986). 
Jansen et al.’s (2006) empirics showed a positive association between the free flow of 
information throughout the organization and acquisition and assimilation (i.e., PACAP). 
Our findings suggest that these positive effects of cross-functional dissemination are 
stimulated all the more if recognition and assimilation capacity are deliberately fostered.  
In addition, cross-functional information dissemination enhances the direct effects that 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition exert on SIcap. In a sense, this 
may suggest that a high degree of cross-functional dissemination of market information 
may sometimes reduce the role of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation. A closer inspection of the measures indeed reveals that crossf is closely 
associated with in particular assim1,assim3 and assim4. In addition, a high level of market 
information dissemination, involving many people from different functional areas, also 
increases the perceived information quality. Research shows that a higher perceived 
information quality stimulates more people to use the information to change their thinking 
process or to implement decisions (Maltz & Kohli, 1996). In this respect, the cross-
functional dissemination of market information may lower the need to establish deliberate 
strategic mechanisms for both assimilation and transformation.  
The results finally indicate that in organizations where market information is shared cross-
functionally, investments in transformation capacity turn out completely redundant. Zahra 
& George (2002) suggested that the free flow of information throughout the organization 
particularly contributes to the transformation and exploitation of new knowledge (i.e., 
RACAP), hence suggesting an increase in the stock of transformation capacity. In contrast, 
organizations characterized by little information dissemination largely need deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for transformation. A high level of market information 
dissemination may prevent the ‘not invented here syndrome’, enabling members to collect 
and use new information to a larger extent (Menon & Varadarajan, 1992). Kennedy et al.’s 
(2003) research findings indeed show the advantages of information dissemination in 
terms of a rise in stakeholder commitment. They found that the dissemination of customer 
information stimulated individuals to effectively deliver value to customers. One could 
hence argue that a lack of cross-functional information sharing, limiting wider 
organizational support, makes the establishment of deliberate strategic learning 
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mechanisms for transformation necessary to channel the effects of recognition and 
assimilation on SIcap.  
 
6.3.3 The influence of general information provision by customers and suppliers 
(RQ4 & RQ5) 
 
The literature indicates that the amount of innovative ideas an organization may develop 
depends on the information the organization can get from outsiders, such as other supply 
chain parties (Koput, 1997). If a firm shows openness to this external information, it may 
allow the firm to draw in ideas from outsiders (Laursen & Salter, 2006). External 
information sources may furthermore bring different perspectives on information. We 
hence studied the moderating effects of information provision by customers and by 
suppliers.  
As regards the effects of information provision by supply chain parties, overall, more or 
less similar effects were found for information provision by customers (infocus) and 
information provision by suppliers (infosup). Both moderators increase the effects of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition and assimilation. Information 
provision by customers or suppliers hence intensifies the effects of a deliberate stimulation 
of the path-breaking elements of PACAP.  
 
Yet, when we compare the effects of supplier information provision to the effects of 
customer provision, two differences are discerned.  
First, the mediating effect of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation is 
more intensified when customers provide much information than in the case much 
information is provided by suppliers. In other words, in the case of high supplier 
information provision, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition produce a 
direct effect on SIcap. This direct effect is absent in the case of high customer information 
provision. This difference can be attributed to several potential reasons.  
A first explanation may be found in the earlier mentioned ‘over-searching’ effect (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004). Customers may simply provide too much information for the firm to manage 
and choose between, or the amount of ideas is so abundant that few ideas are taken 
seriously or are given a sufficient level of attention or implementation effort (Koput, 
1997). In this case, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation might 
diagnose this so-called ‘attention allocation’ problem (Laursen & Salter, 2006), 
functioning as an additional filter and ensuring information and ideas are given serious 
consideration. For example, research shows that in customer relationship programs stress 
is primarily put on the acquisition of customer knowledge, instead of on the interpretation 
of it. The lack of a common interpretation of customer information among different 
managerial domains creates problems for the integration of this information throughout the 
organization (Campbell, 2003). For this reason, in the case customers provide much 
information, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation seem necessary to 
channel the effects of recognition stimulation.  
Secondly, effects may be attributed to the specific type of information customers versus 
suppliers provide to a focal firm. Recall that the constructs ‘infocus’ and ‘infosup’ measure 
the general information customers or suppliers spontaneously provide about the market, 
competitors and other relevant organizations in the industry (see chapter 4). This kind of 
information is hence not to be confused with the specific path-breaking market information 
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that is stimulated by strategic learning mechanisms for recognition. More specifically, a 
supplier expects a market-oriented customer to perform better. A customer’s market 
orientation towards his respective market hence increases a supplier’s trust, cooperation 
and commitment towards this customer (Baker et al., 1999). So, suppliers have more 
successful relationships with their customers if their customers help them to gain market 
availability (Gemünden et al., 1996). A supplier has therefore a large interest in providing 
the focal firm (his direct customer) with valuable market information, in order to increase 
the latter’s market insight. The general market information a supplier provides to his 
customer (the focal firm), may hence be expected to be of strategic value to the focal firm. 
As such, the focal customer-firm attaches a higher strategic value to the information that 
the supplier provides and may directly act on it, which improves the direct effect that 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition have on SIcap.  In contrast, the information 
a customer provides may be of a more operational nature. Although, we are not in the 
know of any research that has tackled this issue, it can be argued that the customer’s 
business does generally depend to a lesser extent on the supplier’s market orientation or 
performance in general terms. If customers spontaneously give information, this 
information can be expected to be of a more operational nature, limited to the specific 
transactional activity. For this reason, the fact that a customer provides information does 
not take away the need to establish strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation before 
actual SIinitiatives can be created. 
Thirdly, effects may furthermore be determined by the specific internal information 
systems dedicated to manage these different categories of information. If a supplier wants 
to give valuable information to his customer, chances are high that this information 
exchange will not take place through the traditional buyer-seller information channels. The 
exchange of strategic information is likely to happen at a relatively high managerial level. 
The higher level of managerial involvement raises organizational commitment, which in 
turn increases chances that the information will be effectively disseminated, used and acted 
upon. As such, the direct effect of strategic learning mechanisms for recognition is 
improved. In contrast, customers primarily address their account manager to exchange 
information (e.g., Coviello et al., 2002). However, the majority of organizations that have 
implemented key account management, have located it in the sales department and as such 
still consider it as a classical sales task (Wengler et al., 2006). Hence, even in the case 
customers do provide strategically relevant information, it is still possible that account 
managers are not encouraged or/and might be overcharged to transfer this information to 
other functions in the organization, such as marketing or business development, where this 
information can be further deployed (Walter et al., 2001). In the QUAL2 findings, the 
stickiness of customer information in the sales department was an often-cited problem.  
 
A second distinction between the effects of both moderators is that information provision 
by customers may make deliberate strategic mechanisms for transformation redundant, 
whereas these mechanisms keep an important mediating role when information is provided 
by suppliers.  
When customers provide much information, the establishment of strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition and assimilation seem to pay off highly. In fact, the value of 
deliberately cranking up the PACAP cycle is highly effective. Yet, stimulating PACAP 
aspects seems to suffice in this case. The results suggest that if organizations, gaining 
much usable information from their customers, pay explicit attention to the collection and 
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critical reflection upon customer and market issues, they are automatically triggered to 
create SIinitiatives. The effects of infocus hence pertain to the area of RACAP as well. 
Campbell (2003) found that organizational processes specifically designed to facilitate the 
interpretation of customer information (assim) affects the effectiveness of integration of 
this information throughout the organization. Indeed, during the QUAL2 interviewees 
mentioned that customer information takes away risk en increases organizational 
commitment to create SIinitiatives. In addition, Helfert et al. (2002) argue that sufficient 
customer information increases the effectiveness of customer relationships, in that it may 
stimulate to jointly explore future opportunities, such as partnerships for SI. Hence, when 
customers provide much information, and the organization has in place mechanisms for 
recognition and assimilation such that the information the customer provides can be better 
integrated within recognition and assimilation capacity, formal stimuli for transformation 
are neither required, nor pay off. On the contrary, in the case of a high information 
provision from suppliers, the deliberate stimulation of transformation capacity remains 
important. This finding sheds however some doubt on the validity of the third explanation 
above. More specifically, the involvement of high managerial levels in the handling of 
strategically relevant information from suppliers would suggest the redundancy of 
deliberate strategic mechanisms for transformation. 
 
6.3.4 The influence of a centralized organizational structure (RQ7) 
 
Centralization indicates whether decision authority lies in the higher or lower levels of the 
organizational hierarchy (Tsai, 2002). As indicated in chapter 2, decentralized structures 
have traditionally been thought to fit aggressive strategies and innovation (Vera & 
Crossan, 2004). Yet, our findings show that firms with centralized decision autonomy 
achieve higher levels of SIcap.  
Research has indeed produced conflicting views upon the relationship between 
centralization and (marketing) information use, and the relationships between 
centralization and innovation. This was also manifested in the QUAL2-findings. Even 
though many authors assert that the reduced flexibility, the lack of autonomy and 
employees’ feeling of alienation provoked by a centralized organizational structure may 
lead to a smaller use of marketing information, others have argued that decentralization 
may instead lead to a policy vacuum, isolated knowledge generation and diffusion. The 
latter elements all hamper the utilization of marketing knowledge (Menon & Varadarajan, 
1992) needed for SI.  
 
The moderator analysis indicates that organizational structure mainly affects the PACAP 
component. Moreover, centralization increases the direct association between deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition and SIcap. As a functional or hierarchical 
organizational form may limit the scope and flexibility of absorption (Van den Bosch et 
al., 1999), deliberate strategic mechanisms for recognition prove hence highly valuable. 
However, centralization decreases the (mediation) effects of assimilation. It seems indeed a 
rather logical assumption that a centralized structure channels the effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition more easily to concrete SIinitiatives. Hage 
& Dewar (1973) found that a centralized structure is much more effective in promoting 
innovation: normal channels of communication are sufficient for leaders to receive the 
information and ideas needed to initiate innovation, as long as leaders are inclined to 
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innovate. A recent study by Kirca et al. (2005) could furthermore not confirm the 
restraining influence of centralization on the intra-organizational market information flow. 
In other words, while decentralization may stimulate bottom-up initiative, bottom-up ideas 
do not succeed on their own, because processes must be linked and behaviours must be 
constrained so that energy is not diffused (Day, 1994). As a centralized structure speeds up 
decisions and actions, diminishing the risks of errors of individuals who lack the needed 
skills or information, centralization has been considered the appropriate structural design 
for entrepreneurs wanting to implement their vision and strategy in an efficient way 
(Matsuno et al., 2002).  
A decentralized structure, in contrast, requires deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation more strongly in order to gain any effects from deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition. A possible explanation may be that decentralized 
organizations only materialize ideas/concepts in concrete initiatives to the degree they have 
become more widely supported and shared. The full mediating role of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for assimilation may then be explained in the sense that assimilation-
stimulating mechanisms foster organizational commitment by stimulating the involvement 
of different people in interpersonal reflection and discussion about the market/customers.  
 
In conclusion, our findings may provide evidence for Zaltman et al.’s (1973) argument that 
centralization may actually have different effects on the sequential phases of innovation: 
search and implementation. This is because “search requires unpredictability, foolishness, 
and randomness, implementation requires efficiency, reliability and organization” (Koput, 
1997: 529). Despite a centralized firm’s improved efficiency in the implementation of 
SIinitiatives, the ineffectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation in this kind of organizations may carry a danger. More specifically, the 
ineffectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation may imply that 
ideas are less circulated and that innovative ideas from less influential people are vetoed 
(Hage & Dewar, 1973). Because of the central path-breaking role of assimilation, it is 
possible that decentralized organizations, while achieving lower levels of SIcap, will 
eventually achieve higher success rates of SIinitiatives (not measured by SIcap).   
 
6.3.5 The influence of supply chain innovation potential (RQ8, RQ9, RQ10) 
 
We finally studied the effects of moderators related to ‘supply chain innovation stimulus’.  
In chapter 2, we referred to several authors who claim that a proactive business logic and 
the creation of new markets requires not only a different internal learning mode (generative 
rather than adaptive) but also a different external perspective on collaborations and 
partnerships (e.g. Tuominen et al., 2004). The value that relationships, collaborations and 
partnerships with other supply chain parties may have for SIcap was confirmed in the 
QUAL data (see chapter 4). 
We studied the effects of ‘innovation stimulus from customers’, ‘innovation stimulus from 
suppliers’ and ‘general chain climate’ on the effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and transformation. The first moderators refer to 
the possibility of joint innovation with customers or suppliers, respectively. The third 
moderator measures the degree of absence of hostility or unaccustomedness among 
industry parties (see chapter 4).  
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As regards innovation stimulus from customers and innovation stimulus from suppliers, a 
similar pattern of effects could be discerned. In both cases a high stimulation to innovate 
intensifies the direct effect of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition. The 
mediating role of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation weakens, and 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation prove to be ineffective.  
 
Let us first digress on the effects of an innovation stimulation by customers. 
Recent research by Malhotra et al. (2005) indicated that collaborations with supply chain 
partners influence companies’ ACAP by broadening the scope and quality of the 
information exchanged among the partners. Collaborative partnerships increase both the 
intelligence generation within the partnership and the dissemination of intelligence 
between the partners. In this way, it can be considered as one way of market intelligence 
generation (Slater & Narver, 2000). More specifically, collaborative supply chain 
partnerships allow firms to develop a better understanding of the market and the 
competitive environment. Alternatively, a customer focus increases the level of 
collaborative relationships (Spekman & Carraway, 2006). An innovation stimulus from 
customers will thus intensify the effect of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition all the more.  
Furthermore, partners may offer alternative perspectives on the meaning of information 
and may as such foster the development of frame-breaking lenses (Slater & Narver, 1995). 
Recent research demonstrates that learning about new customer preferences takes place 
through interaction with the customer (Joshi & Sharma, 2004). Interorganizational learning 
may in this sense lead to intra-organizational learning if the firm internalizes the 
collectively created experiences (Holmqvist, 2004). Even if partnerships do not involve 
radically innovative ventures (interorganizational exploitation), they may produce new 
intra-organizational or inter-organizational exploration (Holmqvist, 2004). Day (2000) 
even makes a plea for the development of a ‘superior market-relating capability’. An 
innovation stimulus from customers may hence increase the stock of assimilation capacity, 
making deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation less needed as mediators 
for recognition capacity. 
Furthermore, the results show that companies that are experienced in innovation 
partnerships with customers will gain more direct value from deliberate strategic 
mechanisms for recognition and assimilation. Collaboration with customers provides firms 
intelligence about new opportunities or new means to create superior customer value (Day, 
2000) and enables them to exploit externally generated new ideas (Laursen & Salter, 
2006). The beneficial effects of collaborative partnerships with customers are hence not 
limited to an increase in the cognition capacity of the partners; partners may also combine 
experience (Håkansson et al., 1999). The ability to effectively draw knowledge from these 
partnerships depends however on the firm’s ability to sustain a pattern of interaction over 
time (Laursen & Salter, 2006). The experience with customer innovation partnerships 
creates ‘collaborative know-how’, the internalized experience with collaborations that 
determines how effectively new collaborations are entered and managed (Simonin, 1997). 
Collaborative know-how enables firms to better combine internal with external 
competences for new customer value creation, while holding collaboration risk under 
control (Kothandaraman & Wilson, 2001). Through their collaborative experience with 
customers, firms may have developed knowledge, skills and structures, which can be 
leveraged when entering new partnerships for SI. In this sense, experience in innovation 
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partnerships with customers may have created the transformation capacity, required for 
SIcap. A further stimulation of transformation capacity becomes redundant. The QUAL2 
findings seem to confirm this argument. Interviewees mentioned the value of joint 
initiation and development of SIinitiatives with lead customers (e.g. the use of pilots to 
jointly fine-tune the initiative). The more a firm has experience in innovation-partnerships 
with lead customers, the more they may be expected to deploy/extend these partnerships to 
the joint development of SIinitiatives as well.  
Finally, Danneels’ (2003) study on the market of apparel retailing indicates that market 
knowledge that is developed through close interactions with customers is more likely to be 
attended to and effectively used than is information collected through general scanning 
activities. The deliberate stimulation of assimilation and transformation capacity may 
hence be decreased. In contrast, in the case customers do not stimulate innovation to a 
great extent, findings show that the entire formal ACAP cycle needs to be implemented 
and can as such largely affect the organization’s SIcap (R2=0.473).  
 
As regards the impact of an innovation stimulus from suppliers, results resemble the results 
that were found for an innovation stimulus from customers. This is not surprising. 
First the literature shows similar findings for collaborations with customers and for those 
with suppliers. Collaborations with suppliers may facilitate a firm’s customer value 
creation (Martin & Grbac, 2003; Hogan, 2001), especially when downstream customer 
needs are changing (Wathne & Heide, 2004). For example, it enables reverse marketing 
and demand-driven manufacturing to better meet customer demands. Furthermore, 
suppliers that are involved in an innovative partnership, are specially selected partners that 
require a more extensive form of relationship management (Möller & Törrönen, 2003). 
Firms may consider the supplier’s current capability profile as a proxy of how useful this 
supplier may be for other, future specific value creation projects (Möller & Törrönen, 
2003). As clearly evident from the QUAL2 analysis, supplier partnerships may 
furthermore bring the technology needed to create fundamentally new and superior 
customer value (Sheth & Sharma, 1997). Based on Walter et al. (2001), Möller & 
Törrönen (2003) mention supplier’s indirect value functions, such as the possibility of joint 
innovation, accruing new customers and markets, providing valuable market information, 
and giving access to other important actors, inside and outside the industry, that may 
indirectly enable the firm to create fundamentally new customer value in the future. An 
innovation stimulus from suppliers may hence increase the direct effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for recognition and assimilation as a) experience with 
supplier innovation collaborations increases the efficiency and effectiveness of future 
supplier collaborations (van der Valk & Wynstra, 2005), and b) being able to manage 
supplier partnerships for incremental innovations (as captured by the measure innosup) is a 
necessary learning step to move to a higher level of supplier relationship management for 
innovations of a more radical nature, such as SI (Möller & Törrönen, 2003). Markides & 
Geroski (2003b) mention in this respect alliance creation with key suppliers as one 
potential strategy to achieve radical innovation. 
Secondly, the similar effects an innovation stimulus from customers and one from 
suppliers provoke could also be attributed to a different cause. A study of the literature on 
supplier and customer partnerships suggests the possibility of an underlying mediating 
factor. More specifically, research indicates that good supplier relationship management 
depends on a large amount of intra-organizational cross-functional information sharing 
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(Martin & Grbac, 2003). Reason for this is that sharing information among various 
organizational functions facilitates inter-functional coordination, which is in turn required 
for the kind of supplier partnerships that extend beyond a mere logistics focus (Sanzo et 
al., 2003; Ballou et al., 2000). Similarly, Helfert et al. (2002) stress that in close customer 
relationships, the people involved from the focal firm’s side (i.e. the service provider) need 
to have sufficient information about the organization, the customer’s needs and the market.  
Hence, firms experienced in supplier or customer innovation-collaborations can be 
expected to have in place good systems for cross-functional information sharing. Good 
systems for information sharing may imply that also market information is well 
disseminated cross-functionally. This may hence suggest a mediated moderation role of 
cross-functional dissemination of market information. Given this logic, it is not surprising 
to find a results pattern similar to the one we found for the cross-functional dissemination 
of market information (see, section 5.4.3.2).  
 
Although an innovation stimulus from customers or from suppliers both exert a similar 
influence on the effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms, the effects of an 
innovation stimulus from suppliers are however less pronounced. The effects of an 
innovation stimulus from suppliers on the level of SIcap were indeed negligible (both 
groups scored a similar score), whereas firms stimulated by their customers scored 
significantly higher on the SIcap construct. This finding is also backed by QUAL2-
findings. Interviewees stressed that the impact of an innovation stimulus exerted by 
suppliers is far less drastic than in the case customers stimulate them to innovate. 
Interviewees only referred to the indirect effects of a supplier stimulus, in that suppliers 
may take care of the technological aspects of the SI. The proper idea for the SIinitiative 
does however seldom come from suppliers. 
 
Finally, we studied the effects of the general climate among supply chain parties.  
Our results indicate that a positive general chain climate enhances the effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition and assimilation. The 
effectiveness of mechanisms fostering transformation capacity however diminishes up to a 
level of nonsignificance. As evident in QUAL2-citations, a favorable chain climate may 
reduce the perceived market risks and may as such increase transformation capacity, 
eliminating the need for any formal stimulation of transformation. In contrast, a hostile and 
unwilling chain climate may considerably withhold organizations from the actual 
implementation of SIinitiatives (see chapter 4). Therefore, deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for transformation are highly needed in this case.  
 
The effects of general chain climate may furthermore suggest an underlying mediating 
effect of partnerships for SI, as the one we mentioned above. In other words, general chain 
climate not only produces moderated mediation effects, it may in itself be considered a 
‘mediated moderator’ (James & Brett, 1984); its influence may be determined by the 
effects it produces on the level of partnerships for SI. More specifically, by definition a 
positive chain climate is characterized by a high level of trust among supply chain parties. 
A high level of trust, meaning that parties consider one another as reliable and integer, 
logically increases parties’ commitment to one another (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). In turn, a 
high level of commitment leads to loyalty (Moorman et al., 1992). Loyalty then diminishes 
free-rider behavior, which was mentioned in QUAL2 as a major obstacle to SIcap (see 
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chapter 4). Trust and commitment (and hence little free-rider behavior) take away the 
perceived risk of opportunistic behavior when entering into close, strategic ‘partner’ 
relationships with other supply chain parties (Eggert et al., 2006; Johnson & Selnes, 2004; 
Day, 2000; Wucherer, 2006; Selnes & Sallis, 2003). Furthermore, Walter et al. (2001) 
argue how defensive or competitive relationships between vertical links in a supply chain 
may prevent firms from yielding the full benefits of relationship management. They 
illustrate how this may occur when a supplier considers its direct customer as a competitor 
as well. The QUAL2 (e.g. TMS) findings confirmed this proposition. Yet, as mentioned 
above, close relationships increase innovation possibilities and the creation of more and 
unique customer value (Johnson & Selnes, 2004). For this reason, this type of relationships 
is often needed in the context of SIinitiatives. Both an innovation stimulus from 
customers/suppliers and a favorable chain climate may trigger the establishment of 
partnerships for SI. Therefore, the influence of general chain climate results in a pattern of 
effects, similar to the one we observed for an innovation stimulus from customers or from 
suppliers.  
In sum, our results indicate that if recognition and assimilation capacity are deliberately 
stimulated, a positive chain climate will increase a firm’s willingness and capacity to 
effectively set up SIinitiatives and to accordingly change organizational behavior. The 
mediating role of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation disappears.  
 
 
In conclusion of the moderator analysis, we may pose that: 
• none of the moderators produces negative effects on a firm’s SIcap. On the 
contrary, several moderators considerably enhance a firm’s level of SIcap. 
Significant, positive effects were found for innovativeness, risk taking, the cross-
functional dissemination of market information, information provision by 
customers, centralization and an innovation stimulus from customers.  
• overall, the establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms is 
especially effective (high R2) in organizations with an innovative culture, that 
disseminate market information cross-functionally, where suppliers provide much 
information, or in organizations operating in an adverse chain climate. 
• the establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for all three 
categories of recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity (i.e. important 
mediation effects) proves especially beneficial in firms characterized by high 
levels of innovativeness, risk taking, or information provision from suppliers. In 
these cases, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation operate 
as an important mediating mechanism. 
• several moderators especially intensify the effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for PACAP. The direct effect of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition is particularly enhanced by innovativeness, cross-
functional dissemination of market information, information provision by 
suppliers, centralization or an innovation stimulus form customers or suppliers. 
This implies that these organizational and supply chain characteristics seem to 
‘lift’ the effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, 
channeling recognition capacity to the creation of concrete SIinitiatives. In this 
case, the introduction of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition 
is useful in and of its own. Moreover, centralization and the innovation stimulus 
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from customers or suppliers also weaken the (mediating) effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, increasing the strength of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition all the more. 
• the cross-functional dissemination of market information, information provision 
by customers, centralization, and all moderators related to supply chain 
innovation stimulus diminish or even eliminate the effectiveness of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for transformation. The establishment of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for transformation in companies characterized by 
these ‘side-conditions’, seems hence entirely useless at first sight.  
 
We have made a first attempt to interpret and elucidate these effects, yet, the exploratory 
character of the research questions (essentially due to the ‘flow’ character of the 
independent variables), makes further research appropriate to study these potential effects 
in a more detailed way.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
SYNTHESIS OF THE STUDY 
 
This PhD study is motivated by a search for managerial mechanisms firms may use to 
foster their capacity to systematically create strategic innovation initiatives.   
Based on a literature study of contributions in the areas of strategic innovation, and related 
concepts in the managerial and scientific literature, first a definition of strategic innovation 
is developed. We define strategic innovation in the following way:  
Strategic innovation entails the creation of new and substantially superior customer value 
by a new and fundamentally different way of playing the game in an existing industry. It 
implies the deviance from traditional industry assumptions and conventions and, as such, 
has the potential of altering the rules of the game in an industry.  
Strategic innovation can be achieved by redefining the business model and the roles and 
(power) relationships in the industry.  
As empirics demonstrate the value of continuous strategic innovation (e.g., Larsen et al., 
2002, 2003; Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004), we take strategic innovation capacity as the 
dependent variable in our study. We define strategic innovation capacity as an 
organization’s capacity to systematically create strategic innovation initiatives. 
 
Our quest for specific managerial mechanisms embarks with a theoretical integration of the 
concepts of dynamic capabilities, absorptive capacity and strategic innovation. A further 
study on recent literature streams on routines enables us to finally identify semi-structured, 
strategic learning mechanisms. We furthermore contend that firms may deliberately 
establish these strategic learning mechanisms. We argue that the establishment of such 
‘deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and 
transformation’, as we call them, may foster strategic innovation capacity on two different 
levels. The first level is the most obvious one. Relating absorptive capacity explicitly to the 
literature on strategic innovation and to cognitive theories of sensemaking, we detect 
aspects in the three absorptive capacity dimensions that are pivotal to promote path-
loosening effects. We propose that strategic learning mechanisms fostering especially 
these aspects may foster strategic innovation capacity.  
Secondly, the semi-structured nature of these mechanisms promotes agency and hence 
cranks up routines’ endemic change potential. In this sense, deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms do not only foster the path-breaking elements in the generation and 
organization of market knowledge (say, absorptive capacity), but they also hold the key to 
relaxing the constraints on path dependency in the development process itself of these 
aspects (Coombs & Hull, 1998).  
 
Based on a ‘QUALÆQUAN’ research design we study the effectiveness of such deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for strategic innovation capacity empirically.  Inspired by 
the conceptual study, we select and study real strategic innovation initiatives and strategic 
innovators (business units or companies with a high level of strategic innovation capacity) 
during the qualitative phases. The qualitative findings, enriched by existing conceptual 
insights, enable us to identify, select and operationalize relevant (sub)constructs, and to 
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formulate hypotheses regarding partial mediation effects among the three categories of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. Additionally, we formulate research questions 
concerning the effects of several organizational and supply chain ‘side’-characteristics on 
the effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms.  The hypotheses and 
research questions are further validated in a partial least squares-study of a sample of 
Dutch industrial firms.  
 
Our empirical results enable us to distinguish several relevant path-breaking focus areas in 
a firm’s recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity.  
Our findings regarding recognition refute the value of the prevailing ‘market-driven’ 
market orientation (Narver & Slater, 1990; Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Deshpandé et al., 
1993) in the case of frame-breaking innovation. Yet, our results also take the edge off 
skeptics’ warnings against the blinding effects of the market orientation construct (see e.g., 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994b). Empirical evidence is found for 
the modern ‘proactive’ market orientation view (Slater & Narver, 1998; Narver et al., 
2004).  
Our findings related to assimilation capacity support the insights of extant sensemaking 
and strategic innovation literature regarding the value of interpersonal discussion and 
reflection upon customers, markets and the marketing approach (e.g., Louis & Sutton, 
1991; Markides, 1997, 1998). 
Finally, our results on transformation capacity corroborate the theoretical distinction 
between the internal and external facets of frame-breaking innovation. We find early 
empirical support for Baden-Fuller’s (1995) belief in the superiority of innovations 
producing large external effects (industry rules) while imposing only small internal effects 
(competence leverage). 
 
The QUAN results substantiate the usefulness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
for the creation of strategic innovation capacity. The three hypotheses formulated are all 
confirmed as well. These findings imply that the effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition are mediated by deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation and transformation (H1 and H2). Furthermore, the effects of deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation are in turn mediated by deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms for transformation (H3). In other words, deliberately enhancing 
recognition capacity will only fully affect strategic innovation capacity on the condition 
path-loosening elements in assimilation and transformation capacity are triggered as well. 
In turn, fostering assimilation capacity will only fully affect strategic innovation capacity if 
transformation capacity is triggered as well. Our findings provide empirical evidence for 
the argument that the different dimensions of absorptive capacity build upon each other 
(e.g. Zahra & George, 2002; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998): stimulating just one dimension 
limits its full potential.  
Yet, the partial character of the mediation effects suggest the importance of ‘stock’ effects 
of recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity, associated with a firm’s unique 
characteristics and history.  
 
In particular, the large direct effect of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
assimilation is a striking result. The effect size of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms 
for assimilation moreover surpasses this of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
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transformation, hence suggesting the superiority of the former as a stimulator of strategic 
innovation capacity. Firstly, this finding may provide evidence for the argument that, 
despite the beneficial effects of sensemaking in action (e.g., Weick, 2002; Bogner & Barr, 
2000), in the case of strategic innovation, learning at a cognitive level is more fundamental 
than learning at the action level (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Secondly, assimilation 
capacity may be more susceptible to deliberate stimulation efforts than is transformation 
capacity. In this way, the emphasis much of the sensemaking literature has put on steering 
cognitive aspects (e.g. Thomas et al., 1993), more than behavioral aspects, seems 
corroborated. A third reason may be found in our operationalization of strategic innovation 
capacity. Our focus on a business unit’s capacity to systematically create strategic 
innovation initiatives, stands somewhat midway between full exploitation (successfully 
commercialized) and full exploration (ideas, concepts not yet materialized in any way). 
This would explain a lower need of any behavioral transformation. Fourthly, findings may 
point to the existence of a so-called ‘transformation platform’ that may leverage the 
implementation of more than only one strategic innovation initiative. A final reason may 
point to the appropriateness of different ambidexterity strategies for the initiation versus 
implementation stages of strategic innovation initiatives.  
 
Finally, we find that different organizational and supply chain characteristics considerably 
enhance a business unit’s strategic innovation capacity. First, we find that firms45 
emphasizing innovative and risk taking values, with a centralized structure, where market 
information is cross-functionally disseminated or where customers provide much 
information or highly stimulate the business unit to innovate all gain significantly higher 
levels of strategic innovation capacity.  
Different organizational and supply chain characteristics impact on the effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as well. The establishment of deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms is especially effective in organizations with an innovative culture, 
that disseminate market information cross-functionally, where suppliers provide much 
information, or in organizations operating in an adverse chain climate. 
The establishment of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for all three categories of 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity proves especially beneficial in firms 
characterized by high levels of innovativeness, risk taking, or information provision from 
suppliers. In these cases, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation and 
transformation function as important channels for recognition and assimilation capacity. 
Still, innovativeness, cross-functional dissemination of market information, information 
provision by suppliers, centralization or an innovation stimulus from customers or 
suppliers seem to channel the effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for 
recognition directly to the creation of concrete strategic innovation initiatives. In this case, 
the introduction of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition is also very 
useful in and of its own. Centralization and a large innovation stimulus from customers or 
suppliers moreover weaken the (channeling) effects of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for assimilation, increasing the strength of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms for recognition all the more. Finally, the cross-functional dissemination of 
market information, information provision by customers, centralization, and all moderators 
                                                          
45 For reasons of clarity we use the term ‘firm’ or ‘organization’ in the remainder of the 
Conclusions. In fact, we should say ‘business unit (or firm for single-unit firms)’. 
Conclusions 
 272 
related to a supply chain innovation stimulus diminish or even eliminate the effectiveness 
of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation. The establishment of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation in companies characterized by 
these side-conditions seems hence entirely useless at first sight.  
 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
 
Refinement, integration and operationalization of theoretical concepts 
A first contribution of our study lies in the development of several concepts, in terms of 
theoretical refinement, in terms of empirical operationalization and in terms of conceptual 
integration.  
Firstly, our study adds to the literature on strategic innovation by the more fine-drawn 
delineation of the strategic innovation-concept. Although different scholars have marked 
the value of strategic innovation to counter hypercompetion and commoditization 
tendencies that intensify strategy-convergence (e.g., Markides, 1999a; Baden-Fuller, 
1995), largely stemming from a managerially-oriented research tradition, contributions on 
strategic innovation predominantly lack scientific rigor, despite their promising ideas and 
instruments. Discussions regarding the properties of strategic innovation are often replete 
with rhetoric and counter-rhetoric, and pay only scant regard to definition or exactitude. 
Being conceptually underdeveloped the concept of strategic inovation hence runs the risk 
of many other managerial concepts that temporarily enjoy great popularity, but remain 
supported mainly by examples or anecdotes instead of being subjected to rigorous testing 
(Simonson, 2005). Providing the concept with a more rigorous underpinning is hence 
essential for the concept to be more than just ‘a managerial fad’ (Markides in Mang, 2000). 
Therefore, chapter 1 was entirely devoted to the theoretical enrichment of the strategic 
innovation-concept. We systematically inventoried all publications on strategic innovation 
and on related concepts (e.g. value innovation, disruptive innovation) in order to detect any 
underlying theoretical patterns. These insights were further contrasted to scientific 
contributions regarding the concept of ‘strategic renewal’. Since no single description 
contained within the sources examined was sufficiently inclusive to represent the meaning 
of all others, a definition of strategic innovation was developed incrementally. This 
definition represents the range and variety found within all sources evaluated.  
The lack of any clear definition of strategic innovation in the literature is reflected in the 
non-existence of any validated measure to operationalize the concept. Strategic innovation 
was operationalized in our study by measuring a business unit’s level (or firm’s level for 
single-unit firms) of ‘strategic innovation capacity’. Although we faced the scientific 
quandary of measuring issues of change (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002), the conceptual 
definition developed in chapter 1 and the findings of the qualitative phase enabled us to 
finally develop a reflective multi-item measure for strategic innovation capacity.  
Finally, the empirical study sheds further light on the specific mechanisms firms can use in 
developing strategic innovation capacity, and on the additional influence exerted by 
different organizational and supply chain characteristics. In this way, we attempted to 
enhance both the theoretical development and the managerial relevance of the concept of 
strategic innovation capacity. 
Next to a conceptual and empirical demarcation of strategic innovation, we integrated the 
concept of strategic innovation capacity with the concepts of dynamic capabilities and 
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absorptive capacity. In this way, we respond to the often-heard critique on management 
research that different concepts are not sufficiently linked and do often not build on each 
other. This creates confusion and prevents the field from progress in theoretical insights 
(e.g., Markides in Mang, 2000).  
Firstly, by linking the dynamic capabilities concept to strategic innovation capacity, we 
managed to tackle the tautology and vagueness of the dynamic capabilities concept that 
researchers on the resource-based view have often been blamed of. Following Zahra & 
George (2002) in their conceptualization of dynamic capabilities as absorptive capacity-
processes and -routines, the concept becomes much more concrete. Demarcating specific 
path-breaking areas in the absorptive capacity-dimensions of recognition, assimilation and 
transformation, we did a further attempt to make the abstract concept of dynamic 
capabilities more tangible and action-oriented. This furthermore implies that we follow the 
assumption that dynamic capabilities, albeit a strategic factor, reside at the operational 
level within firms and not at the aggregate firm level (Ethiraj et al., 2005). Ethiraj et al. 
(2005) have indeed fiercely criticized the aggregate measures for capabilities, such as 
overall firm R&D intensity, frequently used in the literature. Aggregate measures, they 
argue, provide little insight into the specific micro-foundations of capabilities; they do not 
provide any clear answer to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of inter-firm differences. Focusing our 
attention on specific managerial mechanisms that foster recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity, our results provide further insight into the intentional learning 
mechanisms firms may establish to develop dynamic capabilities, and to steer their 
development path (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
Secondly, relying on this conceptual integration of the three basic constructs, we also did a 
first attempt to specify the absorptive capacity construct in the context of strategic 
innovation. The value absorptive capacity has been traditionally ascribed with in the area 
of technological innovation (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) has been extended to the 
strategic innovation arena. Conceptualizing three absorptive capacity dimensions as 
important determinants of strategic innovation capacity, we answer Lane et al.’s (2002) 
critique that absorptive capacity researchers have so far been unable to stretch the concept 
beyond a pure R&D context (see also Lane & Lubatkin’s (1998) critique on R&D 
spending as an overall measure of absorptive capacity). Furthermore, focusing on the three 
antecedent-dimensions for strategic innovation capacity, we attempt to respond to Almeida 
et al.’s (2003) call to not just study the processes but the underlying capabilities firms rely 
on to manage knowledge for innovation. Studying deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms that target three dimensions of absorptive capacity we furthermore try to 
disprove Lane et al.’s (2002) critique that absorptive capacity research to date pays too 
little attention “to the actual processes underlying absorptive capacity” (: M4), this despite 
Cohen & Levinthal’s (1990) original stress on the need to study organizational 
mechanisms for absorptive capacity development.  
In addition, so far, contributions to the measurement of absorptive capacity have been poor 
(Van Den Bosch et al., 2003). Regarding possible operationalizations of the different 
absorptive capacity dimensions, Zahra & George (2002) encourage researchers to “focus 
on the routines and processes that organizations use to acquire, assimilate, transform, and 
exploit knowledge” (:199). Liao et al. (2003) have made a call for a more fine-grained, 
multi-item index of absorptive capacity. To date, researchers seriously lack consensus on 
how to measure the different dimensions of absorptive capacity (Lane et al., 2002), let 
alone on the underlying mechanisms to stimulate them. Linking the absorptive capacity 
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concept to the strategic innovation domain, a first attempt has been made to operationalize 
learning mechanisms for the development of different absorptive capacity-dimensions. 
More specifically, founding our argument on cognitive theories (e.g. Thomas et al., 1993), 
we argue that deliberate strategic learning mechanisms influencing specific aspects of three 
absorptive capacity-dimensions could loosen path dependencies. To this end, specific 
elements indicated in the strategic innovation and sensemaking literature were 
incorporated into the three absorptive capacity dimensions, and formative multi-item 
indexes were built.  
Zahra & George (2002) furthermore mention the value of both interview and survey 
methods, to capture the ongoing practices for absorptive capacity in firms. This 
recommendation has also been echoed in Van Den Bosch et al. (2003). Using a mixed 
method research design we tried to answer this call as well. The value that deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms for absorptive capacity may have for a firm that attempts to 
create strategic innovation capacity, was empirically verified in both a qualitative and 
quantitative way. 
 
Mixed method management research 
Methodologically, our research design shows that mixed method research is to be 
considered a viable design for (strategic) management research (Creswell et al., 2002). The 
combination of a ‘QUALÆQUAN’ design (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003a) with 
Orton’s (1997) iterative research process demonstrates how different research methods can 
be combined to develop a nascent theoretical model on new and immature management 
concepts and phenomena (Currall & Towler, 2003). We think the ultimate value of the 
mixed design reveals itself in the discussion of the findings of the quantitative phase, 
where findings could be interpreted by means of the insights of the prior qualitative 
research phases.  
Traditionally, mixed method research has been promoted chiefly because of its potential to 
combine the methodological weaknesses and strengths of different research methods. Yet, 
we think our research gained as much in scientific soundness, as it did in managerial 
relevance. The insights from the different qualitative phases enabled us to translate abstract 
research concepts into concrete managerial mechanisms, of which the effectiveness could 
be validated on a larger scale by means of survey research. We hence fully share Rocco et 
al.’s (2003) assertion that in generating broader and deeper insights than mono-method 
research, mixed method studies have the potential to be more useful to managers as well.  
 
Path-breaking focus areas 
Our empirical results reveal several path-breaking elements in a firm’s recognition, 
assimilation and transformation capacity that a firm can deliberately foster.  
Regarding recognition capacity, our findings confirm the usefulness of recent contributions 
on market orientation research (e.g., Narver et al., 2004), and extend the value of a 
‘proactive market reorientation’ to the domain of strategic innovation. Our results 
regarding assimilation shed doubt on the overstated value of firms’ knowledge codification 
efforts. We hope that our findings relating to assimilation capacity will trigger researchers 
who study the link between knowledge management systems and frame-breaking 
innovation, to abandon their overly focus on information codification and filing by means 
of ICT-tools, in favor of methods that target the sensemaking system in itself (Dougherty 
et al., 2000).  
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Finally, our study on the path-breaking areas in transformation capacity points to a fruitful 
integration of research on architectural innovation, partnerships and alliances and strategic 
innovation. 
 
Deliberate management and auto-evolution 
Focusing our attention on deliberate strategic learning mechanisms that stimulate the path-
breaking focus areas in recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity, we follow 
research in the conceptual domain of entrepreneurship, which has broadened from 
traditional questions of entry to management processes used to have the organization act 
entrepreneurially (Matsuno et al., 2002). We moreover share Ray et al.’s (2004) view that 
this focus on concrete management processes could turn the resource-based view of the 
firm much more managerially relevant. In this way, we also try to respond Thomas et al.’s 
(2001: 332) remark: “While a consensus has emerged that a strategic learning capability is 
an important one, there is a paucity of empirical research illustrating particular practices 
that organizations can institutionalize to achieve it”.  
Our empirical study demonstrated their relevance in fostering a firm’s innovative capacity. 
Our results hence provide evidence for the argument that second-order competences may 
mitigate the effects of path dependencies (Danneels, 2002), and that moreover the 
development of such second-order competences can be deliberately stimulated. The high 
significance of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation, in particular, 
validates the assertion that a) cognitive change can prevent the competency traps induced 
by local, experiential search (e.g., Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), and b) this cognitive change 
can be deliberately triggered and institutionalized in the operating core (e.g., Bogner & 
Barr, 2000). This finding consequently questions the famous, though empirically under-
investigated (Adler et al., 1999), exploration-exploitation (Levinthal & March, 1993), 
flexibility-efficiency (Adler et al., 1999), or double loop-single loop learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978) trade-off prevalent in organizational theories, and suggests the possibility of 
a recursive and even co-evolutionary relationship between exploitation and exploration 
(King & Tucci, 2002; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  
 
Overall, despite the path-loosening effects of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms, the 
partial character of the mediation effects confirms the idea that deliberate strategic 
learning mechanisms do not operate on ‘empty canvasses’ (Ray et al., 2004), and that 
important stock-effects of the organization’s recognition, assimilation and transformation 
capacity should be taken into account. Furthermore, the limited effect we found regarding 
deliberate strategic mechanisms for transformation may suggest a lower effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms to foster path-breaking behavior (versus 
cognition). Although we argued that multiple arguments can be brought up to explain this 
remarkable finding, we think that in particular the creation of transformation ‘platforms’ 
and the need for the parallel implementation of multiple ambidexterity strategies for the 
initiation and implementation stages of strategic innovation initiatives, may prove viable 
future research routes. The results of our moderator analysis furthermore illustrate that 
organizational and supply chain side-conditions exert important influences on the 
effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as well.  
In this respect, our results validate recent ideas from strategic choice theory (Child, 1997) 
that the impetus for organizational change comes both from strategic choices and from the 
auto-evolution of the system itself (Deneault & Gatignon, 2000). 
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The managerial relevance of our study logically flows from our research object: deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms. We admit that a good strategy is always part foresight, part 
serendipity (Hamel, 1998b). Yet, our findings illustrate how serendipity can be increased, 
just as the creation of strategic innovation initiatives can be stimulated.  
In other words, our results provide managers with the evidence that deliberate 
interventions can indeed foster strategic innovation capacity. Our findings show that the 
strategic innovation capacity of a firm is far more dependent on the establishment of such 
tools than on its position in the supply chain, its size and the fact whether the firm is 
primarily a product or a service provider. Such results hence enfeeble excuses that a firm’s 
limited market insight is entirely due to for example its upstream position in the supply 
chain or its large (or small) size.  
Moreover, these mechanisms are real, concrete tools to stimulate the strategic innovation 
capacity of a firm. Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms are relatively easy to 
implement and hence provide managers with handles to stimulate strategic innovation 
capacity on a much shorter term than can be done by the creation of generally cited 
enablers such as an innovative organizational culture (e.g., Markides, 1999a).  
 
The mechanisms focus on three aspects: the stimulation of the business unit’s capacity to 
recognize new external customer/market information, the business unit’s capacity to 
assimilate this information, and the business unit’s capacity to accordingly act on this (i.e. 
change behavior).  
Our results show that a firm may stimulate its capacity to recognize new valuable 
information about customers and markets, by the development of a deep learning 
relationship with customers. Attentive listening to customers and closely studying their 
different buyer experience stages seem crucial. Furthermore, firms need to think about the 
effects changes in the business environment may exert on the needs of their customers and 
they should broaden their market research towards the study of non-customers. New value 
propositions can be discovered by linking these data to the firm’s competencies. In 
particular a consultation of the most innovative customers for innovative ideas seems 
highly valuable. Yet, large-scale market research (such as customer satisfaction surveys) 
and desk research on general industry or societal information prove no discriminating 
factors. These findings all point to a new, extended role for account managers and all 
‘people in the field’ (such as service engineers) as ‘market and idea antennas’. It 
furthermore questions the value of separate –detached– business development departments 
for the initiation of strategic innovation initiatives. 
In addition, we find that a business unit’s capacity to critically reflect on its prevalent 
assumptions about the market, customers and the marketing approach is pivotal in the 
creation of strategic innovation capacity. Furthermore, these discussions should involve 
different organizational functions, such as business unit management, sales, and marketing.  
Codifying knowledge on the intranet or on other storage media is ineffective since not 
used. We hope these findings will restrain firms from their inclination to become 
“information-rich, but interpretation-poor systems” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1995: 6). These 
findings have implications for the implementation of knowledge management as well. Tsai 
& Shih (2004) demonstrated that firms can enhance their marketing capabilities by the 
application of ‘marketing knowledge management’. Our results however demonstrate that 
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organizations should balance their knowledge codification efforts with a stimulation of 
conversations, critical discussions and market information flows. With respect to the latter, 
Day (2002) has pleaded for ‘maps of the market-learning processes’ in the organization. 
These maps describe in detail the market information flow in the organization: for 
example, where does the information enter the organization, how is it distributed and how 
can it be retrieved? 
Thirdly, to stimulate actual behavioral transformation, the use of scenario patterns seems 
highly useful. General blueprints limit implementation chaos and describe in advance how 
processes may be adjusted.  Furthermore the adjustment of the organizational structure, 
especially by the set-up of separate units and project-teams for the roll-out of initiatives, is 
critical. These units should however keep tight bonds with the rest of the organization. For 
example, employees are part-time or temporarily detached to these units. Units operate 
under different brand names to increase market acceptance and to better cope with 
potential brand interference.  
 
The effectiveness of these different categories of mechanisms shows a reverse pyramidal 
structure: if firms want to gain full effects of these mechanisms, all three categories of 
learning mechanisms should be established. In other words, new market information is 
leveraged by mechanisms that foster a critical discussion of this information. In turn, 
mechanisms fostering behavioral change are needed to channel the effects of both the other 
categories. Strategic innovation capacity can hence be stimulated best when all 
mechanisms are in place.   
Yet this is not always the case. Specific characteristics of the organization and the supply 
chain in which it operates, exert considerable influences. Organizations with an 
organizational culture that values openness towards innovation, organizations that manage 
to disseminate market information well across the different organizational functions, or 
organizations where decision authority is largely centralized gain a direct value from 
mechanisms that stimulate market insight. In other words, stimulating the recognition of 
new, valuable market information will directly lead to new strategic innovation initiatives. 
This is also the case for firms that gain much market information from their suppliers or 
that are highly stimulated by their suppliers or customers to innovate (e.g. firms with many 
customer- or supplier-partnerships for innovation projects).  
The existence of some organizational characteristics may even make the stimulation of 
behavioral change completely useless. This is the case in organizations with a centralized 
organizational structure, or organizations where market information is well cross-
functionally disseminated. This is also the case for several supply chain conditions: if 
customers share much information through normal working relationships, if there is little 
hostility among the different vertical supply chain links, and if either customers or 
suppliers largely stimulate the firm to innovate.  
The beneficial effects of supply chain characteristics on the creation of strategic innovation 
capacity should convince managers to develop a strategic view on how they can leverage 
the knowledge embedded in networks and the supply chain. They should develop 
competences that can extract the maximum of information and knowledge out of network 
partners. The latter often implies a more strategic and long term view on supply chain 
relationships.  
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Finally, Slater & Narver (1998) cite Drucker (1974) that the two essential activities of 
business are innovation and marketing. Furthermore, as confirmed in empirical studies, 
marketing strategy and market orientation type should match business strategy (e.g., Slater 
& Olson, 2001; Tuominen et al., 2004). Hence, our results have also specific implications 
for the marketing function in firms. More specifically, our study demonstrates that 
fostering an organization’s strategic innovation capacity requires a balanced and integrated 
marketing approach. Investments in external information acquisition (the most traditional 
role of marketing) will not lead to new customer value creation when the other two areas 
(assimilation and transformation) are neglected.  
First, because of its external focus the marketing department is well positioned to stimulate 
the outside-in process of market sensing (Day, 2002). Traditional market research methods 
should however be complemented with the use of nontraditional outside information 
sources, such as own customer visits. In this way, the critique on marketing departments 
for having lost market feeling, and for being too ‘model-driven’ may be tempered. Since 
our results show how the generation of deep insight into the market is not confined to the 
marketing function, marketers should actively involve other organizational functions in the 
generation of market information (Slater & Narver, 1995). Furthermore, we share 
Danneels’ (2002: 1113) view that a second-order competence for assessing new markets 
(the ability to learn new domains) “could be considered as a marketing competence proper, 
operating at a higher level than a market or customer competence”. In this respect, 
marketers can even become the ‘haulers’ of strategic innovation, by collecting market 
information dispersed in the organization, by triggering collective reflections on the 
market, and by translating these reflections into new concepts for strategic innovation 
initiatives. They should however mobilize different organizational functions in this 
process. Indeed, and in line with the market orientation literature (e.g., Slater & Narver, 
1999), our study suggests that marketing activities are not the sole responsibility of the 
marketing department. Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms should be anchored 
within the entire organization. Hence, the value of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms evidence Harris’ (2000) marketing paradox that developing an external 
orientation (towards the creation of fundamentally new and superior customer value) 
chiefly rests on internal, organizational characteristics.  
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
Despite the study’s contributions to theory and practice, several limitations merit further 
discussion. 
 
This study aimed to gain deeper knowledge on deliberate mechanisms firms may use to 
stimulate their strategic innovation capacity. Taking strategic innovation capacity as the 
dependent variable in this study carries with it two important conceptual limitations. 
Firstly, although our qualitative research sheds some light on the usefulness of strategic 
innovation as a growth strategy in competitive and commoditized Dutch industrial 
markets, a study on the benefits of such a strategy was no research goal as such. This 
implies our findings do not enable us to pronounce any normative judgments upon the 
appropriateness of strategic innovation as the strategic route to pursue.  
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Secondly, our focus on strategic innovation capacity bears with it an emphasis on the 
initiation and preliminary implementation phases of innovation projects, this to the 
detriment of aspects related to actual commercialization and market roll-out. The success 
factors of strategic innovation initiatives in terms of market growth or increased financial 
benefits were not explicitly taken into account.  
 
Furthermore, taking deliberate strategic learning mechanisms as the independent variables 
in our study implies a focus on ‘flow’ variables. Additional effects of firms’ stocks of 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity were not given explicit research 
attention.  Still, the findings of the qualitative research and the observation of the partial 
nature of mediation mechanisms point to a considerable influence these stock effects may 
exert on the effectiveness of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms. In other words, 
although our focus on concrete mechanisms enhanced managerial relevance and 
concretized some of the vague theoretical concepts, it considerably complicated the 
interpretation of the quantitative results as well. In the concrete, nonsignificant path 
estimates (ineffective mechanisms) may be attributed to a) a lack of organizational 
conditions needed to leverage the mechanisms’ effects, or in contrast b) the existence of a 
well-developed capacity, turning the establishment of deliberate mechanisms to foster this 
capacity even more, redundant.   
 
Methodologically, several additional limitations should be noted. Although the 
combination of different research methods partly compensates for the weaknesses of each 
method in isolation, still, methodological limitations do arise.  
First of all, the level of analysis of the entire study was the organization or business unit. 
Due to resource constraints, our data collection and analysis strategies (single-informant) 
assumed homogeneity among organization members regarding the constructs under study. 
To prevent level of analysis fallacies, this homogeneity should be further demonstrated by 
means of for example multi-level studies where data on an individual level are aggregated 
to the firm level. Indeed, only variables that prove to be homogeneous within companies 
can predict between-company differences (Klein et al., 1994). 
As regards the qualitative phases, the QUAL2-phase led to an unequal harvest of strategic 
innovation initiatives across the five sectors. The confidential and strategic character of 
strategic innovation initiatives refrained different parties from (extensive) participation in 
the study. Although we triangulated the QUAL2-data on several different levels, we were 
unable to extend the study of these strategic innovation initiatives to full case-study 
research. Presumably, a deeper study of these strategic innovation initiatives would have 
provided a richer insight into the specific process characteristics associated with the 
creation of strategic innovation initiatives. In addition, both the qualitative and the 
quantitative study targeted firms in Dutch industrial sectors. Although we think our results 
may be generalizable to other Western-EU industrial sectors, findings may prove 
nontransferable to non-EU, or to non-industrial sectors.  
The quantitative study brings several additional methodological limitations to the surface. 
First of all, findings may be less generalizable to small service firms. Finally, the use of the 
partial least squares method confirms the exploratory character of the study. Flexibility of 
analysis was prioritized over statistical inelegance. The choice for PLS reflects our 
preference for content validity (e.g. the use of formative indicators) over statistical 
conclusion and external validity in the exploratory phases of research, this against 
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predominant traditions in management and marketing research. Moreover, the cross-
sectional nature of our analysis did not enable us to fully test for the causal sequence that is 
implied in our conceptual model, let alone for important feedback effects among the 
variables studied. We recognize this as one of the most important shortcomings of our 
study and support the warnings expressed by Woodside (2005) and Laurent (2000) to resist 
the temptation to trade-off complexity and nuance for the sake of a parsimonious structural 
equation model. A longitudinal research design seems necessary to further validate the 
claims of causality and feedback effects. We were however not able to integrate this into 
this PhD project due to time and resource constraints. The ‘QUALÆQUAN’ research 
design we applied was already very demanding in terms of time, resources and 
methodological knowledge.  
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
 
As is often the case in research, our study has generated at least as many questions as it 
answers. Evidently, there are a number of areas that require further exploration, some of 
which we touch on here.  
 
Our study of the path-breaking focus areas suggests useful insights may come from a better 
integration of marketing and (strategic) management research. We hope market orientation 
researchers will broaden their focus from traditional product innovation outputs towards 
the domain of frame-breaking strategic innovation as well. More specifically, extending 
research on market orientation to study its effects on innovation types that challenge the 
industry rules of the game may dismiss skeptics’ critiques on the blinding effects of the 
market orientation construct (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
Furthermore, further study should be devoted to the internal competence effects strategic 
innovations may produce. Studies that integrate insights on architectural innovation, 
competence leveraging and the value of partnerships in this, may further validate (or 
reject) our finding that strategic innovations rest on leveraging the existing competencies, 
more than on a complete competence redefinition. In this respect a stronger integration of 
research on strategic renewal and strategic innovation seems a promising avenue.  
 
We hope furthermore that our results may inspire researchers to delve deeper into the study 
of potential moderating effects, since both the absorptive capacity and the strategic 
innovation literature lack clear documentation and justification of potential moderators 
(Van Den Bosch et al., 2003; Daghfous, 2004). 
More specifically, we studied the effects of different organizational and supply chain side-
conditions in isolation. It is however plausible that the combined effects of different 
moderators may produce different effects. Further research may combine these isolated 
effects into more complex moderation analyses. Our moderator analysis for the effect of 
supply chain innovation stimulus suggested furthermore the potential occurrence of 
mediated moderation effects. More specifically, we posited that the effects of an 
innovation stimulus from customers or suppliers may enhance the cross-functional 
dissemination of market information, which may in turn affect the effectiveness of 
deliberate strategic learning mechanisms.  In addition, we argued how the effects of 
general chain climate may be channeled through its effect on partnerships for SI. We hence 
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followed Baron & Kenny (1986) that results of a moderator analysis should suggest 
potential underlying mediating mechanisms through which the moderator effect takes 
place. Future research attempts may study the mediating mechanisms suggested here.  
The central role of partnerships with intra-industry and industry-foreign partnerships also 
questions the overly stress researchers on customer and supplier co-operations (e.g., IMP) 
have traditionally put on their beneficial effects in terms of efficiency gains (e.g. logistics). 
We would like to make a plea for the extension towards more strategic areas, such as the 
benefits that innovative co-productive relationships may have for the reconfiguration of 
industry roles and the creation of fundamentally new and superior customer value (e.g. 
Normann & Ramírez, 1993; Ramírez, 1999).  
In addition to these research directions, directly resulting from our findings, we think our 
research opens up additional research opportunities. 
 
Stock and feedback effects 
The results of our research make a further search on the potential stock effects of 
recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity indispensable.  For example, the 
interpretation of the causes of moderator effects was considerably complicated by the stock 
effects these moderators may produce on a firm’s recognition, assimilation and 
transformation capacity. A more detailed study on stock effects seems hence appropriate to 
validate the tentative findings on moderating effects. 
The importance of ‘stock’ effects of recognition, assimilation and transformation capacity, 
also points to the benefits of further research on positive and negative feedback loops and 
vicious cycles. The literature has indeed shown that innovation is a dynamic process, 
influenced by multiple variables that are interconnected in various feedback processes 
(e.g., Koput, 1997; Amis et al., 2004).  
Firstly, deliberate strategic learning mechanisms fostering strategic innovation capacity 
may set into motion a self-reinforcing cycle of strategic innovation capacity.  
It has been argued that the breadth of a firm’s experience base positively affects the 
breadth of its assimilation structures. For example, Hargadon & Fanelli (2002) indicate 
that pluralism in mental schemata can be triggered by a diverse set of experience. This is 
because contextual variations may increase a firm’s ability to change or broaden its shared 
managerial schemas (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999). As a result, assimilation can accommodate 
more diverse external signals and is hence less likely to be based in existing capabilities. In 
this way, broader experiences diminish the detrimental effects of path dependencies 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004). Since strategic innovation capacity entails by definition ‘the 
capacity to systematically create strategic innovation initiatives’, and since each strategic 
innovation initiative is characterized by ‘the deviance from traditional assumptions and 
conventions’, strategic innovation capacity can be assumed to broaden the organization’s 
experience base. In a similar vein, Weick (2002) has elaborated on sensemaking by/in 
action. This action-based sensemaking stresses once more the value of experimental action 
(strategic innovation capacity) to improve or adapt sensemaking (Bogner & Barr, 2000). 
Following this line of logic, some authors in the field of strategic innovation have asserted 
that initial expectations can enhance through experiential learning across different strategic 
innovation initiatives (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2004; Hamel & Getz, 2004). It can indeed 
be argued that over time successful strategic innovation initiatives are considered (and 
promoted by the firm’s management) as tangible manifestations of the value of path-
breaking elements in absorptive capacity. In this respect, high levels of strategic innovation 
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capacity may be expected to trigger absorptive capacity, which in turn stimulates an 
organization’s strategic innovation capacity all the more. In this respect, path dependencies 
are not only diminished in cognition, but in action as well (experimenting with strategic 
innovation initiatives) (Danneels, 2003)46. Yet, negative feedback effects may occur as 
well. Koput (1997) argues that a trade-off between search and implementation may take 
place in the sense that a higher number of strategic innovation initiatives may require more 
selection, implementation and roll-out efforts, taking organizational attention away from 
new search efforts needed for the creation of new, additional strategic innovation 
initiatives.  
The feedback effects that deliberate strategic mechanisms for recognition, assimilation and 
transformation may produce remain however more difficult to predict. In line with Cohen 
& Levinthal (1990), Van den Bosch et al. (1999) argue that absorptive capacity promotes 
expectation formation (the belief in the value of exploration and absorptive capacity). 
Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms, triggering absorptive capacity may in this sense 
stimulate expectation formation. This expectation formation may in turn intensify the 
effort to deliberately influence the determinants of absorptive capacity, which in turn will 
foster absorptive capacity, etc. Hence, the establishment of deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms may activate a self-reinforcing cycle of deliberate stimulation efforts. 
Alternatively, the increased absorptive capacity produced by deliberate strategic learning 
mechanisms may also lower the need for any formal stimulation mechanisms, which 
would point to the existence of a self-destructing cycle of deliberate stimulation efforts. 
Since the determination of the precise direction of causality in a strategic relationship is a 
major challenge in business research (Hurley et al., 2005: 282), future research attempts 
should explicitly incorporate the further study of these feedback effects. Repenning’s 
(2002) results on innovation implementations show however that “relative simple theories, 
if they include multiple feedback relationships and time delays, can create complicated 
behaviors that are hard to anticipate via intuition” (: 126). Future studies on these feedback 
effects are hence far from evident and require more advanced methodological approaches, 
such as longitudinal and multi-level studies.   
 
Process studies  
The importance of deliberate strategic mechanisms shows that senior management can 
enable strategy to ‘emerge’ by formulating the right set of organizational preconditions 
(Hamel, 1998b). Our study brings the process aspects of strategy to the forefront, after 
years of an overly emphasis on context and content aspects of strategy (Hamel, 1998b; 
Bogner & Barr, 2000). In this way, the strategy creation process is not restricted to a 
mechanical, top-down, ‘directed’ process. Instead, top management creates the appropriate 
system of context and incentives for nurturing the organic and emergent nature of this 
process (Leavy, 1997; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). If organizational members have some 
                                                          
46 We would however like to stress that these potential positive feedback effects of 
strategic innovation capacity do not invalidate our previous arguments about the high value 
direct cognitive learning may have in the context of strategic innovation. We only argued 
that the high effect size of deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation may 
be a sign that a direct cognitive change may be more effective, or that cognitive change 
may be more easy to stimulate directly.  
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freedom in pursuing ‘autonomous initiatives’ (Burgelman, 1991), over time the shifting 
contents of initiatives may bend the strategic intent towards a different direction (Lovas & 
Goshal, 2000). This process has been well documented in Burgelman’s (1983, 1991) 
studies of strategic bottom-up initiatives. Top management’s role is hence broadened to 
facilitating, triggering, and cranking up the organizational variation-selection-retention 
mechanism (cfr. Lovas & Goshal, 2000). Although our study provides insights into 
deliberate strategic mechanisms fostering variation, research on the specific selection and 
retention processes (e.g. screening, budgeting, planning) used in the creation of strategic 
innovation initiatives could complement our study. Whereas research indicates that 
cognitive hurdles prevail in reorientation (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003a,b), other hurdles 
(such as resource allocation and political hurdles) may hinder the actual implementation 
and roll-out of initiatives. In this respect, our research results may be considerably 
enriched by case study research providing deeper insights into the processes firms rely on 
when selecting, implementing and commercializing strategic innovation initiatives.  
Such process studies may also validate our tentative propositions regarding the existence 
of transformation platforms and complementary strategies to manage ambidexterity in the 
different innovation stages. We think valuable knowledge may be generated when these 
research projects build upon existing knowledge from the domain of corporate and 
strategic entrepreneurship (see also Baden-Fuller, 1995). Furthermore, process insights 
could be borrowed from the strategic renewal and change literature to help open up the 
‘black box’ of strategic innovation journeys (Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
In this respect, we also see value in the incorporation of the effects of organizational 
politics on the selection and retention of strategic innovation initiatives.  For example, 
Lawrence et al. (2005) have argued that the processes that lead a selection of new ideas to 
effective organizational action considerably depend on the political will and skill of the 
individuals involved. Jarzabkowski (2004: 540) has taken up a more radical position, 
asserting that: “path creation or change may be viewed as an essentially political process 
since it involves the mobilization of goals, authority structures, technology, and 
stakeholders”. This does not imply that power necessarily comprises a dysfunctional 
aspect, yet, if certain types of power are over- or underdeveloped this may lead to 
dysfunctional organizational behaviors. For example, Lawrence et al. (2005) distinguish 
between episodic (e.g., sponsors’ and champions’ informal networks and hierarchical 
position) and systemic forces (e.g., compensation or accreditation processes) of power. 
They contend that an underdevelopment of episodic power may inhibit fundamental 
exploration. Accordingly, unbalanced sources of power may disturb the achievement of an 
appropriate exploration/exploitation balance. These viewpoints reflect Winter’s (2000) 
argument that additional factors, such as organizational politics, may determine 
performance heterogeneity although they have little to do with the technical difficulties of 
capability development. 
 
Value appropriation 
Organizational science is concerned with both behavior and performance (Prietula & 
Watson, 2000). Our study targeted exclusively the first aspect. In this way we follow the 
cognitive research tradition on strategic change, by emphasizing aspects of the change 
creation in itself and not its effects in financial terms (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). In 
doing so, we make abstraction as to the economic and financial consequences of choices in 
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the market, i.e. the performance aspects. The latter aspects nevertheless determine the 
ultimate failure or success of strategic innovation initiatives (Prietula & Watson, 2000).  
In other words, we exclusively focused on the ‘value’ dimension of the value-price-cost 
framework (Hoopes et al., 2003). Even though the creation of customer value has been 
considered as cornerstone to a firm’s success, it is insufficient to achieve financial success. 
Despite the wide consensus that customer value drives shareholder value (Payne & Holt, 
2001), customer value is neither a sufficient condition for, nor does it automatically lead to 
shareholder value (Cleland & Bruno, 1996). Even a firm that has created substantially 
superior customer value may not be able to appropriate the economic rents associated with 
this value. Both value creation and value appropriation are hence necessary for achieving a 
competitive advantage, since “Value creation influences the potential magnitude of the 
advantage; value appropriation influences the amount of the advantage the firm is able to 
capture and the length of time the advantage persists” (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003: 64). So 
firms that fail to attach sufficient attention on appropriation are unlikely to reap the 
competitive benefits of their strategic innovation initiatives.  
The importance of new pricing mechanisms for strategic innovation initiatives was 
spontaneously brought up by strategic innovators during the qualitative research phases. 
Strategic pricing of a new offering (its exchange value) may be as important as the creation 
of fundamentally new customer use-value (Sharma et al., 2001). Dutta et al. (2003) 
describe for example Polaroid’s inability to change their pricing processes fit for analog 
cameras (based on films sold) towards the market of digital imaging technology. Pricing 
strategy is also a prominent aspect in Kim & Mauborgne’s (1999, 2000, 2004) 
contributions. Markides (in his publications with Charitou, 2003, 2004) and Christensen et 
al. (2002) stress these same aspects in strategies to scale-up markets for strategic 
innovations. Yet, literature in industrial marketing, management and economics, generally 
assuming that firms can automatically impose the ‘appropriate’ prices, has given only 
scant attention to a firm’s ability to set or change prices (e.g., Hinterhuber, 2004). Dutta et 
al. (2003) however found that the specific organizational processes firms use for setting or 
changing prices are a firm-specific capability that may even create a basis for competitive 
advantage.  
Furthermore, as Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) indicated, although value may be created by 
organizational members, the actual appropriation of value (in monetary terms) is 
determined by the perceived power relationships between economic actors (buyers and 
suppliers). Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) hence attach a more external notion to the issue 
of value appropriation. Mizik & Jacobson (2003) argue that firms that do not have the 
capacity to lower competitive forces are unable to appropriate the value they created. In 
this respect, both the resource-based view of the firm, focusing on internal resource 
idiosyncrasies, and theories of competitive strategy deriving from industrial organization, 
focusing on a firm’s external relationships, each tell half of the story. They complement 
each other in that the resource-based view tackles value creation (use value) and industrial 
organization theory focuses on value capture (exchange value).  
Further research could hence link our insights on strategic innovation (and the creation of 
fundamentally new and superior use value) to the study of industrial bargaining 
relationships. In this way, the assumed relationships between the creation of surplus use 
value and firm profitability could be tested. After all, it is exchange value that determines a 
firm’s profitability, and it is the prospect of profits that motivates firms to innovate (i.e. to 
create value) in the first place.  
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An alternative route is to study the performance effects of strategic innovation strategies. 
Markides & Charitou (2004) developed a measure to indicate perceived success in 
adopting a new business model along nine performance criteria. They assert that although 
self-assessment performance measures may be biased, their reliability has been 
demonstrated as well. When more objective performance measures are used, the time lapse 
between the initiation and performance effects of strategic innovation initiatives should be 
taken into account. Brews & Hunt (1999) found a time lag of 4 years between a new 
strategy and the performance effects that can be attributed to it. To circumvent this 
problem, for firms quoted on the stock exchange, stock market data may be used. Mizik & 
Jacobson (2003) argue that stock market data provide an estimate by financial markets of 
the total expected value of a strategy and are hence a more reliable performance measure 
than the more traditional measures of sales or profits. 
 
The appropriateness of strategic innovation strategies 
Finally, in analogy with for example the literature on organizational learning (Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003), strategic innovation research has left practitioners and researchers with an 
overly normative view of strategic innovation as an exclusively beneficial strategy. Yet, 
strategic innovation is by definition not always inherently superior to the existing play and 
is consequently not the appropriate prescription for every organization; the question of 
being better or being different than competitors depends on the organizations’ history (core 
competences) and the industry’s evolution and dynamism (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Markides, 
2000b). Barr et al. (1992) mention in this respect the probability of making ‘type I-errors’, 
meaning that the considerable expenses in time, effort and costs that strategic innovation 
entails are not always required. Sometimes a nonroutine strategic response is developed 
when a –far less costly– routine response would have sufficed. Barr et al.’s (1992) view 
has later been echoed by Winter (2000, 2003), arguing that even though the investments in 
dynamic capabilities are inefficient if they are not targeted at explicit change efforts, too 
much change may however increase cost burdens as well if the disruption costs outweigh 
the benefits that result from a specific change effort. Thus, if opportunities for competitive 
change are relatively infrequent, firms relying on mere ad hoc problem solving may be at a 
cost advantage over firms that heavily invested in systematic dynamic capabilities. Indeed, 
cost differences in resource deployments determine differential firm performance (Zott, 
2003). Next to the emphasis Hamel & Välikangas (2003) put on increasing the magnitude 
and frequency of strategic transformation, they add that the real trick is to simultaneously 
reduce the investments in it too (i.e. time, expense and emotional energy required to effect 
the transformations). Principles companies can apply to increase their innovation 
efficiency are offered in Hamel & Getz (2004), e.g. a high ratio of radical innovations to 
incremental innovations. Managers should hence pay attention to the trade-offs in making 
investments in dynamic capability development (Ethiraj et al., 2005) and strategic 
innovation capacity. Yet, the costs firms incur to establish new resource configurations are 
often hidden and rarely quantified (Zott, 2003). Winter (2003 : 994-995) maintains: “That 
investing in dynamic capabilities (of whatever order) can be a partial hedge against the 
obsolescence of existing capability, and can sometimes yield relatively sustainable 
advantage, is obvious from the nature of ‘dynamic capability’, as defined here. That this 
cannot be uniformly or inevitably advantageous is equally obvious, from the meaning of 
‘investing’: the thought experiment of raising the costs while holding the gross benefits 
constant makes the net benefit disappear, and certainly the world is capable of turning such 
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a thought experiment into a real experiment. The concept of dynamic capability is a 
helpful addition to the tool kit of strategic analysis, but strategic analysis remains a matter 
of understanding how the idiosyncratic attributes of the individual firm affects its prospects 
in a particular competitive context”. Following this logic Eisenhardt & Martin’s (2000) 
assertion that dynamic capabilities are necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions for 
competitive advantage becomes debatable. Thomas (1996) indicates that industries with 
low levels of dynamic resourcefulness (i.e. the ability to generate new strategic assets) will 
compete in a static way, i.e. based on Porter’s ‘Five Forces’. This same argument has been 
put forward by Kim & Mauborgne (1999), who argue that cost leaders and differentiators 
can still prosper in certain industries. Further research should consequently study the 
appropriateness of strategic innovation strategies, and hence of investments in deliberate 
strategic learning mechanisms. These studies may for example control for the existence of 
industry hypercompetition (for a possible operationalization, see e.g. McNamara et al., 
2003).  
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APPENDIX I.A: STRATEGIC INNOVATION CONTRIBUTIONS 
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 d
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n d
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 d
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 d
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m
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 m
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APPENDIX II: MEASURES OF ALL VARIABLES  
(as used in final web survey, translated from Dutch) 
 
 
1. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
a) Position in supply chain 
Where would you position your business unit (firm) in the supply chain? 
1 
(raw materials) 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
10 
(end customer) 
 
 
 
b) Business unit (firm) type: product or service firm 
Is your business unit (firm) mainly a product or service firm? Please, specify which type of products/services it 
mainly supplies.  
Mainly PRODUCTS?  
 
Wich mainly?  
Mainly SERVICES?   
 
Wich mainly? 
Raw material  Maintenance, Repair & Installation  
Finished materials & semimanufactures  Control (security, technical)  
Machine components & semimanufactures  Transport, Storage & Logistics  
Finished machines & devices  Wholesale & Dealership  
Equipment, Manufacturing supplies & 
Spare material 
 Consultancy, Counseling & Training  
Office supplies  Other...  
Finished consumer products  
Other …  
 
c) Business unit (firm) size: 
How many people does your  business unit (firm) employ (in FTEs)?  
Less than 100   
100-199  
200-499  
More than 500  
I don’t know exactly  
 
 
II. BASIC CONSTRUCTS 
 
a) Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for recognition (recog) 
recog1 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to focus our 
market research more on future customer needs than on 
current customer needs. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog2 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to detect 
fundamental changes in our industry (e.g. technology, 
competitors, regulation). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog3 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to study the 
likely effect that changes in our business environment will 
have on our customers  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog4 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to frequently 
collect and evaluate general macro-economical information 
(e.g. interest rate, exchange rate, GDP, industry growth rate, 
inflation). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
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recog5 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to maintain 
contacts with officials of government and regulatory bodies 
(e.g.  Ministery of Economic affairs, Chambers of 
Commerce) in order to collect and evaluate pertinent 
information.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog6 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to collect and 
evaluate information concerning general social trends (e.g. 
environmental consciousness)  that might affect our business 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog7 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to study the 
behavior of our customers throughout the different 
experience stages of our product/service (e.g. search, 
purchase, use, disposal). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog8 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to reveal 
trends in the behavior of our customers throughout the 
different experience stages of our product/service  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Recog9 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to study how 
the different features of our products/services meet the needs 
of our customers throughout the different experience stages 
of our product/service  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog10 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to consult 
innovative customers for new, interesting business ideas.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
recog11 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to focus our 
market research on other industries as well.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Recog12 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to retrieve 
information about the needs of the end customer. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Recog13 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to gain a well-
founded insight into the reasons why our non-customers 
aren’t our customers. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
b) Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for assimilation (assim) 
Assim1 R We do not use any general mechanisms that stimulate us to 
share our critical reflections about our customers/market 
with each other.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Assim2 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to frequently 
discuss the assumptions that we have about our customers.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Assim3 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to frequently 
discuss the assumptions that we have about our market(s). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Assim4 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to keep alive 
past critical reflections about our customers/market.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Assim5 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to frequently 
discuss the assumptions that we have about all aspects of our 
market(ing) approach. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Assim6 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to 
systematically file our critical reflections about 
customers/market (e.g. in a data base, on the intranet).  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
c) Deliberate strategic learning mechanisms for transformation (transf) 
Trans1 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to adapt the  
organizational structure to better cater the needs of a 
(planned) new offering  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Trans2 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to replace our 
skills (competencies) to better cater the needs of a (planned) 
new offering 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Trans3 R We do not use any general mechanisms that stimulate us to 
prevent chaos in view of a (planned) new offering 
 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
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Trans4 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to support new 
projects, even if they possibly may take away from sales of 
existing products/services 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Trans5 R We do not use any general mechanisms that stimulate us to 
adapt our procedures to better cater the needs of a (planned) 
new offering. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Trans6 We use general mechanisms that stimulate us to change our 
ways of working to better cater the needs of a (planned) new 
offering 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
d) Strategic innovation capacity (explo) 
To create new and substantially superior customer, we take, in comparison to our competitors: 
Explo1 ... more initiatives to collaborate in an untraditional 
way (i.e. unusual in our industry) with parties in our 
supply chain, such as suppliers or customers.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo2 ... more initiatives to collaborate in an untraditional way (i.e. 
unusual in our industry) with parties outside our supply chain 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo3 ... more initiatives to change the traditional roles and 
relationships in our industry 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo4 ... more initiatives to change our business model  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo5 ... more initiatives to create a market approach that is 
unusual in our industry   
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo6 ... more initiatives to break the traditional power 
relationships among the different parties in the supply 
chain   
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Explo7 R ... fewer initiatives to deviate from the traditional rules 
of the game 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
III. MODERATORS 
 
a) Innovativeness (innovat) 
Cult1 When it comes to problem solving, we value creative new 
solutions more than the solutions of conventional wisdom. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult2 Top managers here encourage the development of innovative 
marketing strategies, knowing well that some will fail 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult3 We frequently try out new ideas.  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult4 We always look for new ways to do things  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult5 We are creative in our methods of operation  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
b) Risk taking attitude (risktak) 
Cult6 R We value the orderly and risk-reducing management process 
more highly than leadership initiatives for change. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult7 R Top managers in this BU (firm) like to “play it safe”  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult8 R Top managers around here like to implement plans only if 
they are very certain that they will work. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Cult9 R Innovation in our BU (firm) is perceived as too risky and is 
resisted.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
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c) Crossfunctional dissemination of market information (crossf) 
crossf1 
 
Marketing personnel spends time discussing customers’ 
future needs with other functional departments. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 2 Our BU (firm) periodically circulates documents (e.g. 
reports, newsletters) that provide information on our 
customers. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 3 We have cross-functional meetings very often to discuss 
market trends and developments (e.g. customers, 
competition, suppliers) 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 4 We regularly have interdepartmental meetings to update our 
knowledge of regularly requirements. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 5 Technical people in this BU (firm) spend a lot of time 
sharing information about technology for new products with 
other departments 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 6 Market information spreads quickly through all levels in this 
BU(firm) 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 7 Top managers frequently meet to discuss customer trends.  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 8 Ideas to improve customer satisfaction are openly shared at 
all levels in this BU (firm). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
crossf 9 When planning new or changed products/services, we use a 
team approach that involves all functional areas 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
d) information provision by customers (infocus) 
Nwinfo1 Through our working relationships with customers we obtain 
general information about the market.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinfo2 Through our working relationships with customers we obtain 
general information about our competitors.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinfo3 Through our working relationships with customers we obtain 
general information about other relevant third organizations. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
e) Information provision by suppliers (infosup) 
Nwinfo1 Through our working relationships with suppliers we obtain 
general information about the market.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinfo2 Through our working relationships with suppliers we obtain 
general information about our competitors.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinfo3 Through our working relationships with suppliers we obtain 
general information about other relevant third organizations. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
f) Formalization (form) 
struct1 R I feel that I am my boss in most matters.  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
struct2 R A person can make his own decisions without checking with 
anyone else. 
 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
struct3 The employees are constantly being checked for rule 
violations. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
Appendix II 
 303
g) Centralization 
struct4 There can be little action taken here until a supervisor 
approves a decision. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
struct5 A person who wants to take his own decision would be 
quickly discouraged here 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
struct6 Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up 
for a final answer. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
struct7 I have to ask my boss before I do almost anything  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
h) Innovation stimulus from customers (innocus) 
nwinno1 Our customer relationships lead to the joint development of 
production processes. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
nwinno2 Our customer relationships lead to the joint development of 
new products/services 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
nwinno3 Our customer relationships lead to the adoption of new 
technologies 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
nwinno4 Our customer relationships lead to prototype testing.  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
nwinno5 Our customer relationships lead to the joint introduction of 
new concepts.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
nwinn11 R We explicitly have to pay attention to customer education.  1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno14  Customers reward us when we invest in them; they seldom 
show free-rider behavior. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
 
i) Innovation stimulus from suppliers (innosup) 
Nwinno6 Our supplier relationships lead to the joint development of 
production processes. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno7 Our supplier relationships lead to the joint development of 
new products/services 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno8 Our supplier relationships lead to the adoption of new 
technologies 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno9 Our supplier relationships lead to the joint introduction of 
new concepts.  
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
 
j) Supply chain climate (chainclim) 
nwinno10 R 
 
We are hostile against some parties in the supply chain since 
they systematically prevent us from developing or launching 
new concepts 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno12 R 
 
We have hostile relationships with parties before and after us 
in the supply chain. 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno13 R 
 
We feel quite unaccustomed vis-à-vis other parties in the 
supply chain 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
Nwinno15 R 
 
Due to hostility or opportunism, collaborations in the supply 
chain are often ad hoc (opportunity driven). 
 1    2   3    4   5  
     
n/a 
  
R= reversely coded item 
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APPENDIX III: SUMMARIZED FINDINGS OF QUAL2 PER INDUSTRY 
Table A: Functional Food industry: independent variables 
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Table A (ctd.): Functional food industry: critical internal & external factors 
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Table B: Truck & Trailer industry: Independent variables 
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Table B (ctd.): Truck & Trailer industry: critical internal & external factors 
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Table C (ctd.): Graphics printing industry: critical internal & external factors 
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Table D: Traffic Management Systems industry: Independent variables 
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Table D (ctd.): TMS industry: critical internal & external factors 
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Table E: Energy industry (electricity): Independent variables 
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Table E (ctd.): Energy industry (electricity): critical internal & external factors 
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APPENDIX IV: ASSUMPTION CHECK EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSES 
 
Assumption check separate EFAs: 
• Sample sizes of all EFAs met the cases-to-indicator ratio of 5:1 (Iacobucci, 1994). 
Furthermore, the minimum sample size was above 150, which is considered as 
‘fair’ (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c; Iacobucci, 1994). Missing values were 
pairwise deleted. 
• Normality: The EFA solution is enhanced when data are normally distributed. 
Since no statistical inference is used here, if data fail to meet this criterion the 
solution may be degraded but is still useful (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c: 588). 
(Univariate) normality was assessed by skewness and kurtosis, by histograms, by 
normal probability plots and by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality. 
Many variables showed a mild skewness (values of -1 to +1) or kurtosis (values 
of -1 to +1) in different directions, which is not problematic as statistical 
inference was not used (Heck, 1998). However, nwinfo1was more seriously 
negatively skewed and positively kurtotic. Also, nwinn12 was negatively skewed. 
Overall, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that all variables failed in 
normality (p < 0.05), and since the direction of skewness differed among 
variables the EFA solution may be weakened (because of lower correlations). 
Nonetheless, we decided not to transform the data since main analyses would be 
run through PLS, which does not assume data normality (not inference-based). 
Transforming data only in order to optimize the EFA results (which on top can 
cope relatively well with non-normality) is not worth the disadvantages of 
transformation, such as changing existing and validated scales and hampering 
interpretation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001b; Allison, 1998). 
• Linearity: Since correlations (on which the EFA is based) only take linear 
relationships into account, the solution is degraded when linearity fails 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). Linearity was examined by the inspection of 
scatter plots. Variables appeared to be more or less linearly related so that a 
suboptimal solution may be possible. (Skewness in different directions did 
however not lead to curvilinear relationships among the variables). 
• Outliers: Since univariate and multivariate outliers may distort solutions, they 
were removed from the analysis (see section 5.1.3). In order to make full use of 
all available data, for the separate EFAs we did not remove the previously 
identified multivariate outliers among all constructs, but we identified 
multivariate outliers among the indicators per construct domain (because the 
separate EFAs were restricted to a specific construct domain). Mahalanobis 
distance was calculated by performing a regression analysis with all indicators per 
construct domain as the independent variables and the response number as the 
dependent variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001a). Several multivariate outliers 
were found; for the cultural variables we identified three multivariate outliers, for 
the chain information domain six, for the structural constructs six (and one 
univariate outlier on struct3, as previously indicated, see section 5.1.3), for chain 
innovation stimulus one, for crossfunctional information dissemination none, and 
for the dependent variable three multivariate outliers were found. Further study of 
these outliers (by comparison of the outlier scores to average indicator values of 
the remaining sample) revealed that they represented cases with inconsistent 
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answering patterns among the indicators per construct domain. All these outliers 
(together with the in section 5.1.3 mentioned univariate outliers) were removed 
from the separate EFAs. 
• Factorability was checked by means of the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (H0: 
Correlations are zero). For all EFAs results were significant. Also, the anti-image 
correlation matrix was inspected and showed small values on off-diagonal 
elements. Finally in each EFA the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s measure of sampling 
adequacy largely exceeded the 0.6 lower boundary (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). 
 
First, the appropriateness of the oblique rotation method was examined. For all constructs 
the factor correlations confirmed the appropriateness of an oblique rotation (for the exact 
factor correlations, see Table 5.1, last column). Only, for the constructs of the domain of 
chain innovation stimulus, the correlations were relatively low, only the correlation 
between innocus and innosup was higher (0.341). Since this highest factor correlation is 
still a borderline value the more interpretable orthogonal rotation was chosen for further 
examination.  Factor intercorrelations never exceeded 0.8, meaning that there is no danger 
of too many factors being extracted and a higher-order factor analysis being more 
appropriate (Iacobucci, 1994). 
Then the number of factors to be extracted was decided upon, based on a combination of 
several methods (Heck, 1998). Although we could a priori define the number of factors (= 
number of constructs) per construct domain, we checked this number with the scree test 
(Cattell, 1966) and the Kaizer criterion. The Kaiser-eigenvalue criterion implies that 
factors with eigenvalues greater than one are retained. However, the underlying logic of 
the Kaiser criterion is to maximize variance, which is not the goal of FA. In addition, this 
rule does not always perform well empirically; in PCA often too few components are 
extracted and in FA it can result in too many (Iacobucci, 1994). Overall results of the three 
methods indicated that the hypothesized number of factors could be retained in the 
analysis. 
As all manifest variables would account for 100% of the common variance, the goal is to 
account for as much common variance as possible with the fewest number of factors 
(Heck, 1998). Consequently, the proportion of variance extracted (of each factor and of all 
factors as a group) was examined and proved satisfactory in all factor solutions.  
Finally, once the number of factors was examined, loadings and communalities could be 
studied. A measured variable’s communality is its total variance minus its uniqueness; 
communality comprises the variance caused by common factors, which are shared with 
other measured variables (Iacobucci, 1994). So the communality of a manifest variable is 
its variance accounted for by the factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c). Communality is 
calculated by summing the squares of the loadings of the indicators on all factors. Since 
clear cut-off values for communality are lacking in the literature, evaluation of 
communality is a relatively subjective act (Wijnen et al., 2002).  
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Assumption check joint EFA: 
• Sample size did not meet the cases-to-indicator ratio of 5:1 (Iacobucci, 1994) as 
45 items were entered in a FA on 182 cases. However, when there are several 
high loading variables (which could be expected since measures had already been 
refined based on the results of the separate EFAs) a smaller sample size, of for 
example 150, is considered as adequate (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001c; Iacobucci, 
1994). Missing values were pairwise deleted. 
• Normality: cfr. results of separate EFAs 
• Linearity: Given the number of variables, inspection of all pairwise scatter plots 
was not possible. We ran a spot check on a few plots which were expected to be 
the worst (those with the most discrepant distributions; e.g., skewed versus 
normal distribution, or negatively versus positively skewed). These plots did not 
reveal any serious linearity problems.  
• All outliers identified in section 5.1.3 on data cleaning (i.e., the univariate outlier 
and the multivariate outliers among all indicators and constructs) were discarded. 
• Factorability was checked by means of Bartlett's test of sphericity (p<0.000), 
inspection of the anti-image correlation matrix and by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's 
measure of sampling adequacy (0.756). Results proved satisfactory. 
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APPENDIX V: POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE MODERATOR ANALYSES 
 
In short, with any statistical test, the researcher runs the risk of two kinds of mistakes: 
rejection of H0 when in fact it is true (type I error), or acceptance of H0 when in fact it is 
false (type II error) (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994). The probability of making a type I 
error is expressed in the α-level the researcher chooses (e.g. 0.01). The probability of 
making a type II error is denoted as β. The complement of β indicates the probability of 
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis and is known as the power of the test (1-β) 
(Reynolds & Diamantopoulos, 1996). Reporting statistical power is especially important 
when the statistical analysis does not reject the null hypothesis (i.e. when an insignificant 
effect is found) (Cook & Campbell, 1979). This is because an insignificant result can 
appear because a true relationship is absent, but can also be due to the sample being too 
weak to detect a reasonably sized (e.g. with a 0.95 confidence interval) effect (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). Larger sample sizes reduce sampling error in that their estimates better 
approximate the population parameters, which results in higher statistical power. However, 
although the high power of a large sample size increases the probability of a rejection of 
the null hypothesis, it does not necessarily increase the probability of valid rejection 
(Sawyer & Peter, 1983). Hence, results are less reliable when the test is significant and 
power is high (because a trivial misspecification may cause the rejection of H0), or when 
the test result is non-significant and power is low (because a priori the chances of finding 
significant results were very low) (Saris et al., 1987). However in the context of SEM, 
power levels have been reported only seldom (Saris et al., 1987).  
Since sample sizes are considerably reduced in a median-split analysis, running the risk of 
making type I errors is reduced, while the chance of type II errors is increased. In other 
words, significant results of the subgroup analyses would be very reliable, while 
insignificant results would be less fail-proof. The latter risk made it necessary to first 
check sample sizes for adequate power levels before subgroup analyses could be 
interpreted.  
 
We adopted sample size-rules developed for multiple regression analysis, as PLS rests on 
simple and multiple regressions (see chapter 3). 
Green (1991) severely criticized the application of over-simplified rules of thumb that are 
based on a minimum ratio of number of cases to number of predictors (e.g., Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001b; Harris, 1975). Relying on the power-analytical work by Cohen (1988), 
Green (1991) proposed two more complex rules of thumb (one for R2s, and one for beta 
coefficients), as a function of the number of predictors and of effect sizes as well. Both 
these rules determine the required sample size for an alpha level of 0.05 and a power level 
of 0.8. He uses 0.05 and 0.8 based on Cohen (1988). Cohen (1988) argues that the relative 
risk of making a type I and type II error can be expressed as a 4 to 1 ratio. Setting the alpha 
level on 0.05 implies that the probability of a type II error should be set at 0.2 (0.05*4), or 
at a power level of 0.8. He considers a power level of 0.8 as appropriate for the behavioral 
sciences (Green, 1991).  
We first applied Green’s (1991) formula for the multiple correlation of SIcap. Although 
Cohen (1988) based his power analysis on medium effect sizes, Green (1991) advises 
researchers to not blindly follow this guideline but to consider the magnitude of the effect 
envisioned in their study.  Since the R2 of SIcap in the hypothesized model was large 
(0,353 see section 5.3.3.2) a large effect size (>0.26) could be expected here as well. 
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Applying Green’s (1991: 504) formula for a large effect-size led to a minimum sample 
requirement of 39 cases for the subgroups.  
In the formula for the partial correlations, the largest multiple regression involved in the 
PLS model was considered: the multiple regression to compute the weights of the recog 
indicators. (This largest multiple regression could not be considered to apply the formula 
for multiple correlations since recog, being an exogenous variable in the model, does not 
yield an R2 value in the PLS analysis). If we base ourselves on the results of the formative 
indicators in the hypothesized model (section 5.3.3.1), a medium-large (0.13-0.26) effect 
size could be expected. Green’s (1991: 507) formula resulted in a minimum subgroup 
sample size of 31 for a large effect, and 60 for a medium-sized effect.  
We then selected the largest result of both formulas (39 versus 31-60) as the minimum 
sample size requirement for the moderator study (Green, 1991).  
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Globalisering van de economie en een toename van technologische innovatie hebben ertoe 
geleid dat de structuur in veel industrieën regelmatig verandert. Lagere toetredingsbarrières 
maken ruimte voor agressieve nieuwe toetreders op de markt (McNamara et al., 2003). 
Hierdoor verhoogt de concurrentiedruk, en afspraken tussen bestaande spelers vervagen 
langzaamaan (D’Aveni, 1995a). Bedrijven voelen zich bedreigd, en in een wanhopige 
poging om hun eigen marktaandeel beschermen, trachten ze vooral om marktaandeel van 
hun rechtstreekse concurrenten af te snoepen (Markides, 1999a). Met het oog op snelle 
winsten, zoeken ze alle hun toevlucht in dezelfde wapens:  kostenverlagingen, 
kwaliteitsverbeteringen of beide tegelijkertijd. Omdat ze elkaar bestrijden met dezelfde 
middelen ontstaat op de duur een heftige prijsoncurrentie (Larsen et al., 2003), waardoor 
marges en winsten gevoelig dalen (D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994). Dit fenomeen wordt 
‘hyperconcurrentie’ genoemd (D’Aveni, 1995a).  
Bovendien merken vele bedrijven dat hun producten en services sneller commodities 
worden (Rangan & Bowman, 1992). Om zich te differentiëren zoeken ze naar drastischere 
manieren dan incrementele productaanpassingen (Styles & Goddard, 2004; Day & 
Montgomery, 1999).  
Ook in industrieën die minder onderhevig zijn aan technologische innovaties, aan 
internationale concurrentiedruk of aan klanten die steeds veeleisender worden, vertonen 
bedrijven de neiging om strategieën te volgen die gelijkaardig zijn aan deze van 
concurrenten. Omdat managers beperkt zijn in hun vermogen om informatie te verwerken, 
gebruiken ze mentale structuren die hen helpen om omgevingsinformatie eenvoudiger en 
duidelijker te maken (Porac & Thomas, 1990). Door de sociale interacties binnen een 
industrie ontstaan er zo ook op industrieniveau een aantal gedeelde overtuigen over wie ‘de 
concurrent’ is en hoe men het best kan concurreren (Huff, 1982; Spender, 1989; Sutcliffe 
& Huber, 1998). Deze overtuigingen worden zelden of niet in vraag gesteld en bedrijven 
maken hun strategieën consistent met deze overtuigingen, waardoor die op zich nog meer 
ingeworteld geraken. Deze spiraal maakt het erg moeilijk voor individuele bedrijven om 
los te breken uit het concurrentierecept van hun industrie (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; 
Johnson & Hoopes, 2003; Porac et al., 1989). 
 
De vaststelling van deze tendensen wekte de interesse van academici op voor een soort van 
innovatie die fundamenteel ‘ontwrichtend’ is. Managementonderzoekers raden bedrijven 
aan om radicaal af te wijken van de bestaande conventies in hun industrie, en om een 
fundamenteel nieuw en ander concurrentiespel te spelen (Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). 
Een dergelijk nieuw concurrentiespel is uiteraard enkel zinvol als het ook nieuwe en méér 
waarde aan de klant biedt (Miller & Chen, 1996).  Dit soort innovatie wordt ‘strategische 
innovatie’ genoemd (Markides, 1997, 1998). Dit is het type innovatie dat wij 
onderzochten.  
Onderzoekers hebben bovendien aangetoond dat het duurzaam concurrentievoordeel dat 
bedrijven kunnen realiseren met één enkele ‘one shot’ strategische innovatie, beperkt is 
(Govindarajan & Gupta, 2001). Daarom raden ze bedrijven aan om portfolio’s van 
meerdere strategische-innovatie-experimenten uit te werken (bij voorbeeld om risico te 
beheersen). We bestudeerden bijgevolg de capaciteit van bedrijven om systematisch 
strategische-innovatie-initiatieven te kunnen creëren: ‘strategische-innovatiecapaciteit’. 
Meer bepaald gingen we op zoek naar specifieke mechanismen die managers doelbewust 
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kunnen opzetten om de strategische-innovatiecapaciteit van hun business unit of bedrijf te 
verhogen. 
De keuze voor dit onderzoeksonderwerp reflecteert uiteraard onze interesse voor dit soort 
innovatie, alsook ons geloof in de waarde ervan in bepaalde omstandigheden. Echter, we 
kunnen op basis van dit onderzoek geen normatieve uitspraken doen of strategische-
innovatiestrategie altijd, overal, en voor elk bedrijf een aangewezen strategie is.  
 
Het onderstaande schema geeft weer hoe we dit onderzoek uitvoerden.  
 
Figuur: Onderzoeksopzet 
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De figuur geeft weer dat de studie is opgebouwd uit een conceptueel (links) en een 
emprisch luik (rechts).  
 
De box uiterst links in de figuur geeft de conceptuele studie aan. Het onderzoek rond 
strategische innovatie, en zeker dit rond aansturingsmechanismen voor strategische-
innovatiecapaciteit, staat nog in zijn kinderschoenen. Vooraleer we dit soort van innovatie 
dus empirisch konden onderzoeken, dienden we eerst een aantal begrippen goed af te 
bakenen. De conceptuele studie bestond uit twee grote delen.  
Ten eerste bestaat er in de literatuur nog steeds geen duidelijke omschrijving en definiëring 
van het concept ‘strategische innovatie’. Daarom onderzochten we de literatuur rond 
strategische innovatie en rond gelijkaardige concepten. Op basis van een vergelijkende 
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studie van al deze bijdragen, konden we bepaalde patronen afleiden en uiteindelijk een 
definitie voor strategische innovatie(capaciteit) ontwikkelen.  
Eens we het concept duidelijk afgebakend hadden, zetten we onze zoektocht voort naar 
specifieke managementmechanismen die strategische-innovatiecapaciteit zouden kunnen 
stimuleren. We argumenteren dat de integratie van bepaalde theoretische concepten mooie 
perspectieven biedt. Voortbouwend op inzichten uit recente literatuur rond routines konden 
we uiteindelijk mechanismen achterhalen die bedrijven doelbewust kunnen opzetten ter 
verhoging van hun strategische-innovatiecapaciteit. Deze zijn semi-gestructureerd. Er 
bestaan drie categorieën van deze mechanismen: mechanismen die een bedrijf stimuleren 
om beter marktinformatie te herkennen (herkenningscapaciteit), mechanismen om beter 
deze herkende informatie te assimileren (assimilatiecapaciteit), en tenslotte mechanismen 
die het bedrijf ertoe aanzetten om gemakkelijker op basis van deze geassimileerde 
informatie te handelen (transformatiecapaciteit). 
 
Het empirisch luik bestaat uit drie grote delen: twee kwalitatieve en een kwantitatief 
onderzoek. Het kwalitatieve gedeelte richt zich tot vijf Nederlandse industriële sectoren: 
energie, printing, trucks & trailers, functionele voeding en verkeersbeheersingssystemen. 
In het eerste kwalitatieve onderzoek (QUAL1) selecteerden we ‘echte’ strategische-
innovatie-initiatieven en ‘echte’ strategische innovatoren. ‘Echte’ betekent dat we de 
initiatieven die recent ondernomen werden in de vijf onderzochte sectoren, stelselmatig 
vergeleken met de heersende concurrentie-opvattingen in deze sectoren. We onderzochten 
hiertoe vak- en industrietijdschriften, namen 12 explorerende interviews af en hielden een 
discussiegroep met 11 managers uit deze sectoren. Per sector werd er ook een focusgroup 
(5 in totaal) gehouden waarin alle partijen in de keten vertegenwoordigd waren. Tenslotte 
werden er ook nog 28 bijkomende ‘expert’-interviews afgenomen.  
De geselecteerde ‘echte’ strategische-innovatie-initiatieven en ‘echte’ strategische 
innovatoren werden verder bestudeerd in de tweede kwalitatieve fase (QUAL2). Opnieuw 
werden focusgroepen georganiseerd en we interviewden 18 strategische innovatoren en 
hun klanten. Op basis van QUAL2 kregen we een eerste beeld over de kenmerken van de 
aansturingsmechanismen. 
Deze voorlopige bevindingen werden statistisch getest op een representatieve steekproef 
van alle Nederlandse industriële bedrijven. Voor de interpretatie van onze resultaten 
steunden we enerzijds op bestaand onderzoek en ook werden de gegevens van QUAL2 
opnieuw bestudeerd. Hiermee kwamen we tot de finale bevindingen van ons onderzoek.  
 
Onze resultaten tonen dat ‘doelbewust opgezette mechanismen voor strategisch leren’ 
aanzienlijk de strategische-innovatie-capaciteit van een bedrijf beïnvloeden. Wat betreft 
mechanismen voor herkenningscapaciteit, wijzen onze resultaten op het belang van een 
hechte relatie met de klant. Aandachtig luisteren naar klanten en het goed bestuderen van 
de manier waarop zij de producten en diensten die een bedrijf aanbiedt in hun eigen 
businessprocessen gebruiken, kunnen leiden tot ideeën voor nieuwe waardeproposities. 
Het raadplegen van de meest innovatieve klanten voor nieuwe businessideeën blijkt 
bijzonder effectief. Een sterke focus op bestaande klanten maakt een bedrijf niet blind, 
maar tegelijkertijd is het toch belangrijk om ook niet-klanten te bestuderen. Grootschalig 
marktonderzoek en algemeen ‘desk research’ (de traditionele activiteiten van de 
marketingafdeling) zijn ineffectief. Onze bevindingen wijzen vooral op een nieuwe, 
verrijkte rol voor account management en alle ‘mensen in het veld’ (bv. service engineers) 
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als informatie- en idee-antennes. Ook voor marketingafdelingen brengt onze studie 
interessante resultaten. 
Wat betreft herkenningscapaciteit blijkt het bediscussiëren van, en het collectief reflecteren 
op, de assumpties die het bedrijf heeft over zijn markt en klanten cruciaal. Deze discussies 
moeten bovendien meerder bedrijfsfuncties betrekken; voornamelijk sales, marketing en 
business unit management blijken hierin een centrale rol te vervullen. Het coderen en 
opslaan van inzichten in databanken of op het intranet levert geen resultaten op. Deze 
informatie wordt immers zelden gebruikt. Hieruit kunnen belangrijke lessen getrokken 
worden voor het opzetten van kennismanagementprogramma’s en de neiging die bedrijven 
vertonen om “information-rich, but interpretation-poor systems” te worden (Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1995: 6) . 
Wat betreft het stimuleren van transformatiecapaciteit is vooral het veranderen van de 
bedrijfsstructuur belangrijk. Onze resultaten suggereren de waarde van aparte units voor de 
effectieve implementatie van strategische-innovatie-initiatieven. Vaak worden mensen 
intern uit het bedrijf tijdelijk of half-time gedetacheerd naar deze units. Bovendien vergen 
strategische-innovatie-initaitieven geen fundamenteel nieuwe bedrijfscompetenties, maar 
creëren bedrijven een hefboomeffect door hun bestaande competenties anders in te zetten 
of ze te combineren met de competenties van andere (industrie-vreemde) bedrijven in 
allianties. 
 
Onze resultaten wijzen er bovendien op dat de effectiviteit van deze drie categorieën van 
mechanismen een ongekeerde piramide vormt. Met andere woorden, deze mechanismen 
bouwen op elkaar voort. De effectiviteit van mechanismen voor herkenningscapaciteit zal 
pas ten volle benut kunnen worden als ook mechanismen voor assimilatie en transformatie 
worden toegepast. Hetzelfde geldt voor de relatie tussen assimilatie- en 
transformatiemechanismen. De effectiviteit van deze mechanismen is echter ook 
afhankelijk van bepaalde organisatie-eigenschappen. Zo zal bijvoorbeeld een innovatieve 
bedrijfscultuur de effectiviteit van de drie categorieën van mechanismen verhogen, terwijl 
het opzetten van assimilatie- en transformatie-mechanismen dan weer niet zinvol blijkt in 
een gecentraliseerde structuur.  Bovendien zijn er ook een aantal eigenschappen van de 
externe bedrijfsketen waarin een bedrijf actief is, die de effectiviteit van deze 
mechanismen bepalen. Zo zal bijvoorbeeld een niet-vijandig ketenklimaat (geen 
vijandigheid in de verticale relaties, dus tussen een bedrijf en zijn klanten en leveranciers) 
de effectiviteit van transformatie-mechanismen doen afnemen.  
 
Bovendien blijken mechanismen voor herkenning en assimilatie effectiever dan deze voor 
transformatie. Vooral het stimuleren van assimilatiecapaciteit heeft een erg groot effect op 
de strategische-innovatiecapaciteit van een bedrijf. Dit zou kunnen betekenen dat het 
gemakkelijker is om cognitieve verandering aan te sturen dan een gedragsverandering. 
Onze resultaten suggereren ook dat het erg belangrijk is deze herkenningscapaciteit en 
assimilatiecapaciteit in de gewone bedrijfsvoering in te bedden. Ideeën voor strategische-
innovatie-capaciteit ontstaan in en tijdens de ‘gewone’ business. Op basis van dit resultaat 
kunnen we de waarde van aparte business development- en marketingafdelingen voor het 
initiëren van nieuwe strategische-innovatie-initiatieven in twijfel trekken. Daarentegen lijkt 
het aangewezen om de effectieve implementatie van initiatieven wél in aparte units te laten 
gebeuren. Deze units opereren op de markt onder aparte merknamen. Deze afgezonderde 
units beperken het risico en verhinderen mogelijke chaos in de organisatie. Met betrekking 
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tot dit laatste, lijkt ook het gebruik van blauwdruk-patronen erg waardevol; blauwdruk-
patronen beschrijven mogelijke procesveranderingen vooraf, maar laten de mogelijkheid 
tot context-specifieke invulling in de concrete uitvoering.    
 
Algemeen draagt ons onderzoek bij aan managementtheorie door de verfijning en 
integratie van verschillende strategische concepten. Managementtheorie is bovendien vaak 
bekritiseerd voor haar hoge abstractieniveau. Wij maakten sommige van de ‘vage’ 
theoretische managementconcepten zeer ‘tastbaar’ en vertaalden ze naar concrete 
bedrijfsprocessen. Onze resultaten bevestigen bovendien recente inzichten rond ‘strategic 
choice’ theorie (bv. Child, 1997). Managers kunnen zeer bewust strategische keuzes 
maken, en de strategische richting die een bedrijf opgaat wordt niet volledig bepaald door 
zijn geschiedenis (evolutionary economics) of de industrie waarin het opereert (population 
ecology). Managers kunnen door het opzetten van de juiste mechanismen de 
innovatiecapaciteit van hun bedrijf gedeeltelijk ‘kneden’ en kunnen dus ook de 
strategische-innovatiecapaciteit van een bedrijf doelbewust stimuleren. Echter, een bedrijf 
is niet volledig plastisch en de mechanismen die het management inzet werken niet op ‘een 
wit blad’.  
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tion tendencies they are confronted with. In recent years, management
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new and superior customer value. Yet, research on this kind of inno-
vation is still in its infancy. Even though the phenomenon of strategic
innovation did arouse (marketing) managers’ interest, academia has
so far been unable to provide managers with concrete handles they
may use to stimulate their firm’s capacity for strategic innovation.
Moreover, insights have been supported mainly by examples or anec-
dotes, and contributions tend to lack scientific rigor and corroboration
despite their promising ideas. 
This book is hence motivated by a scientific quest for any mechanisms
firms can use to deliberately crank up their strategic innovation capa-
city. It builds on insights from the management literature, integrates
several theoretical concepts and translates them into concrete business
practice. The book reports the results of qualitative and quantitative
empirical studies of Dutch industrial firms. Evidence is provided that
the establishment of specific managerial mechanisms may indeed foster
a firm’s strategic innovation capacity. The book distinguishes several
categories of mechanisms, specifies what elements these mechanisms
should target, how different mechanisms work in concert and finally,
what effects organizational and supply chain characteristics may
produce on the effectiveness of these mechanisms.
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